# Fiscal Sovereignty of the Member States in an Internal Market

**Past and Future** 

Edited by Sjaak J. J. M. Jansen



Law & Business

#### EUCOTAX Series on European Taxation

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#### Preface

Recent decades have seen an increasingly rapid pace of globalization, with the economies in the various countries becoming ever more closely entwined. This has created worldwide markets on which individual countries have little, if any, influence. That in turn is resulting in their sovereignty becoming eroded. Meanwhile the sovereignty of individual countries is also coming under pressure because of the establishment of international organizations such as the World Trade Organization (WTO), which have restricted countries' sovereignty in specific policy areas. So, too, has the creation of the European Union gone hand in hand with the transfer of some of the sovereignty of the Member States. The introduction of the Economic and Monetary Union, for example, resulted in Member States transferring their powers to determine their own monetary policies to the European Central Bank. Now the only areas in which European Community (EC) Member States can still determine how to structure their economies for themselves are their spending and labour market policies and taxation. This may be one of the reasons why Member States are so attached to the principle of fiscal sovereignty and why the requirement for unanimity in this policy area is so cherished. With twenty-seven Member States, however, it is becoming increasingly difficult, if not impossible, to achieve unanimity in the field of fiscal policy.

Although the EC countries have retained national sovereignty in tax matters, a consistent line of decisions by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) requires them to exercise these powers consistently with the higher Community law. In other words, the Member States are not wholly autonomous. This in turn creates tensions. In its decisions the ECJ has sometimes made it painfully clear to Member States that certain tax regulations are not consistent with Community law. Member States also have to deal with the issue of the prohibition on state aid. According to ECJ case law, fiscal measures can certainly be regarded as state aid. Legislators introducing fiscal stimulation measures benefiting domestic or foreign investors consequently

also have to consider whether the specific measures are in compliance with the state aid provisions in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).

Competition in direct taxation has intensified within the European Union as a result of tax sovereignty and Member States no longer being able to determine their own monetary policies. This issue was investigated by an international group chaired by the Financial Secretary to the UK Treasury, Dawn Primarolo. The group's report, which was published in 1999, identified the Netherlands as the leader in the field of harmful tax competition. The fierceness of this competition has not decreased since this report was published. On the contrary, the accession of a number of new Member States in May 2004 seems only to have intensified it. The focus of the competition seems, however, to have shifted from competition on tax bases to competition based on tax rates. As are other Member States, the Netherlands is playing a full part in this battle.

Another significant development is the merging of the Member States' economies into a single, large economy (the 'internal market'). An internal market assumes the existence of a level playing field, where production factors can move freely. The internal market has major implications for national taxation laws as there are clearly tensions between the demands that an internal market places on national regulations and the question of national sovereignty in the field of direct taxation.

These various developments were one of the reasons prompting the Tax Law group at the Erasmus University's School of Law in Rotterdam to set up its 'Fiscal autonomy and its boundaries' research programme. One of the subprogrammes involved researching the effects of Community law on national and international tax law. This book is a report on one of the subprogramme projects, which examined the sovereignty of Member States within the European Union.

The focus of the project was not only on taxation. Instead we sought to approach the issue from a wider angle. In Chapter 1, for example, developments in states' sovereignty are considered from a broader perspective. Although the sovereignty of states can be viewed from various angles, it is only sporadically looked at from the perspective of the European Union. Chapter 2 consequently examines how the European Union is funded since a state having its own sources of funding is an absolute precondition for its being able to exercise sovereignty. Chapter 3 looks at the question of the current and possible future effects of the internal market on the fiscal sovereignty of Member States. An important feature of an internal market such as the European Union is the ability to move freely within this market, and so Chapters 4 (free movement of workers), 5 (freedom of establishment) and 6 (free movement of capital) consequently focus on these freedoms as they are provided for in the TFEU. Globalization and the internal market have meant a rapid increase in the numbers of cross-border movements of labour, services and capital, with states having to negotiate with each other and agree on treaties if they are to avoid double taxation. Chapter 7 examines the limits that European law imposes on Member States' policy sovereignty in matters of international tax law. European law not only affects taxes imposed by central governments as its influence also extends to taxes levied by local authorities, and this subject is examined in Chapter 8. Chapter 9 contains some final thoughts on the subject, while also taking a brief look at the future and the consequences that the Treaty of Lisbon may have for Member States' fiscal sovereignty.

The articles in this were finished in the period between January till 30 November 2009. Therefore the old EC and EU treaty was the basis for these articles. Since 1 December 2009, the new treaties, Treaty on European Union (TEU) and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), became effective. Therefore, we have also mentioned the articles of the TEU and TFEU.

The editor is very grateful to the authors: Fabian Amtenbrink, Helena Raulus, Peter van der Hoek, René Barents, Bruno Peeters, Ben Kiekebeld, Daniël Smit, Arnaud de Graaf, Maikel Evers and Henk van Arendonk.

Sjaak J.J.M. Jansen Rotterdam, December 2009

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