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Empirical Research on Agricultural Alliance Stability:
an Example from "a Company + Farmers" Mode

涉农联盟稳定实证研究： 以“公司+农户”为例

符少玲 ■ 著



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“公司+农户”是农业产业化进程中一种典型的伙伴间联盟模式，实践中该联盟商品契约违约率高达80%，不利于农户持续性提高收入。因而，农业领域中联盟不稳定一直受到政府和农业经济学家的广泛关注。

对联盟的不稳定最早进行揭示的是 Franko，但直到20世纪90年代，联盟的不稳定才引起理论界的关注。Inkpen 和 Beamish 对联盟的不稳定做出了精确的界定，认为联盟的不稳定是联盟一方或多方未计划或未经深思熟虑的意外中止，这有别于联盟各方曾达成共识后的解体或清算，稳定是与之相对应的概念。

国外关于联盟稳定的研究主要关注其原因和影响因素，认为资产专用性、关系质量、环境不确定性、权力是影响联盟稳定的主要因素，不足之处是未能深入探讨联盟绩效与联盟稳定的关系。大部分学者认为联盟绩效高等同于联盟稳定，但实证研究中未能得到有力的支持。

对订单农业中联盟稳定的研究，农业经济学者是从商品契约履约的角度着手，一致认为：契约履约，联盟即稳定；契约违约，联盟即不稳定。国外学者对农业商品契约履约问题主要关注发展中国家（巴西、墨西哥、南非、波兰等），研究表明，信誉、专用性投资等对于提高履约率有很大影响。国内延续了履约的影响因素，认为资产专用性、市场不确定性、信誉、合约条款、合作的组织形式影响了履约率。但已有研

究仅是从理论与个案层面对联盟履约问题进行有价值研究，缺乏从企业和农户层面进行实证研究。

基于此，本书将弥补国外研究缺口，以联盟绩效作为切入点，在资源依赖理论、社会交易理论的基础上，构建“权力—信任、关系承诺—联盟绩效—联盟稳定”的分析框架，选取农业产业化框架下订单农业中的龙头企业和农户为调查对象，采用实证研究方法，研究、检验各变量间的关系，通过探明农业龙头企业和农户的履约影响因素，从而有效提高联盟主体履约率，对促进我国农业产业化向纵深发展具有十分重要的实践意义和理论意义。

研究结果表明：①经济性权力与信任之间的关系是不同的，即奖励权对信任负向关系不显著，惩罚权对信任负向关系显著。非经济性权力与信任之间正向关系显著，即专家权与信任之间正向关系显著，合法权与信任之间正向关系显著。因此，非经济性权力的运用可以强化公司或农户对对方的认同感，致力于共同解决问题，形成良好的合作氛围。而经济性权力中的惩罚权运用会增加付出的成本，必然会降低公司或农户对对方的信任，增加他们之间的渠道冲突，伙伴间的经营理念会背道而驰。因此，在公司和农户的合作过程中应尽量避免使用惩罚权。

②公司对农户使用经济性权力时，经济性权力与农户对公司的关系承诺之间关系不显著，并且还存在一定程度的正向影响，而公司使用非经济性权力战略与关系承诺有显著积极影响。农户对公司使用经济性权力时，奖励权与关系承诺之间关系不显著，且存在一定程度的正面影响，惩罚权与关系承诺之间关系显著。在合作过程中，农户可以使用专家权来影响公司对农户的关系承诺。③信任对关系承诺有显著正向影响，这说明信任能够促进合作伙伴价值观的认同和内化，对合作的长期导向有很重要的影响，而不会导致对外在报酬和利益的算计。④信任与联盟绩效有显著的正向关系，即信任与收入增加有显著正向影响，信任与成本削减有显著的正向影响。因此，应积极培育公司和农户之间的信任来增



加联盟绩效。⑤关系承诺与合作获得的联盟绩效有显著的正向影响,即关系承诺对公司或农户的收入增加有显著的正向影响,关系承诺对公司或农户的成本削减有显著的正向影响。⑥联盟绩效对联盟稳定有着显著的正向影响。当联盟能够持续地为合作伙伴创造价值时,合作伙伴退出联盟的意愿就会降低。

本书通过整合多个学科领域的概念和知识为订单农业这一重要课题的研究提供了跨学科、多视角的洞见和理解,丰富和深化了订单农业中联盟伙伴的理论体系。具体来说,本书的创新体现在以下几个方面:

①分别从公司和农户视角实证论证了联盟绩效和联盟稳定之间的正相关关系,弥补了这方面实证研究的不足。收入增加是正向影响联盟稳定的第一因素,其次是成本削减。说明农户或公司对收入增加的敏感强过成本削减,验证了联盟绩效从收入增加和成本削减考虑会更合理。交易成本理论单一地强调了成本的节约,忽视了价值创造,是该理论的不足,因此非常有必要从资源视角考虑价值创造,实证显示两个视角整合的探讨更有效。从联盟绩效入手,有利于抓住订单农业联盟伙伴关系稳定问题的实质。

②分别从公司和农户视角实证论证了信任、关系承诺对联盟绩效的正向影响。国内学者仅是从个案研究中提出关系治理在中国农村这个封闭环境中比正式合约能更有效约束机会主义行为,促进交易的自我执行,可以提高联盟绩效,本研究弥补了实证研究的不足。

③实证论证了权力分为经济性权力和非经济性权力两方面来考虑是非常必要的。实证显示权力的运用是“双刃剑”,既有消极影响,也有积极影响。实践中尽量避免使用惩罚权,多使用专家权和合法权等去影响合作方。

Abstract

“A Company + Farmers” is a typical alliance mode between partners in the process of agricultural industrialization. The default rate of the merchandise contract of the alliance reaches up to 80 percent in practice, which does not help farmers to sustainably increase their income. Therefore, the alliance stability in agricultural fields has caught the attention of government and agricultural economists.

Franco first revealed the instability of the alliance. However, the instability of the alliance has been ignored by theorists until the 1990s. Inkpen and Beamish precisely defined the instability of alliance as the instability of union that is an accidental suspension of insufficient planning or careful consideration of one side or more. They further argued that such concept is different from the dissolution or clearing after the coalition of parties have agreed, and that its opposite side is the concept of stability.

The foreign study on alliance stability that concerns its reasons and effect believes that asset specificity, relationship quality, environmental uncertainty, and power are the main factors that influence alliance stability. However, we did not explore the relationship between alliance performance and alliance stability further. Most scholars assume that the alliance with high performance is equal to its stability. However, this assumption is not strongly supported by empirical research.

The study of alliance stability in contract farming from the perspective of performing commodity contracts agrees that compliance with contract means a stable alliance, and the breach of contract means an unstable alliance. This deduction is also supported by agricultural economists. Foreign scholars will give more attention on developing countries (Brazil, Mexico, South Africa, Poland, and so on) if the issue is about adhering to the contract of agricultural products. Research indicates that reputation and specific investment significantly influence the improvement of compliance rate. The same is true in China, where thinking asset specificity, market uncertainty, and credit and contract terms affect the cooperative compliance rate of an organization. However, the existing research is based only on theoretical and single case level for the alliance compliance issues to be significant. It lacks empirical research on companies and farmers.

This study compensates for the shortcomings of study abroad and regard the alliance performance as an entry point, and construct the framework of “power-trust, relationship commitment - alliance performance-alliance stability” based on resource dependence and social exchange theories. Selecting agriculture leading enterprises and farmers who are under the framework of agriculture industrialization for the survey, using empirical research methods to study and test the relationship among the variables to explore compliance factors of agricultural leading enterprises and farmers. Promoting the practical and theoretical development of agricultural industrialization in China is very important.

The results are shown as follows. (1) Different types of economic power impact trust in different ways, indicating that reward power has not significantly negative influence trust but coercive power to trust is significantly negative. Non-economic, expert power and legitimate power are positively associated with trust. Therefore, the use of non-economic power can strengthen the identification of companies or farmers, devotion to solve problems, and formation of a good cooperation atmosphere. Meanwhile, the use of coercive power increases the costs



and will inevitably reduce the trust of the company and farmers, thereby increasing their channel conflict and causing business philosophy to be opposite. Therefore, the company or farmers should avoid using coercive power during collaboration.

(2) The relationship between company's economic power and farmers' relationship commitment is insignificant and has a positive effect when a company uses economic power on farmers. The effect on relationship commitment is significantly positive when non-economic strategy is used. When farmers use economic power on the company, the effect between reward power and relationship commitment is insignificant. Moreover, a positive influence exists to a certain degree. Meanwhile, the effect between the coercive power and relationship commitment is significant. Farmers can use expert power in the collaboration process to affect the relationship commitment of the company. (3) Trust has a positive effect on relationship commitment. Specifically, trust can promote recognition and internalization of the value of the cooperation partner, significantly affecting the long-term direction of the cooperation, instead of it leading to an external rewards and benefits calculation. (4) Trust has a significant positive relationship with alliance performance, a relationship caused by the significant positive effect between trust and increasing income and decreasing cost. Hence, we should foster trust between a company and the farmers to increase alliance performance. (5) Relationship commitment has a significant positive effect on alliance performance when cooperation is achieved. This finding indicates a significant positive relationship between relationship commitment and increasing income and decreasing cost. (6) It is a significant positive effect for the alliance performance on the union stability. The probability that partners will withdraw from the union will be reduced when the union continues to create value for partners.

This study integrates multiple disciplines and knowledge on contracting farming. Thus, this study provides interdisciplinary, multi-angle insight, and understanding, thereby enriching and deepening the alliance partners' theoretical

system of contracting farming. Specifically, the innovations of the study are as follows:

(1) This study investigates and empirically demonstrates a positive correlation between alliance performance and alliance stability from the perspective of companies and farmers. This study compensates for the lack of empirical research in this area. Income increase is the first factor that has a positive effect on alliance stability, followed by cost reduction. This result means that companies or farmers feel that income increase is more sensitive than cost reduction, and verifies that alliance performance will be rationalized from the perspective of income increase and cost reduction. Transaction cost theory is limited in that cost saving is considered whereas value creation is ignored. Thus, considering value creation from a resource perspective is necessary, and the evidence shows that the integration of the two perspectives is more effective. Starting from the alliance performance is helpful to seize the essence of partnership stability of contract farming. (2) This study explores and demonstrates the positive relationship between trust and relationship commitment of alliance performance from the perspective of companies and farmers. Domestic scholars from case study only proposed that the relationship governance in the closed Chinese rural is more effective than a formal contract to constrain the opportunistic behavior and promote self-executing transactions to improve alliance performance. Thus, the present study compensates for the lack of empirical research. (3) This study empirically demonstrates the necessity of dividing power into economic power and non-economic power. The evidence shows that the use of power is a “double-edged sword.” Specifically, the use of power results in negative effects as well as positive effects. In practice, the company and the farmers can avoid using coercive power and should use expert and legitimate powers to affect each other.

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1

绪 论



“公司+农户”是农业产业化进程中一种典型的伙伴间联盟模式。农业产业化经营自从二十世纪八十年代中期在我国山东等地区实施以来，逐渐在全国各地被采用、推广和普及。农业产业化经营是农业经营体制的第二次改革（牛若峰，1997），是中国农业发展的基本方向（杨明洪和孙继琼，2008）。但是，在农业产业化经营发展的过程中却出现了龙头企业与农户合作关系不稳定、违约率高的问题，严重阻碍了农业产业化经营的进一步发展，引起了理论界的广泛关注。

1.1 研究背景和意义

1.1.1 实践背景和意义

1978年发端于安徽的以建立家庭联产承包责任制为主要内容的农村改革已经进行30多年。在当时的约束条件下，倍加艰辛推出“包产到户、包干到户”的双包制度具有划时代的意义。它解决了集体生产固有的监督困境问题，激发了农户自主经营的积极性，带来中国农产品质量不断增创历史新高的纪录。但是，分散的农户生产很难适应市场的供求变化，如1983—1993年先后出现两次大的农产品卖难现象，昭示中国的农业生产已经遭遇市场约束。各地频繁出现的农民“丰产不丰收”现象暴露出小农户生产与大市场之间的内生矛盾，制约了农业增效、农民增收、农村增富的进程。

在不改变农村基本经营制度的前提下，如何让分散生产的小农户组织起来进入市场，已经成为各方共识。于是各种农业产业化经营方式应运而生（尹成杰，2002）。农业产业化经营作为一项制度创新，在农村经济改革的宏观背景以及企业发展的微观需求下产生，并逐渐在全国各地被采用、推广和普及。目前已形成了多种产业化经营模式，主要包括“公司+农户”模式和“公司+中介+农户”模式。

农业产业化组织类型虽呈现多样化，但不管哪种模式，都是以合同形式实现的农业产业化经营，所以有学者称其为“订单农业”。订单农业又称合同农业，是指通过长期或短期的合同实现龙头企业与农户的连接。其明显的特征是龙头企业与农户签订或松或紧的长期合同来取代一些临时性的市场交易，明确双方分别承担的责任和义务，但企业与农户仍保持各自独立的经济主体不变，他们之间是一种合作关系。订单对农户来说具有规避价格风险和销售风险的功能，对企业而言则有减少交易费用和分散经营风险的实惠，为双方互动产生正向协同效应提供了制度安排。

近几年来，我国订单农业的规模呈逐年扩大趋势，造就了一批有竞争力的市场主体，为充分发挥农村劳动力成本低的比较优势，创造有较强竞争力的名牌农产品，提高我国农业的市场竞争力发挥了重要作用。作为一种市场导向型的生产经营模式，订单农业有利于提高农业市场化程度，有利于引导农业结构的调整，有利于增加农民收入，有利于促进农业产业化经营，有利于加快农业科技进步。截至2012年底，以龙头企业为主体的各类产业化组织，辐射带动中国40%以上的农户和60%以上的生产基地。2012年底，中国有各类农业产业化龙头企业12万家。其中，种植业、畜牧业、水产业的龙头企业数量分别占总数的56.9%、27.4%和6.6%，所提供的农产品及加工制品占农产品市场供应量的1/3，占主要城市“菜篮子”产品供给的2/3以上（张红宇，2015）。

但是，在订单农业发展中，也存在许多问题，其中最为典型和比较严重的问题是合同违约行为频频发生，龙头企业违约现象和农户违约现象都严重存在，违约率高。据有关调查，在16984个存在合同关系的龙头企业