THE ESTABLISHMENT
RESPONDS

POWER, POLITICS, AND PROTEST SINCE 1945

Edited by

**Kathrin Fahlenbrach, Martin Klimke,
Joachim Scharloth, and Laura Wong**

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THE ESTABLISHMENT RESPONDS

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Foreword

"A Delicate Balance": Protest Movements, Global Transformations, and the World Orders since the 1960s

Akira Iriye

In 1916 the English mathematician and philosopher Bertrand Russell wrote a letter to President Woodrow Wilson, appealing to him to try to bring the European war to an end. "If a plebiscite of the nation were taken on the question whether negotiations should be initiated, I am confident that an overwhelming majority would be in favour of this course, and that the same is true of France, Germany, and Austria-Hungary." Russell believed that the "Press ... is everywhere under the control of the Government," but that in "other sections of Society feeling is quite different." But he recognized that "public opinion remains silent and uninformed, since those who might give guidance are subject to such severe penalties that few dare to protest openly, and those few cannot obtain a wide publicity."[1]

Russell himself was to spend two years in prison because of his antiwar activities. His example anticipated the state-society relationship that was to characterize many countries' histories in the subsequent decades. But he also encountered a different experience when he visited China shortly after the war (and his release from prison). There he felt social forces, especially those guided by the educated ("a civilized Chinese is the most civilized person in the world," he noted), were more powerful than the government and that sooner or later they would revolutionize their country.[2] This, too, was a development that would repeat itself during the twentieth century; society would overwhelm the state, replacing the latter with a new political structure, thus in turn becoming a new state (and giving rise to new social movements).

As the chapters that follow reveal, the state-society relationship is infinitely variable. In many instances it exists in a precarious balance. To borrow from a literary example, Edward Albee's play "A Delicate Balance" may be taken as an apt description of this state of affairs. Written in 1966, the drama exemplified one important aspect of the decade, the breakdown of authority, or the challenge posed to the political and social order. In this drama, a delicate balance has been maintained by a family whose core members are an aging couple living in a middle-class suburban home. Both the husband, a retired businessman, and his wife try to preserve some sense of order in their life, a task that

has become complicated as the wife's sister, an alcoholic, has moved in. The couple have lost their only son, and their only daughter, age thirty-two, has been divorced three times and is being separated from her fourth husband. Not a very enviable circumstance, and eventually the "delicate balance," maintained by familial norms, certain words, even facial expressions, and gestures that they all understand, breaks down when they are visited by another couple, close friends of the husband and wife, who have become frightened for no particular reason and decide to move in with this family.[3]

The story, with its purely domestic context, may be irrelevant to the world elsewhere, but we may nevertheless see it as suggestive of the sense, which was widely felt in the 1960s, of the breakdown of the delicate order that had held the nations and societies more or less together in the post–World War II world. For the generation that had experienced World War II, the new "realities" in the postwar era—notably the Cold War, decolonization and nation-building, economic reconstruction and growth—had been familiar themes that everybody understood and could relate to. At least to those living in the liberal capitalist democracies in the West, the world appeared to be getting better—more stable, more prosperous, and more just than anything they had experienced before the war. Even for others, however, it could be said that most individuals identified with their respective countries, within each of which they recognized some basic structure of politics and social relations. Whether living in one of the industrial democracies or in a developing country, in a capitalist welfare state or under a communist dictatorship, whether enjoying a middle-class way of life oriented toward consumerism or condemned to agrarian poverty, individuals could define themselves in familiar frameworks and relate to the world in terms of some shared vocabulary. In short, there existed some recognizable order on the basis of a delicate balance between state and society.

As was the case in Albee's play, the delicate balance maintained by familiar words, gestures, and ways of life was never entirely orderly or stable, and it was always subject to internal tensions and fissures. Indeed, the years after 1945 are usually understood in the framework of the Cold War that had always contained the possibility of turning into a third world war, which certainly would have been the end of any order. As a recent opera titled "Dr. Atomic" suggests, history seemed to have entered a new phase with the first successful explosion of nuclear devises in July 1945. In Peter Sellars's libretto, Robert Oppenheimer who oversaw the development of the first atomic bombs, says, a few minutes before the explosion, "there are no more minutes, no more seconds! Time has disappeared; it is Eternity that reigns now!"[4] A sense of order calibrated by time seemed to have come to a stop. But at least one could make sense of the contemporary world in such a framework and then go on living. There was certainty in uncertainty. Moreover, wars, whether cold or hot, had been familiar themes in modern history, just as family crises and domestic violence had always been present in social relations. These crises, whether domestic or worldwide, could still be comprehended within the framework of some balance.

The delicate balance breaks down when even the concept of balance is no longer relevant, when the precarious equilibrium that had underlain social relations becomes unhinged so that one must look for new ways of understanding what is happening. What the protest movements of the 1960s and beyond

did may be seen as a large-scale version of such a phenomenon. The protests served to push the already precarious equilibrium off the cliff, to unbalance completely the familiar national as well as world orders. In a sense, the world-wide protest movements served the role that the two visitors in Albee's play did, to act as a catalyst for disruption, disorder, and transformation.

So the inevitable question, just as in Albee's play, was whether a new order would emerge to reestablish some balance. The chapters in this volume describe how the "establishment"—the state, business leaders, educators, and the like—sought to do so. Their task was complicated, however, because the world in which the balance might, or might not, be restored and reinforced began to change drastically in the wake of the protest movements of the 1960s. States and societies remained, but both now operated in an environment in which global, transnational forces were altering the ways in which the state-society relationship was worked out.

In this connection, it would be useful to note what David Edgar, a play-wright, has written of the 1960s: "With millions of others, I saw in the worldwide youth revolt of 1968 the prospect of a world without poverty, exploitation and war, and the possibility of my generation bringing that uto-pia about."[5] That such a world has not emerged is less important than the fact that, especially since the 1970s, such a vision of "the generation of 1968" has never disappeared and has, in some instances, even prodded governments in various parts of the world to take these objectives seriously. There emerged something like a shared perception of goals and ideals across national bound-aries, promoted both by states and civil societies. The world was entering a phase of globalization and transnational movements to such an extent that the state-society balance now had to be worked out not just within nations but also throughout "the planet earth," an idea about the world community that emerged in the wake of man's first trip to the moon in 1969.

Global and transnational forces had long existed, but it was in the last decades of the twentieth century that they came to challenge the world of independent states, questioning the traditional formulas and agendas for order and balance. One can see this in the rapid march of technological and eco-nomic globalization; in the steady expansion in the number and size of non-state actors such as multinational business enterprises, religious institutions, ethnic identities, and nongovernmental organizations; and in the worldwide concern with such issues as environmental degradation, energy shortages, and human rights that were not soluble within separate national communi-ties and had to be dealt with by the international community as a whole. To the extent that nations, non-national entities, and individuals everywhere cooperated in coping with these human as well as ecological problems, a new global balance would come a step closer to realization. Any domestic order would have to be an integral part of the global order.

In promoting a new balance in state-society relations in an increasingly transnational world, we may need to go back to the ideas of humanity and civilization. As Bruce Mazlish has noted, in the 1915 condemnation of the Armenian genocide, the governments of Britain, France, and Russia invoked these ideas, coupling "humanity and civilization" in opposition to acts of barbarism.[6] To be human was to be civilized, and vice versa. Since then, the

concept of humanity has become internationally accepted, as most explicitly seen in the worldwide support, at least in principle, for the promotion of human rights. Since the 1970s, moreover, the idea of "human security" has gained currency, the point being that the basic needs of individual humans, be they physical or spiritual, political or economic, should be the concern of all countries, whose pursuit of often conflicting national security agendas should not stand in their way. Human rights, human security, and humanitarian missions to help global migrants and refugees, who today account for 5 percent of the total population, suggest that the notion of humanity is here to stay, from which it would not be possible for states or societies to free themselves.

As Mazlish has pointed out, however, somehow "civilization" has dropped out from the coupling of "humanity and civilization." But it need not be. We would do well to consider bringing the idea of civilization back to contemporary discourses on human affairs. Quite often civilization is presented as a plural noun, "civilizations." That reflects the idea that there are a number of different civilizations, some of which may be compatible with one another but others may be in conflict. Throughout the twentieth century, much was made of the alleged conflict among civilizations, and even today some hold on to that view. To counter such determinism, others, notably the United Nations, and in particular UNESCO, have been promoting dialogue among civilizations, an effort that is based on the idea of diversity among human beings. On the other hand, others continue to use the term civilization in the singular, to connote the essential sameness of all humans and their achievements.

The concept of civilization is as old in India, China, and elsewhere as in the West and suggests that for centuries people have differentiated between civilization and barbarism. No matter where they are, they have shared the notion that in order to live with one another they must engage in what Europeans in the nineteenth century called "civilized intercourse." That would include tolerance for diversity and mutual understanding as well as cooperation to promote common well-being. If the protest movements in the second half of the twentieth century—and the establishment's responses to them—meant anything, it must certainly have been to prod them both to rediscover the critical imperative of civilized intercourse. As Ian McEwan, the contemporary British writer, wrote in *Enduring Love* (1997), "Observing human variety can give pleasure, but so too can human sameness."[7] The search for common humanity across national, political, cultural, and social boundaries will continue, even as states seek to maintain some semblance of order among increasingly divergent populations.

Notes

1. *The Autobiography of Bertrand Russell: The Middle Years, 1914–1944* (Boston, 1969), 23.
2. Ibid., 173.
3. Edward Albee, *A Delicate Balance* (New York: Penguin Books, 1997).
4. Peter Sellars, "Doctor Atomic" (Lyric Opera of Chicago, 2007/2008 season), 12.
5. David Edgar, "Pentecost," Stratford Festival of Canada, August 3 to September 21, 2007, program note, 5.
6. Bruce Mazlish, *The Idea of Humanity in a Global Area* (New York, 2008).
7. Ian McEwan, *Enduring Love* (New York, 1997), 4.

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Introduction

Kathrin Fahlenbrach, Martin Klimke, Joachim Scharloth, and Laura Wong

In a speech on worldwide student unrest, the executive secretary of the Inter-Agency Youth Committee Robert Cross in 1968 discerned five factors that separated current youthful unrest from its historical precedents. According to Cross, "quantitative growth, democratization of education, 'post-modernism,' the education explosion and the creation of a 'youth class'" distinguished student activism at the end of the 1960s. Due to its global dimension and an increasing utilization of violence, governments worldwide suddenly paid attention to this phenomenon after years of polite yet largely unsuccessful requests for change voiced by the students. What was even more significant was that, in Cross's view, students had formed the "first truly international generation":

> A steady stream of student activists have become internationally self-perpetuating and multiplying. [...] The 1968-style international student movement is international not because it is organized but rather because young people in many countries are facing the same human problems and applying the same basic approaches to their solution. It is equally certain, however, that a great cross-fertilization, a very rapid and effective student grape-vine, functions. What happens in New York is known overnight in Paris and Manila. The speeches of Rudi Dutschke are in the hands of Mark Rudd faster than you can seem to get your mail delivered.[1]

For Cross, this meant that neither universities nor policymakers could afford to ignore this young generation any longer. Despite the obvious dangers of disorder, overly rapid change, a public backlash, and constant disturbances of the peace, student unrest, in his interpretation, was by and large constructive. As "a brutally honest critic of our world and ourselves," the student activist therefore provided an indispensable contribution for the development of society when put to good use by political decision-makers:

> He is, this unrestful student, our ally for he cries out for change, for equality, for justice, for peace, for morality, for honesty—as we do beneath our facades of experience and maturity and, often, callousness. He only seems to be an enemy because he tends to shame us into thinking anew

and aloud the long dormant thoughts and dreaming the long buried dreams of a bright future that we too once harbored.

If we can learn to let him speak freely—
If we can truly listen to what he says—
If we can try to understand what he means—
If we can react to his purposes and not his effrontery—
If we can use wisely his outcry as a stimulus for needed change and over-due improvement held back too long by inertia and vested interests—
then, the unrestful student of the twentieth century may become that long sought for change agent needed to bring about the modern, free, peaceful, just world we are all seeking.[2]

Cross's analysis of student protest at the end of the 1960s is particularly telling in two respects. First, it acknowledges the global collective identity and connectivity of the student movements. Second, it frankly recognizes that this wave of dissent had become a phenomenon that the government could conveniently co-opt and utilize to foster policy objectives.[3] Consequently, Cross's analysis fittingly illustrates the complex relationship between the "establishment" and protest movements that had emerged after World War II.

As long as there have been formalized structures of government, there have been acts of protest and social movements directed against their actions or their very existence, provoking a dynamic of interaction between protesters and representatives of these institutions. Social movements are, in fact, most often defined in relational terms, as "collectivities acting with some degree of organization and continuity, partly outside institutional or organizational channels, for the purpose of challenging extant systems of authority, or resisting change in such systems, in the organization, society, culture, or world system in which they are embedded."[4] Protest phenomena that fit this definition can be found in abundance in the period from 1945 to 1990, for example: the June 1953 workers' uprising in East Germany, the revolts in both Poland and Hungary in 1956, the student movements of the late 1960s in the West, the efforts to generate a "socialism with a human face" of the Prague Spring in 1968 in Czechoslovakia, as well as the Polish Solidarity movement of the early 1980s and the so-called Velvet Revolutions of 1989/1990, to name but a few.

As junctures of the Cold War, these expressions of dissent and the response they provoked from governments and society shaped postwar history. With respect to the 1950s, for example, the events of 1953 in East Germany led to a tightening of government control, ideological as well as physical repression, and the build-up of a close net of domestic surveillance.[5] In Poland, on the other hand, the revolts in June and October 1956 not only transformed Warsaw's comprehensive ideological grip on all parts of Polish society and put an end to mass terror, but also channeled Polish patriotism and reconfigured Soviet-Polish relations with the appointment of the new first secretary Wladyslaw Gomulka.[6] Imre Nagy, his Hungarian counterpart, by contrast, was unable to manage popular discontent in his country enough to ward off a Soviet invasion.[7] All of these events profoundly affected international relations and foreign policy strategy, leading U.S. diplomats, among other things,

to engage in a major review of "liberation" and "rollback" ideology and to grudgingly accept the Soviet line of "peaceful coexistence."[8]

Yet protest movements also managed to transcend the bipolar geopolitics of East and West during the Cold War, and continue to affect global policymaking today. Since 1945, protest movements and activist networks have impressed their positions to affect policy outcomes and legislation on a whole host of issues ranging from nuclear proliferation, the implementation and enforcement of human rights, the international trade with illegal "blood diamonds," as well as the proliferation of landmines.[9] Furthermore, global perspectives have likewise influenced the reactions of official decision-makers. Decolonization, for example, not only transported conflicts from the periphery to the colonial nations when many immigrants from the so-called Third World moved into them, but also shaped the response of local officials and law enforcement agencies to domestic protest, as can be seen in the case of the massacre of Algerians in October 1961 in Paris and the strategies employed by the local prefect of police Maurice Papon.[10] Along the same lines, East German officials in 1989, when faced with domestic demonstrations that escalated in size and intensity, seriously considered a "Chinese solution" modeled on the vicious crackdown on dissidents in Tiananmen Square in June of that year.[11]

In many of these conflicts, the "establishment" itself became the target of protesters. This term, of course, is problematic, and already engendered ample debate among the editors, contributors, and reviewers of this book. Its origins can be found in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century descriptions of (legal) church structures in England. American writer and philosopher Ralph Waldo Emerson also used it frequently in the nineteenth century.[12] It gained prominence again through Rose Macaulay's 1923 novel *Told by an Idiot* and, more importantly, through the conservative British journalist Henry Fairlie, who defined it in a 1955 newspaper column as not only "the centres of official power ... but rather the whole matrix of official and social relations within which power is exercised," insisting that the "exercise of power in Britain (more specifically, in England) cannot be understood unless it is recognised that it is exercised socially."[13]

The British media picked up on Fairlie's use of the term, which gained even wider currency with the 1965 publication of *The Established and the Outsiders*, a sociological study by Norbert Elias and John Scotson on the social community structures of a suburban area near an industrial city in central England.[14] In the context of C. Wright Mills's "power elite" and Herbert Marcuse's "one-dimensional man," two formative texts of the New Left, the protest movements of the late 1960s subsequently adopted and popularized the expression to describe existing power structures in society.[15] Writing in October 1968, even Henry Fairlie himself saw the success of the term in the dissent of the young generation and the rise of the counterculture. In his view, protesters were drawn to this label because it appeared to confirm their defeatist outlook and conspiracy theories. With their being disillusioned by the state of society and their seeming inability to change it, he saw the concept serving as "an infantile replacement for the political utopianism that no one any longer has the heart to nourish."[16]

Despite its illustrious career and continuing utilization from various sides of the political spectrum, we have decided to retain the term in the title of our book, following the *Oxford English Dictionary's* definition of "establishment" as "a social group exercising power generally, or within a given field or institution, by virtue of its traditional superiority, and by the use esp. of tacit understandings and often a common mode of speech, and having as a general interest the maintenance of the status quo."[17] In doing so, we neither proclaim it to be a theoretically sufficient concept nor a methodologically all-encompassing one. Rather, our aim is to use it as a starting point to foster interdisciplinary discussion about the broad impact of social movements, activist networks, and protest phenomena on social, legal, political, as well as cultural and economic structures as exemplified by the contributions in this volume.

The extremely rich scholarship on social movements has always involved the in-depth exploration of their elements, actors, dynamics, repertoire, cognitive and emotional orientations, contexts and conditions, as well as capacities for mobilization.[18] In our current understanding, social movements emerged as distinctive players in public politics during the second half of the eighteenth century in Western Europe and North America. Three interrelated features characterize them as agents in the political field; they are considered "campaigns of collective claims on target authorities; [...] array[s] of claim-making performances including special-purpose associations, public meetings, media statements, and demonstrations; [... and] public representations of the ... worthiness, unity, numbers, and commitment" of the causes they advocate.[19] Whereas previous movements may have shared some of these features, the combination of all three is what many scholars have come to see as a necessary qualification for "full-fledged social movements."[20]

Although individual acts of dissent, singular mass meetings, open letters, and such that fail to coalesce into more comprehensive campaign efforts or sustained engagements with the public sphere are not included in traditional analytical frameworks dedicated to movement research, they nonetheless form part of the larger field of contentious politics.[21] Only recently have the dynamics of reciprocal actions and the larger repercussions they initiate in domestic institutions and cultures, as well as in the area of international relations, become the subject of systematic scholarly inquiry.[22] Research on their short- and long-term consequences, however, is still grappling with a variety of conceptual and methodological challenges.[23] Given the elusive nature of protest movements, this is hardly surprising. One major obstacle to attaining a comprehensive picture is the plethora of transformations that may (or may not) have been initiated, influenced, or shaped by social movements, so that it often seems challenging if not impossible to come to a clear understanding of their impact. Scholars have started to point to how movements affect the state and the legal system, public and national policy, the cultural field, as well as domestic and international norms.[24] They have also begun to assess biographical consequences and the effects of sociopolitical structures on the mobilization and repertoire of protest movements.[25] However, it is striking that sociologists and political scientists largely dominate this literature. Despite the quality of these works and their treatment of historical topics, there seems to be very little dialogue with a number of other disciplines,

including history, anthropology, and media and communication studies. Representatives of these disciplines, in turn, even when writing about protest movements, often shy away from considering the theoretical and methodological tools applied in the field of social movement research. While the separation of the disciplines undoubtedly has its heuristic value and merits, it might prevent us from producing a more nuanced understanding of how movement and "establishment" interactions trigger social, cultural, and political transformations.

The aim of this volume is to provide such an integrated approach, focusing on the manifold reactions protest movements have triggered since 1945. Drawing on contributions from a wide range of disciplines, it seeks to illustrate the many ways in which political parties, economic players, foreign policymakers, and the intelligence community have experienced, confronted, and even contributed to domestic and transnational forms of protest. Presenting an alternative analytical framework that integrates various social actors (institutionalized politics, the media, academics, law enforcement, and intelligence agencies), the book seeks to showcase the entanglements of protest movements with all parts of society. As such, it is an attempt to promote future interdisciplinary debate.

In this spirit, the first section of this book introduces analytical models and approaches to protest movements and institutional responses to them. Marco Giugni and Lorenzo Bosi start by presenting the major theoretical and methodological trends in the research of social movement outcomes. Differentiating between political, cultural, and biographical impacts—both for movement participants and the society they are embedded in—they highlight the gaps and obstacles in the current literature, pointing, for example, to the issue of effect stability, interrelated and unintended effects, and causal attribution. Giugni and Bosi call for a more reflective comparative perspective across countries and movements that would transcend a mere accumulation of case studies. Their aim is to shift the focus to the long-term processes and reciprocal mechanisms that determine the impact of protest, both by looking at grassroots action and by the "establishment" response.

Ralph Negrine then focuses on the significance and development of professional communication strategies among protest movements and their utilization to achieve specific goals. Juxtaposing an environmental campaign from the 1980s with more recent examples of grassroots activities, Negrine explores how advances in alternative and online media have expanded the media repertoire of today's social movements. He illustrates how activists, facilitated by the traditional mainstream media and the rapid spread of information and communication technology, have transformed previous forms of mobilization, thereby posing new challenges to their opponents. In his view, future research needs to take into account the publicity activities as an essential resource in the professionalization of dissent and its political communication, paying particular attention to the relationship between applied media strategies and the makeup and objectives of protest groups.

Nicole Doerr and Simon Teune sharpen the focus on mediatization by presenting a model for investigating the effects of visual codes on social movement outcomes. Using the "Sword into Ploughshares" emblem of the East

German peace movement of the 1980s as an example, Doerr and Teune illustrate the central role images and iconography play in contentious politics. Drawing on the "pictorial" and "iconic turn" in the humanities, they characterize the visual as a space of contestation and images as crucial signifiers in domestic and international struggles for recognition. Whereas scholars have traditionally highlighted the textual at the expense of the visual, Doerr and Teune include visual tools and markers as a vital component in any understanding of the contexts of movement activities, their framing work, as well as the construction of collective identities, thereby underlining the value of systematic empirical studies in this area.

Finally, Ellen Messer-Davidow rounds out the opening theoretical section with an analysis of the institutionalization of academic feminism, which provides an account of how a protest movement can converge with an establishment institution. Detailing the dissemination of feminist ideology and activism across U.S. campuses in the first half of the 1970s, Messer-Davidow describes the rapid growth of the academic field from the first formal publications to academic programs and the establishment of a vibrant discipline. In the battle for recognition, feminism and women's studies gradually carved out spaces for themselves by means of institutional representation at annual meetings of organizations such as the American Sociological Association (ASA) and the Modern Language Association (MLA). In addition to penetrating commissions and caucuses, feminist scholars and activists founded their own organizations (e.g., the Committee on the Status of Women and Sociologists for Women in Society), meetings (e.g., the Berkshire Conference of Women Historians), and publication outlets (e.g., *Women's Studies* or *Feminist Studies*). In retracing the discipline's efforts to balance between forming new and independent organizational structures and making difficult inroads into traditional associations and structures, Messer-Davidow offers a unique case study that sheds light on the ways that grassroots activism can transform knowledge structures and power relations.

The second section of the book explores the connection between protest movements and political change as well as transformations in legal norms. The first contribution by Manfred Berg evaluates the reaction of U.S. political elites to the African American Civil Rights movements from the late 1950s to the mid-1960s. Berg argues that our current image of the movement as a success story of democracy and racial integration tends to gloss over the deep-seated obstacles it faced at the time, which, among other things, included a largely indifferent or outright hostile court of U.S. public opinion. Highlighting the "Massive Resistance" and insistence on gradual reform in the South, Berg recounts how Southern politicians such as George Wallace adjusted their electoral strategies to exploit widespread antipathy toward the civil rights struggle, thereby playing into popular sentiments of miscegenation and race wars. Likewise, Berg points to the reluctance of both the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations to intervene in local racial disputes. Despite the global damage segregation and racial discrimination wrought on the image of the United States, it was primarily the domestic pressure of the African American grassroots mobilization that forced the white liberal Cold War establishment to act, leading to the "rights revolutions" of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the