Criminal Justice Policy

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Acknowledgements

Introduction

Jodi Lane and Joan Petersilia

The world is currently witnessing an unprecedented level of violent crime – ever-changing, ever more threatening. Not only do the rates of criminal violence exceed anything in our history, but also the acts have become more random, more brutal, and targeted toward more vulnerable victims, for example children and innocent bystanders. Around the world, newspapers report stories of innocence shattered: the Oklahoma City bombing, the drowning of two young boys in a South Carolina lake by their mother, the brutal stabbing of Nicole Brown Simpson and Ronald Goldman, and the murder of the German tourists in Florida.

High-profile crime cases are not just restricted to the United States or their citizens either. In Abbotsford, British Columbia, a quiet, conservative town full of bungalows, a 16-year-old girl named Tanya Smith was sexually assaulted and murdered in late 1995 by an uncaptured assailant dubbed the 'Abbotsford Killer'. Her murder was so shocking that it attracted the attention of American tabloid television shows such as *Hard Copy* and *Inside Edition*.[1] Another high-profile Canadian crime occurred in the Ottawa suburb of Napean and apparently was perpetrated by members of the 'Ace Crew', a local street gang involved in the crack–cocaine trade. A boy named Sylvain Leduc was kidnapped, tortured and beaten for three hours before he died, and three other kidnapped teenagers were beaten and tortured but survived.[2]

Although the US crime rate is now declining slightly, experts predict another crime wave by the year 2000 because of an anticipated increase in the number of teenagers in America – teenagers who, based upon today's figures, are twice as violent as adults. As Alfred Blumstein discusses in one of his articles in this book (Chapter 8), the growth of the illicit-drug industry has created a group of young people who arm themselves for protection, use these arms in confrontations with others, and are more likely to shoot 'innocent' strangers because of their inability to aim well. He also notes that while some types of crimes are declining, there has been a significant increase in the US homicide rates by males aged 14–17 years old since 1985, particularly for African-American males.[3]

Compounding the youth crime problem is a number of demographic trends. As one of America's leading criminologists, UCLA's Professor James Q. Wilson, writes in his article reprinted here (Chapter 26), the next generation of children is more likely to be born to single mothers, experience poverty, and be unemployed than were previous generations – all factors known to relate to later criminality. His summary of the situation is:

> Just beyond the horizon, there lurks a cloud that the winds will soon bring over us. By the end of this decade there will be a million more people between the ages of fourteen and seventeen. This extra million will be half male. Six percent of them will become high rate, repeat offenders – thirty thousand more young muggers, killers and thieves than we have now. Get ready (p. 34).[4]

Such dire predictions are being made about international crime trends as well. As James Lynch of American University notes, the only significant distinction between crime in the United States and that in comparable countries is the *lethality* of US violence (Chapter 1). The US does not differ significantly from other common law countries with regard to less serious forms of violence and property crime.[5] His comparisons are confirmed by international victimization surveys, analysed and discussed in this volume in Richard Block's article (Chapter 2). Analysing self-reported surveys of crime victims from various countries, Richard Block finds that the US levels of assault, robbery and burglary are not much higher than in eleven comparison countries but, again, gun use in the US is *much* higher.[6] The universality of crime – and the near universality of its growth – makes crime a worldwide concern.

As Gene Stephens, a well known futurist who writes on crime matters, recently observed: 'crime is increasing worldwide, and there is every reason to believe the trend will continue through the 1990s and into the early years of the twenty-first century.'[7] Stephens notes that street crimes are escalating in formerly communist countries throughout Eastern Europe, and in other European nations such as Scandinavia and the United Kingdom. While the US was the first industrialized, democratic, heterogeneous nation, and thus the first to face a serious crime problem, other nations are now undergoing similar difficulties as they experience increasing modernization and enter the postmodern era previously occupied solely by the US. For example, there are reports that the 'mob' is now ruling Russia and that organized crime is so strong there that it threatens the legitimate government.[8] Another report estimates that since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, foreign businessmen have become frequent crime targets: apparently 50 percent of the 560 professional murders committed there during 1995 that involved foreign businessmen as victims.[9] In Tijuana, Mexico, law enforcement officials are living in terror after eight officials were murdered by 'drug lords' within an eleven-month period during 1996 and early 1997.[10] In Canada, like in the United States, overall violent crime is dropping, but youth violence has continued to increase and is double the rate it was in 1986.[11]

In their article reprinted here, Farrington, Langan and Wilkström (Chapter 3) indicate that between 1981 and 1991, America, England and Sweden all experienced increases in officially recorded assaults. And, during this time, burglary and vehicle theft increased considerably in England and Sweden.[12] Just as the US experienced an increase in violence followed by an increase in prison commitments, so too are prisons worldwide. In England and Wales, for example, the prison population is now over 60 000 – a staggering increase of one-third over three years – and there is no sign of any slackening in the upward trend.[13]

Political and media discussion of crime has contributed to a citizenry that is understandably concerned and frightened. In every major US public opinion survey since 1994, crime has been ranked ahead of unemployment, the deficit, pollution, and other issues as the main problem facing the country.[14] In Canada, the 1996 Gallup Poll found that about a third of Canadians are afraid to walk alone in their neighborhoods at night, and almost half of women are afraid to walk there after dark.[15] In China, citizens are supporting tough punishment policies because of their fear of crime and disorder.[16] In Poland, citizens are fighting for a right to bear arms as their fear of crime grows.[17]

As Wesley Skogan discusses in his article (Chapter 13), however, fear of crime results from a complex interaction of factors, not simply the crime rate.[18] Fear of crime is height-

ened by media attention to high-profile crimes, and research suggests that when people hear about crime through the media or through friends, they can be indirectly victimized and therefore become more fearful than would have otherwise been the case.[19] Community factors may also prompt the public to believe that crime is increasing and neighborhood stability is declining. Factors such as abandoned buildings, graffiti, prostitution, public drinking and streets filled with litter indicate to the public that the neighborhood is no longer a safe place. Individuals see such community characteristics as evidence of an 'underlying level of disorder'.[20] Increasing racial and ethnic diversity are also thought to increase fear because people are unable to understand the manners and behaviors of others and are therefore more fearful of them.[21] As Wesley Skogan, and James Q. Wilson and George Kelling (Chapter 22), indicate in their articles, such fear can actually lead to *more* crime – as people withdraw from neighborhood interactions to avoid victimization, they decrease the level of social control in the area, leading to 'social disorganization'.[22] Social disorganization has been shown to increase both crime and fear of crime.[23]

Another social aspect of disorganized communities is high unemployment. As Canadian criminologist, John Hagan discusses in his article reprinted here (Chapter 12), in the aggregate, neighborhood unemployment is associated with higher levels of crime, but the reverse is also true. At the individual level, living in a community with high crime and unemployment rates can severely hinder one's likelihood of gainful adult employment. Important contributing factors in such environments include delinquent friends, participation in delinquent behavior, and parental criminality.[24]

Policymakers often suggest that socially disorganized inner cities often lack the appropriate family structures (for example, two parent households) to raise law-abiding youth. However, Joan McCord's research (see Chapter 10) on the correlations between family relationships and delinquency shows that competent mothers can *insulate* children from the criminogenic factors in such areas. She indicates that the father's interaction with the family is less important. She also suggests that the factors contributing to *juvenile* delinquency are different from those contributing to *adult* criminality. Mothers seem to have much more impact on juvenile delinquency, whereas the father's interaction with the family during childhood is predictive of adult criminality.[25] There is general agreement among all the authors in this book that families and child rearing is critical in crime prevention. But, as James Q. Wilson notes, American and most Western societies are unwilling to intervene in the family at a level that would prevent crime because the family is 'sacrosanct' and the family-preservation movement is powerful.[26]

Peers are another powerful predictor of juvenile delinquency and criminality. Terence Thornberry and his colleagues note, however, that this is not a unidirectional relationship. While it is true that associating with delinquent peers contribute to delinquency, delinquent activity also contributes to the likelihood that one will associate with delinquent peers. Delinquent (and prosocial) behavior results from the interactions between people and their environment. People affect each other over the life course, both in their behaviors and their beliefs.[27]

As Travis Hirschi and Michael Gottfredson report in their article (Chapter 6) though, there is strong evidence that criminality peaks in late adolescence and declines with age. And while criminologists generally agree about the factors that lead to the start of a delinquent career, there is less empirical information about why offenders desist. Such

information is critical to the design of effective crime policies. Can events in life be interpreted as possible turning points as Robert Sampson and John Laub argue,[28] or should they be seen as evidence of the versatility in offenders' behaviors as Hirschi and Gottfredson believe? Hirschi and Gottfredson write that delinquent acts are a 'subset' of acts that compromise the long term, and that these acts tend to be perpetrated by those who are least likely to consider their long term prospects.[29] In essence, they say the behaviors change more than the people do.

Sampson and Laub (Chapter 7), on the other hand, believe that we should take a developmental approach to understanding human behavior as it occurs over time. In contrast to Hirschi and Gottfredson, they argue that attachment to the labor force and cohesive marriages can explain variations in criminal behavior independent of previous criminal tendencies.[30] As both pairs of authors indicate, there is considerable support for both points of view in the literature, and this debate is far from settled.

Richard Catalano and David Hawkins (Chapter 5), like Sampson and Laub, attempt to explain both the onset and the desistance of criminal behavior. They attempt to explain such events through an integrated theoretical framework which explains the 'onset, escalation, maintenance, de-escalation, and cessation' of crime and drug abuse.[31] Using a developmental model, they create four distinct submodels to explain antisocial behavior and its antecedents between birth and the end of high school. In each submodel, they consider the relevant contextual, environmental, personal, and relationship variables to that period. Importantly, they also indicate *which* policy approaches work best at each stage in the child's life based upon this developmental and age-appropriate perspective.

Given increasing concern about crime and the variety of ways such behaviors are explained, it is exceedingly difficult to create a sound, universal crime policy. Nevertheless, there is growing pressure for government officials to 'do something' about the crime problem. And government leaders, eager to display toughness and determination before an increasingly apprehensive voting public, have supported an unprecedented binge in new laws, allocated increasing taxes to fund more police and more prisons and, in general, have supported tougher penalties. In the US, for example, the *Sentencing Reform Act of 1984* abolished parole release and established a Federal sentencing commission to develop sentencing guidelines. In his article, leading US sentencing expert Michael Tonry (Chapter 20), argues that these guidelines have been a disaster and have angered judges because of the strict expectations and rigid structure of the rules.[32]

More recently, President Clinton signed the *Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994*, which requires mandatory life imprisonment without possibility of parole for Federal offenders with three or more convictions for serious violent felonies or drug-trafficking crimes. Individual US states have followed suit, implementing punitive measures such as three strikes laws, mandatory prison terms, no parole, and expanding the death penalty.

Other countries have begun to import most of the current North American sentencing fashions. In 1994, for example, the British parliament passed the *Criminal Justice and Police Bill*, marking the return to a get-tough English crime policy. British Home Secretary Michael Howard called the legislation 'the most comprehensive attempt to tackle crime [in England] in more than three decades'. One feature of the new statutes gives courts wider powers for sentencing persistent offenders aged 12 to 14 and doubles the maximum permis-

sible sentence in institutions for youthful offenders.[33] And, as a result of a recent (April 1996) harsh anticrime program in China, more than 160 000 people were arrested and over 1000 executed within the first six months of the implementation of the new policy for crimes that in most countries would not be considered capital offenses.[34] Reports suggest that tougher sentencing trends are also returning to Scotland, Northern Ireland, and Canada.[35]

The tough approach to drugs in particular has been a hallmark of American crime policy since the Reagan years. But, as Robert MacCoun, Peter Reuter, and Thomas Schelling argue (Chapter 9) there is no need to view the drug control debate in black and white terms. That is, we do not need to consider only the extreme options of strict prohibition and sweeping legalization, each of which can be considered to have positive and negative consequences. There are a range of policy possibilities in between these two extremes which may be differentially effective depending on the drug. We need to consider the social harm associated with each drug, as well as the likelihood of control under the prohibitionist approach before making drug policies.[36] And, if possible, it would serve us well to take the debate out of the political arena and argue on empirical grounds about costs and benefits of different drug control policies.

The result of these sweeping and harsh sentencing policies, especially the drug and the three strikes laws, has been a quadrupling of the US prison population. Today more than a million adults are in prison, costing the nation close to $28 billion in 1996.[37] As Franklin Zimring and Gordon Hawkins discuss in their article reprinted here (Chapter 25), the California rate of imprisonment doubled between 1980 and 1985 and doubled again between 1985 and 1990. Other states have experienced similar increases, although these increases have been less extreme. As these authors note, it is important to study the effects of 'so much extra imprisonment' on society's crime rates and society as a whole.[38] A National Academy of Sciences panel reviewed all available data on the incapacitation effects of prison and concluded that doubling the US prison population between 1973 and 1982 probably reduced the number of burglaries and robberies in the US by 10 to 20 per cent. The panel went on to state: 'The increments to crime control from incapacitation are modest, even with very large general increases in inmate populations'.[39] Despite massive financial investments and new legislation, crime has not been reduced significantly either in the US or worldwide.

Why haven't tougher penalties made more of an impact on crime? The short answer is that we expect too much of our prisons and the formal criminal justice system more generally. Even at its best, there is ultimately little the justice system alone can do to reduce crime. To those unfamiliar with criminal justice research, this may seem self-contradictory. After all, simple logic suggests that when offenders are incarcerated, they cannot commit new crimes in the community. However, it is one thing to say that a person will not commit a crime when incarcerated and quite another to say that society's overall crime rate will be affected. Marvin Wolfgang and his colleagues have shown that for most youth, delinquency begins early, peaks between the ages of 15 and 19, and declines as the youths age.[40] By the time the criminal justice system has enough evidence to identify a person as a serious career criminal deserving of imprisonment, the individual's criminal career has probably reached its 'maturation phase'. Imposing a prison term at this stage serves to *punish* that individual, but it may have little impact on that person's overall contribution to crime in the community.

Of course, ideally we would want to be able to identify *which* offenders will continue in serious criminality and use our scarce prison resources to lock them up *before* they commit

more violence. If we could identify high-rate offenders at sentencing, they could be selectively incapacitated, thereby significantly reducing crime without necessarily increasing the total number of offenders incarcerated. Canadian criminologist, Paul Gendreau and his colleagues report here (Chapter 21) that variables such as age, criminal history, companions, family factors, gender, social achievement and substance abuse are 'significant and potent predictors' of recidivism. They also argue that dynamic factors, such as criminogenic needs, are as important to understanding recidivism as are the typical static factors such as age, gender, and race.[41] However, with regard to selective incapacitation, the most important problem is the presence of 'false positive' predictions – predictions that persons will engage in criminal behavior when in fact they will not.[42] In essence, the likelihood of false positives is strong, and, by selectively incapacitating based upon statistical predictions, we would be imprisoning people who would not have done anything wrong had they been left alone.

Selective incapacitation, based on predictions about future behavior, raises other ethical and constitutional issues as well. For example, males are more likely to be high-rate offenders, as are younger persons and persons from identifiable ethnic and racial groups. Most would find it objectionable to use ethnic and racial characteristics to enhance punishment, even if these characteristics were associated with high-rate offending. Hence the dilemma: we want to incapacitate offenders who are likely to commit the most crime if free, but to make more accurate predictions raises troublesome ethical and legal problems. As a result, our imprisonment policy tries to implement an incapacitation strategy based on crimes (not criminals), limiting crime prevention/incapacitation effects.

As Michael Tonry cautions in his article entitled the 'Racial Disproportion in US Prisons' (Chapter 14), Australia, Canada, England and Wales, and the United States already have racial disproportion in their prisons (as compared to their resident populations). His analysis indicates that in all of these countries, members of disadvantaged visible minority groups are 7 to 16 times more likely than whites to be confined to correctional institutions. He suggests that in the United States the disproportionate imprisonment of blacks results from racial differences in participation in the types of crime that result in imprisonment, for example, homicide, robbery, and aggravated assault, and from the foreseeable discriminatory effects from the Federal War on Drugs.[43]

Ronald Weitzer's research (Chapter 15) suggests there is also likely to be racial discrimination in the US criminal justice system. He believes it is difficult to gauge the extent to which it exists because many components of the justice system are hidden from public view, and many forms of discrimination are subtle rather than overt. He argues that although discrimination is not as pervasive as some argue, it has been documented at certain points in the system (for example, police processing of juveniles) and in certain jurisdictions.[44]

If greater imprisonment and harsher penalties do not substantially reduce crime, then what policies would? Everyone is asking the same question: how can we obtain truly meaningful crime control? Can gun control laws reduce violent crime? Would more police on the streets reduce crime? Would drug legalization substantially reduce crime, addiction, and violence? Do community alternatives to prison make matters better or worse? How can we prevent young people from choosing a life of crime? And, importantly, what works in terms of rehabilitation programs?

Because of the popularity of crime as a topic, there has been an explosion in the research, statistics, and theories on these topics, and there is now a rather solid body of studies

addressing them, as the articles in this volume illustrate. Ultimately the goal of this research is to construct theories and models that allow for a better understanding of criminal behavior, and which permit the development of strategies to address the crime problem. Has 'scientific criminological' research had this effect? Not necessarily. As we will see below, many of the popular crime reduction proposals have little support from the scientific literature.

One of President Clinton's campaign promises called for placing 100 000 more police on the street. But policing issues are not that simple. Lawrence Sherman, a noted US policing researcher, has indicated that these additional police officers would do much more good if they were strategically placed in the 'hot spots' of crime, rather than evenly dispersed throughout the country.[45] David Bayley and Clifford Shearing, in their article reprinted here (Chapter 23), note that public police officers are currently redefining their roles worldwide as they struggle with the problems of controlling and preventing crime. Many of them are combining the ideas of crime-oriented and community-oriented policing in an attempt to better prevent crime. And policing has become both a public and private enterprise as private policing has outgrown public policing in many countries, including Canada, Britain and the US. They argue that the future of policing will not be any less complex as the threat of crime intensifies. Hence, they suggest restructuring the public policing even further, possibly giving block grants to poorer communities to fund private security, and focusing even more on community policing.

But enhanced policing efforts have little impact if those arrested cannot be meaningfully punished. With prisons and jails full, probation and other community-based sanctions are 'catching the overflow'. Today, US probation officers supervise close to 3 million adults, half of whom are convicted of felony (not misdemeanor) crimes. If probation supervision is lax, community safety is compromised and justice is not served. In recent years, 'intermediate sanctions', such as intensive supervision probation, house arrest, and electronic monitoring have been developed for the purposes of devising sentences which are more punitive than regular probation, but not as expensive as a prison or jail cell.

Joan Petersilia contends that we must continue to invest in these sanctions if we hope to control crime rates (see Chapter 24). Since two-thirds of all convicted offenders in the US remain in the community on such sanctions, a failure to provide offenders with stringent supervision not only results in more crime victims, but also a missed opportunity to deliver rehabilitation early in the criminal career. Instead of viewing community-based sanctions as 'soft on crime', she argues we should view them as serious crime control measures, which can substantially reduce crime while restoring crime victims and delivering retribution.[46]

For those that we determine *must* be incapacitated in correctional facilities, Don Andrews *et al.* (Chapter 19) recommend that we maintain the rehabilitative ideal by administering appropriate treatment. According to these authors, there are correctional treatment programs that work – the key is targeting the right program to the right offender clientele, and then assuring that the program model is implemented faithfully. The most effective treatment programs target higher-risk offenders, focus upon their criminogenic needs, and use treatment techniques that match the needs and learning styles of the people who are participating.[47]

But the most humane and cost effective approach to reducing crime is to focus on helping children *before* they get to the point where they have come to the attention of the justice system. Hirokazu Yoshikawa (Chapter 16) found that a combination of early family support

and quality education are crucial factors in preventing juvenile delinquency, both in the short- and long-term, because they 'are most likely to affect multiple risks in multiple settings'. Furthermore, he argues that in the long run, the benefits – in terms of later costs not expended – of such programs far outweigh their initial expense.[48]

Peter Greenwood and his colleagues (Chapter 17) at RAND support Yoshikawa's views, buttressing the argument with a statistical modeling effort that shows that investing in crime prevention is far more effective than policies, such as three strikes initiatives, which incapacitate repeat offenders. The RAND researchers compared the costs and benefits of alternative crime policies, and found that providing high school graduation incentives (e.g., where high-risk students are paid to complete high school) are the most efficient, followed by parent training, delinquent supervision, three strikes, and enhanced home visits and day care for high-risk families.[49]

In agreement with the findings of Greenwood *et al.*, Bryan Vila's article (Chapter 4) notes the importance of combining nurturant strategies, such as child development programs, with suppression and crime control strategies like criminal justice responses and deterrent tactics. He suggests that these nurturant approaches can be economically feasible in the long term by creating people who contribute positively to society.[50]

Wilson and Howell (Chapter 18) also find that prevention and nurturant strategies are a promising strategy for decreasing serious delinquent behavior. In arguing for a broad, holistic approach to addressing delinquency, they, like Yoshikawa and Vila, believe we should strengthen families and support institutions such as schools, churches and community organizations that promote prosocial behavior in children. When children act out, we should respond to them quickly and in concert with the important people and institutions in their lives. For those who fail to respond to such non-criminal justice interventions, Wilson and Howell recommend we create a system of graduated sanctions specifically for juveniles, ranging from community service to institutionalization, so that the needs both of offenders and the public may be more adequately addressed.[51]

While the academic community has suggested sound policy proposals to reduce crime such as these, it has been difficult to translate such ideas into programs and policies because of the political nature of crime control debates. Todd Clear's article (Chapter 27) addresses this issue directly. In discussing the development and effects of criminological research in the US, Professor Clear notes the political benefit in ignoring or disseminating knowledge, depending upon the findings, and the participation of academic criminologists in this political enterprise. He believes criminologists have played three problematic roles in the 'offender control movement' which has dominated the natural political agenda for the last twenty years. First, they went along with political trends by vying for government funding which required them to at least indirectly support the political agenda. Secondly, criminologists acted as advisers to funding agencies and legislative bodies. And, thirdly, criminological work legitimated coercive policies by 'giving' them scientific merit. The theoretical problem with these 'coercive' approaches, according to Clear, is that they fail to address the causes of crime and fail to understand why people obey the law. In practical terms, Clear believes, coercion is bad policy because such strategies often backfire by interrupting the process toward desistance or by creating unanticipated negative consequences.[52]

Alfred Blumstein's article (Chapter 28) on the contribution of criminological research to policy supports Clear's argument about selective attention to research findings. He notes that

much academic work fails to enter the public discussions on crime policy because of the 'overt politicization' that has occurred in recent years. He suggests we end up pouring billions of dollars into crime reduction programs, but these programs are often driven by public opinion, fear, and political hype rather than sound criminological data and theory. For example, he notes that mandatory sentences are still popular strategies, even though research continually shows that they are often applied to the least serious offenders. We also continue to wage the drug war even though research has shown that drug treatment is more cost effective.[53]

This is not to imply that criminological research has been totally absent on crime policy, for that certainly is not the case. The famous Robert Martinson study, which basically concluded that 'nothing works in correctional treatment',[54] is a case in point. That study is often credited with giving rehabilitation the *coup de grâce*, and providing the empirical basis for shifting the goals of sentencing away from rehabilitation and towards incapacitation. Other studies too have affected crime policies.[55] But for the most part, much criminological knowledge circulates within our universities and research institutions that is rarely, if ever, known or considered by policymakers and practitioners. There now exists a rather solid body of criminological research that should be influencing crime policy, and the best of it is represented in this book.

The challenge is to bring the best of criminology to the forefront of public debate and discussion about what to do about the crime problem. The public's desire to *do* something about crime is admirable, yet they possess little of the knowledge necessary accurately to address the problem. Cancer is a major problem too, but the public does not think it should go in there and start tinkering – telling doctors what drugs to administer or when to hospitalize patients. But in criminal justice matters, the public does tinker. It votes to enact punitive sentencing legislation, abolish parole boards, and abandon treatment programs. It's almost as if we have put the public in charge of a major medical operation even though they are untrained and ill-equipped for the task.

But lest we take the doctor analogy too far, justice is different than medicine, because the community is a co-producer of justice. Unlike the doctor, experts can't solve crime alone. In fact, they aren't even the critical link to the solutions. Rather they depend on citizens to identify assailants, bring them to justice, and assist in offender reintegration. So, justice experts cannot simply say to the public, 'leave us alone'. Rather, the goal must be to move the public away from the television set and toward more factual information. We must provide a comprehensive resource so that the public and policymakers can learn to separate crime fiction from crime fact.

We, the editors of this volume have attempted to do that, by assembling what represents the best 'scientific criminology' on the most important topics of our time. We sought to represent the international criminological community and assemble leading experts from a variety of disciplines, philosophies, and political viewpoints.

The articles are organized in five sections: they are: Part I, The Extent and Nature of Crime: International Perspectives, which includes articles comparing crime and victimization in various countries; Part II, Theoretical Explanations for the Onset, Escalation, and Termination of Criminal Behavior, which includes articles from some of the top theoretical experts of our time wresting with the causes and cures of criminal behavior; Part III, The Social Context of Crime including works which discuss the various substantive issues that