

Threat Assessment and Management Strategies

Identifying the Howlers and Hunters



Second Edition

Frederick S. Calhoun | Stephen W. Weston

With a Summary of the Research on the Intimacy Effect by Debra M. Jenkins



CRC Press
Taylor & Francis Group

Second Edition

Threat Assessment and Management Strategies

Identifying the Howlers and Hunters

Frederick S. Calhoun
Stephen W. Weston



CRC Press

Taylor & Francis Group

Boca Raton London New York

CRC Press is an imprint of the
Taylor & Francis Group, an **Informa** business

CRC Press
Taylor & Francis Group
6000 Broken Sound Parkway NW, Suite 300
Boca Raton, FL 33487-2742

© 2016 by Taylor & Francis Group, LLC
CRC Press is an imprint of Taylor & Francis Group, an Informa business

No claim to original U.S. Government works

Printed on acid-free paper
Version Date: 20150916

International Standard Book Number-13: 978-1-4987-2184-4 (Paperback)

This book contains information obtained from authentic and highly regarded sources. Reasonable efforts have been made to publish reliable data and information, but the author and publisher cannot assume responsibility for the validity of all materials or the consequences of their use. The authors and publishers have attempted to trace the copyright holders of all material reproduced in this publication and apologize to copyright holders if permission to publish in this form has not been obtained. If any copyright material has not been acknowledged please write and let us know so we may rectify in any future reprint.

Except as permitted under U.S. Copyright Law, no part of this book may be reprinted, reproduced, transmitted, or utilized in any form by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying, microfilming, and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without written permission from the publishers.

For permission to photocopy or use material electronically from this work, please access www.copyright.com (<http://www.copyright.com/>) or contact the Copyright Clearance Center, Inc. (CCC), 222 Rosewood Drive, Danvers, MA 01923, 978-750-8400. CCC is a not-for-profit organization that provides licenses and registration for a variety of users. For organizations that have been granted a photocopy license by the CCC, a separate system of payment has been arranged.

Trademark Notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Calhoun, Frederick S., author.

Threat assessment and management strategies : identifying the howlers and hunters / Frederick S. Calhoun and Stephen W. Weston, J.D. -- Second edition.
pages cm

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN 978-1-4987-2184-4

1. Violence--Prevention. 2. Violence--Psychological aspects. 3. Aggressiveness. 4. Police training. 5. Criminal behavior, Prediction of. 6. Threats. I. Weston, Stephen W., author. II. Title.

HM1116.C353 2016
303.6--dc23

2015033145

Visit the Taylor & Francis Web site at
<http://www.taylorandfrancis.com>

and the CRC Press Web site at
<http://www.crcpress.com>

Second Edition

Threat Assessment and Management Strategies

Identifying the Howlers and Hunters

To Austin James Calhoun (1918–2006)
and John Wayne Weston (1926–1992)

Preface to the First Edition

Robert L. Burke settled his disputes with bombs. At work, Burke frequently threatened his fellow employees in the air traffic control tower at Walker Field Airport in Grand Junction, Colorado. Several of his colleagues complained that talking with Burke often left them in fear for their lives. During one conversation with Gary Mueller, his supervisor, Burke bragged about owning two guns, including a .357 Magnum. When Mueller asked why Burke needed two pistols, Burke replied that two guns increased his killing power. "Why a .357?" Mueller asked. "You'll find out," Burke told him. During this same conversation, Burke demanded that Mueller do things Burke's way because Burke was the only person who knew how to do things right. If Mueller did not follow Burke's instructions, "something big was going to happen" and "Mueller would be sorry" because Burke "had nothing to lose." After nearly a year of such conversations, threats, and references to violence, in March 2004, Serco Management Services terminated Burke's employment.*

Burke took up a nomadic existence, moving frequently with his belongings packed into a maroon van. In July 2005, he bought a used ambulance from a couple in Derby, Kansas, but then failed to take possession of it. When the owners sold it to another buyer, Burke rejected the check they sent him for reimbursement. He e-mailed them on July 19 saying, "If/when it comes time to get 'the information' I will...and then My Farewell Tour will begin." The tour began on February 1, 2006.†

Burke left his first bomb on the roof of Serco Management Services headquarters in Murfreesboro, Tennessee. It exploded around 4 p.m. but did little damage and resulted in no injuries. Twenty-seven days later, on February 28, Burke arrived in Derby, Kansas, and left a bomb on the porch of a house belonging to a neighbor of the ambulance sellers. Its explosion also did little damage. A month later, Burke returned to Grand Junction and, early in the morning of March 25, planted five bombs at the homes of his former coworkers, all of whom had testified against him during his dismissal proceedings from Serco Management. Three of the bombs went off; the other two were disarmed by police. The three that exploded caused minor damage, primarily from the fire resulting from the incendiary accelerant Burke had added to the explosives. When police searched a storage shed used by Burke, they found a piece of paper containing the addresses and phone numbers of several of his targets.*

On April 3, a man claiming to know Burke called a *Grand Junction Daily Sentinel* reporter to arrange a meeting. The man claimed that Burke had stored information on a computer that "would affect every contract [air traffic control] tower in the country." The reporter, however, suspected the caller was actually Burke, so he alerted police. When the "informant" called back April 5, the reporter agreed to meet him at a motel in Orem, Utah.

* Morris, E., Saccone, M., & Harmon, G. (2006, March 25). Feds take over serial bomber case. *Grand Junction (CO) Daily Sentinel*, Morris, E. (2006, March 27). GJ bombs similar to one in Tennessee. *The Daily Sentinel*, and Harmon, G., & Morris, E. (2006, March 27). Burke still at large. *The Daily Sentinel*.

† Harmon, G. (2006, April 6). Burke linked to 7th bomb. *The Daily Sentinel*.

A police surveillance team caught Burke hiding behind the Orem Walmart, his van parked in such a way as to hide the rear Colorado license plate.* At trial, Burke pled guilty to the Colorado bombings and received a prison sentence of 10 years. "This was personal," the judge noted in handing down the sentence.†

Burke qualifies as what we call a *hunter*. Simply defined, hunters intentionally use lethal violence. Their behaviors in carrying out the violent act follow a defined trail which we call the *path to intended violence*. Burke developed a grievance against his employer and coworkers, decided to act violently against them, then researched their locations, built his bombs, delivered them, and set the timers for detonating them. That the bombs did not do as much damage as intended does not detract from the hunting process in which Burke engaged. Like all hunters, Burke intended to act violently, then engaged in all the requisite behaviors necessary to consummate that lethal violence, including, ultimately, exploding the bombs.

Around the time Burke planned his hunt, again according to press reports, Suffolk County, New York policeman Michael Valentine met a woman on Match.com, an Internet dating service. Beginning in November 2005, they dated about 6 weeks before she broke up with him. Unwilling to let her go, Valentine hacked into her e-mail account and essentially stole her online identity. He began sending himself and some 70 other men e-mails in which he pretended to be her. These e-mails expressed romantic interest toward each recipient. On at least two occasions, men showed up at her house believing they had arranged a date with her. Suffolk County computer-crime detectives believed Valentine used several computers, one belonging to the police department. In April 2006, the district attorney obtained a 197-count indictment against Valentine, charging him with stalking, computer trespassing, official misconduct, and tampering with evidence. Valentine's lawyer promised a vigorous defense.‡

On June 30, 2006, Valentine copped a plea. He resigned from the police department and pled guilty to two counts of Unauthorized Use of a Computer. The district attorney dropped all of the other charges. The judge sentenced Valentine to 1 year of "conditional discharge." The judge also issued a 3-year order of protection for the victim.§

Valentine is what we call a *howler*. Simply defined, howlers engage in problematic behavior toward their targets, but that behavior does not result in lethal violence. Valentine developed a brief relationship with a woman, then targeted her after she rejected him. However, at no time did he appear to entertain thoughts of committing violence against her, nor did he take any of the steps along the path to intended violence. Instead, he embarked on a high-tech harassment campaign to embarrass, inconvenience, and perhaps even frighten her. By stealing her online identity, Valentine wreaked havoc on her social life and seriously embarrassed her by attributing messages and emotions to her through forged e-mails. As despicable as these actions were, at no time did he put her in physical danger.

Herein lies the distinction between hunters and howlers. Burke wanted to kill his targets by blowing up their residences or burning down their houses. He measured his success

* Suspected bomber arrested in Utah after tip. (2006, April 7). *Salt Lake City Tribune*.

† Harmon, G. (2007, February 3). 'This was personal' judge blasts GJ bomber with 10 years in prison. *The Daily Sentinel*.

‡ L.I. officer charged with cyberstalking. (2006, April 4). Associated Press.

§ Brian Creter, Senior Investigator, Gavin de Becker and Associates, to Frederick S. Calhoun, e-mail dated October 3, 2014, in author's personal possession.

in terms of death or destruction. Valentine wanted to harass and embarrass his target. He sought emotional and mental injuries, not physical. He measured his success in terms of inconveniencing, embarrassing, or frightening his former dating partner. Hunters deal in lethal violence; howlers cause stress.

This book explores in detail the differences between those who hunt and those who howl. Its intended audience goes beyond law enforcement or security specialists. Rather, anyone involved in managing potentially violent situations or problem individuals, such as human resource staff, mental health professionals, staff attorneys, employee assistance professionals, school administrators, teachers, guidance counselors—even potential targets—might gain from reading it. Our approach avoids theory in favor of practical concepts that can be readily applied by anyone involved in managing threatening situations or individuals. We are pragmatists who recognize that at workplaces, schools, homes, courts, and all the other venues of intended violence, threat management requires a multidisciplinary team approach. We write for every member of that team and use the generic term *threat manager* to address them all.

Taken together, hunters and howlers represent problem individuals. More precisely, they are individuals who purposefully intend to cause problems. At one end of the spectrum, the problems involve lethal violence. At the other end, the problems entail establishing harassing or binding attachments. In between are threats, intimidations, stalking, vandalism, physical abuse, and other forms of disruption. Threat managers must manage both ends of the spectrum and everything in between, although clearly, the killing end takes precedence. But that precedence in no way means that howlers can be ignored. By their very nature, problem individuals of every stripe insist on having their problems addressed. That insistence requires responses from threat managers.

This book, we believe, offers threat managers several benefits. First, it arms them with ways to identify problem behaviors and associate those behaviors with either hunters or howlers. Knowing with whom one is dealing is a crucial first step in any threat management process. Second, unlike any other study on threat management, we focus as much on problem individuals who intend to harass or intimidate (the howlers) as we do on individuals who intend lethality (the hunters). No other study gives as detailed a definition of howlers, yet howlers comprise the vast majority of problem individuals in any social setting. Third, through actual case studies and case analyses, we offer the best practices for assessing problem individuals and recommending the best protective response and management strategy.

Implementing an Effective Threat Management Process

A successful threat management process does not necessarily depend on large staffs or huge resource commitments, but instead on attention to detail and a thoughtful approach. It consists of 10 elements, each integral to the others, and they constitute the golden rules of contemporary threat management. Following them will allow the threat manager to implement an effective threat management program. We present them in Chapter 1 by way of introducing the approach to understanding hunters and howlers.

Threat management cases are not about investigating or solving crimes; they are about managing the behavior of an individual. Threat managers do not have a caseload of crimes assigned to them. Rather, threat managers manage problem individuals. Consequently, a

threat manager's caseload is a hybrid between a criminal caseload and a parole or probation officer's caseload.

Hence, we shy away from such traditional terminology as opening or closing a threat management case. Rather, we find the following designations best suited for managing threat management cases: active, inactive, chronic or habitual, or long-term.

Contemporary threat management seeks to avert violence altogether. Organizations must expand their security from simply fortifying physical security countermeasures and reacting to violent attacks. They need to incorporate an effective threat management process for defusing the risks of violence before the violence erupts. We are not talking about *predicting* violence. Predictions are the provinces of angels and fools. We advocate establishing procedures to enable the threat manager to identify potential problem individuals, assess the seriousness of the risk, investigate the circumstances, and then devise the appropriate strategies for managing the subject. Implementing an effective threat management process requires organizations to follow the 10 golden rules. Doing so will further enhance their security.

Because hunters and howlers have entirely different purposes, they behave in very different ways. This book explores those behaviors in order to make each more recognizable. In between those explorations, we offer detailed case analyses to show how being able to distinguish hunters as hunters and howlers as howlers can offer profound benefits to identifying, assessing, and managing both situations. Because hunters and howlers behave differently, threat managers need to deal with them in different ways. That requires being able to separate those who hunt from those who howl. This book discusses how to do exactly that.

Preface to the Second Edition

We take the opportunity of this second edition to expand our scope. The content of the first edition remains intact, although we updated many of the examples and illustrations. In this edition, we added a new section. “Section I: Threat Assessment and Management Strategies” offers our current thinking on how to conduct thorough threat management processes. We draw on the latest research as well as ideas and concepts from our previous books. Overall, the second edition allows us to integrate the sum of our careers in threat management—both our individual experiences managing problem situations and our research and writing on the topic—into a single volume. Our purpose with this second edition is to create a stand-alone volume on how to develop a threat management program and how to run it effectively.

In Chapter 1, we discuss the necessity for establishing threat management processes, then offer guidance on how to do so. Chapter 2 covers how to identify potential problems by conducting protective fact finding. As facts are gathered, we then describe the best methods for assessing those facts to determine the level of risk in Chapter 3. On the basis of those ongoing assessments, in Chapter 4, we discuss how to select the most appropriate threat management strategies to defuse the risk. Section I, then, provides the necessary skeleton for setting up threat management processes.

“Section II: Identifying the Howlers and Hunters” reprises the subjects presented in the first edition, effectively adding flesh and tissue to the bones of Section I. It defines two types of problem individuals. *Howlers* make disturbing and inappropriate communications but never go beyond those disturbances. *Hunters* do go beyond to launch attacks and inflict harm. Both pose problems; both have to be managed; neither can be ignored. Yet, understanding their differences informs both the threat assessment and the selection of the most appropriate threat management strategies. Howlers and hunters differ considerably. Threat managers need to understand and exploit those differences. Chapter 5 introduces the twin concepts of hunter and howler. Chapter 6 presents precise definitions for each concept. Chapter 7 offers insights into understanding hunters, while Chapter 8 does the same for howlers. Throughout, each concept is illustrated with numerous examples drawn from real-life events.

Chapter 9, “Working with the Intimacy Effect and the Law,” discusses how the degree of intimacy between subject and target affects the credibility of threatening communications and reviews the case law on domestic violence, the most intimate venue for violence. Chapter 10, “Working with the Hunter, Howler, and Other Concepts,” summarizes the importance of recognizing hunters and howlers and also reviews a number of important concepts.

The appendix reprints a summary of research on the intimacy effect written by Debra M. Jenkins. Nothing has emerged from subsequent research in the field of threat management to disabuse her 2009 conclusion that the intimacy effect factors into the credibility of threatening communications. The more intimate the relationship between subject and

target, the higher the likelihood of carrying out the threatened action. The more distant or impersonal the relationship, the less likely the threatened action will occur. The intimacy effect affects both hunters and howlers. Understanding it and applying its principles in threat assessments give the threat manager better insights into the degree of risk and how best to manage the situation.

We view working on the second edition of *Threat Assessment and Management Strategies: Identifying the Howlers and Hunters* as a great opportunity to consolidate our thinking on threat management into one volume. For a quarter of a century, we—individually and as partners—have pondered the perplexities of managing problem individuals. Over that time, we developed practical ideas and approaches that we applied to our own work, to our writings, and to our teaching. In this edition, we draw on the latest research and on our previous works and ideas to present to the reader a comprehensive approach to setting up a threat management process. Our purpose is to provide guidelines, not prescriptions. Dealing with hunters and howlers is a volatile, slippery challenge that belies rules, order, and predictions. It requires approaching the problem intelligently, flexibly, and, with each new problem, with originality. In this edition, we set up the parameters for implementing a successful threat management process. The threat manager must provide the intelligence, flexibility, and originality.

About the Authors

Frederick S. Calhoun, PhD, was the lead researcher and principal architect in developing the threat assessment process used by the U.S. Marshals Service for analyzing risks to federal judicial officials. He also developed the service's policies and procedures for conducting protective investigations. At the request of the National Sheriffs' Association, Dr. Calhoun coordinated the curriculum and led a nationwide training program on contemporary threat management for local law enforcement. He also wrote the curriculum and led the training of deputy U.S. Marshals Service threat investigators and their supervisors. Dr. Calhoun earned his PhD from the University of Chicago and is the author of 13 books, including *Hunters and Howlers: Threats and Violence Against Judicial Officials, 1789–1993* and *Defusing the Risk to Judicial Officials: The Contemporary Threat Management Process* (with Stephen Weston). In 2013, he and Mr. Weston released their newest book, *Concepts and Case Studies in Threat Management: A Practical Guide for Identifying, Assessing and Managing Individuals of Violent Intent*.

Dr. Calhoun also teaches a periodic 2-day seminar entitled "Managing Threats: Reducing the Risk of Violence." This seminar is designed to train law enforcement officers, mental health professionals, and private security officials to identify, assess, and manage individuals of violent intent. Instruction includes defining inappropriate communications and contacts, assessing problem individuals, and employing effective threat management strategies.

Stephen W. Weston, JD, is a 32-year veteran of the California Highway Patrol. From 1991 to 2006, he managed the unit responsible for the investigation of threats against California state officials.

Mr. Weston has been on the staff of the Los Rios College District since 1978 as an instructor in dignitary protection, threat assessment, and major event planning. He was an instructor in the nationwide contemporary threat management training sponsored by the National Sheriffs' Association. Mr. Weston has served on the faculty of California State University, Sacramento, in the Criminal Justice Division, teaching the course "Violence and Terrorism." In 1996, he graduated from Lincoln Law School in Sacramento and was admitted to the California State Bar.

Stephen Weston is the coauthor, with Frederick S. Calhoun, of *Defusing the Risk to Judicial Officials: The Contemporary Threat Management Process* and *Concepts and Case Studies in Threat Management: A Practical Guide for Identifying, Assessing and Managing Individuals of Violent Intent*. Mr. Weston consults with government and private organizations in the management of threatening situations and lectures throughout the country on public official threat management. He has served as president of the Northern California Chapter of the Association of Threat Assessment Professionals.

Contents

Preface to the First Edition	xiii
Preface to the Second Edition	xvii
About the Authors	xix

Section I

THREAT ASSESSMENT AND MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES

1	Establishing Threat Management Processes	3
	Recognize the Need for Threat Management Processes	4
	Assign Responsibility to Manage Inappropriate Situations to Trained Threat Managers	5
	Provide Training and Liaison with Potential Targets and Administrative Staff	6
	Create an Incident Tracking System with Well-Documented Files	7
	Establish Liaison with Other Agencies, Neighboring Organizations, and Institutions with Shared Interests	9
	Conduct Thorough Fact Finding	10
	Use Consistent and Valid Threat Assessment Methods	10
	Apply Threat Management Strategies Flexibly and Intelligently	11
	Communicate with Potential Targets Professionally, Confidently, and Competently	11
	Manage Inappropriate Situations Appropriately	15
	When Is When?	17
	Summary	18
	Situation Analysis: When Physical Protection Fails	18
	Issues of Interest	21
2	Identifying Problem Individuals	25
	Understanding Violence	25
	Identifying Problem Individuals	29
	Protective Fact Finding Compared to Criminal Investigations	31
	Conducting Protective Fact Finding	33
	Using the Need to Knows	33
	Need to Knows on the Situation Circumstances and Context	34
	Need to Knows on Subject's History	35
	Need to Knows on Subject's Mental and Physical Condition	36
	Interviewing the Subject	37

Purpose of Section II: Identifying the Howlers and Hunters	94
Summary	97
Situation Analysis: The Poacher	97
The Facts	97
The Threat Analysis	98
Recommended Protective Response	98
Recommended Threat Management Strategy	98
The Outcome	98
Issues of Interest	99
6 Defining Hunters and Howlers	101
Hunters Defined and Exemplified	102
Anatomy of a Hunter	106
Howlers Defined and Exemplified	107
Anatomy of a Howler	109
The Effect of Space and Time on Howling	109
Hunters versus Howlers	114
Summary	116
Situation Analysis: The Payoff	116
The Facts	116
The Threat Assessment	116
Protective Response	117
Threat Management Strategy	117
Outcome	117
Issues of Interest	118
7 Understanding Hunters	119
What Hunters Do	119
On Grievances	122
On Ideation of Violence	128
On Research and Planning	131
On Preparation	133
On Breach	136
On Attack	137
The Undetectable	138
Summary	139
Situation Analysis: The Nonaccidental Tourist	139
The Facts	139
The Threat Analysis	140
Protective Response	140
Threat Management Strategy	140
The Outcome	140
Issues of Interest	141

8	Understanding Howlers	143
	Howler Categories	143
	Personally Sinister Howlers	146
	Personally Binding Howlers	150
	Impersonally Sinister Howlers	154
	Impersonally Binding Howlers	161
	What Howlers Want	164
	Summary	167
	Situation Analysis: The Snitch	168
	The Facts	168
	The Threat Analysis	168
	Protective Response	168
	Threat Management Strategy	168
	The Outcome	168
	Issues of Interest	170
9	Working with the Intimacy Effect and the Law	171
	Working with the Intimacy Effect	172
	Violence against Public Figures	172
	Violence against Workplace Colleagues	173
	Violence against School Officials and Students	173
	Violence against Domestic Intimates	173
	General Observations	173
	Applying Federal Law	177
	Working with State and Local Laws on Threats and Domestic Violence	185
	State Stalking Laws	188
	Summary	190
	Situation Analysis: A Mother's Help	190
	The Facts	190
	Threat Assessment	191
	Recommended Protective Response	191
	Recommended Threat Management Strategy	191
	The Outcome	192
	Issues of Interest	192
10	Working with the Hunter, Howler, and Other Concepts	195
	Working with the <i>Last-Straw Syndrome</i>	196
	Other Concepts Influencing the Threat Management Process	202
	Managing Hunters and Howlers	203
	10 Guidelines for Managing Hunters and Howlers	204
	Summary	207
	Situation Analysis: The Relentless Pursuer	207
	The Facts	207
	Threat Assessment	208
	Recommended Protective Response	208

Contents	xi
Recommended Threat Management Strategy	208
The Outcome	208
Issues of Interest	210
Appendix: When Should Threats Be Seen as Indicative of Future Violence? Threats, Intended Violence, and the Intimacy Effect	211
DEBRA M. JENKINS	
Index	251