
ELECTING PEACE

From Civil Conflict to Political Participation

AILA M. MATANOCK —



"Matanock's terrific book sheds light on the relatively new phenomenon of crafting peace agreements that include provisions for the political participation of former rebels. She uses new data to deftly weave together analysis of peace agreements, peacekeeping, peace duration, elections, and election monitoring – topics that are typically considered separately – and provide a comprehensive and compelling argument for the importance of formally integrating former rebels into post-conflict governance."


Tanisha Fazal, University of Minnesota

"Almost half of all elections globally occur in the shadow of violent conflict, and post-conflict elections have become vital international tools of peacebuilding and democratization. Yet these elections, fraught with tension and high stakes, have an unenviable track record: as often as not, they lead to conflict recidivism and democratic decline. Against this backdrop, Aila Matanock's *Electing Peace* sounds a clarion call not to keep the faith. The key is to create a path for yesterday's combatants to become tomorrow's politicians. When such a path is seen as credible by warring parties, they are more likely to trade tanks for campaign buses and guns for microphones. This is a must-read for academics and policymakers who aspire to build peace through democracy in conflict-afflicted countries." *Irfan Nooruddin, Georgetown University*

"Aila Matanock helps solve one of the hardest problems associated with civil wars: how to get a successful peace agreement without the help of a third party military intervention. Using new cross-national data on peace agreements and detailed analysis of Guatemala and El Salvador, Matanock shows us how electoral participation can help combatants enforce agreements. Bravo!"

Barbara F. Walter, University of California, San Diego

Cover illustration: *Voto* by Christian Grooms for *Electing Peace*.



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Aila M. Matanock

University of California, Berkeley



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Electing Peace

Settlements to civil conflict, which are notably difficult to secure, sometimes contain clauses enabling the combatant sides to participate as political parties in post-conflict elections. In Electing Peace, Aila M. Matanock presents a theory that explains both the causes and the consequences of these provisions. Matanock draws on new worldwide cross-national data on electoral participation provisions, case studies, and interviews with representatives of all sides of the conflicts in these cases and others (including with former combatant leaders). She shows that electoral participation provisions, nonexistent during the Cold War, are now in almost half of all peace agreements. Moreover, she demonstrates that these provisions are associated with an increase in the chance that peace will endure, potentially contributing to a global decline in civil conflict, a result which challenges prevailing pessimism about post-conflict elections. Matanock argues that electoral processes and democracy promotion programs pave the way for international actors to help secure settlements by detecting and sanctioning noncompliance. Matanock's theory and evidence also suggest a broader conception of international intervention than currently exists, identifying how these inclusive elections can enable external enforcement mechanisms and provide an alternative to military coercion by peacekeeping troops in many cases.

Aila M. Matanock is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of California, Berkeley. Her research addresses international intervention, civil conflict, and weak states. Her Stanford University dissertation, on which this book is based, won the 2013 Helen Dwight Reid Award from the American Political Science Association for the best dissertation from the previous two years in international relations, law, and politics.



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In addition, I am grateful to the many individuals who were willing to speak with me about their experiences leading rebel groups and governments through these transitions from battlefield to ballot box or their experiences supporting these processes as international policymakers — we covered much more detail from many cases than could be corralled into the pages of this book. I also thank those who provided initial contacts, including Alfonso Cuéllar and Marta Ruiz in Colombia, Mike McDonald in Guatemala, and Erika Murcia in El Salvador; Brenna Powell did the same and so much more in Northern Ireland. All who gave their time were invaluable to developing my thinking.

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Pieces of this project appeared as a stand-alone article, "Bullets for Ballots," and paper, "External Engagement," presenting parts of the theory and empirics from this book. The journal editors and anonymous reviewers' comments on these also provided useful advice that I greatly appreciate.

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¹ Matanock 2017. I appreciate *International Security* for allowing me to use material from "Bullets for Ballots" in this book.

² Matanock 2016b.

I have had the opportunity to present pieces of this project, and each has made this book stronger, due to the incisive comments provided by discussants and audience members, who number too many to name here. These presentations took place at national conferences of the organizations that foster our political science and peace science communities, as well as at seminars at Columbia University, Duke University, the Elliott School at George Washington University, Emory University, the Gerald R. Ford School of Public Policy at the University of Michigan, the Naval Postgraduate School, the Peace Research Institute Oslo, Stanford University, Universidad de Los Andes, University of California, Berkeley, University of California, Los Angeles, University of California, Merced, University of California, San Diego, the University of Chicago, University of Texas, Austin, Uppsala University, Yale University, the Conflict Consortium's Virtual Workshop, and more.

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Part I
Introduction and Theory