Peter the Great Changes Russia

Second Edition

Edited and with an introduction by Marc Raeff



Peter the Great Changes Russia

Second Edition

Edited and with an introduction by

Marc Raeff
Columbia University

D. C. HEATH AND COMPANY
Lexington, Massachusetts Toronto

Published simultaneously in Canada.

Printed in the United States of America.

International Standard Book Number: 0-669-82701-0

Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 72-1850

INTRODUCTION

We call the world we live in "modern"—stressing the fact that it seems to us far different from what the world was to our ancestors of the Renaissance, the Middle Ages, and classical antiquity. And implied in this difference is the belief that what is "modern" has come about through rapid and far-reaching changes in the political, economic, and cultural aspects of Western life. We speak, therefore, of the Industrial Revolution, the great political revolutions of the United States and France, the revolutions in thought and taste associated with the "modern" notions of science, realism, individualism. In short, we have become quite familiar with the idea of revolution and change, and we associate it with innovation, acclaiming it as evidence that things are moving forward, are improving and giving wider scope to man's energies. Even if we disapprove of some specific results of a revolution, we still feel that it is but a perversion of something basically desirable and good, an effort at correcting and improving a bad situation that has gone wrong. We stress the element of innovation, the new direction which the revolution has brought about.

In so doing we tend to forget at times that however radical and thorough a revolution, it must have its foundations in the conditions that preceded it and that its results, therefore, cannot be completely unrelated to what went on before. As time passes, the novelties introduced by the revolution are taken for granted, and we are made aware of the survival of some of the antecedent conditions. We begin to speak of fundamental continuities in the country's history and downgrade the revolution as an accidental and superficial development in the basic structure and direction of a society's evolution.

And yet, something did change, a new turn was taken, no return to the past was possible any longer. There is no denying that something of a break did occur in the continuity of a nation's history.

What at first glance distinguishes the history of Russia from that of most Western European countries is that it has experienced a greater number of profound, "revolutionary" breaks in its history, each one leaving a deep imprint on the nation's consciousness. Like all European nations, Russia experienced its first "revolution" with its conversion to Christianity. Then came the Mongol or Tartar conquest which had a similar impact, though it did not change the Russian people's self-image as much. But it did interrupt contacts with other Christian nations and thereby stop Russia's participation in the life of Europe for two centuries. Whether the reign of Ivan the Terrible (1533–1584) marked a revolution may be a matter of debate. But there can be no question of the profound impact of the reign of Peter the Great, the subject of the present collection of readings. Lastly, without any question, the Revolution of 1917 profoundly transformed Russia and its people. In every instance, but more particularly in the last two (though not to the same extent for all social classes), the Russians felt that they had not only undergone institutional changes but that, as people, they had been transformed spiritually, culturally, psychologically.

The reign of Peter the Great (1682–1725) is known in Russian literature as the period of "transformation" and Peter as the Tsar Transformer [*tsar' preobrazovate'*]. It was only in the nineteenth century, under the influence of the events in France after 1789, that some radical intellectuals began to see Peter the Great as a revolutionary figure who had forcibly pushed Russia onto the path of secularism, rationalism, radical innovation, and modernity. To Russians of the eighteenth century, Peter had been the transformer of his nation, bringing to life a new—modern—type of Russian man, and like God literally creating Russia anew: "Our Lord, Peter the Great, who has drawn us from nothingness into being," a younger contemporary put it. But Peter the Great's work, whether truly "revolutionary" or merely "transforming" did not occur in a vacuum.

The area that was to become the nucleus of what is today Russia had been unified politically and freed from Tartar overlordship in the second half of the fifteenth century. In the course of the sixteenth

century the institutional, social, and economic patterns were elaborated and became fixed. The first selection of readings in the present volume gives a summary description and analysis of the major patterns. At this point it need only be stressed that economically, Russia remained quite primitive—underdeveloped we would say today—compared to Western Europe, though it was not quite as backward as is sometimes believed. Socially and institutionally, Russia had none of the complexities bequeathed by the feudal order to Western European nations. Political power was monopolized by the autocratic Tsar, while society consisted essentially of two classes —nobility and peasantry—each equally powerless before the Tsar; but the nobility was gaining more and more despotic power over the peasantry. The city population was relatively small and politically powerless, and in contrast to Western Europe economically poor and socially weak as well. Nor did the Church and clergy play nearly as significant a role in the political and economic life of the country as they did in the West. The cultural life of Muscovy, as the country was then known both to the natives and to foreigners, was dominated by religious concerns, and institutionally it was centered in the Church. The second half of the sixteenth century witnessed an energetic effort at making the basic institutional, social, and cultural aspects of Muscovite life more efficient and better adapted to the political problems faced by the country. The security of the borders was much improved, and in some cases Russia could even embark on a policy of expansion. Ivan the Terrible and his successors, tsars Theodore [*Feodor*] and Boris Godunov endeavored to open Russia to more active intercourse with the West. Boris Godunov even went so far as to send several young Russians to study in England (they never returned, presumably because of the turmoil that broke out in Russia at the death of Boris).

These developments were brusquely interrupted, however, by dynastic and social upheavals which lasted for over a decade and brought foreign invasions in their wake. This period (from about 1603 to 1613), known as the Times of Troubles, was marked by civil and foreign wars, popular revolts, and almost resulted in the destruction of the Muscovite state and the loss of Russia's *national* and religious independence at the hands of Poland and the Roman Catholic Church. Eventually, the crisis was overcome, a new dynasty

—the house of Romanov—was elevated to the throne, and the national, social, and spiritual integrity of Russia was preserved.

But the experience left a shattering impression on the people, the ruling class as well as the peasantry. In the first place, a very strenuous effort was required of all classes to repair the physical damage and to rebuild the institutional, economic, cultural fabrics of Russian life. This process of reconstruction, extending over more than half of the seventeenth century, brought about a consolidation and hardening of the patterns initiated and developed in the sixteenth century. When a society reconstructs itself following some major cataclysm, it has a tendency to use the past for its standard and model. The Russians were no exception. Because they had come so near to losing their national independence and spiritual identity, the Russians were especially eager to preserve and strengthen the traditional elements of their way of life and exclude the foreign ones that seemed to be a threat. Muscovy became as self-centered as it had been under the yoke of the Tartars; it turned more isolationist and more chauvinistic than it had been at the end of the sixteenth century when its tsars had encouraged active and fruitful contacts with the West.

Of course, Muscovy could not remain self-contained and isolated from the rest of Europe completely. Willy-nilly it had to maintain relations with foreign nations, especially its neighbors. At the time, these neighbors were much more powerful than Russia. Poland, on the eve of her rapid decline, was still one of the largest and most powerful nations in Europe, and Sweden had emerged from the Thirty Years' War as the dominant power in the Baltic. In the south, the Ottoman Turks had not yet spent their offensive energies and together with their vassal, the Khan of the Crimea, threatened the security of Muscovy's richest lands to the south of the capital. Lastly, as a by-product of the conflicts between Turkey, Poland, and Muscovy, the free Cossack Host (occupying the area of modern Central Ukraine) acted both as an irritant and an invitation to penetration. The incorporation of the Cossack Host and its lands into Muscovy in the middle of the seventeenth century created new responsibilities and opportunities. Necessities of national security, as well as diplomatic considerations, required that Russia be on the alert and possess adequate military means. To this end the tsars needed an

efficient army and economic resources. To obtain the first, Russia's fighting forces had to be set up along professional, Western lines and endowed with modern equipment. Thus, the Russians had to acquaint themselves with techniques developed in Western Europe. As regards the economic side, Russia needed to exploit more fully and effectively its natural resources and develop its foreign and domestic trade.

Although foreign contacts and the acquisition of Western techniques and knowledge had become a necessity for national survival, the adoption of such a course ran counter to the prevailing mood of isolation, the fear of everything foreign as a potential threat to the traditional values and spiritual identity of the nation. Those who desired to modernize Russia, to open her up to foreign breezes and influences, had to tread very gingerly. Even tsars had to bow to national and religious prejudices, as did Peter's father, Tsar Alexis (Aleksei Mikhailovich, 1645–1676) when he gave up his efforts at creating a permanent theatre and relaxing the prohibitions against foreign dress. The few foreigners who were admitted into the country were prevented from merging into Russian life; they were restricted to a special suburb of Moscow (the so-called "German suburb"), and Russians were not allowed to mix freely with them. Isolationism and bigoted traditionalism were not alone responsible for the very slow and largely ineffective attempts at dealing with basic national needs in an imaginative, "modern" way. The available institutional tools and the country's economic poverty played their role too.

The "primitive" economic resources (because of ignorance and lack of techniques to make greater use of their hidden potential) were strained to the utmost to repair the damage wrought by the Times of Troubles and continuing incursion of foreign raiders; military needs swallowed up the lion's share of the product of the people's labors. As for the institutions, they were proving increasingly more inadequate in dealing with new, unfamiliar, and pressing problems. The old institutions acted on the basis of tradition and precedent, piecemeal, dealing with every case in isolation without an overall view or direction. As long as the problems had been familiar ones, as long as it was only a matter of preserving the traditional status quo, the institutions functioned satisfactorily. But the

challenges and new problems raised by a modern military establishment, diplomacy, international trade, technical and cultural needs, proved beyond the capacity of the customary operating procedures. Some far-seeing individuals like the Regent Sophie and her chief minister and lover V. V. Golitsyn, and the architect of Tsar Alexis' foreign policy, Ordyn-Nashchokin, were aware of the situation and endeavored to correct it by attempting to create new institutional tools. Thus, a corps of professional soldiers—the *streltsy*—was established; foreign technicians and instructors were hired; a new code of laws drafted; embassies sent abroad; new administrative departments set up and their work organized along more rational and functional lines; finally, some of the most inefficient practices were being gradually eliminated. Important as these reforms were, they did not go far enough, for they could not overcome the dead weight of traditional prejudice nor break through the fear and suspicion of everything foreign that the Russians had developed from their past experiences, especially the Times of Troubles. The most dramatic illustration of a violently negative reaction to desirable and anodyne external changes was provided by the schism of the Old Believers who rejected Patriarch Nikon's reforms of the ritual in the middle of the seventeenth century.

This was the situation into which Peter came to power. Awareness that a transformation was needed had developed in the minds of many leading Russians. But they had neither the power, the institutional tools, the energy, nor the vision to initiate policies that would gradually bring about the desired change. It was a matter of the dynamics of change—its rate had to become such as to make possible a far-reaching transformation—and this is what Muscovy could not bring about. The task fell to Peter, who carried it out in quite a different spirit from theirs. Indeed, the enlightened and reform-minded Muscovites wished to transform Russia, but not at the price of a loss of its traditional spiritual and cultural identity. For Peter, on the other hand, this identity did not have any absolute value or particular meaning, quite the contrary perhaps.

In speaking about transformation we have implicitly meant "modernization." But what did modernization mean for Russia at the end of the seventeenth century? First and foremost it meant "joining" Western Europe, becoming part of its political and commercial and

even cultural world. To join Western Europe, to become part of its political system and play in it the role that befitted a country of the size and resources of Russia, meant also to accept the technology and the outlook of the West, for only such an acceptance would guarantee Russia its freedom of action as a nation. The Western Europe of the late seventeenth century, however, was a product not only of the medieval flowering of a Christian civilization and of a social system built around the family (in the broader sense), the corporation, the church, and the common acceptance of norms and symbols that combined the pagan tribal with the Christian imperial legacies. If it were only that, then the world of the West would have been no more strange to the Russians of the late seventeenth century than it had been to their ancestors of Kievan times or to their teachers, the Byzantines of the ninth century. In fact, however, the West implied much more, and in particular those elements that had been developed by the historical events we call—in shorthand fashion—the Renaissance, the Reformation, individualism, and the rise of modern science.

Indeed, the institutions, attitudes, and actions of Western Europe were permeated by "new" elements that were a far cry from the medieval pattern of tradition, slow evolution, the ideal of a static and harmonious order of things designed for the preparation of a life hereafter. To begin with, traditions were in the process of being rapidly subverted and displaced by the commands of reason. Rationality—in the broader sense of the term, that is, clear consciousness of a goal and the search for the most effective means for reaching it —was the principle that dictated the choice and development of the institutional means put at the disposal of the absolutist state, the enterprising trader, the creative thinker and artist. It was the spirit of reason that explained the preference for the general scheme and the readiness to make far-going transformations and to rebuild institutions from anew. We shall see how much of this spirit Peter the Great made his own, and the resistance that it was bound to encounter in a society still living on the basis of uncritically accepted tradition.

The triumph of reason entailed primacy of the individual over the group, for reason could only live in the single person, while the group relied on the workings of uncritically, emotionally held tradi-

tions. In the West the old group loyalties were weakening, were even being abandoned outright, for the sake of the triumph of the enterprising and driving energies, the critical reason of the individual. A transformation on the model of Western Europe, therefore, had to accept this new dynamic element and promote the spirit of individualism at the expense of the traditional loyalties and group ties. For Muscovy which still was so much rooted in the traditional family pattern of clannish solidarities, for Muscovy where the single individual counted for blessedly little outside his family and clan, the acceptance of the primacy of individualism signified a revolutionary departure from a centuries-old evolution. In breaking the old group ties Peter unsettled old values and beliefs, disorganized whole strata of society, aroused spirited antagonism on the part of the traditionalists. At the same time, those individuals whom he helped to liberate themselves from the old fetters of the group found themselves isolated, faced with new and difficult problems and very much in need of guidance and help from a strong hand; in the case of Russia it was the hand of the Autocratic Emperor. Thus, Peter's breaking of traditional groupings and the freeing of the individual, at first, served to strengthen the hold of the absolute monarch and his centralized bureaucratic state apparatus.

In the West, rationality and individualism had fostered an active orientation towards life and the solution of its problems. They had stimulated economic enterprise, as well as a belief in progress—in the sense of increasing the realm of human possibilities and the rewards for individual energy. The "modern" period of European history is marked by the expansionist character of European civilization, both internally through economic development and the creativity of the intellect, and externally in the form of the Europeanization of the inhabited world. Acceptance of the patterns of modernization on the Western European model, therefore, implied an acceleration of economic activity, the development of all resources of the country, and the stimulation of the creative powers of the Russian mind. Peter understood this double implication of the process of Westernization and modernization very well. As some of the later readings will illustrate, he devoted much of his energy to this task, a task whose satisfactory (on the whole) fulfillment was to be the major legacy of Peter the Great's reign.

In the West the essential traits of modernity we have just mentioned were put at the disposal of "power"—political, economic, spiritual. Power was the most easily perceptible and most dramatic manifestation of the new spirit of Europe. It was this very modern and Western trait that Peter possessed to a high degree. He had a strong and fervent drive for power, not so much for himself as for his country and his nation. He wanted to bring Russia's power to its peak; and as in his time this could be done by rising to the level reached by the Western European states, Russia would have to go to school in the West and open itself to foreign influences. This was not to be done without difficulty and without creating serious new problems for the Russian body politic, as some of the subsequent readings will show.

Deriving from the rationalistic, individualist approach to power, Peter also had a positive concept of government, while his predecessors had mainly a negative one: Muscovite government policy and practice were negative in the sense that they aimed at preventing the invasion, conquest, destruction of Russia (which did not preclude their taking advantage of opportunities for expansion); they aimed at preserving the traditional values, institutions, and culture of Russia. Peter, on the other hand, wanted to make Russia more powerful, more prosperous, better administered, more enlightened, more progressive, and he wanted it to play a positive and active role among other nations. He wished Russia to become acquainted with and make use of everything that foreign civilizations had to offer of value and benefit. To his way of thinking the state had to play an active role, take a positive stand, and have a general purpose—that of making Russia strong and its people happy. He, therefore, endeavored to impart a positive orientation to the government and to make the administration goal-conscious. His objective did not preclude trial and error, fumbling and improvisation on his part—but he always kept in mind the overall new direction he wished to impart to Russian life. He never was content to let things evolve, situations shape themselves, and transformations to come about gradually, growing out of existing circumstances.

In method, too, Peter differed from his predecessors. The difference did not lie so much in any specific solutions or policies; it was rather a matter of the temper or atmosphere created by Peter. The

Emperor's vitality, energy, driving force have few parallels among the great leaders of history. Not only was he strong physically, he was also a human dynamo: always active, always curious and eager to learn, always driving on; his enthusiasm was unbounded, his will inflexible, and his stamina and working capacity limitless. By contrast, the traditional Muscovite was indolent, slow, timorous, passive (there may have been good reasons for it, but they did not concern Peter). By comparison, the Western European was a more energetic, active, creative, and lively individual. Peter had noticed this very early when he contrasted the interesting, free, stimulating social life in the German (i.e. foreign) suburb of Moscow with the crudeness and boring formality of his own family and court. Intent on bringing out in others the qualities he possessed himself to such a high degree, Peter wanted to change the Russians into active, creative, energetic individuals, like the Western Europeans. He knew, or sensed, that the Russians were as gifted and intelligent as the Westerners, that they only needed the stimulation and opportunity to display their gifts. Western dress—with the greater freedom of bodily movement it afforded—became the symbol of the kind of transformation Peter wanted to bring about. Impatient and driving, himself successful in freeing himself from the shackles of Muscovite patterns, he was determined to lead all of Russia—at least its élite—onto the same path rapidly. Peter cared little for new institutions and policies for their own sake. To him what really mattered was to pull Russia out of its rut, its passivity, to open up channels for the free flow of its people's energies and resources. He wanted to impart motion to Russia—in Pushkin's words, he made the country rear like a steed—and to transform the nation's ways so that it could join the ever-expanding and ever-forward-moving stream of civilization. No wonder that in this attempt he disregarded the psychological resistance of his people, that he rode roughshod over traditional beliefs and values, oblivious to the anguish and suffering he brought to many. In the process, naturally, his personal traits and his ways of doing things became part and parcel of his larger design; they affected the character of his work. For this reason the personal element of Peter has become also an element in the historical destiny of his reign.

To be successful in his own terms, Peter the Great had to take

steps leading to a rapid transformation of Russian man, at least of the members of the upper class. All textbooks relate how he went about changing the external appearance of the Russians, and several of the selections in this volume will describe how he initiated their spiritual, inner transformation. Peter wanted the transformation to take place immediately, under his very eyes. The question arises not only whether he succeeded superficially in getting the new values and culture adopted, but also whether he secured their genuine acceptance by the new generations of the Russian élite. Did Peter's contemporaries and their immediate descendants feel that they were in truth different from their Muscovite ancestors? In the realm of political and institutional history, Peter's reign, as some historians have pointed out, may perhaps have had only superficial or ephemeral, albeit striking, results. But did it not have lasting effects on the ways of thinking and feeling, on the way of life of many Russians? Viewing his reign from this vantage point, perhaps Peter's work found its culmination and completion only in the Revolution of 1917 (when the entire Russian people was launched onto the path of full "modernization"), although that revolution was brought about in a spirit far different from Peter's.

Of course, not all Russians were affected equally by the transformation in their way of life. And herein lie both a difficulty in assessing the reign of Peter and the tragedy of modern Russian history. The basic changes affected only the upper classes and those who came to be closely related to their way of life. They did not affect the mass of the people, the peasantry, who continued to live in Muscovite times. It was the formation of this gulf, the appearance of "two nations," that has colored all evaluations of Peter's reign by Russian thinkers and historians. For this reason, too, any and all interpretations of the reign are intimately bound up with ideological presuppositions and political preferences. In Russian thought and historiography Peter's reign has become, and still is, a live political and intellectual issue. The history of the historiography of the reign is actually an account of the intellectual development of the Russian élite over two hundred years. This is also the reason why Peter and his work still await their definitive histories.

If Peter's work affected different social classes differently, the same can also be said of various aspects of his reforming activity.

The elements of modernity and innovation Peter introduced did not affect all branches of public life, nor did they have equal success in all the areas in which they were introduced. Foreign policy and the creation of its instruments—a modern army and navy—were the areas in which Peter appears to have been successful immediately and well-nigh completely. In the domain of economic development, however, or in his social and fiscal measures, the first Emperor was not wholly successful. Even if his measures did affect these areas of Russian life profoundly, they did not always have the results expected by the Tsar. In judging Peter's reign it is, therefore, important to give an order of priority to various areas of his activities. One of the reasons for the disparity in the judgments pronounced by historians on the reign derives from the fact that every historian assigns a different order of priority to the various accomplishments of Peter's policies and plans.

In considering a period of profound and rapid transformation, especially a transformation that gave a new orientation and outlook to many strata of societies and many institutional developments, it is a great temptation to pay attention only to what has survived, to that which seems to lead directly to the present. To give way to this temptation—as advocated by E. H. Carr in *What Is History?*—is to shut oneself off from an important part of reality: that which has not survived, but which at one time may have been equally—if not more—important to contemporaries. Even to understand what has survived, and why, it is necessary to keep in mind the alternatives that were available to previous generations. It is equally important, as noted earlier, to remember that the opinions and reactions of Peter's contemporaries—however wrong they might be "objectively"—were themselves a factor in determining the outcome of Peter's reign, in shaping Russian reality subsequently. The wholehearted and even enthusiastic acceptance of Russia's cultural Westernization by the élite meant that Russian art, literature, music, and thought would be directly influenced and shaped by Western models and values. The rejection of Peter's work by the peasantry, the sullen resistance to it by a large segment of the people, created a gulf between the upper and lower classes. Sooner or later, thoughtful and enlightened individuals, social critics and political leaders would discover the depth of this gulf and attempt to bridge it. In so doing they might be

led to reject all of Peter's work and everything that issued from it —i.e. the political, social, cultural régime of Imperial Russia—and advocate either violent and complete revolution or a return to the allegedly truer national past of Muscovite Russia.

This raises a last general observation. A change that has been dramatic and rapid, a change that has left a deep impression on the consciousness of contemporaries, appears to those who have had to submit to it like a tidal wave or hurricane, an inevitable, elemental force that cannot be resisted. Its results, therefore, must be accepted without questioning. Such was the effect of Peter's work on several generations of Russians, and in some respects it lasted for over two centuries. His impact—due to the energy and ruthlessness of his ways—was so profound, his accomplishments so stupendous, that the smaller and more timid men who followed him were overawed.[1] They did not dare to touch the basic structure he had left. Consciously or unconsciously they endowed it with an absoluteness that imparted great rigidity to the system Peter had helped into being. This rigidity, this fear of touching the structure, lest Russia's newly won position crumble and the country revert to its previous backward helplessness, saddled Imperial Russia with a particularly onerous heritage. To advocate far-reaching changes in Peter's system seemed tantamount to rejecting it; and this in turn appeared to call into question the very existence of modern Russia, its power, its achievements, and its culture. Whether they liked Peter's work or not, whether they accepted or rejected it, educated Russians in the late eighteenth century, and throughout the nineteenth, could not deny Peter's paternity. They operated with the institutional tools and the modern rational concepts of national progress and welfare that Peter had first introduced to Russian consciousness.

The problems raised by the reign of Peter the Great, the impact of his grandiose personality on the destinies of Russia, admit of two sides. There is, first, an evaluation of the novelty and solidity of the institutional changes wrought by Peter. It is a task which is amenable to more or less objective and definitive historical analysis. We can ascertain to what extent the administrative institutions, or economic policies, for instance, had been an elaboration and extension

[1] A beautiful and compellingly dramatic illustration of this reaction is A. Pushkin's famous narrative poem *The Bronze Horseman*.

of Muscovite practices; to what extent they were modeled on foreign patterns; how long they survived in the form Peter gave them and how long they remained effective at all. Some of the historians quoted on the following pages will attempt to provide answers, or suggestions, in some specific areas. The other side is more complex and more difficult to come to grips with. Peter's reign must be evaluated in terms of the impact it had on the minds of contemporaries and later generations, of the consciousness Russians had of its significance for them. In this respect the personal characteristics of Peter and of his methods are of particular relevance. The people's awareness of the transformation wrought by Peter and their reactions to this awareness are very much part of an overall assessment of Peter's role in the history of Russia.

This last aspect of the historical problem presented by the reign of Peter the Great gave rise to an analytical and critical attitude among the Russian élite, and this attitude in turn became the source and stimulus to intellectual and artistic creation. Peter the Great, therefore, is both the pretext and the inspiration of modern critical and rational thought in Russia. He also occupies a major place in the history of the artistic and intellectual creations of the Russian mind over the last two centuries. Russian thinkers had to come to terms with Peter and his efforts at Westernization, his wish to see Russia join the family of European nations and participate in Western culture. In so doing the Russian élite—the *intelligentsia*—created the distinctive Russian contribution to the common cultural heritage of the modern world. Whatever their specifically Russian traits, Pushkin, Gogol, Dostoevsky, Tolstoi, Chekhov are unthinkable without Peter's work in Westernizing Russia.

[Note: In this volume, in the selections reproduced from existing translations the original transliteration has been preserved. In other selections which have been especially translated for this volume, the simplified Library of Congress system has been used. The dates are given according to the Julian calendar.]