


SARAH B. K. VON BILLERBECK

WHOSE PEACE?

LOCAL OWNERSHIP & UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING



OXFORD

Whose Peace?

Local Ownership and United Nations Peacekeeping

Sarah B. K. von Billerbeck

OXFORD
UNIVERSITY PRESS

OXFORD

UNIVERSITY PRESS

Great Clarendon Street, Oxford, OX2 6DP,
United Kingdom

Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford.
It furthers the University's objective of excellence in research, scholarship,
and education by publishing worldwide. Oxford is a registered trade mark of
Oxford University Press in the UK and in certain other countries

© Sarah B. K. von Billerbeck 2017

The moral rights of the author have been asserted

First Edition published in 2017

Impression: 1

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in
a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the
prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted
by law, by licence or under terms agreed with the appropriate reprographics
rights organization. Enquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the
above should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the
address above

You must not circulate this work in any other form
and you must impose this same condition on any acquirer

Published in the United States of America by Oxford University Press
198 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016, United States of America

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
Data available

Library of Congress Control Number: 2016939411

ISBN 978-0-19-875570-8

Printed in Great Britain by
Clays Ltd, St Ives plc

Links to third party websites are provided by Oxford in good faith and
for information only. Oxford disclaims any responsibility for the materials
contained in any third party website referenced in this work.

Whose Peace?

To Nikolas,
who works harder every day than I ever did on this book

Acknowledgments

This book would not have been possible without the intellectual, financial, and moral support of a wide array of people and institutions, many more than I can list here.

My greatest intellectual debt goes to Richard Caplan, for his enthusiasm, support, and patient guidance for this project in its earlier guise as a doctoral thesis. I would also like to thank the many individuals who generously took time from their busy schedules to provide feedback or serve as examiners for me, including Dominik Zaum, John Gledhill, Jennifer Welsh, Neil McFarlane, Jochen Prantl, Yuen Foong Khong, Duncan Snidal, Amy King, Christine Cheng, David Zarnett, Julia Amos, and Johanna Boersch-Supan. Their thorough readings and thoughtful comments significantly focused my own thinking and provided inspiration and new ideas. I also owe a debt of gratitude to the Clarendon Fund, Nuffield College, the Cyril Foster Fund, and the Department of Politics and International Relations at the University of Oxford, whose generous financial support made this research possible. I would also like to thank the three anonymous reviewers whose close readings and detailed feedback were invaluable in preparing the manuscript. Finally, thanks are due to the editorial and production teams at Oxford University Press for their hard work and support of this project.

A very sincere thanks also goes to the many individuals in New York, Democratic Republic of Congo, the UK, and elsewhere who agreed to be interviewed as part of my research, for candidly and thoughtfully sharing their insights and perspectives; and a special thanks goes to Denis, without whose little red Peugeot and encyclopedic knowledge of the back roads of Kinshasa, I would have missed most of my appointments.

My greatest thanks goes to my family: to my parents and Omayya, who have encouraged me, advised me, and celebrated with me in every endeavor I have ever undertaken; to Moose, my little companion in adventures around the world, who snoozed loyally by my side for most of the time that I wrote this and who I sorely miss; to Günther, whose belief in me is unwavering, who always makes me laugh, and who always reminds me when it's time for a double-decker bus ride; and to Nikolas, Frida-Sofia, and Magdalena, who are the lights of my life.

List of Abbreviations

ACABQ	Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions
AFDL	Alliance de Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo
AMP	Alliance pour la Majorité Présidentielle
ANC	Armée Nationale Congolaise
AU	African Union
BNUB	United Nations Office in Burundi
CIAT	Comité International d'Accompagnement de la Transition
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
CNDP	Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple
CONADER	Commission Nationale de la Démobilisation et Réinsertion
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration
DDRRR	Disarmament, Demobilization, Repatriation, Reintegration, and Resettlement
DEMIAP	Détection Militaire des Activités Anti-Patrie
DIAG	Disarmament of Illegal Armed Groups
DPA	Department of Political Affairs, United Nations
DPKO	Department of Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations
DPET	Division of Policy, Evaluation and Training, United Nations
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
EU	European Union
FAC	Forces Armées Congolaises
FARDC	Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo
FAZ	Forces Armées Zaïroises
FDLR	Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda
FRPI	Forces de Resistance Patriotiques en Ituri
ICC	International Criminal Court
INPFL	Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia
ISSSS	International Security and Stabilization Support Strategy

List of Abbreviations

MDRP	Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Programme
MLC	Mouvement pour la Libération du Congo
MONUC	Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies en Congo
MONUSCO	Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies de Stabilisation en Congo
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NPFL	National Patriotic Front of Liberia
NPFL-CRC	National Patriotic Front of Liberia-Central Revolutionary Council
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OHR	Office of the High Representative, Bosnia
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PBC	Peacebuilding Commission, United Nations
PBSO	Peacebuilding Support Office, United Nations
PNTL	Polícia Nacional de Timor-Leste
PPRD	Parti du Peuple pour la Reconstruction et la Démocratie
PRS	Poverty Reduction Strategy
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
RBB	Results-Based Budget
RCD	Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie
RCD-G	Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie-Goma
RCD-K/ML	Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie-Kisangani/Mouvement de Libération
RPF	Rwandan Patriotic Front
SAT	Selection Assistance Team
SIDA	Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
SMART	Senior Mission Administration and Resources Program
SOFA	Status of Forces Agreement
SRSG	Special Representative of the Secretary-General
SSR	Security Sector Reform
STAREC	Stabilisation et Reconstruction des zones sortant des conflits armés
UDPS	Union pour la Démocratie et Progrès Social
ULIMO	United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy
ULIMO-J	United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy-Johnson
ULIMO-K	United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy-Kromah

UN	United Nations
UN ECHA	United Nations Executive Committee on Humanitarian Affairs
UNAMA	United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
UNAMID	African Union/United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNMIBH	United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina
UNMIL	United Nations Mission in Liberia
UNMISS	United Nations Mission in South Sudan
UNMIT	United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste
UNPOL	United Nations Police
UNTAET	United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor
USAID	United States Agency for International Development



Map No. 4007 Rev. 10 UNITED NATIONS
July 2011

Department of Field Support
Cartographic Section

Map 1. The Democratic Republic of the Congo.

Source: United Nations, *Democratic Republic of the Congo*, Map No. 2007, Rev. 10, July 2011. <http://www.un.org/Depts/Cartographic/map/profile/drcongo.pdf>. Reproduced with permission.

Table of Contents

<i>List of Abbreviations</i>	xi
<i>Map 1. The Democratic Republic of the Congo</i>	xiv
1. Introduction	1
2. Conflicting Normative and Operational Imperatives: A Conceptual Framework	16
3. The Evolution and Discourse of Local Ownership	28
4. Understandings of Local Ownership	48
5. Operationalizations of Local Ownership: Practices	78
6. Operationalizations of Local Ownership: Actors	91
7. Local Ownership: A Discursive Tool?	114
8. Local Ownership: An Operational Obstacle?	127
9. Conclusion	146
Annex I: List of Interviewees	157
Annex II: List of UN Peacekeeping Operations, 1948–2016	163
<i>Bibliography</i>	171
<i>Index</i>	199

Introduction

National and local ownership is critical to the successful implementation of a peace process. In planning and executing a United Nations peacekeeping operation's core activities, every effort should be made to promote national and local ownership and to foster trust and cooperation between national actors. Effective approaches to national and local ownership not only reinforce the perceived legitimacy of the operation and support mandate implementation, they also help to ensure the sustainability of any national capacity once the peacekeeping operation has been withdrawn.¹

The above quotation, from the 2008 *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines*, known as the Capstone Doctrine, of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), reflects what has become a near orthodox commitment to local ownership in United Nations (UN) peace operations in post-conflict states. Similar rhetoric surrounding local ownership can be found in any number of DPKO guidelines, best practices, and lessons learned documents, as well as in the mandates of current peacekeeping operations throughout the world, all of which endorse local ownership as a key principle of peacekeeping.² Advocates of local ownership of peacekeeping assert that it renders peacekeeping more legitimate and more sustainable by preserving host-country consent; protecting UN impartiality; ensuring that reconstruction

¹ United Nations, *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines* (Capstone Doctrine) (New York, United Nations, Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support, 2008), 39.

² See, for example, United Nations, Capstone Doctrine; United Nations, A/63/881-S/2009/304 (2009), *Report of the Secretary-General on Peacebuilding in the Immediate Aftermath of Conflict*; United Nations, A/65/747-S/2011/85 (2011), *Civilian Capacity in the Aftermath of Conflict: Independent Report of the Senior Advisory Group*; and United Nations, *Handbook on United Nations Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations* (New York: United Nations, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Best Practices Unit, 2003). With a few exceptions, UN mission mandates do not usually employ the term local ownership, but reiterate that the primary responsibility for governance and security lies with the government of the host country.

efforts are rooted in indigenous structures, culture, and norms; and building local capacity.

Because of these purported benefits, local ownership has emerged as one of the leading principles shaping peacekeeping operations today. In a 2011 meeting of the Security Council, local ownership was recognized “not only as a moral imperative but also as a pragmatic necessity for legitimacy and sustainability.”³ The 2009 UN *Report of the Secretary-General on Peacebuilding in the Immediate Aftermath of Conflict* puts ownership at its heart, also calling it an “imperative” in peacebuilding.⁴ The 2011 UN report *Civilian Capacity in the Aftermath of Conflict* similarly makes national ownership the first of its four operational recommendations, noting that international interventions should nurture existing national capacities as much as possible and support national institutions “from within.”⁵

The culmination of this emphasis on ownership within the UN is, perhaps, the creation of the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) in 2005, which puts local ownership at the center of its doctrine. To be on the agenda of the Commission, a member state must request it, and a compact is then concluded between the Commission and the state. Countries may also be referred to the Commission by the Security Council, the General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council, or the Secretary-General, but again, the state’s consent is required. Moreover, the Commission is not an operational body, but one that acts in an advisory capacity for the Security Council and the General Assembly, meaning that leadership of program design, implementation, spending, and evaluation rest with the government of the concerned state. The local ownership approach to peacebuilding is thus codified by the PBC as one the UN must take, and Security Council Resolution 1645, which established the Commission, affirms “the primary responsibility of national and transitional Governments and authorities of countries emerging from conflict or at risk of relapsing into conflict... in identifying their priorities and strategies for post-conflict peacebuilding, with a view to ensuring national ownership.”⁶

Yet despite the widespread use of the term, local ownership remains remarkably understudied and, to date, understandings of ownership have been based primarily on assumptions and normative beliefs held broadly in both the policy and academic communities. These assumptions and beliefs appear to be sound, justified, and even commonsensical, and it is difficult to argue with the perceived advantages of local ownership in peacekeeping. If international

³ United Nations, S/PV.6630 (2011), *Proces-Verbaux of 6630th Meeting [provisional]: Maintenance of International Peace and Security*, 2.

⁴ United Nations, A/63/881-S/2009/304, 1.

⁵ United Nations, A/65/747-S/2011/85, 10.

⁶ United Nations, S/RES/1645 (2005).

actors “do” everything for local actors—that is, ensure security, build institutions, draft and uphold legislation, and encourage reconciliation—not only will the peacekeeping process be perceived as externally imposed and hence illegitimate, it is also likely to fail once the UN departs, as national actors will have been unable to build the necessary capacity to continue what the UN has begun. Accordingly, without local involvement, peacekeeping will both lose legitimacy and be less sustainable over the long term.

However, despite these purported benefits, the UN has failed to realize local ownership in the broad way in which it is presented in discourse. Instead, the UN often relegates local actors to a secondary role in peacekeeping, and aside from a select group of elites, they tend to be excluded from decision-making and implementation. This selective approach to ownership in turn prevents the generation of legitimacy and sustainability that a more inclusive approach to peacekeeping is thought to bring. In short, the UN both conceptualizes and operationalizes local ownership in ways that undercut the very benefits it claims local ownership bestows.

Argument in Brief

Why does the UN advocate for local ownership based on a set of purported benefits while operationalizing it in a way that undermines the achievement of those very benefits? I argue that the primary reason for this is that peacekeeping brings two key UN obligations into conflict, one normative—the upholding of national self-determination—and one operational—the maintenance of international peace and security.

Much of the emphasis on local ownership in peacekeeping relates to a deeper normative dedication to the principle of self-determination within the UN. As an organization, the UN has long been a proponent of this principle and of the corollary principle of non-interference in the domestic affairs of member states. At the same time, the UN has an operational responsibility to take action—including, at times, the deployment of armed peacekeepers to war-torn states—when situations are deemed to constitute a threat to international peace and security. However, international intervention, by definition, violates the principles of self-determination and non-interference, forcing the UN into a situation where it must either not act and violate one set of institutional imperatives, or act and violate another. The emphasis on local ownership, then, may be viewed as an attempt by the UN to reconcile these conflicting imperatives. By giving local actors a leading role in peacekeeping, the UN can minimize the degree of imposition entailed by its operations and maintain the ability of local actors to determine their own political path, even in the context of international intervention.

However, as this book will show, because it is a contradictory and contested concept and gives rise to its own set of operational challenges, local ownership only enables the UN to paper over that difficulty. More specifically, while discursively local ownership may seem like an appropriate solution to the violation of institutional principles entailed by peace operations, in practice the UN perceives the excessive devolution of responsibility for peacekeeping to local actors to put at risk two key operational goals—the liberalization of the post-conflict state and the delivery of demonstrable outputs in the short term—goals that the UN links to its responsibility to maintain international peace and security and that it is therefore under obligation to achieve. As a result, the UN adjusts and limits local ownership both conceptually and in practice, relying on it primarily as a discursive tool for legitimation but not an operational principle for effective peacekeeping.

However, this restrictive approach to local ownership in practice brings the UN's actions into sharp contrast with its discourse, which depicts local ownership as entailing the broad and open inclusion of national actors in peacekeeping and a relatively high degree of deference to their aspirations and wishes. Because of this gap between the UN's words and deeds, the UN's attempts to create legitimacy through discourse fail to persuade local actors, suggesting that the UN's discursive efforts appear to be more successful as a tool of internal self-legitimation than one able to generate perceptions of legitimacy among national actors. Moreover, because of variability in the ways that the UN operationalizes local ownership, the UN not only deepens the curtailment of self-determination and the degree of external imposition on the host country, it also undercuts its ability to realize the very operational goals it is trying to protect by constraining ownership, thus also limiting any legitimacy it may derive from operational effectiveness.

Ultimately, while local ownership may be theoretically sound at first glance, it is not well understood and is actually a deeply contested concept, one that does not lend itself to easy definition, one that can be translated into practice in many different ways, and one that, at its broadest, is linked to the conflicting operational and normative imperatives that face the UN. While it may be able to reconcile the clash between intervention and self-determination "in theory," it does not enable the UN to actually eliminate this underlying tension, and its operationalization of the concept is ultimately detrimental to both its ability to adhere to the principles of self-determination and non-imposition *and* to its operational effectiveness.

These arguments do not imply that local ownership has no positive value whatsoever, that it cannot foster legitimacy and sustainability, preserve self-determination, and mitigate external imposition. Nor does it imply that the UN's emphasis on local ownership is misguided or imprudent, that the UN is "wrong" to include or exclude local actors under certain conditions, or that

local ownership should be jettisoned as a principle of UN peacekeeping operations. But because ownership is advocated so pervasively, it merits critical examination in order to determine how the concept is understood, how it is operationalized, how these understandings and practices do or do not lead to expected effects, and what they reveal about the motivations of the UN in peacekeeping.

Scope of the Book

The perception that local ownership may help to overcome the tension between the UN's normative and operational obligations in peacekeeping and thus boost its legitimacy and sustainability has informed UN peacekeeping policy to a large extent, but to date, the UN has proclaimed these positive benefits without describing the mechanisms that allegedly produce such effects, specifying the conditions under which this correlation holds, or providing convincing empirical evidence that ownership does indeed boost legitimacy and sustainability by protecting self-determination and minimizing external imposition. The claims that no peacekeeping effort will be sustainable if it is not directed by national actors or that peace and good governance cannot be externally imposed are echoed by scholars, but they are grounded neither in a careful theoretical and empirical analysis of the relationship between international and national actors in the post-conflict space and their differing perspectives on peacekeeping and ownership, nor in an examination of how the UN translates the idea of local ownership into practice. Indeed, because local ownership both as a concept and as a policy is thought to be understood and considered to be logically sound, it is rarely questioned, deconstructed, or analyzed, and is instead generally taken for granted by international peacekeepers.

Worse, exactly what local ownership is remains unclear, despite its frequent invocation in peacekeeping scholarship and policy discourse. According to Simon Chesterman, local ownership refers "in a . . . vague way to the relationship between stakeholders," hazily suggesting the need to include national actors in some way in international peacekeeping activities.⁷ When, how, and exactly who should be involved, remain underspecified, and the UN offers no coherent definition of its own, despite its persistent emphasis on it.⁸ In addition, neither the UN nor other analysts make reference to *local*

⁷ Simon Chesterman, "Ownership in Theory and in Practice: Transfer of Authority in UN Statebuilding Operations," *Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding* 1, no. 1 (March 2007): 4.

⁸ Béatrice Pouligny, "Local Ownership," in *Post-Conflict Peacebuilding: A Lexicon*, ed. Vincent Chetail (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 175.

understandings of local ownership, to whether these coincide with UN understandings, and to whether local actors feel a sense of ownership of the peacekeeping process in their country, points that are critical to determining if local ownership indeed functions as UN discourse suggests.

Additionally, though local ownership discourse has been present in peacekeeping for more than a decade, few multidimensional peace operations have conclusively “achieved” ownership, in the sense of having an implementation process that grants a significant degree of agency to local actors, effects an eventual full transfer of authority to them, or both. Many UN staff admit that local ownership in peacekeeping complicates or even impedes the achievement of the UN’s operational objectives, most importantly the establishment of liberal democratic political systems in the post-conflict country and the more immediate delivery of demonstrable results, such as the disarmament of combatants and collection of weapons, the undertaking of military patrols, the holding of elections, the passing of legislation, and the running of public sensitization campaigns.⁹ More importantly, despite the heavy emphasis on local ownership in recent peacekeeping discourse, the same period has not been marked by demonstrable changes in the legitimacy levels of UN missions, the long-term sustainability of their efforts, or the efficiency and rapidity with which goals are achieved.¹⁰ In other words, it remains unclear how to operationalize the principle of local ownership for peace operations in a way that will both increase their sustainability and legitimacy and enable the UN to realize its operational goals.

This “failure” of ownership is indicative of a disjuncture between policy theory and actual practice: while local ownership may make sense in theory, as described, it often fails to produce its intended practices and effects. “Good” policies that are theoretically sound can still lead to “bad” outcomes because of differences in understanding, contradictory goals and obligations, and problems in implementation, which bridges beliefs, intentions, and effects.¹¹ In the case of local ownership, for all the logical soundness of the concept in

⁹ The results-based budget (RBB) exercises that UN peace operations undertake provide a good overview of the types of demonstrable outputs that missions seek to deliver. These tend to be measured quantitatively, for example, the number of patrols undertaken, the number of meetings held with various national and international interlocutors, the number of weapons collected, or the number of police trained. For financial performance reports that show progress on these outputs, see, for example, United Nations, “ACABQ Reports: MONUC United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo,” <<http://www.un.org/ga/acabq/documents/all/572?order=title&sort=asc>>.

¹⁰ Legitimacy in peacekeeping can, of course, derive from a variety of sources (as well as crumble for a variety of reasons), but according to the discourse of local ownership, the degree to which local actors are involved in peacekeeping should make a significant and visible difference to legitimacy levels.

¹¹ See David Mosse, “Is Good Policy Unimplementable? Reflections on the Ethnography of Aid Policy and Practice,” *Development and Change* 35, no. 4 (2004): 640–1.