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Dictionary of
**INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS**



PENGUIN REFERENCE

The Penguin Dictionary of
**INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS**

Graham Evans
Jeffrey Newnham



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PENGUIN REFERENCE

The Penguin Dictionary of International Relations

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A fo ben, bid bont

He who would be a leader, let him be a bridge
(Old Welsh proverb)

PREFACE

The end of the Cold War proved traumatic for practitioners and theorists of International Relations (IR) alike. For over forty-five years after the end of World War II, the East–West conflict was regarded as the central factor in international affairs. Few areas of the world escaped its baleful influence in terms of either their domestic dispositions or their diplomatic orientations. Certainly in the dominant Anglo–American tradition of thinking and acting in foreign affairs, everything else seemed subordinate to it. That the Cold War lens afforded an extremely myopic and distorted view of international relations is now being gradually (though sometimes grudgingly) acknowledged: both by academic specialists in IR for whom the discipline has in an important sense been liberated and by foreign policy elites for whom this confrontational behavioural paradigm had achieved the status of an unquestioned ‘grundnorm’ from which virtually all policies and perspectives logically flowed. In the early 1990s this deceptively simplistic policy and ideational framework disappeared resulting in widespread uncertainty on the campus and in the chancellery about foreign policy agendas and the ranking of priorities and interests within them. Thus, not only did the end of the Cold War highlight serious shortcomings in the discipline of IR itself, it also robbed it of much of its empirical rationale since the main actors and problems it identified were located within the discourse of the Cold War standoff and its implications for the workings of the global system.

With hindsight it is easy to see that the events of the last quarter of 1989 in eastern Europe brought about a revolution in international relations comparable in scope to those of 1815, 1848, 1918 and 1945. That the ‘New World Order’ so confidently predicted by US President George Bush in the wake of the Persian Gulf War did not materialize and was followed instead by a spate of virulent, ethnically based conflicts and the disintegration of established orders, is beside the point: 1989 really did signal a fundamental change in both the scope and domain of world politics. *The Penguin Dictionary of International Relations* was conceived in part as an attempt to capture, record and evaluate the thinking that surrounds these developments and their uncertain aftermath. In this sense it represents a substantial revision of an earlier work (*The Dictionary of World Politics*, Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1989 and 1992). While the format remains the same, the entries and explanations offered are designed to reflect the dramatic changes that have taken place

over the past decade both in the academic discipline of IR and in actual foreign policy formulation and conduct. As with the previous volume, my colleague Jeffrey Newnham was invited to join the project: the idea being that a collaborative approach, particularly in the contested sub-fields of strategic/security studies and international political economy, would greatly strengthen the revisioning and rewriting process. The overall division of responsibility was roughly 60 per cent (GE) and 40 per cent (JDN).

Selection of entries was governed by three main considerations: first, those ideas, theories, concepts and events which we considered essential to any sophisticated understanding of IR (e.g. Diplomacy, International Law, National Interest); second, those which are only likely to be encountered in specialized texts or journals (Unit Veto, Agent-structure, Neorealism) and third, those which indicate developments and shifts of understanding which have greatly affected the subject since the end of the Cold War (Nineteen eighty-nine, Critical theory, Ethnic cleansing). *The Dictionary* has a cross-reference facility. The items preceded by an arrowhead symbol are those which might usefully be followed up to gain a most extensive explanation, or to indicate the family of ideas to which the particular entry belongs. For example, the entry on Realism contains references to ►Thucydides, ►Hobbesian, the ►state, ►state-system, ►power, ►balance of power, ►self-help, ►sovereignty, ►national interest, ►international law, ►international organizations, ►equality, ►high politics, ►great powers, ►anarchy and ►neorealism – all of which, singly or together, should provide the reader with a comprehensive overview of the item in question. At the end of the book a select bibliography is included to acknowledge and follow up sources cited in the text and to aid further study.

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Swansea, September 1997

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A

ABC Weapons ► weapons of mass destruction

ABM Anti-ballistic missile. This is a system of interceptor missiles and accompanying ► radar which would seek to defend designated targets against incoming offensive missiles. Until the ► Strategic Defence Initiative of the 1980s, it was always assumed that an ABM system could most effectively be deployed as a 'point' defence of 'hard' targets (e.g. missile silos). However, the systems first mooted in the 1960s were susceptible to various countermeasures, in particular pre-emptive attacks on their radars. Furthermore, the development of multiple independently targeted re-entry vehicles (MIRVs) meant that any system could potentially be saturated by incoming missiles and confused by decoys all carried on one 'bus'. The originally envisaged ABM systems would have intercepted incoming missiles relatively late in their midcourse phase, thus creating the paradox that high-altitude defensive detonations would severely degrade the environment of the defender.

The shortcomings of these earlier systems led to the ABM Treaty of 1972. This limited ABM deployment to two sites: one to protect the capital, the other an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) site. In 1974 a further ► protocol was agreed, limiting ABM deployment to one site. The US system was dismantled in 1975 although the former Soviet Union continued to deploy the Galosh system around Moscow.

The ► technology of space-based defence, developed during the 1980s, implies that some offensive missiles could be destroyed before re-entry into the earth's atmosphere. The significance of the type of system discussed above would therefore be reduced.

Although the ABM Treaty continues to be the cornerstone of the Russian and American nuclear relationship (President Clinton in effect reaffirmed this in 1993 when he killed off President Reagan's SDI programme) the debate concerning strategic vulnerability in the post-► Cold War nuclear age is unresolved. Whereas the Strategic Defence Initiative envisaged astrodome defences of orbiting weapons that could protect entire countries from attack, developments in the 1990s are now much more specific. The US decision to acquire Theatre Missile Defenses (TMDs) – designed to protect troop concentrations, airfields, ports and so on against slower, shorter-range missile strikes – is a good example. For many ► hawks inside and outside the US Administration the 1972 ABM Treaty was 'violative of the US national interest' (Casper Weinberger,

Accidental war

1994) and there is now an urgent need to develop a new long-range multi-site defence system to act as a shield against ballistic missile attacks by ►pariah/rogue states armed with nuclear, chemical or biological weapons capability. How long the ABM Treaty will survive in its present form is clearly a function of threat-perception differences within the American defence establishment.

Accidental war The term may appropriately be used in two senses. First, where ►war occurs literally by 'accident'; thus through some technical malfunction an act of violence occurs which nobody intended. A variation of this might be where, through insubordination or incompetence, an individual or group commits an act of violence, against the intentions of the political ►leadership, which leads to war.

Second, accidental war may occur because one or a number of parties in conflict misread the situation and initiate violence. 'Accident' in this second sense may be seen as a function of ►misperception rather than technical failure or failure in the chain of command. This misperception is particularly likely in periods of ►crisis where time pressure is a situational factor which often accounts for considerable psychological stress among political leaders and their senior advisers. Historians and political scientists have identified the European crisis of the summer of 1914 as exemplifying many of the characteristics of accidental war in both senses used here.

The advent of ►nuclear weapons has greatly increased concern about preventing accidental war. ►Arms control theories and measures have been directed to reduce the incentives to attack and to seek to reassure adversaries, particularly in times of crisis, that they can manage the situation without recourse to war. Attention has also concentrated upon the ►proliferation of all ►weapons of mass destruction and the likelihood that this will increase the dangers of accidental war. ►Crisis management; pre-emption

Accommodation Term much beloved of ►crisis management theorists and practitioners of negotiational ►diplomacy. It refers to the process whereby ►actors in ►conflict agree to recognize some of the others' claims while not sacrificing their basic interests. The source of conflict is not removed but the ►aggression it often generates is presumed to be. It assumes that international conflict is not ►zero-sum, where the gain of one party is automatically the loss of the other. It also assumes that total ►harmony of interests does not prevail. Thus, it can be described as a halfway house (place of 'accommodation') between confrontation and harmony. The term is normally used in association with 'interests' and as such is not without sophistry.

ACP The African/Caribbean and Pacific states. ACP is ►European Union shorthand for those states in the ►Third World, some of whom are also members of the ►Commonwealth, that have negotiated a special ►aid and ►trade regime with the EU. These arrangements have a long history going back to 1963

when eighteen states, known as Associated African States and Madagascar (AASM), signed the Yaoundé Convention with the original six members of the European Economic Community (European Community). The Yaoundé Convention was supplanted by the Lomé Convention in 1975 following the accession of the UK to the community. Lomé has been renewed on a regular basis since its inception and is currently in its fourth revision. Membership has expanded from the founding eighteen to seventy states at the same time. The ACP system has its own institutions which mirror those of the Union: a Council of Ministers, Committee of Ambassadors and Joint Assembly. The existence of a directly elected European Parliament since 1979 has potentially enhanced the democratization of Community aid and trade policy under Lomé.

The ACP/Lomé regime was designed for an era when the conventional wisdom about development was attuned to the compensatory version of economic liberalism. The Lomé states' share of the European market has been reduced substantially since 1975; moreover, the ACP countries are in the unenviable position of needing Europe more than Europe needs them. The end of the Cold War and the collapse of communism as a viable developmental paradigm has removed much of the political impetus behind such aid/trade schemes. The whole idea of the Third World has fractured beyond repair and out of that collectivity a group of actual and potential 'First World' economies has emerged. The recent reaction to the South African bid for accession to Lomé is instructive. Africa has the largest contingent of states in ACP/Lomé so on these grounds South African exclusion looks somewhat discriminatory. In point of fact South Africa competes with a number of Mediterranean members of the EU and is arguably not the paradigm Third-World economy that the regime was designed to accommodate. It may well be that, in future, regional groupings such as ASEAN will provide more viable vehicles for negotiation between Europe and the Third World.

Act of war Literally, any act which is incompatible with a state of peace. Under customary international law states had the right to resort to war whenever they deemed it necessary. The principal restraint upon this behaviour was thus the laws of warfare. Distinction must immediately be made between the laws covering the conduct of war – *jus in bello* – and the laws governing the resort to conflict – *jus ad bellum*. The idea of an act of war, therefore, properly comes under *jus ad bellum*.

Before the establishment of universal international institutions in the twentieth century, there was a good deal of auto-interpretation attached to this concept. In practice states could decide for themselves what constituted an act of war. Once war had been declared between the parties then notice was served upon the whole state system that relations had changed from peace to war. A complicating factor in this was the alliance. States entering alliances took upon themselves obligations to fight each other's wars. If the alliance was to function

properly the parties needed to know what constituted an act of war against themselves whereby the alliance would become operational. This is referred to as the *casus foederis*.

The current century has seen important changes in the laws of war, both *ad bellum* and *in bello*. Treaty law, such as that set out in the ►United Nations Charter, now draws a clear distinction between the legal and illegal use of ►force. The presumption is now made that force can only be used in ►self-defence. In the absence of more effective means of ►conflict resolution, states still resort to force. The twentieth century has required its statesmen to be more imaginative in seeking justification for doing so than in the past. At the same time use of less direct modes of ►aggression, such as ►guerrilla warfare, have made it more difficult to apply the laws of war. External ►intervention in civil wars has become widespread in the twentieth century. Some of the most intractable regional conflicts – such as the ►Arab–Israeli conflict – originated as communal differences. In sum, just as international lawyers have attempted to establish new criteria for the use of force, other developments have increased uncertainties. ►belligerency

Action–reaction The term which describes a relationship where two ►actors are stimulated to respond to what the other is doing in an immediate reactive way. The term has been widely applied to ►conflict analysis, particularly by ►game theorists and scholars influenced by behavioural psychology. Students of ►arms races, such as Lewis Fry Richardson, have applied action–reaction ideas to this phenomenon. According to the Richardson process, therefore, State A reacts to State B's increase in military ►capability by increasing its own expenditure. State B perceives this as justifying its own initiative but, at the same time feeling that A's reaction has reduced its margin of safety, B further increases its own arms budget. Richardson's work on action–reaction in arms races is set out in *Arms and Insecurity* (1960). Like many models, the Richardson processes represent highly simplified versions of the real world and few would want to attempt to support the proposition that arms races cause ►wars. Nonetheless, arms races frequently precede hostilities and may, in themselves, contribute to the tension and hostility associated with violent conflict.

Action–reaction ideas have also been applied to ►decision-making. The influence here has been particularly felt from behavioural psychology. Sometimes the term input–output is used rather than action–reaction. In this approach decision-making is conducted by a system. The system reacts to its environment, which includes other decision-making systems. Thus an action–reaction pattern can be again stipulated. The application of action–reaction models to decision-making in ►international relations was widely established in the third quarter of the twentieth century as a productive and plausible way of conceiving the activity.

Actor Any entity which plays an identifiable role in ►international relations

may be termed an actor. The Pope, the ►Secretary-General of the UN, British Petroleum, Botswana and the IMF are thus all actors. The term is now widely used by both scholars and practitioners in international relations as it is a way of avoiding the obvious limitations of the word ►state. Although it lacks precision it does possess scope and flexibility. Its use also conveys the variety of personalities, organizations and institutions that play a role at present. Some authors have argued that, in effect, the system can be conceived of as a ►mixed actor model because the relative significance of the state has been reduced. More precise distinctions between actors can be made by introducing additional criteria. Such criteria might include the tasks performed by actors and the constituency affected by this task performance. Some commentators suggest that actors should be judged according to their degree of ►autonomy rather than the legalistic concept of ►sovereignty. ►pluralism

Adjudication A method of settling disputes by referring them to an established court; as such, it ought not to be confused with ►arbitration. The basis of adjudication is that the adjudicator applies ►international law to settle the dispute. The creation of the World Court in the present century has meant that the means for international adjudication now exist on a permanent basis. In 1920 the ►Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) was established by the ►League of Nations and between 1922 and 1940 it made thirty-three judgments and gave twenty-seven advisory opinions. In 1945 the ►International Court of Justice (ICJ) was established as its successor. The main difficulties both courts have experienced are the limitations upon their jurisdiction. Parties can only submit a case for adjudication by express consent, although there is an optional clause in the statute of the ICJ (see Article 36). Moreover, only ►states may be party to cases before the Court (Article 34). This has had the effect that important non-state ►actors, including individuals, cannot directly initiate litigation.

It must be recognized that many disputes are simply not justiciable. International actors find that other modes of ►conflict settlement allow greater flexibility for bargaining and compromise and do not imply the same loss of control over the outcome that is inherent in adjudication. Also, international law tends to have a ►status quo orientation. ►Revisionist states thus tend to find that the use of adjudication does not allow sufficient scope for peaceful change. This must be said notwithstanding the ability of the World Court to apply principles ►*ex aequo et bono* if the parties agree (see Article 38).

Although the World Court represents the most significant attempt yet to apply the rule of law in international disputes instead of the more traditional modes of settlement (►war, diplomacy, arbitration), it is severely hampered in its operation by the absence of the principle of compulsory jurisdiction. International adjudication is always dependent on the consent of states, and this is rarely given on matters of vital importance. The doctrine of ►sovereignty

is therefore seen by many as an insuperable barrier to the development of the international judicial system. Compulsory jurisdiction is not on the horizon and the international judicial process has played no significant part in the major issues of world politics since 1946 (e.g. the ►Cold War, the anti-colonial revolution, the ►North–South division, or the regulation of ►nuclear weapons).

Administered territory Refers to the ‘Mandates system’ established in Article XXII of the Covenant of the ►League of Nations usually credited to Jan Smuts but actually first proposed by G. L. Beer, a member of Woodrow Wilson’s staff at Paris in 1919. It involved control and administration, though not ►sovereignty, over former ►colonial possessions of Germany (in Africa and the Pacific) and Turkey (in the Near and Middle East) and was largely a US-inspired attempt to avoid the traditional ►imperial relationship. Administration of these territories was ceded to certain ‘responsible’ ►states in ‘sacred trust’ to the League. Thus South Africa, by mandate in 1920, was given administrative responsibility for the former German South West Africa (now Namibia). The principles of trusteeship, tutelage, guardianship and ultimately international supervision and control were envisaged but the international supervisory dimension, as instanced by the case of Namibia, has proved a particularly difficult matter to enforce. The system was clearly a compromise between outright ►annexation of these territories and direct international administration. The struggle between the old realist and the newer ►idealist approaches can be seen in the language of the Article dealing in this matter: it was designed to foster and develop territories ‘which are inhabited by people not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world’ (Article XXII). The term ‘stand by themselves’ is clearly a reference to the principle of ►self-determination, the intention being that the mandatory state held administrative authority until such time (to be determined by the League) that these territories and their populations became sufficiently sophisticated to manage self-rule and achieve full legal title. To this end three classes of mandate were introduced depending on the degree of development attained and a Permanent Mandates Commission was established to oversee the process. With the creation of the UN the mandates system and administered territory was transmuted into the system. Most of the former territories have now achieved full ►independence (including Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, Iraq and Namibia).

Despite its obvious faults and despite what today might appear to be its paternalistic overtones it should be noted that the mandates system was ‘the world’s first experiment in the international control of dependent territories’ (F. S. Northedge, *The League of Nations*, 1976). In this way, it contributed much to the downfall of the ►colonial system that had hitherto dominated ►international relations.

Afghanistan The large-scale military ►intervention by forces of the former Soviet Union in Afghanistan in late December 1979 was one of the defining

moments in the ►Cold War relationship between Soviet Russia and the United States of America. As with other Soviet interventions of the period (for instance, the 1968 case of Czechoslovakia), the move could be seen as primarily a defensive reaction by the Communist ►leadership fearing that domestic instabilities and uncertainties within the target state would produce political and social changes which would profoundly damage Soviet interests. The motivation behind the Afghan initiative was particularly controversial since the 'defensive' analysis of Soviet intentions was broadly rejected by American ►elites in favour of more offensive/ confrontational interpretations. The consequential American reaction produced dissension in the ►Atlantic Alliance as leading European states refused to subscribe to the American policy of selective ►economic sanctions against the USSR. Implicit in this secondary intra-mural dispute within ►NATO was the ►issue area of ►*détente*. For the American leaders the 'invasion' of Afghanistan signalled that *détente* should finally be abandoned. France and West Germany in particular refused to subscribe to this ►definition of the situation.

In the nineteenth century Afghanistan had been seen as a buffer state between the British and Tsarist Empires. Following the Russian ►revolution and the conclusion of the First World War the two states agreed to abrogate any special interests in Afghanistan and to recognize its ►independence. The gradual decline in British influence in the Indian sub-continent meant that perforce the Afghans came increasingly under Soviet influence. The immediate reality of the Cold War added to the ►geopolitical significance of Afghanistan in Soviet ►perceptions. American partiality towards Pakistan further ►polarized the area.

In the spring of 1978 a group of radical Army officers staged a successful ►*coup d'état*. A loose power sharing Revolutionary Council was formed comprising the military and the ►Marxist People Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) which had been formed in 1965. The subsequent attempt by the new leadership to introduce reforms and to ►modernize Afghan society met with stiff resistance from traditional leaders. As a result an ►Islamic fundamentalist ►insurgency began to take hold in a country which had a strong tradition of tribal and provincial ►subsidiarity in any event. By the winter of 1978–9 most of the provinces of Afghanistan were experiencing some degree of civil strife and organized anti-centric resistance. In a ►scenario which was redolent of American policy in Vietnam during the Kennedy years, the Soviet Union became inexorably involved in Afghan domestic politics at a time when that system was evincing great instability and uncertainty. At the end of 1978 the two governments concluded a ►Treaty of Friendship, Good Neighbourliness and Cooperation. The treaty included a military dimension in a number of articles and specifically talked of the need for an 'effective security system in Asia' in its 8th article.

Faced with a deteriorating security situation throughout the state, pressure upon the Soviet leadership to intervene more directly began to mount through-

out the summer and autumn of 1979. An internecine power struggle within the Afghan Communist leadership developed in the autumn and purges within the ruling clique failed to stabilize the situation. Garthoff (1994a) has argued that at the Politburo meeting of 12 December 1979 the decision was taken to intervene with force in Afghanistan to replace the leadership in Kabul. Thereafter military preparations were put in hand and the intervention began over Christmas 1979. By the end of the year a more compliant clique was installed and by the end of January 1980 some 80,000 Soviet troops were in Afghanistan. Technically the logistical side of the intervention was efficiently and rapidly effected. Soviet air-lift capabilities were impressively demonstrated and resistance from sections of the Communist party identified as anti-Soviet was suppressed.

Various rationalizations and justifications were offered by the Soviet leadership for the intervention. Ostensibly the intervention was by invitation and could be justified by the Friendship Treaty and the ►Brezhnev Doctrine. As *ex post facto* pretexts these may be adequate. As substantial analyses of motivations and perceptions they are not. Clearly the situation in Afghanistan in the winter of 1979 was ripe for intervention. The existing Communist party faction was seen by the Soviets as unstable and unreliable. The country was sliding into internal chaos and civil strife. Externally Pakistan and China were opposed to the regime. The incipient Islamic rebellion raised the possibility of such contagion spreading to non-Russian Muslim republics in the USSR. In the USA the Carter presidency seemed preoccupied with the Iranian hostage issue. Failure by the Soviet Union to intervene might have looked like a failure of nerve and damaged their ►credibility, particularly in Eastern Europe. Valenta (1984) has analysed the decision on Afghanistan in the light of a modified ►bureaucratic politics model, suggesting that the Politburo gradually came to the decision to intervene by the late autumn because of an absence of attractive alternatives.

Opinion in the USA was much more ready to see the intervention as expansionist and offensive rather than in the defensive framework suggested above. Fundamentally by taking such coercive action outside the ►scope and ►domain of the ►Warsaw Pact, Soviet Russia was held to have infringed the tacit rules of the Cold War confrontation which had delimited spheres of influence which Afghanistan seemed to contest. Western observers speculated that the move was inspired by traditional Russian expansionism involving access to the Persian Gulf oilfields and a warm water port. The fact that Afghanistan was ►landlocked weighed lightly in this analysis. Subsequently the invasion was condemned in the ►United Nations and by ►non-aligned states. Within the USA it produced a reappraisal of policy towards the Soviet Union and it led directly to the promulgation of the ►Carter Doctrine and to significant American rearmament. US military ►aid to the ►partisans (mujaheddin) was initiated under Carter and expanded under his successor Ronald Reagan. Electorally Afghanistan seemed to suggest to many Americans that President Carter had

been naïve before the event and confrontational afterwards. The charge of inconsistency was hard to avoid. As with the ►Cuban missile crisis, the Soviets seemed to misread American intentions and reactions in their planning.

The ►war that ensued between the Soviet forces, their putative allies in the central government and the partisan Islamic forces proved very costly and fundamentally inconclusive. The Afghan war caused a major displacement of peoples into Pakistan and Iran as a result of the fighting. The territory was flooded with weapons by both ►superpowers and it is probable that some were diverted into other uses and other hands than those intended by the donors. Vast tracts of the territory were made uninhabitable as a result of the indiscriminate sowing of anti-personnel mines. The failure of the Soviet Union to achieve any of their goals in Afghanistan was recognized by the Gorbachev leadership after 1985. Deciding that its prosecution should not interfere with the objective of a new *détente* with the USA, Gorbachev demoted Afghanistan to a ►regional conflict which allowed United Nations ►good offices to broker an agreement at Geneva in 1988. The parameters of the agreement were:

- 1 withdrawal of Soviet forces
- 2 non-interference in internal affairs of states
- 3 right of return for ►refugees
- 4 USA and the Soviet Union to become co-guarantors of the accord.

Whilst the Soviet withdrawal was generally welcomed by the international community which saw it as evidence of Gorbachev's 'new thinking' on Soviet ►foreign policy, the net costs to Afghanistan, as shown above, were profound. The cessation of outside intervention did not produce the stable coalition government and the commitment to power sharing that it implied. The Afghan episode showed once again the perils and pitfalls for parties intervening in situations of civil strife and communal violence. It confirmed the finding that military power is not particularly ►fungible and it demonstrated how readily policy makers can misperceive others' intentions and responses in their definition of the situation.

Agent-structure Associated with the ►level of analysis problem, the agent-structure issue refers to the question of how best to conceptualize the relationship between ►state ►actors and the ►international system. The problematic nature of this issue was imported from social theory and introduced to IR by Alexander Wendt (1987). It revolves around two basic truisms: '(i) human beings and their organizations are purposive actors whose actions help reproduce or transform the society in which they live and (ii) society is made up of social relationships which structure the interactions between these purposeful actions.' The 'problem' is how agency (i) relates to structure (ii) and vice versa. The properties of agents and structures are both relevant to accounts of social behaviour, but the central question, as Smith and Hollis (1991) point out, is how to combine them in a