INSTITUTIONAL ORIGINS OF ISLAMIST POLITICAL MOBILIZATION

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CAMBRIDGE
UNIVERSITY PRESS

Acknowledgments

Abbreviations

AIS	Armé Islamique du Salut, Algeria
AKP/PJD	Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (Justice and Development Party), Turkey
AMUPI	Association Malienne pour l'Unité et le Progrès de l'Islam, Mali
ANAP	Motherland Party, Turkey
APR	Alliance for the Republic, Senegal
BDS	Bloc Démocratique Sénégalais, Senegal
CERID	Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches "Islam et Développement," Senegal
CHP	Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (Republican People's Party), Turkey
CIRCOFS	Comité Islamique pour la Reforme du Code de la Famille au Sénégal, Senegal
DP	Demokrat Partisi (Democratic Party), Turkey
DYP	True Path, Turkey
FAIS	Fédération des Associations Islamiques au Sénégal
FFS	Front des Forces Socialistes, Algeria
FIS	Front Islamique du Salut, Algeria
FJP	Freedom and Justice Party, Egypt
FLN	Front de Libération Nationale, Algeria
FSD	Front pour le Socialisme at la Démocratie – Sewe Sa Dek (Save your Country), Senegal
GIA	Groupes Islamique Armée, Algeria
GSPC	Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat, Algeria
HADEP	Kurdish People's Democratic Party. Turkey
HAMAS	Islamic Resistance Movement, Palestine
IBDA-C	Islamic Front of Fighters of the Great East, Turkey
MIA	Mouvement Islamique d'Algérie, Algeria

MIA	Movement Islamique Armée, Algeria
MHP	Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi (National Action Party), Turkey
MSP	Mouvement de la Société pour la Paix (Movement for a Peaceful Society), Algeria
MUSIAD	Müstakil Sanayici ve İşadamları Derneği, Turkey
NOP	National Order Party, Turkey
NSP	National Salvation Party, Turkey
PKK	Kurdistan Worker's Party, Turkey
PDS	Parti Démocratique Sénégalaise, Senegal
PSS	Parti de la Solidarité Sénégalaise, Senegal
RND	Rassemblement National Démocratique, Algeria
RNS	Rassemblement pour le Salut National, Senegal
RPP	Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (Republican People's Party), Turkey (see CHP)
SP	Saadet Partisi (Felicity Party), Turkey
TUSIAD	Türk Sanayicileri ve İşadamları Derneği (Turkish Industrialists' and Businessmen's Assocation), Turkey
UCM	Union Culturelle Musulmane, Senegal
UPS	Union Progressiste Sénégalaise, Senegal

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Introduction

On 12 June 1990, voters cast their ballots in local polls that were to inaugurate a new era of democratic participation in Algeria. The Algerian one-party state led by the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) had come under severe strain, leading some in the party to support democratic participation as a measure to alleviate popular demands on the state. When the votes were tallied, the state party was shocked and dismayed at the news. The historical vanguard of Algerian nationalism, the FLN, received only 28 percent of the total vote, while an immature, recently recognized party highlighting its Islamic credentials had almost doubled the state party's returns with over 54 percent. The new Front Islamique du Salut (FIS) reveled in the magnitude of the challenge it had brought against "le pouvoir," highlighting its moral leadership as a key source of popular strength. Although the state portrayed the local elections as of minor consequence, the first round of National Assembly elections the following year demonstrated that the Islamists again captured the popular imagination along with half (47%) of the popular vote.[1] At this point the Islamist challenge to the state became transparently clear to the Algerian military, which stepped in to abort the second round of voting and to dissolve the FIS by force.

A remarkably similar story occurred in Egypt two decades later. After the Egyptian military ousted long-standing president Hosni Mubarak in the context of mass popular protest on 11 February 2011, Islamists took the lead in filling the political void as the country prepared for free democratic elections. The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood encouraged its supporters to vote for its new Freedom and Justice Party (FJP), leading the FJP to win both parliamentary elections in January 2012 and presidential elections in June of that year. Mohammed Morsi, formerly a Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated MP in the Egyptian assembly, became the first democratically elected president of Egypt. Other Islamist political parties, such as the Salafi-oriented al-Nour (Light) Party, also performed surprisingly well in the context of free elections,

outperforming all of the Islamists' more secular political competitors. As in Algeria, however, the Islamists' electoral triumphs were short-lived. The new Islamist-dominated parliament was dissolved by court order within six months after its election, and the military ousted President Morsi in the context of widespread social mobilization and increasing conflict in July 2013.

The electoral victories of the Algerian Islamists and the decision to move against them militarily defined Algerian politics throughout the 1990s. Mass electoral mobilization by the Islamist party quickly turned into mass demonstrations against the state. As political demonstrations by the FIS were forcefully repressed, demonstrations themselves became increasingly violent. The conflict deepened as it progressed; groups of Islamists began to actively mobilize as revolutionaries using guerrilla tactics. Before 1990, Islamists were at the margins of Algerian politics; by the mid-1990s they were embedded in a horrific civil war that would claim over 100,000 lives by the decade's end.

After President Morsi's ouster in Egypt in 2013, the Egyptian military and state security services also moved aggressively against the Muslim Brotherhood as an organization, jailing as many of the organization's leadership as they could find, as well as massacring large numbers of Brotherhood protesters in an infamous incident in Cairo's Raba'a Square. Despite having won both parliamentary and presidential elections, the state moved against the Brotherhood by confiscating its assets and declaring it a terrorist organization, making membership in this long-vibrant social organization a violation of Egyptian law. By early 2015, both former President Mohammed Morsi and the leader of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, Mohammed Badie, had been sentenced by Egyptian courts to death. Violence in Egypt increased, and although the Brotherhood formally maintained its rejection of political violence, violence by a number of self-proclaimed Islamist groups occurred across Egypt.

The tragic story of Algerian politics in the 1990s, as well as that of Egyptian politics in the wake of the Arab uprisings of 2010–2011, highlights several puzzles regarding mobilization by religious actors in the Muslim world. First, why did these countries experience such a dramatic rise in Islamist mobilization compared with previous decades? In other words, why did rapid political mobilization revolve around a Muslim identity and an "Islamic" agenda when other issues had previously defined politics?

Second, why did mass Islamist mobilization occur in Algeria and Egypt, while it did not occur to the same degree in neighboring countries? In many respects, Tunisia and Morocco share a similar history, culture, and demography with Algeria, yet there was no dramatic electoral, protest, or violent manifestation of Islamist mobilization in these countries that compared with what happened in Algeria. Only recently has electoral mobilization for Islamist parties occurred in these countries.[2] Similarly, while the Muslim Brotherhood claimed dominant electoral victories in Egypt, it lost the founding free election in neighboring Libya in July 2012. Countries on North Africa's southern border (Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Chad) are dominantly Muslim, yet they have

historically experienced far less political mobilization by religious actors than their northern neighbors. Why?

Finally, what causes Islamist actors to shift the type of political mobilization that they support (from voting to protest to violence)? Very little Islamist violence occurred in Algeria before 1992. Within a few years tens of thousands of Islamist, military, and civilian deaths had occurred. The extent to which Islamist violence will continue to spread through Egypt is unknown, but attacks by both Islamist actors and state security services increased substantially in the wake of President Morsi's ouster. What are the conditions under which an act of voting for an Islamist party is transformed into an act of violence on behalf of an Islamist movement?

Although each of these questions highlights a prominent puzzle in the Algerian and Egyptian cases, they are also central puzzles in explaining variation in Islamist mobilization throughout the Muslim world. Today, a number of countries with large Muslim populations hold competitive elections in which parties that brand themselves as the "Islamic choice" compete with other types of parties. Elections in Tunisia and Morocco brought Islamist parties to power in 2011 and 2012. Iraq has been led by Islamist political parties since free elections began in 2005. As early as the 1970s, parties articulating a religious frame of reference have competed in Turkey, with varying degrees of success. By the mid-1990s, the Islamically oriented Welfare (Refah) party had risen from obscurity to become the largest party in parliament, producing an "Islamist" prime minister in a country with an explicitly secular constitution. One of its successors, the Justice and Development Party (AKP), has dominated Turkish elections since 2002. Likewise, the 2002 elections in Pakistan demonstrated the dramatic political rise of an Islamist electoral coalition led by the Jamaat-i-Islami, which had seen only limited success in previous elections. Islamist parties in Malaysia and Indonesia have also competed with variable degrees of success over the course of iterated elections, beginning as far back as the 1950s in Malaysia and the 1970s in Indonesia.

In addition to experience with Islamist political parties, different regions of the world have also seen wide variation in their experience with Islamist protest and Islamist violence. The post-Soviet republics of Central Asia vary dramatically in the extent to which they have experienced Islamist mobilization in the political arena since independence in the 1990s. Islamist actors played a central role in Tajikistan's first years of independence, figuring prominently in an anti-Communist electoral coalition in 1991 and leading a revolutionary challenge against Tajikistan's Communist leadership. The violent challenge rapidly evolved into a civil war that killed about 50,000 between June 1992 and January 1993.[3] On a smaller scale, Islamists have also proven a significant challenge to the government of Uzbekistan. Uzbek Islamic activists, grouped under the banner of the cross-national Islamic Renaissance Party, are considered a major security threat, which the government has confronted through violent repression and mass arrests. In contrast with Tajikistan and Uzbekistan,

other Central Asian countries (Kazakhstan, Kyrgystan, Turkmenistan) have had much less mobilization for Islamist political causes. This is the case in both the strongly repressive state of Turkmenistan and the comparatively more open country of Kyrgystan.

West African states with large Muslim populations saw little formal Islamist mobilization in the twentieth century compared with Arab Muslim states, demonstrating significant differences in mobilization across regions. Even within West Africa, countries with similar religious compositions have quite different experiences with religious mobilization. The protests and violence that accompanied debates over Islamic law in Northern Nigeria, and which led to the subsequent rise of the fiercely militant Islamist Boko Haram movement, are largely absent in neighboring states that also have northern Muslim populations. Despite prominent discussion of the role of Islamic law after Nigerian independence, mobilization in support of Islamic law was muted or absent for decades. Why did it reemerge in the 1990s, and why has support for Islamist militancy in Nigeria increased in recent years? By contrast, why has dominantly Muslim Senegal avoided Islamist violence, and also seen virtually no electoral mobilization on behalf of Islamist political parties?

Similar questions can be raised about variations in Islamist militancy (militancy is defined here simply as the use of political violence) in the Middle East. Why has the organization that calls itself the "Islamic State" been so successful at mobilizing militants on behalf of a violent, state-building jihad in Iraq in Syria, while its influence remains neglible in most areas of the Middle East? Why did a dominantly peaceful, non-Islamist opposition in Syria in 2011 transition to an almost entirely Islamist set of militant actors fighting the Syrian regime beginning in 2012? Likewise, why did Islamist militancy spread after the overthrow of Muammar Qaddafi in Libya, while it has remained more muted in neighboring Tunisia and Algeria?

The puzzling comparative variation in cases such as those highlighted here is the product of a combination of factors with qualities that are unique to the history of each case. One of the purposes of this study is to highlight the diversity of contexts and types of religious and political mobilization that occur across the Muslim world. While highlighting the range and diversity of Islamic political behavior, this study also seeks to systematically measure variations in Islamist mobilization across a wide range of countries and regions. This is done with two purposes: first, to provide an accurate description of the range of religious–political (Islamist) mobilization outcomes across the Muslim world; and second, to provide a foundation for building theory about the sources of Islamist political mobilization more generally.

THE FRAMEWORK OF THIS STUDY

This study attempts to explain variation in Islamist mobilization by trying to answer two broad questions. First, what factors best account for varying levels

and types of Islamist political mobilization across countries? Second, what factors best account for varying levels and types of Islamist political mobilization in the same country over time? In answering these questions, I seek to examine competing theories of Islamist mobilization and provide a new, institutional theory that I believe captures a significant portion of this variation, though certainly not all of it. Although one study cannot comprehensively evaluate the claims made by a wide range of competing theories, the aim here is to assess observable implications of competing claims through comparative analysis. In the process, a theoretical perspective is presented that seeks both to integrate previous theoretical arguments and to challenge arguments that receive little support across a range of cases.

The study utilizes comparative analysis on two levels. The first level takes a broad look at a defined population of relevant cases. The cases under consideration consist of all global polities whose self-defined domestic Muslim population is at least 25 percent of the polity's total population. A cutoff of 25 percent was selected to avoid including countries in which Muslim populations do not have a realistic hope of obtaining a significant measure of state power.[4] This yields 57 polities for analysis, 55 of which are currently in the global system.[5] In the large number of countries with Muslim populations less than 25 percent of the total, any Islamic mobilization is largely mobilization either for minority rights or for secession. These objectives are here considered theoretically distinct from mobilization to gain state power, as they include mobilization around a narrower set of policy concerns and a general lack of interest in building broad coalitions or mobilizing large sections of society on behalf of their interests. Countries with proportionately small Muslim populations were thus excluded in order to avoid distorting the results for the largely Muslim countries that are the central interest of the study. The remaining population of 57 polities is examined through both statistical and comparative historical analysis to yield general patterns of Islamist mobilization across space and time.

The second level of analysis uses largely qualitative research methods to closely examine three particular cases of interest: the experiences of Algeria, Turkey, and Senegal. The cases were chosen for the following theoretical reasons. First, they demonstrate a range of variation across the dependent outcome of Islamist political mobilization. Broadly speaking, Algeria in the late 1980s and 1990s represents a case of very high Islamist mobilization, Turkey in the 1970s to early 2000s represents a case of moderate levels of mobilization, and Senegal represents a case of low Islamist mobilization throughout the period since independence. The chosen cases should therefore provide evidence supporting the range of possible outcomes. Second, the cases exhibit considerable variation on possible explanatory variables highlighted both in existing theories and in the institutional theory presented here. These include differing levels of economic development, ethnic and linguistic backgrounds, colonial experiences, Islamic historical experiences, types of Islamic institutions, levels

of urbanization, levels of political openness, types of political institutions, and levels of government stability. Third, despite this variance, these three cases share several important commonalities that serve as control variables and keep the comparison from being too loose to make causal inferences. Notably, all the cases have dominantly Muslim populations, have extensive ties to the non-Muslim West, have traditions of state secularism, and have had experience with electoral politics.

Finally, out of several possible cases that might fit these criteria, Algeria, Turkey, and Senegal each has distinct attributes that provide particular leverage on the research question. In Algeria, the level and success of Islamist political activity rose rapidly in a short period of time, and came to dominate Algerian politics throughout the 1990s. Algeria has arguably witnessed both the highest level of electoral support for Islamist parties (in the early 1990s) and the largest number of deaths in political violence by explicitly Islamist actors in the modern period, at least prior to the Syrian civil war (2012–present).[6] Additionally, Algeria in the 1990s provides some insight into the conditions under which electoral mobilization can be transformed into mass protest and long-term political violence.

Turkey represents a mid-range case, where Islamist mobilization (primarily electoral mobilization) has been present for decades and has shown significant variation in levels of political success. Turkey is the most enduring case in the Muslim world of Islamist actors actively participating in democratic politics. Likewise, it demonstrates better long-term variation in Islamist electoral success than any other case. Turkey also has historically had a unique regional divide in electoral support for Islamically oriented political parties, falling very roughly between its Eastern and Western regions, which allows for greater control in assessing the determinants of Islamist support. The Turkey chapter in this project is the richest chapter in data presentation and in discussion of an Islamist political party tradition that endured from the 1970s to the early 2000s. After 2002, Islamist electoral politics shifted in interesting ways, both diluting and consolidating the impact of Islamist actors.

In contrast to Algeria and Turkey, Senegal represents a case with comparatively low levels of Islamist political mobilization. Sub-Saharan Africa is a regional outlier in which Islamist mobilization has played a relatively minor part in politics, with a few notable exceptions. Senegal, however, has comparatively strong Islamic institutions and a civil society largely dominated by Muslim brotherhoods. Among sub-Saharan countries,[7] one might expect that Senegal would be most likely to have experienced Islamist mobilization in politics, and yet it has not done so to a significant degree. Senegal therefore provides some insight into sub-Saharan cases and other countries with low formal Islamist mobilization.

Data collected both across the larger population of Muslim countries and in the individual case studies in the period from 1970 to 2010 demonstrate

the diversity of historical experience with Islamist mobilization. This diversity is manifest in the type of mobilization that occurs as well as in the levels of mobilization over time. Comparison across the cases highlights patterns of mobilization in the past four decades that enable us to assess many prominent (if overly general) theories of Islamist mobilization, including religious, structural, incentive-based, grievance-based, and social movement theories.

The core argument of this study is that three explanatory factors are individually necessary and jointly sufficient to account for the majority of Islamist political mobilization in Muslim countries during the four decades from 1970 through 2010. The factors are the development of *Islamic common knowledge* through the social penetration of Islamic religious institutions, *opportunities for religious entrepreneurship* due to a misalignment of institutional incentives between "religious entrepreneurs" and the state, and the creation of *public focal points* at the state level, which channel religious common knowledge into collective action. These factors generally are found in three separate types of institutions: the development of common knowledge is achieved through *diffuse Islamic institutions*, incentives are generated at the level of *hierarchical Islamic organizations*, and focal points are created by the *state*. This theory seeks only to explain the dominant form of Islamist mobilization, which is domestic mobilization by Islamist oppositions. It does not account for all mobilization and provides less leverage in explaining either transnational Islamist movements (such as Hizb al-Tahrir or al-Qa'eda) or mobilization directly generated by Islamist governments (as in Iran or the Sudan).

The theory suggests a process by which religious (and/or political) entrepreneurs make decisions regarding whether or not to politicize Islam in a context of religious common knowledge about symbolic meaning and appropriate behavior. Their efforts to politicize Islam achieve success when they are not effectively policed by religious elites and when they coincide with focal state events that can channel political protest into an Islamist framework.

Religious common knowledge is more likely to lead to Islamist mobilization in contexts where it extends deeper into a potential constituency and centers around appropriate communal behavior. This kind of Islamic common knowledge can be exploited by political entrepreneurs promoting a vision of sacred authority that includes engagement with the state. Political entrepreneurs claiming sacred authority have opportunities to politicize Islamic common knowledge under conditions of fragmented religious and political competition, and when they cannot be effectively policed by religious superiors. By contrast, Islamist actors that have access to state rent in the form of subsidies, economic agreements, or employment have low incentives to politicize Islam.

Political and religious entrepreneurs who make the decision to politicize Islam depend upon events at the level of the state that frame their activities and serve as focal points for substantial protest mobilization. Prominent focal

events include crises of confidence in the state that contrast with Islamic conceptions of justice, piety, order, and communal protection. Under conditions of certain state crises, protest can be effectively channeled into Islamist organizations. Alternatively, events that signal new policies of political openness, such as founding elections, may also serve to channel protest into an Islamist framework. Through this process, Islamic norms are introduced in support of political arguments. The incorporation of religious common knowledge into political communication lowers the costs of collective action, which is subsequently coordinated through focal public events at the state level.

These processes depend on individual incentives interacting with shifting institutional arrangements that build Islamic common knowledge, opportunities for religious entrepreneurship, and public focal points for collective action. When these conditions are simultaneously present, it is likely to lead to mass Islamist political mobilization.

The study proceeds as follows. Chapter 1 starts by engaging with the difficult conceptual terrain of political Islam, discussing the key theoretical assumptions of the study, and defining the core dependent variable: *Islamist political mobilization*. It then turns to a brief overview of some of the foundational scholarship on political mobilization and existing categories of arguments about the sources of specifically *Islamist* political mobilization. This is followed by Chapter 2, which builds an original theoretical framework for understanding variation in Islamist political mobilization, detailing the aforementioned hypotheses about the role of rational incentives for mobilization in an institutional context.

Chapter 3 presents the range of cases in which the argument is considered to hold. A descriptive account of Islamist mobilization across the Muslim world is outlined, with general observations regarding the prevalent forms of mobilization and variations in the amount of mobilization across regions. Statistical and comparative historical analyses are used to identify broad patterns in mobilization outcomes and their correlates. The implications of an institutional theory and its alternatives are then evaluated within this broad cross-national context.

Chapter 4 examines the possible sources for low mobilization in certain regions, and particularly in sub-Saharan Africa, by looking in detail at the case of Senegal. Although Senegal has strong Islamic social institutions, it has historically had very low levels of Islamist political mobilization. The chapter discusses the reasons and incentives for a historical alliance between Islamic brotherhoods and the state, the effects of a social structure fragmented by brotherhood allegiances, and the characteristics of Sufi Islamic organization that create disincentives for traditional Islamist mobilization. The emergence of an urban Senegalese Islamist movement in the 1990s is discussed, highlighting the reasons for its limited impact on Senegalese politics. The chapter also provides a brief comparison of Senegal with Mali in this context.