DONALD M. SNOW

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DEFENSE POLICY FOR A NEW INTERNATIONAL ORDER

Third Edition

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St. Martin's Press **New York**

Executive editor: Don Reisman
Manager, publishing services: Emily Berleth
Editor, publishing services: Doug Bell
Project management: Editorial Inc.
Cover design: Circa 86, Inc.

Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 94-65233

Manufactured in the United States of America.

9 8 7 6 5
f e d c b a

For information, write:

St. Martin's Press, Inc.
175 Fifth Avenue
New York, NY 10010

ISBN: 0-312-10595-9

Preface

The world has changed radically since the first edition of this book was published in 1987 and the second edition, in 1991. The first edition was written in the context of the Cold War. Any thaw in that environment was only a distant possibility, as leaders speculated leerily about the new Soviet leadership under Mikhail S. Gorbachev. But by the time the second edition was produced, the Cold War structure and its most obvious artifacts had crumbled: the Berlin Wall had fallen in November 1989, and the Warsaw Pact had voted itself out of existence effective July 1, 1991. The Soviet Union still existed as a formidable unit, however, and the failed coup against Gorbachev in August 1991 left observers on edge about the future.

The scene is far different now. Not only is the Warsaw Pact a bit of history, but most of its members have applied for membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) through the Partnership for Peace (P4P) program, as have a number of Soviet successor states. The Soviet Union is now 15 independent countries, most of which share a wary view of Russia.

Because international relations generally, and national security policy specifically, were dominated for over forty years by the Cold War, the end of that competition leaves a notable void that affects both policymakers and analysts. The national security problem, so focused and clear in the Cold War, has become blurred. Have American interests changed? What are the new threats, and how important are they to the United States? What are the roles and missions of American armed forces for the future? How many and what kinds of forces will be needed to face a new international order?

These are some of the questions addressed in this text. Because of the amount of change that was necessary to incorporate, this edition bears scant resemblance to the earlier ones. Eight of the chapters (Chapters 1 and 6 through 12) are entirely new; Chapters 2 through 5 have been updated to include the transition to the Clinton presidency.

Change is also reflected in the book's organization and contents. A new Chapter 1 suggests a new national security debate, conditioned both by a changed environment and a transition in national leadership. The changed environment is described as an international system of

two distinct tiers, each with different characteristics and each posing different national security problems and challenges. Chapters 2 to 5 are carryovers from the second edition, with updates.

Part II deals with how the world has been changing. Chapter 6 recounts the end of the Cold War and its residues. Chapter 7 takes a detailed look at the problem of security, national interests in an altered environment, and the array of instruments of national power available to deal with threats. Chapter 8 looks at the structure of threats in what I call the "Second Tier," a category fundamentally similar to the old Third World of the Cold War, and examines such topics as internal violence within countries, regional conflicts, and nuclear proliferation. Chapter 9 deals with nontraditional problems such as terrorism, transnational problems, and economic security.

Part III examines the implications of these changes for the U.S. national security system. Chapter 10 looks at the whole concept of collective action in the form of peacekeeping and what I call "peace imposition" (but what the United Nations calls "peace enforcement"), with specific application to Bosnia, Somalia, and the ongoing protection zones in Iraq (notably, Kurdistan). Chapter 11 then examines American forces, both nuclear and conventional, and discusses how they relate to future roles and missions. Chapter 12 looks again at the world of tiers as a way to project defense policy into the future.

Because this book deals largely with events and dynamics since 1991, it differs from the preceding editions in another way. In the past, the suggested readings consisted exclusively of book citations; the holdover chapters, of course, still do, because they are either historical or broadly conceptual in nature. For the topics of the new chapters, however, there has yet to develop a large book literature. As a result, the suggested readings for these chapters are interlaced liberally with articles from contemporary policy-relevant journals.

This third edition is also unlike its predecessors in that none of the work was done while I was a visiting faculty member at one of the war colleges. The first edition was revised and prepared for publication while I was at the Naval War College in Newport, R.I., an association from which the manuscript benefitted. Similarly, I undertook work on the second edition while at the Army War College in Carlisle Barracks, Pa. By contrast, this edition was completed entirely in Tuscaloosa during my recent sabbatical leave from the University of Alabama. I want to thank the university for the time and material support made available. Particular thanks are due the Political Science Department staff for material and other support. I also want to thank Professor Simon Duke at Pennsylvania State University for his review and suggestions. As always, my editor, Don Reisman, and his staff at St. Martin's Press were of invaluable assistance.

Donald M. Snow

About the Author

Donald M. Snow (Ph.D., Indiana University) is a professor of political science at the University of Alabama. He has held visiting faculty positions at the U.S. Air Command and Staff College, the U.S. Naval War College (where he was the first Secretary of the Navy Senior Research Fellow), and, most recently, the U.S. Army War College. His recent books include *Puzzle Palaces and Foggy Bottom: U.S. Foreign and Defense Policy-Making in the 1990s,* with Eugene Brown (St. Martin's Press, 1994); *From Lexington to Desert Storm: War and Politics in the American Experience,* with Dennis M. Drew (M E Sharpe, 1994); *Distant Thunder: Third World Conflict and the New International Order* (St. Martin's Press, 1993); *National Security, 2/e* (St. Martin's Press, 1992); and *The Shape of the Future: The Post-Cold War World* (M E Sharpe, forthcoming in 1995).

Contents

Chapter 1

Introduction: National Security in a World of Tiers

The second edition of this book was published late in the summer of 1991; the last changes and updates had been added late that spring. From the vantage point of its subject matter—American national defense and security—the timing could scarcely have been worse.

Think of the international system, the environment in which national security policy is made and executed, as it was at the beginning of summer 1991, and compare it to that existing now. In June 1991 the structure of the Cold War system that had evolved after World War II was still largely intact. Granted, the rule of Mikhail S. Gorbachev had reduced tensions between East and West greatly: most of Eastern Europe had peacefully decommunized, pieces of the fallen Berlin Wall (or facsimiles thereof) were hot souvenirs in a united Germany, and much of the harsh U.S.-Soviet rhetoric had evaporated.

Still, the old structure remained. Both the United States and the Soviet Union remained heavily armed, with both nuclear and conventional arms still aimed at one another. The Warsaw Pact and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) still faced one another in Germany and elsewhere. Change was in the air, but it was not yet developed reality.

And then everything started to unravel. On July 1, 1991, the Warsaw Pact members assembled in Prague and formally dissolved the alliance. On August 19, the world watched—literally, thanks to global television—the last death throes of Soviet communism. On that day, an amazingly inept group of eight Soviet communist functionaries, "led" by Soviet vice president Gennadi Yenayev, launched a coup to overthrow Gorbachev and, presumably, to reinstate the communist dictatorship he had been systematically dismantling for over five years.

At first, there were dire fears that the counterrevolution many had predicted was upon us, and that the "bad old days" of competition and confrontation would come back. The conspirators called out the armed

forces; early clashes resulted in three civilian deaths. Forces loyal to Russian President Boris Yeltsin confronted Soviet forces as the fiery Yeltsin stood astride a Russian tank in photographs eerily reminiscent of similar pictures from the Hungarian Revolution of 1956, crushed ruthlessly by Soviet tanks. Gorbachev remained incognito in the Crimea.

Then the pathos and comedy began. The inheritors of Joseph Stalin felt the need to call a live televised *press conference* to explain that there really had not been a coup at all. Visibly nervous, Yanayev and his co-conspirators explained that Gorbachev had taken ill and that the State Committee for the State of Emergency, as they called themselves, was merely assuming power until he was well enough to return. Two days after the coup occurred, it collapsed, Gorbachev returned to Moscow, and the conspirators were arrested.

The performance of the conspirators was pathetic, showing the depths to which the leadership of Soviet communism had fallen. Yanayev and his comrades lacked the "iron teeth" Andrei Gromyko once attributed to Gorbachev. More importantly, their action lacked support anywhere within Soviet society. Had there been any previous question about the demise of communism in the Soviet Union, it was laid to rest by the coup.

The coup accelerated Soviet disintegration. Emboldened by the surrounding chaos, Estonia and Latvia declared their independence as the coup unravelled, and Lithuania reaffirmed its intention to secede. Within a week, the Ukraine, Byelorussia (now Belorus), and Moldavia (now Moldova) had followed suit. By the end of the summer, most of the central Asian republics had done the same. On December 9, the leaders of Russia, Ukraine, and Belorus declared that the Soviet Union had ceased to exist and would be replaced by a Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), which all former Soviet republics were invited to join. On December 17, Gorbachev made it official, stating that all central governmental institutions would cease to exist at year's end. With the last second of 1991, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics passed into history.

It was a remarkable string of events and political phenomena. The voluntary, *peaceful* dismemberment of a nation-state was an unparalleled political phenomenon in the history of the nation-state system (which most date back to the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648). Certainly, no political unit of the size and import of the Soviet Union had dissolved its union essentially without bloodshed before.

The systemic and national security implications were profound. The system shock was all the greater because essentially no one anticipated what would happen. The collapse of the Soviet Union both deflated what was left of the Cold War structure *and* the military confrontation that was its central feature. The prophecy uttered tongue-

in-cheek a year or so earlier by Georgi Arbatov, a leading Soviet spokesman and Director of the USA and Canada Institute, had come true: "We have done a terrible thing to you; we have deprived you of an enemy."

Practitioners, analysts, and students alike are still trying to sort out the implications of the end of the Cold War. Three years later, the general contours are beginning to take shape, if the details are not yet entirely in focus. It is clear that the evolving environment is different—even profoundly so. What does this mean for the international system? And, more specifically, what does it mean for the conduct of American national security policy?

In the pages that follow, I will lay out some of the changes as an introduction to the subsequent chapters. For now, however, I will look at three aspects of change emerging from the decline of the Cold War: the transition in leadership in the United States and its orientation toward national security; the national security debate about the size and kind of armed forces America will require in the new environment; and the evolving international system and America's security position in a world of tiers.

THE TRANSITION IN LEADERSHIP

A whole generation of leaders and analysts was raised, educated, and conditioned to a set of assumptions about the world based on the immutability of the "protracted conflict" (to borrow the Yugoslav dissident Milovan Djilas' phrase) of the Cold War. The central political reality of that construct was a world permanently divided between communist and anticommunist opponents locked in a competition from which there was no apparent escape or end—other than the fiery Armageddon of nuclear holocaust.

The enormous nuclear arsenals aimed at one another and capable of destroying both countries as functional societies—to say nothing of the world at large—loomed as the central military facet of the system. The nature of the adversarial relationship overwhelmed all other foreign and defense considerations: if either side could not successfully protect itself from the other, nothing else mattered. The confrontation defined defense policy and, in a neat deductive exercise, military strategy, tactics, and force size and competition. The Soviet threat was the bellwether for the United States, and vice versa.

This set of assumptions, especially the belief in the endurance of the competition, blinded analysts and policymakers alike to the possibility of change—the possibility that the Cold War could end with a whimper, not a bang. The idea of peace was utopian, unrealistic, a knee-jerk reaction without base for the "realists" who controlled the

intellectual agenda of national security. The Cold War may have been cold, but it was also war.

When change began in the Soviet Union under Gorbachev in the middle 1980s, these Cold Warriors were still clearly in the ascendancy at all levels of government. Indeed, Ronald W. Reagan, probably the leading symbol of the Cold War mentality, occupied the White House and presided over the largest peacetime military buildup in American history during the first half of the decade to counter the "evil empire."

As the momentum of Soviet implosion grew, Reagan gave way to his former vice president, George Bush. In important ways, Bush was the quintessential Cold Warrior, having been honed in a variety of positions under Gerald Ford (Ambassador to the United Nations, Director of Central Intelligence) and as the number two man under Reagan. Bush understood the nature of the Cold War, the nature of the Soviet opponent, and the machinery of U.S. government to combat that enemy.

It is arguable that Bush and those around him understood the Cold War too well. All his principal advisors (Secretary of State James Baker, Vice President Dan Quayle, Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Colin Powell) were, like the president himself, products of the Cold War. Their collective strength was their common devotion to conducting the Cold War; their common weakness was their apparent inability either to anticipate the possibility of the end of the Cold War or to adapt to it. In the end, the "vision thing" betrayed Bush; that the tenure of this last resolute Cold Warrior and the Cold War itself would end at more or less the same time may be symbolically appropriate.

Bush has been replaced, of course, by President Bill Clinton, part of whose job is to figure out the nature of the new international system and the American national security response to it. Clinton entered the national security playing field with some disadvantages. Since states lack foreign policies and military forces (other than National Guardsmen), his direct experience was minimal. Although he was an international relations major at Georgetown University and is an avid reader, his knowledge base was circumscribed. As the first post-World War II president without military service of any kind, his grasp of military affairs and military life was similarly suspect. All of these traits made the professional national security community wary of Clinton and concerned about how he would handle this crucial aspect of his job.

Because the Democrats had been out of power for 12 years, Clinton had to dip back into a pool of people who had last served in government under Jimmy Carter. His Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, had returned to practicing corporate law, and National Security Advisor Anthony Lake was teaching at a New England college. His original Secretary of Defense, Les Aspin, was chair of the House Armed Services

Committee, his successor, William Perry, had directed Pentagon research under Carter, and Vice President Al Gore was a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee. General Powell was a holdover in the early going, thereby providing some continuity. The very slow pace at which sub-cabinet level appointments were made in the Defense Department and elsewhere suggested, as well, the difficulty of finding experienced hands.

The Clinton administration's relative inexperience offered a hope of sorts in thinking about the new dictates of national security policy. There appears to be less of a Cold War/Warrior mindset, which could only be detrimental to reorganizing and reconceptualizing the national security orientation of the United States. Whether there are the makings of a fresh, coherent orientation toward the world and its problems is uncertain as of this writing.

What this situation may suggest is that the Clinton contribution will be to act as a transition between the old system and that which replaces it. An obvious outcome of the end of the Cold War has been to relieve some of the pressure for large defense spending of the kind that marked the 1980s and was part of the cause of Soviet collapse (see Chapter 6 for a more detailed argument). Questions now emerge about the kind of post-Cold War military the United States requires and the purposes that military should serve.

THE NATIONAL SECURITY DEBATE

The end of the Cold War was obviously accompanied by the collapse of the intellectual framework that had long dominated thinking about national security in the United States. With the passage of time, a remarkable consensus had evolved about the nature of the threat and proper strategy for dealing with it that was shared by most within the national security community. The consensus among so-called "defense intellectuals" and the uniformed services occasionally frayed at the edges on particular items, such as whether the United States needed a particular weapons system or a certain number of troops or carrier battle groups, but the central problem was not a matter of disagreement. From outside the defense community, there were calls for reductions, for nuclear disarmament, and the like, but these were generally ignorable as howlings from the fringes.

That consensus is gone, the victim of three related phenomena. First, the disappearance of the threat and the absence of an obvious successor threat has unfocused attention, leaving a much more disorderly intellectual landscape. There is currently no organizing concept on which to agree. Second, the threat ended at a time of growing concern about domestic priorities, especially deficit reduction and infra-

structural investment. Politicians turned a hungry eye on a defense budget, the size of which now overshadowed the size of the threat. Third, the happy 12-year consensus between conservative Republicans and an equally conservative professional military ended with the advent of a more liberal Democratic regime of which the professional military was inherently suspicious. Civilian-military relations, always somewhat strained, rapidly approached the adversarial.

Any of these three elements by itself would have created a debate about the future of national security policy. Their conjunction both widened and deepened the extent to which it would be argued. The Clinton administration came to office riding the banner of deficit reduction and new domestic priorities at a time when the defense community was feeling reactive and vulnerable. Rightly or wrongly, the military felt itself more at risk with the Arkansan who had avoided military service in Vietnam than it would have had the Republicans been returned to office. The new administration, in turn, contributed to its own problems with clumsy handling of issues such as homosexuality in the military.

The point is clear: there would have been profound debate about the future of American national security policy regardless of who emerged triumphant in the 1992 election because of the confluence of factors listed above. The Cold War orientation of the Bush administration and the synergism between the professional military and the Bush team might have changed the tone and pace of debate, but ultimately the debate had to go on.

The debate is about what kind of policy and what kinds of military capability the United States will have in the future. One aspect is the changed world environment, which is the subject of the next section. For present purposes, we will examine two other factors that exemplify the debate: the defense contribution to deficit reduction and the role of the armed forces in American society in the future.

Defense and the Deficit

No one inside or outside the defense community disagrees either that deficit reduction is needed or that defense should absorb some of the cuts that reduction requires. The defense budget is the largest *controllable* element of the overall federal budget, which means that about two-thirds of all defense appropriations require annual positive legislative actions (as opposed to *uncontrollable* elements such as interest payments on the deficit and entitlements, which are appropriated automatically in the absence of contrary legislation). This status makes the defense budget particularly vulnerable to being cut. In combination with the vulnerability of a new era in which a looming threat cannot dissuade budget cutters, it makes many in the defense community nervous about the future.

Cuts in spending, of course, equate to a diminished force capability. Some cuts can be absorbed by pulling forward-deployed American troops out of expensive overseas billets, some can be absorbed by decreasing the size of the force, and some can be absorbed by reducing training exercises, stockpiles of weapons and equipment, or by decreasing new weapons research, development, and procurement. All such measures have the common effect, of course, of reducing readiness and the ability to project certain kinds of forces in certain areas in a timely manner.

The situation is not without irony. As the Cold War ended, the United States emerged as the remaining "superpower"—the only country on earth with adequate power to provide global leadership in a time of transition. Whenever crisis arose almost anywhere (violence in the former Soviet Union being a notable exception), the other major states turned to the United States for leadership. Where it was not forthcoming or contradicted what the other major powers were inclined to do, the result was inaction. Bosnia was the prototype: the Clinton administration was blamed when it wanted to do nothing and equally pilloried when it proposed military action with which the others disagreed (notably, bombing the Serbs and lifting the arms ban on the Muslims).

The irony here is that the new definition of superpower status contained contradictory elements. During the Cold War, the possession of large arsenals of nuclear weapons largely distinguished the superpowers; nuclear weapons possession was the initiation fee for membership in the major power club. In the new order, nuclear weapons have lost some importance, although they remain part of the calculation because of their feared proliferation in the old Third World, a problem discussed in Chapter 8.

Because of the changing nature of power, the term superpower means something different. The United States *is* the remaining superpower because of its unique combination of military and economic power that can be used to influence events. Other countries possess one form of power or the other: Japan, for instance, has great economic power, but essentially no military power. Russia maintains large—if arguably impotent outside its borders—military forces, but is an economic basket case. China has large armed forces but limited ability to project them beyond its borders, and its economic power is only *potential*. Only the United States presently has both, and, as we shall see in Chapters 2 and 7, both are useful and necessary to maintain America's place in the world.

The irony, of course, is that one builds one kind of power at the sacrifice of the other. Spending on defense often comes at the expense of expanding and making robust the economic base on which economic power is predicated. Likewise, investment in the domestic economy (for example, jobs programs, support for education, federal support for

research and development) requires cutbacks in defense spending if deficit reduction is also to be pursued. The only other source of significant potential cuts in the federal budget is the entitlement programs that, along with servicing the interest on the federal debt, make up the vast majority of the budget. Rhetoric aside, elimination of "welfare baby" abuses will not reduce the debt; only cuts in defense or what amounts to middle class welfare (including social security and medicare) can make a dent.

We are only at the front end of this debate. The Clinton defense plan announced on September 1, 1993, would reduce the active duty armed forces to 1.4 million, a sizable cutback from the 2.1 million serving during the salad days of the Reagan buildup. Clearly, a force this size cannot do the number of things—especially, simultaneously—that the old force could do. That is the bad news. The somewhat better news is that the structure of threats for which the larger numbers were mobilized has diminished. The debate will be about how much is too little and how much is enough. It is a debate with strategic, economic, and political aspects, with ample room for disagreement along each of those dimensions.

The Armed Forces in Society

The relative regard in which military matters are held by the body politic has also become a matter of some scrutiny. The professional military force that is one of the proudest artifacts of the past 15 years views this matter with great anxiety. Arising from the ashes of Vietnam, the most humiliating experience in the history of the American military, was a commitment to produce the most highly sophisticated, professional, and competent military force in the world. Aided by new attitudes about recruiting, training, motivating, and retaining armed forces in the absence of conscription, the American military worked diligently to improve both its competence and its image.

These efforts have largely succeeded. Although the United States suffered a humiliating incident in Beirut in 1983 (the truck bombing that killed 241 Marines in their barracks) and a dubious victory in Grenada later that year, by the latter half of the decade the trend seemed reversed. Operation Just Cause—despite its euphemistic name—in Panama seemed a smashing success, and Operation Desert Storm, the first fully televised war, provided a worldwide showcase for American military genius against the world's fourth largest army (Iraq's). The American military's prestige skyrocketed, apparently reversing traditional American negative attitudes toward peacetime soldiers and sailors (see Chapter 3).

But much of the euphoria has exploded like a pricked balloon, and the American military once again finds itself on the defensive. The