

Tingting Weinreich-Zhao

Chinese Merger Control Law

An Assessment of its Competition-Policy
Orientation after the First Years of
Application

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Foreword

This book has been accepted as doctorate thesis by the Faculty of Law of the Ludwig-Maximilians-University Munich in the winter semester 2013/2014. The work displays the development of the Chinese merger control regime and its application until December 2013. All opinions represented herein are my personal opinions only and not the opinions of any company or organisation I am associated with. The creation of this work has been promoted by a scholarship of the Max Planck Institute for Innovation and Competition in Munich, which also provided me with an excellent academic environment for my research.

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May 2014

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Abbreviations

ABA	American Bar Association
ACCC	Australian Competition and Consumer Commission
AG	Aktiengesellschaft
AMB	Anti-Monopoly Bureau
AMC	Anti-Monopoly Commission
AMEA	State Council's Anti-Monopoly Law Enforcement Authority
AML	Anti-Monopoly Law
Antitrust Bull.	The Antitrust Bulletin
Antitrust L. J.	Antitrust Law Journal
ATC	Anatomical Therapeutic Chemical
AWG	Außenwirtschaftsgesetz (German Foreign Trade and Payments Act)
CASS	Chinese Academy of Social Sciences
CBR	The China Business Review
CBRC	China Banking Regulatory Commission
cf.	Compare
CFI	Court of First Instance
CFIUS	Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States
Chi.-Kent L. Rev.	Chicago-Kent Law Review
CIRC	China Insurance Regulatory Commission
CLP	China Law & Practice
Co.	Company
Corp.	Corporation
CPI	Competition Policy International
CRRT	Continuous renal replacement therapy
CSRC	China Securities Regulatory Commission
CWS	Coal-water slurry
DoJ	US Department of Justice
E.C.L.R.	European Competition Law Review
ECMR	EC Merger Regulation

ECR	European Court reports
<i>ed./eds.</i>	Editor(s)
<i>e.g.</i>	For example
EJC	Court of Justice of the European Union
<i>et al.</i>	And others
<i>etc.</i>	Et cetera
<i>et seq.</i>	And the following
EU	European Union
Eur. L. J.	European Law Journal
FDI	Foreign direct investment
FIE	Foreign investment enterprise
FN	Footnote
FRAND	Fair, reasonable and nondiscriminatory
F.T.C.	Federal Trade Commission Decisions
FTC	Federal Trade Commission
GATS	General Agreement on Trade in Services
GATT	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GCP	Global Competition Policy
GCR	Global Competition Review
GDP	Gross domestic product
GWB	Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen (Act Against Restraints of Competition)
HDD	Hard disk drive
HHI	Herfindahl-Hirschman Index
HSR	Hart-Scott-Rodino
ICN	International Competition Network
<i>i.e.</i>	That is
IIC	International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law
IMF	International Monetary Fund
Inc.	Incorporated
IP	Intellectual property
J. Comp. L. & Econ.	Journal of Competition Law and Economics
J. Eur. Comp. L. & P.	Journal of European Competition Law & Practice
J. Int. Econ. L.	Journal of International Economic Law
JV	Joint venture
Ltd	Limited
M&A	Merger and acquisition
MIIT	Ministry of Industry and Information Technology
MMA	Methylmethacrylate
MOFCOM	Ministry of Commerce
MOFTEC	Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation (now MOFCOM)
MoU	Memorandum of understanding

n/a	Not available
NDRC	National Development and Reform Commission
NiMH	Nickel-hydrogen
No.	Number
NPC	National People's Congress
OEM	Original equipment manufacturer
OFT	Office of Fair Trading
OJSC	Open Joint-Stock Company
OS	Operating system
p./pp.	Page(s)
para.	Paragraph
PBOC	People's Bank of China
PC	Personal computer
PRC	People's Republic of China
R&D	Research and development
RIW	Recht der Internationalen Wirtschaft
RMB	Renminbi
SAFE	State Administration of Foreign Exchange
SAIC	State Administration for Industry and Commerce
SASAC	State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council
SETC	State Economic and Trade Commission
SEZ	Special economic zone
SIEC	Significant impediment of effective competition
SLC	Substantial lessening of competition
SME	Small and medium-sized enterprise
SMPV	Swine mycoplasma pneumonia vaccine
SOE	State-owned enterprise
SSNIP	Small but significant non-transitory increase in price
Strat. Mgmt. J.	Strategic Management Journal
TEE	Trusted execution environment
TFEU	Treaty on the Functioning of the EU
TRIMs	Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures
Tulane J. of Int'l & Comp. Law	Tulane Journal of International and Comparative Law
TVE	Township and village enterprise
U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L.	University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Economic Law
U. Pa. J. Int'l L.	University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law
UK	United Kingdom
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
US	United States
U.S.	United States Reports
U.S.C.	United States Code

USD	US dollar
v/vs	Versus
Wash. U. Global Stud. L. Rev.	Washington University Global Studies Law Review
WTO	World Trade Organization
WuW	Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb
ZChinR	Zeitschrift für chinesisches Recht
ZWeR	Zeitschrift für Wettbewerbsrecht

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