


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外文筆記 29

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外文筆記
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* Il y eut à la cour de France des "noms du roi" jusqu'à Louis XIV en
comité par Baileau, Art. I de son que Louis XIV garda quelque temps. Op. p.
** Op. p. 152 No 147 Op. p. 152 Op. p. 152 296

Les mois, les années s'écoulent inutilement. "Je n'y puis, dit-il, rien, et je
n'y comprends rien; il ne s'agit que de faire qu'ils s'attachent et qu'ils se
parlent." Je vous dis, moi, que j'y vois clair et que j'y comprends tout: ils
se sont parlés.

87. Il ne semble que qui sollicite pour les autres a la confiance d'un homme
d'un homme qui demande justice, et qu'en parlant on en agissant pour
soi-même on a l'embarras et la pudence de celui qui demande, &c.

88. Dans cent ans, le monde subsistera encore en son entier; ce sera le
même théâtre et les mêmes décorations; ce ne seront plus les mêmes acteurs.
Tout ce qui se jouait sur une scène regne, ou ce qui s'effrite et se dés-
espère par un désas, tous auront disparu de dessus la scène. Il s'avance
désormais sur le théâtre d'autres hommes qui vont jouer dans une même
pièce les mêmes rôles; ils s'évanouiront à leur tour; et ceux qui ne
sont pas encore, un jour ne seront plus; de nouveaux acteurs ont pris leur
place. Quel fond à faire sur un personnage de comédie! 80

101. La ville de plaisir de la province, la cour d'honneur de la ville, et jadis
de la cour. Un esprit s'en va à la cour le goût de la solitude et de
le repaître. **

Ch. IX. Des Grands

256
1. La préférence du peuple en faveur des Grands est si aveugle, et l'entêtement
pour leur geste, leur visage, leur ton de voix et leurs manières si gêné-
ment, s'ils s'avisaient d'être bons, cela ira à l'idolâtrie.

257
2. Je leur [les Grands] cède leur femme chère, leurs riches ameu-
blements, leurs chaises, leurs chevaux, leurs singes, leurs nains, leurs
jouis et leurs flatteurs; mais je leur envie le bonheur d'être à

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Findlay, p. 330 on 'The cunning of reason'. T.L.S., June 11, 1976, p. 708 on The British
 opium traffic to reverse the adverse balance of trade with China. "The strange German missionary
 & Karl Gutzlaff played an important role, on the grounds that the 'traffic would send ultim-
 of ately to the introduction of the gospel'. A noble & notable American missionary referred to English
 A.C. naval forces as 'God's fleet' & spoke of opium & thirty-two packmen as 'the instruments of
 the Divine Will'." *Le Progres de la Conscience*, II, p. 423: "A quasi-
Esprit de Goethe et avait sauté dans la bataille de Valmy le début d'une ère
 nouvelle, si c'est pour se jeter dans la sérénité olympienne, dans la fièvre
 placide, du fonctionnaire, qui éblouit la première extraordinaire, en effet,
 "Capitaine du petit Caporal? A quasi-*bon* Hegel, porter en soi l'ultime
bon, de la logique et de l'histoire, de l'art et de la religion, si c'est pour en
 pp. 277 *bon* venir la voir dans un empereur qui parle des *Weltgeist* zu Pferd?"
 Rosenberg on Hitler's assumption of the Chancellorship on 1 Jan. 1933: "On this day,
 "it can be finally said, Hegel died" (*New Statesman*, 18 Feb. 1977, p. 219).
 Fortunate Fall, *Marginalia*, to Brandt, III, 5, "Heterogenie der Zwecke". Albert L. Gairard,
Art for Art's Sake, pp. xxviii: "Technique, the inevitable companion
 of art, easily turns into its enemy. If it grows over-conscious, it
 becomes tyrannical"; pp. 231-2: "We have in our organism a sizeable
 amount of chalk, iron, water; but a bit of chalk, a lump of iron,
 a pocket of water, are diseased conditions. Similarly, technique,
 information, ideas & ideals of art are elements of strength if they
 of *Marginalia* are duly integrated; they become morbid symptom if they are
 to *Hegel* alien matter imbedded in the living flesh. As Ortega y Gasset
Des Soudains put it, a work of art may hold much "ecology in solution".
 in *Deutsche* *Dichtung* *Lambert*, *Studies in Rebellion*, p. 74: "What Belinskij found in Hegel was the
 5.186 worship of the power of history, which turns every actual historical moment into an
 ideal, & which modern man has vulgarized in the delectable practice of 'adap-
 himself to circumstances': whatever happens is inevitable in virtue of 'dialectical
 necessity'."
Bot P. A. Schilpp, ed., *The Philosophy of Santayana*, p. 11: "That which repelled me in
 of Hegel, Browning, etc. was the survival of a sort of forced optimism & pulpity
 of function, by which a cruel & nasty world was nevertheless set up as the model of
 what ought to be. The duty of an honest moralist would have been rather to dis-
Hegel *judicial*, in this mixed world, the part, however small, that could be loved &
 chosen from the remainder, however large, which was to be rejected & denounced."
 p. 58, George Eliot has Adam Bede declare: "Good come out of it!... That doesn't alter the evil

of Jean Vauvenargues: "La clarté est la bonne foi des philosophes", cf. D.R. 32402
 (Jean Paul, *Vorschule der Ästhetik*, §45) [X-10-5-6-2] (A. Thibaudet, *Reflexions*
 sur la Critique, p. 165).

J. N. Findlay, Hegel: A Re-Examination

17 a brief but rounded account. To provide a guiding thread through the tortuous intricacies of Hegel's principal writings. 18 Germany has fitted him into an uncontested place in its historic culture, high in the centre with Kant & above all faction & party. France has excelled all previous Hegelian studies in the objectivity, the scholarship & the illumination of M. Jean Hyppolite's excellent translation & commentary *Phénoménologie de l'Esprit de Hegel*. Despite his condemnation of Hegel, Kierkegaard's views might have come straight from one of Hegel's own phenomenological studies. 19 The wanton obscurity of his language & Hegel only acquired a tolerably lucid style after he had been lecturing for some years at Heidelberg & Berlin, & by then his 2 greatest philosophical works — *The Phenomenology of Spirit* & *The Science of Logic* — had been written. The absurd charge that Hegel was responsible almost wholly for the atrocities of Hitlerism. 20 The Hegelian Absolute is what is entirely present (*das durchaus Gegenwärtige*), what is on hand & actual, not something over above things or behind them (*etwas drüben und hinten*). It is not realized in a supramundane consciousness, nor in a timeless comprehensive vision, but in the creative activities & products of the artist, the faith & worship of the religious person, & the systematic insights of the philosopher. 21 The *Philosophy of Nature* makes it plain that Hegel believed in the existence of natural objects long before the advent of life & consciousness in the world. 22 There is as much materialism in Hegel as in Marx — just as there is certainly a strong strain of teleological idealism in Marx. 23 The purpose of Hegel is to see notions as embodying half-formed tendencies, sometimes conflicting, which other notions will bring out into the open. Self-contradiction is not necessarily negatory & self-stultifying. 24 The main contemporary
 ... I hate that talk of people, as if there was a way of making amends for everything

*cf. Emil Fackler: "Die Vernunft ist nur der durch die Phantasie erweiterte Verstand" (*Gesam. Werke*, ed. E. Rollett & A. Sauer, II, 144)

importance of Hegel lies in his recognition of the "open texture," the unclear corners of all living notions, the fact that they imply more than they clearly cover, & in the further fact that it is natural for them to move or develop in certain ways as soon as they are subjected to unwelcome pressures.²⁷ While modern thought ascribes to the freezing & exaggerating of tendencies implicit in current usage to the misunderstanding by philosophers of the fluid forms of our language, Hegel ascribes it to the "Understanding," the faculty of hard-&-fast abstract thought, which he opposes to the more fluid "Reason," *Vernunft*: "Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our understanding through the instruments of our speech" (*Philosophical Investigations*, I, 109). Hegel: "The battle of Reason consists in this, to overcome the rigidity which the Understanding has brought in" (Wallace, tr. of *The Lesser Logic* as *The Logic of Hegel*, p. 67).³⁰ In the Christian story of the Incarnation, Passion & Resurrection of Christ Hegel comes to see a personal expression of his central thesis: "But the life of Spirit is not one that shuns death & keeps clear of destruction; it endures its death, & in death maintains its being."³² Postentz owes a debt to the students on whose notes the published lectures on the *Philosophy of Religion*, the *Philosophy of History*, the *Philosophy of Fine Art* & the *History of Philosophy*: they show us Hegel untrammelled by the formidable easiness of his written style.³⁴ He dislikes preliminary statements of initial presuppositions. The principles of his philosophy must, he holds, emerge in its systematic development: they must be its outcome rather than its foundation. The

Hegel's obiter dictum on Man's generative organs in Hegel Heine's
Ludwig Börne, Buch IV of Hegel, *Philosophie der Geschichte*, § 97

* of Schelling on "Subjekt-objektivierung" & "Selbstaffirmation"
student, without any knowledge of the direction & goal of his reasoning, is lost
in the great wastes of repetitive explanations. ³⁸ Spirit is the only reality,
but it must confront itself with something seemingly alien, in order to see
through its self-deception, to become aware that it is the only reality. And the
creation & setting aside of this strange deception is ³⁹ moreover necessary
to Spirit, which could have no being without it. "Spirit" means both the
object & the subject of "self-consciousness". It is what I refer to by the pronoun
"I", that I am aware of when I am not merely absorbed in my
commerce with definite objects, but am also aware of myself as active in
dealing with them.

⁴⁸ There is no page from past philosophy on which Hegel sets so much store as on Meister
Eckhart's account of the divine thought as a *von* to *von* or thinking on thinking;
it is quoted at length at the end of the *Encyclopaedia*. He quotes with approval
Meister Eckhart: "the eye with which God sees me is the eye with which I see
Him," ⁴⁹ "my eye & His eye are one. In the meeting point of justice I am weighed in
God & He in me. If God were not, I should not be, & if I were not, He too would
not be" (*Phil. of Religion*, I, p. 228). Kant's "transcendental self-consciousness"
is undoubtedly an ancestor of Hegel's Spirit, but it is from Fichte's Ego that
the Hegelian notion of Spirit principally derives. ⁵⁰ The Ego posits objects as a
needful environment (*Ausgangspunkt*) because it requires resistance (*Ausgangspunkt*)
to elicit its own activities. *

⁶⁰ The kind of thought characteristic of a deductive system is the Understanding,
a thought distinguished by great fixity & definiteness of notions. It cuts off

the corners of our ideas, all the fine penumbra by which they shade into other ideas, or imply them without plainly including them: it also checks the tendency of our ideas & principles to shift & transform themselves into other ideas & principles when faced with unwelcome cases or questions. Having cut out our ideas in this manner, it proceeds to play various neat games with them, which are entirely successful just because their corners are of standard shapes, & fit perfectly into each other. The depreciating understanding goes back to Kant. The sciences & practical arts all involve understanding in their initial abstractions, & would be impossible without it. They must deal with their subject-matter from a peculiar, single standpoint, & must dismiss all other considerations as irrelevant. "Understanding is for Hegel the principle of all bourgeois virtues, the quality that makes a man stick to the duties of his calling. The cultivated man is not satisfied with anything nebulous & indefinite but seizes on objects in their definiteness, whereas the uncultivated man vacillates. 'Either & you...' (Wallace, p. 145). In *Phenomenology* (Baillie, p. 93) there is a passage in which Hegel even waxes lyrical in praise of the understanding with its "amazing power of the negative" in separating "the merely accidental". Understanding is the beginning of philosophy.⁶² Philosophy, having separated off aspects from the continuum of the unanalysed, must again allow these aspects to "pass over into one another."⁶³ Moore's emphatic quotation from Butler, "Everything is what it is & not another thing" — propounded to put an end to the "identities in difference" & the "organic unities" of the British idealists — is a typical expression.

* 中庸

of Understanding. The dialectical aspect of thought is the self-supersession of the finite determinations of the Understanding; "their inward tendency to go out of themselves" (Wallace, p. 147). One-sided abstractions demand to be complemented by alternative abstractions, which are often as antithetical as complementary. Dialectic becomes a reflective shuttling to & fro between notions known to be interdependent & correlative.⁶⁵ Hegel attributes dialectical process to "the world," to the heavenly bodies & political affairs (Wallace, pp. 148-50). Contradiction is the motive force of the world, & it is absurd to say that contradictions are unthinkable (Wallace, p. 223).⁶⁶ Dialectic is only a "moment" in philosophical thinking. If it overcomes the hard-&-fast notions & fixed presuppositions of the Understanding, it must itself be overcome in the higher thought of Reason or "Speculative Thought," which succeeds in uniting or reconciling & finalizing contradictions. If the Understanding has separated off & opposed blatantly, such pairs of concepts as "What appears to the senses" & "What exists in reality," "What pertains to something intrinsically" & "What pertains to something in relation to other things," etc., then the function of Reason is to integrate such notions into new unities, where will be shown to require each other & to be necessary conditions of each other.⁶⁷ The speculative or reasonable attitude in philosophy marks a thinking return to the unthinking reasonableness of ordinary & speech, as this had been before it was disrupted & fixed by the action of the Understanding. As Jorabito's content goes, the reasonable is so to be the exclusive property of philosophy, that it is rather present in all human beings" (Wallace, pp. 152-3). The disharmonies & contradictions are overcome only

* These occur in groups of three, the 3rd category being in a sense a combination of the two previous kinds, e.g. "Limitation" combines "Reality" & "Negation" of T. V. Seung, *Structuralism & Hermeneutics*, pp. 10-14 on the confusion of "Binary distinction" ("contradiction") & "Primary opposition" ("Contradiction") in Leibniz, Hegel, & Schlegel ^{or!} in the sense that they are seen to be necessary conditions of a reasonable mind, & so, in a sense, not overcome at all! ⁶⁸ We are reminded of those photographs in which several successive ballet-positions are projected on the same film. Reason sees together what in Dialectic are separate & incompatible. A dialectical rhythm essentially involves a tripling of stages. ⁶⁹ Hegel thinks it was one of the main merits of Kant to have rediscovered this ancient tripling & to have used it in drawing up his list of categories. Fichte had already read the triadic scheme into Kant & treated these relations in a series of threefold movements (thesis, antithesis & synthesis). The terms "thesis", "antithesis" & ⁷⁰ "synthesis", so often used in expositions of Hegel's doctrine, are in fact not frequently used by Hegel: they are much characteristic of Fichte. ⁷¹ The triads of Hegel's system vary vastly in their make-up. In some the second member of the triad is the direct & obvious contrary of the first (e.g. Being vs Nothing, Essence vs Appearance); in others the opposition is of a much less extreme character (e.g. Whole & its Parts). In some triads the 3rd member is an obvious choice as mediating between the other two (e.g. Measure synthesises Quality & Quantity). ⁷² In other cases the third member is merely one of the things in which the first two members could be united (e.g. Ground is said to mediate Identity with Difference). In yet other cases the reconciling functions of the third member are not at all obvious (e.g. Teleology reconciles the Mechanical & the Chemical, or the Unhappyetheroidness emerges out of Stoicism & Scepticism). There are many more triads in which the 3rd member emerges out of the 2nd member alone.

* of *infra* p. 193

↑ *the best read, I can & idea* - p. 50: "The aptest seems to be growing, restless & disappointed with his means" *with his means*

* of C. Day Lewis, *The Burned Day*, p. 62: "At the Mansion House I felt lost, deserted; trapped in an awareness from which I could not break out - a sort of transparent prison, like the empty jam-jar to the brick". *of*

Handmade in which it emerges out of the two previous members *conjointly* the dialectical transitions also differ vastly from case to case. Sometimes a term plainly involves an inner absurdity or contradiction which only the next term can remove (e.g. an inner Essence independent to outward manifestation). In other cases a term merely involves an incompleteness of which the next term furnishes the required complement (e.g. End leads on to the Means). In yet other cases a subsequent phase merely represents a more explicit version of some character obscurely manifested by its predecessor (e.g. self-adjusting purposiveness develops into conscious valuation). In yet other cases the transition resembles the passage from talk which obeys certain rules, to metalinguistic talk about that talk & about its rules (e.g. Being to Nothing). "It seems especially absurd to hold that contradictions not only exist in thought & language, but also in 'the world', since it is the very mark of a self-contradictory utterance that it describes nothing whatever. Hegel refers to the presence of opposed, antithetical tendencies which work in contrary directions & each aim at dominating the whole field & worsting ^{their} opponents, each which each also require these opponents in order to be what they are, & to have something to struggle with." Our notions & modes of speech have, in fact, not merely a "logical geography" but also a "logical dynamic". So when we define our terms we assert their "logical dynamic" artificially. Hegel may be said not merely to have anticipated many of the views that we now associate with the name of Wittgenstein, but even to have gone beyond these. Wittgenstein recognizes that philosophers suffer from a "mental cramp" engendered by the rigidities of ordinary language, & wants to dispose of these linguistic snags, to "show the flies the way out of the fly-bottle". *