

# CONFRONTING the DEATH PENALTY

How Language Influences
Jurors in Capital Cases

OXFORD STUDIES IN LANGUAGE AND LAW

## Confronting the Death Penalty

How Language Influences Jurors in Capital Cases

ROBIN CONLEY





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## CONFRONTING THE DEATH PENALTY

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Confronting the Death Penalty: How Language Influences Jurors in Capital Cases Robin Conley

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## To my parents, for introducing me to language.

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## CONFRONTING THE DEATH PENALTY

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## Introduction: "That's the hardest thing I've ever had to do"

THE MAJORITY OF MY TIME in Texas was spent with words. Hearing that I was a linguistic anthropologist, death penalty defense attorneys continually thrust papers at me, asking whether their proposed jury instructions were comprehensible and how they might be interpreted. They sought my advice (wisely or not) on how best to phrase their closing arguments, and what to make of the potential juror who spoke reverently of his uncle, the police officer, during voir dire. When I spoke with capital jurors after their trials, we marveled at the complex verbiage of their instructions and how confused they were by legal jargon and the laws they were charged with interpreting. Even the Texas Prison Museum prominently displayed the last words of those who had been executed, exhibited next to printed menus of their final meals.

In my memories of fieldwork, this torrent of words is broken by poignant, wordless moments. I am taken back to the small room where I sat with a defense attorney while he restlessly waited to hear the fate of his client. He took my laptop from me and browsed through my playlist, settling on Carmina Burana. He sang along, his operatic tenor a surprising, pleasant break from the otherwise tense silence. I can still hear the sounds of shackles as a death row inmate approached the prison visiting room from somewhere down the inner hallway. I could always hear the inmates first, well before the hefty door swung open to reveal them standing in prison whites, flanked by guards. My nose seems to contain remnants of the stench from inside one of the oldest occupied prisons in Texas, body odor mixed with urine and old food. I recall sitting in a restaurant with a man who had served on a capital jury years before. The defendant he sentenced to death had recently been executed. The man cried briefly in that restaurant, attempting to process his role in another human's death. I can visualize a defendant's arm stretched out to me in a courtroom, strikingly pale from his time in prison, as he explained how he engineered a needle and tattooed himself while inside.

Texas capital jurors had similarly disjointed experiences. They too operated in a world of words—any legal trial takes human conflicts and textualizes them, reducing complex social interactions to verbal and written form (Felstiner, Abel, and Sarat 1980–81). From the start of jury selection, jurors were required to interpret arcane, complicated legal instructions and rules. During their deliberations, they had to somehow filter weeks of sitting through trials into a decision that could be reconciled with these rules.

Jurors' days in court, however, were also filled with affecting encounters that stood apart from the legal language they were usually occupied with. One juror spoke of the intense disgust that overtook him when he watched the defendant

during trial. He was so sickened that he had to force himself not to look at the defendant any longer in order to try to remain fair, he explained. Another juror stammered as she recalled envisioning herself as the murder victim in her trial. The victim must have realized at some point, the juror figured, after being stabbed over fifty times, that she was not going to escape. A third juror spoke of her discomfort being seated in the courtroom next to the witness stand. She was physically anxious, she said, when cuffed inmates were brought next to her to sit and testify.

While, like mine, jurors' dealings with legal words were entwined with these stirring encounters, their processing of these experiences was highly restricted in comparison to my own. For one, I was able to see each crime and each trial from multiple perspectives, spending time in the courthouse watching testimony and later visiting crime scene locations, trying to visualize, for example, how an escaping inmate's truck careened into a prison guard on horseback, sending her flying to her death. I stood in the death house, gazing at the gurney where the defendants I shared courtroom space with every day would later take their last breaths. Jurors are not afforded such experiences. Their knowledge of crimes and defendants is limited to what is presented to them during trial, to attorneys' selective show-and-tell.

And despite the varied kinds of experiences capital jurors do have during trials, their last duty is one of words. Their emotional reactions and empathic imaginings must be molded to answer two cryptic questions on their jury charge—Will the defendant be a future danger? Does any evidence mitigate the defendant's blameworthiness?1—which translate trial encounters

<sup>1.</sup> Texas capital jurors' instructions, including these "special issue" questions, will be explained in depth in chapter 2.

into a language dictated by the law. Institutionally, this is when jurors' responsibilities end. Where these legal words lead—to the ultimate taking of a human life—is officially no longer their concern. But for many, they live and relive these words, these images, these emotions, recognizing the precise consequences their words have had.

That's the hardest thing I've ever had to do, to look at a man and, you know, know that I'm saying, you know, I don't think you should live.

I've always felt that the death penalty you know, was a good thing? This process here is kinda, makes you wanna, makes me wanna think about it . . . I, it's like I say, that's the hardest thing I ever had to do. And I never thought that it would be that hard.

### TWO FORMER TEXAS CAPITAL JURORS

This book asks one essential question: how can human beings sentence another person to die? For most jurors, serving on a death penalty case is one of the more difficult experiences of their lives. Language, as a vital human resource for sense-making, helps us navigate difficult experiences. It is therefore not surprising that, when facing the prospect of sending another person to his or her death, jurors rely heavily on language in order to make and then live with their decisions.

Relying on actual jurors' reflections on capital trials and my own observations of these trials, this book demonstrates how language filters, restricts, and at times is used to manipulate jurors' experiences while they serve on capital trials and again when they reflect on them afterward. When answering a call to jury duty, potential jurors enter the courtroom and immediately begin reconciling their own, often varied senses