

IMMANUEL KANT

**CRITIQUE
OF JUDGMENT**

TRANSLATED AND WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY
WERNER S. PLUHAR
WITH A FOREWORD BY
MARY J. GREGOR

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FOREWORD

By calling three of his works "critiques," Kant indicated their central role in the Critical Philosophy. The *Critique of Pure Reason*, which determines the limits of theoretical cognition for the human mind, is the foundation of Kant's mature philosophical thought, and the ideal approach to his philosophy would, I suppose, begin with the *Critique of Pure Reason* and work forward systematically. That is to say, as we found various kinds of judgments, we would first analyze the sort of claim to universal assent being made and then attempt to justify that kind of claim by tracing it to the necessary principles of our mental activity. But our philosophical development may not parallel Kant's. If we find ourselves drawn to Kant by an interest in, e.g., ethics or aesthetics, we can go only so far before we get into difficulties. For Kant's interest in any problem has two aspects, the substantive and the critical. The sort of claim we are making can be analyzed in a way that is intelligible to a wide audience. But the status of that claim remains problematic until we have investigated our competence to make it. To justify the principle implicit in our moral judgments, we shall have to undertake a *Critique of Practical Reason*; to justify the principle implicit in our judgments about beauty, we must resort to a *Critique of Judgment*. And our investigation inevitably leads back to the *Critique of Pure Reason*.

To the extent that Kant keeps his substantive and his critical interests more or less separate, some of his writings, or parts of them, will be widely read. What Kant has to say on substantive issues has proved to be of perennial interest. But the student who becomes

interested in Kant's analysis will be aware that he cannot stop short with the analytic phase: Kant will have warned him repeatedly that the validity of these claims is still very much in question. Two courses are open to the serious student. He can plunge into the *Critique of Pure Reason* and work his way forward. In the process he will probably become a Kant scholar, an affliction that generally proves incurable. Or he can be content with a more general understanding of Kant's solution to the critical phase of the problem, which will leave him free to pursue his broader interests. One of the merits of Professor Pluhar's work is that his translator's introduction provides the sort of background for the *Critique of Judgment* that will guide the student interested in aesthetics and philosophy of science through the critical phases in Kant's discussion of aesthetic and teleological judgments.

The combination of Kant's critical and substantive concerns, in this highly complex work, may well account for the long-standing neglect of the *Critique of Judgment* as a whole and the interest recently shown in some of its parts. In his Introduction to the third *Critique*, Kant's interest is primarily critical. On the basis of the first two *Critiques* he acknowledges a "chasm" between nature and freedom that is not to be bridged by way of theoretical cognition. For a post-Kantian philosopher bent on doing speculative metaphysics, this acknowledgment indicates the failure of the Critical Philosophy. Not until nineteenth century idealism had run its course would it seem worthwhile to consider the more modest task Kant had set himself: that of making the transition, by way of reflective judgment and its principle of teleology, from our way of thinking about nature to our way of thinking about freedom. But even then, the connection between the Introduction to the *Critique* and its two parts seemed so tenuous as to raise doubts about the unity and coherence of the work.

In the meantime, developments in art criticism and aesthetic theory focused attention on Kant's accessible and tightly structured analysis of our judgments of beauty, the "Analytic of the Beautiful," into which we are plunged after the Introduction's prologue in heaven. The emergence of formalism in art, the collapse of "expressionism" as an aesthetic theory into a branch of psychology, and the perennial difficulties of assigning "objective" status to beauty suggest that Kant's analysis of taste is relevant to contemporary problems. But, after the analytic, Kant's critical concerns come to the foreground and the

course of the argument becomes puzzling. Kant is somehow, here as in the subsequent treatment of teleological judgments, carrying out the project outlined in the Introduction. But how? The second merit of Pluhar's introduction is that it attempts to explain how Kant is dealing with the problem posed in the Introduction to the *Critique*.

None of the periodic revivals of interest in Kant has, it seems to me, approached the magnitude of the present one. This is the appropriate time for an accurate translation into modern English of the work that has been called "the crowning phase of the critical philosophy." By including in his translation the original Introduction to the *Critique of Judgment* (which Kant replaced by a shorter one), and by adding his own helpful analysis of Kant's argument, Pluhar has taken an important step toward securing for the third *Critique* its rightful place in the Kantian corpus.

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TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE

Because there seems to be general agreement that an accurate and readable translation of the *Critique of Judgment*, including the First Introduction, is needed, I shall not argue that point.

The translator's introduction which follows (and, to some extent, the bracketed footnotes accompanying the text of the translation itself) serves two main purposes. One of these is to supply important background materials to readers with only limited prior exposure to Kant's "critical philosophy": above all, summaries of the *Critique of Pure Reason* and the *Critique of Practical Reason*, including not only the views but also the terminology from these works which Kant presupposes in the *Critique of Judgment*; and summaries of other philosophers' views to which each of the three *Critiques*, but especially the *Critique of Judgment*, responds.¹ The other main purpose is to explain the many difficult passages in the work. In particular, the translator's introduction offers a new interpretation of key elements in the foundation of both Kant's teleology and his aesthetics and uses that same interpretation to make new and better sense not only of the link between these two parts of the work, but especially of Kant's claims as to how the *Critique of Judgment* unites the three *Critiques* in a system. The translator's introduction makes no attempt, apart from an occasional remark, to trace the development of Kant's thought.

¹One excellent source of information on these views is Lewis White Beck's *Early German Philosophy: Kant and His Predecessors* (Cambridge: Belknap Press, Harvard University Press, 1969).

Any reader should of course feel free to skip those sections in the translator's introduction which contain material already familiar; and anyone who finds certain sections too difficult at first try should similarly feel free to set them aside for a while and return to them as needed to make sense of the Kantian passages they are intended to explain.

The translation of both the *Critique of Judgment* and the First Introduction is based on the standard edition of Kant's works, commonly referred to as the *Akademie* edition: *Kants gesammelte Schriften* (Berlin: Königlich Preussische Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1908-13). The text of the *Akademie* edition of the *Critique of Judgment* comes from the work's second edition, which was published in 1793 (the first edition appeared in 1790); it was edited by Wilhelm Windelband and is contained in volume 5 of the *Akademie* edition. The First Introduction appears in volume 20 (193-251) of the *Akademie* edition; it was edited by Gerhard Lehmann. I have considered variant readings throughout but have indicated them only where I either adopted them or found them of special interest.

The translation generally follows the *Akademie* text in the use of parentheses, quotation marks, typographical emphasis, and paragraphing; occasional changes, all but the most trivial of which have been noted, were made in the interest of clarity. All material in brackets, whether in the text or in footnotes, is my own. German terms inserted in brackets are given in their modern spelling and (usually) in their standard form (e.g., verbs are given in the infinitive), to facilitate finding them in a modern German dictionary. All translations given in footnotes are my own, and this fact is not indicated in each footnote individually.

The pagination along the margin of the text refers to the *Akademie* edition; the unprimed numbers refer to volume 5, the primed numbers to volume 20. All references to the work itself and to the First Introduction are to the *Akademie* edition; they are given as 'Ak.' followed by the page number and, as applicable, by the number of Kant's note ("n.") or of my bracketed note ("br. n."). (Because clarifying the text made it necessary to cut up Kant's inordinately long sentences and to rearrange some of them, as well as some of the more convoluted paragraphs, the correspondence between the numbers on the margins and the pages in the original is only approximate.) References to the translator's introduction are given in Roman numerals.

References to works of Kant other than the *Critique of Judgment* and the *Critique of Pure Reason* are to the *Akademie* edition and are given as 'Ak.' followed by the volume number and the page number. References to the *Critique of Pure Reason* are to the first two editions of the work and are given in standard form, as 'A' and 'B' followed by the page number.

At the end of this work will be found a selected bibliography, a glossary of the most important German terms in the work along with their English equivalents, and an index.

I have consulted Bernard's and Meredith's translations of the *Critique of Judgment*, Cerf's translation of a portion of the first part of the work, and Haden's translation of the First Introduction.² Where my renderings of key terms break with tradition, I have indicated this in footnotes at the beginning of major portions of this translation, explaining my reasons for the change.

I would like to express my appreciation to Professor Lewis White Beck for having suggested initially that I undertake this massive translation project and for having given me early guidance pertaining to translation as well as publication. I am heavily indebted to Professors Mary J. Gregor and James W. Ellington for their careful reading of drafts of the entire manuscript, for their detailed and highly valuable criticism, for information concerning both the Kantian and the further background, and for their encouragement. I am grateful to Hackett Publishing Company for their sophisticated and considerate handling of the project. My warmest and deepest gratitude goes to my wife and colleague, Professor Evelyn Begley Pluhar, who has done vastly more to make this project possible than I could hope to express.

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²J. H. Bernard's translation (New York: Hafner Publishing, 1951) first appeared in 1892. James Creed Meredith's in 1911 (first part of the *Critique*) and 1928 (second part) (Oxford: Oxford University Press). Walter Cerf's in 1963 (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill), and James Haden's in 1965 (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill). For an earlier translation of the First Introduction, see Immanuel Kant, *On Philosophy in General*, trans., with four introductory essays, by Humayun Kabir (Calcutta: The University Press, 1935).

TRANSLATOR'S INTRODUCTION

0.

Preliminary Note: The Scope of the *Critique of Judgment*

The *Critique of Judgment* contains Kant's mature views on aesthetics and teleology, and on their relation to each other as well as to the two earlier *Critiques*, the *Critique of Pure Reason* and the *Critique of Practical Reason*. It has two parts, the Critique of Aesthetic Judgment and the Critique of Teleological Judgment. The term 'judgment,' in these headings, means the same as 'power (or "faculty") of judgment' (*Urteilstkraft*), which is simply our ability to make (individual) judgments (*Urteile*).³

The Critique of Aesthetic Judgment deals mainly with two kinds of aesthetic judgments: judgments of taste, i.e., judgments about the beautiful in nature and in art, and judgments about the sublime. Kant's main concern is with judgments of taste. The problem with

³For my use of power, rather than faculty, see below, Ak. 167 br. n. 3. On *Urteilstkraft* and *Urteil*, cf. below, Ak. 167 br. n. 4.

these judgments is, roughly, the following. When we call something 'beautiful' we seem to do so on the basis of a certain liking, a certain feeling of pleasure; and pleasure is something very subjective. And yet it seems that in such a judgment we say more than "I like the thing." For in using the adjective 'beautiful' we talk as if beauty were some sort of *property* of the thing, and hence we imply that other people, too, should see that "property" and hence should agree with our judgment; in other words, we imply that the judgment is valid *not* merely for the judging subject but universally.

Kant's solution to this problem hinges on how he analyzes the special kind of feeling involved in judgments of taste. Specifically, the solution hinges on how Kant relates this feeling to, on the one hand, theoretical knowledge (i.e., knowledge of what is the case, as distinguished from knowledge of what ought to be done), and, on the other hand, to morality. The key concept (to be explained below: *liv*) in Kant's analysis of judgments of taste is the concept of nature's subjective "purposiveness" (*Zweckmäßigkeit*), as judged aesthetically.

Kant analyzes this concept of nature's subjective purposiveness by reference to our mental powers, and much of Kant's theory of taste can indeed be understood in terms of that analysis. Yet Kant's main line of argument for the universal validity of judgments of taste brings in not only the concept of nature's subjective purposiveness but also the concept of something "supersensible" underlying that same purposiveness. In fact, as my new interpretation of abundant textual evidence will show, Kant *equates* (treats as equivalent) these two concepts. Because this equation seems very perplexing indeed, Kant should have made it thoroughly explicit and clear. Instead he just switches mysteriously from the one concept to the other, without informing the reader that the equivalence between them has been established, even if still not nearly as explicitly and clearly as it should have been, in the *Critique of Teleological Judgment*.

Kant goes on to apply his theory of taste to fine art. When we judge fine art by taste, we judge it as we do nature, viz., in terms of its beauty. But since, unlike nature, works of fine art are something created by man, we can judge them also by how much genius they manifest. Kant's main contribution to the theory of fine art is his analysis of genius.

The *Critique of Teleological Judgment* deals with our judgments of things in nature in terms of final causes, i.e., ends or purposes.

A purpose, for Kant, is an object or state of affairs insofar as it is, or is regarded as, the effect brought about by some cause through a concept that this cause has of it (cf. Ak. 180 and 408); thus a nightingale is a purpose insofar as we at least regard it as having been produced by some cause through the concept that this cause had of a nightingale. If the object or state of affairs was in fact produced through a concept that the cause had of it, then it is an intentional purpose; if we merely regard it as having been produced in this way, then it is an unintentional purpose. An intention (*Absicht*), it seems, is simply the cause's concept of the purpose it pursues, i.e., the concept of the object or state of affairs it seeks to bring about.⁴ Sometimes Kant apparently forgets his definition of 'purpose' and uses the term, as indeed we often do in English, as synonymous with 'intention'.⁵

The Critique of Teleological Judgment argues that, while natural science cannot explain things without appealing to mechanism and hence to efficient causes, some things in nature, viz., organisms, are such that we cannot even adequately investigate them unless we judge them not only in mechanical terms but also in terms of final causes, i.e., unless we judge them at the same time as purposes. However, judgments of natural products as purposes do not seem to share the firm status and justification enjoyed by mechanistic explanations. Worst of all, such "teleological" judgments (from Greek *τέλος* [*télos*], 'end,' 'purpose') seem to involve us in contradiction. For in judging the object as a purpose we judge it as contingent, viz., contingent on ("conditioned by") the concept of a purpose; and yet, insofar as we judge and try to explain the same object as an object of nature, we judge that same object, even the same causal connections in it, at the same time as necessary.

Kant's solution to this problem hinges again on his analysis of the concept of nature's purposiveness (the "subjective" purposiveness with an "objective" one based on it), this time as judged teleologically rather than aesthetically. Here again Kant equates this concept with

⁴Although Kant does not define *Absicht*, this is how he seems to use the term most of the time. See, e.g., Ak. 383, 398, and 400 (line 19).

⁵See, e.g., Ak. 391, 393, and 397. Sometimes Kant seems to use '*Absicht*' to mean an intentional purpose, rather than the concept of such a purpose; in those cases I have rendered the term by 'aim.' See, e.g., Ak. 484.

the concept of the supersensible basis of that same purposiveness. Even here Kant does not make this equation nearly explicit and clear enough but leaves us to assemble laboriously the various things he says in different places. But the textual evidence that he does in fact make this equation is overwhelming. The argument from this interpretation of mine will proceed by pointing to that evidence and tying the pieces together gradually; it will not be complete until the end of this introduction.

That argument will connect with a second one. This second argument has to do with the relation of the Critique of Aesthetic Judgment to the Critique of Teleological Judgment and, above all, the relation of the entire work to Kant's critical philosophy as a systematic whole. Kant is greatly concerned to show that the *Critique of Judgment* is needed to complete the "critical system." Although this concern is not assigned a special part in the work, Kant brings it up again and again, especially in his two introductions. I shall devote the remainder of this preliminary note on the scope of the present (third) *Critique* to a rough sketch of that second argument of mine, the argument regarding the relation of the two parts of the *Critique of Judgment* to each other and to the critical system. Anyone not already familiar with the main views of the first two *Critiques* should, for now, feel free to skip the remainder of this note and proceed to the next section, with which this introduction actually begins.

The *Critique of Pure Reason*, as Section 2 of this introduction will explain, had argued that we need the concept of something supersensible as substrate of nature (of nature as it appears to us) if we are to solve four "antinomies" (seeming contradictions), into which our reason falls inevitably when it tries to make sense of nature. But this concept of the supersensible had to be left completely *indeterminate*, as merely the concept of "things as they may be in themselves" (rather than as they appear to us). In the *Critique of Practical Reason*, as will be explained in Section 3, another antinomy had arisen. This antinomy concerned the "final purpose" that the moral law of which we are conscious enjoins us to pursue, a purpose we must therefore regard as achievable although obstacles insuperable for us finite beings seem to stand in the way. Solving this antinomy required the assumption that we are immortal souls and that there is a "moral" God, a God the concept of whom (as, of course, something super-

sensible) is made *determinate* through attributes derived from the moral law (and from the final purpose that this law enjoins on us).

Now the Critique of Aesthetic Judgment and the Critique of Teleological Judgment each gives rise to another antinomy and, as I shall interpret these antinomies and Kant's solution to them, resolving these antinomies requires that we equate the concept of nature's (subjective and objective) purposiveness with the (indeterminate) concept of some supersensible basis of that purposiveness. Kant holds that this last concept of the supersensible, i.e., as the basis of nature's purposiveness, "mediates" between the other two concepts of the supersensible (respectively, as nature in itself, and as required by the moral law) so that the three concepts of the supersensible can for the first time be thought of as applying to the *same* (i.e., a united) supersensible. It is through this unification of the supersensible that the three *Critiques*, which give rise to the three concepts of the supersensible, are themselves united to form a whole having the coherence of a system. What allows the concept of nature's purposiveness to play this mediating role is, as I shall show, precisely Kant's equation of that concept with the concept of the supersensible basis of that same purposiveness, combined with the analysis he gives of the concept of that basis.

1.

Kant's Life and Works

Immanuel Kant was born at Königsberg, East Prussia, on April 22, 1724. His father was a master saddler of very modest means, his mother a woman without education but with considerable native intelligence. According to Kant's own account, his grandfather was an immigrant from Scotland. Kant was raised, both at home and at school (at the *Collegium Fridericianum* at Königsberg), in the tradition of Pietism, a Protestant movement with a strong ethical orientation and a de-emphasis of theological dogma.

Kant attended the University of Königsberg from 1740 to about

1746. After that he served as a tutor in several aristocratic families in different parts of East Prussia, earning a very modest income. Having kept up his studies in the meantime, he returned, in 1755, to the University of Königsberg, employed as an instructor. He continued in this position for fifteen years, lecturing in several natural sciences, in mathematics, and in philosophy. In 1770 he was appointed professor of logic and metaphysics at the University of Königsberg. He remained active in this position until a few years before his death, at Königsberg, on February 12, 1804.

Kant's first publication (on a topic in Leibnizian physics) appeared in 1747, when he was still a student. For the next fifteen years, most of his writings were in the natural sciences, but some were in philosophy. Two of these philosophical works were (roughly) in the philosophy of religion (the more important of these is *The Only Possible Basis of Proof for Demonstrating the Existence of God*, 1763); another was the *Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime*, 1764. Kant's only publication, apart from the *Critique of Judgment*, that touches on aesthetics. (It discusses the subject from the point of view of social psychology; not until a few years before publication of the third *Critique* did Kant believe that an aesthetic judgment about the beautiful or sublime had validity for persons other than the subject making it.) The Inaugural Dissertation of 1770 (which was written in Latin), *On the Form and Principles of the Sensible and Intelligible World*, marks the beginning of Kant's so-called "critical period" (as distinguished from the "precritical period"), because here for the first time Kant treats space and time as he does in the first *Critique*: as forms of sensibility (forms of "intuition"), i.e., as something that the subject contributes to the world of experience, which is therefore only a phenomenal world. (Kant does not yet assign such a contributory role to any concepts.)

By then Kant's publications had already won him a considerable reputation in learned circles in Germany; and the publication of Kant's most important work, the *Critique of Pure Reason*, was eagerly anticipated. It took Kant about a decade to complete the work. When it finally appeared, in 1781, it was met with enthusiasm by some, by others with consternation. Kant rewrote portions of the work for the second edition, of 1787; but first he published, in 1783, the *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics*, a greatly simplified and shortened restatement of the main positions and arguments of the first *Critique*.