




西方社会学文选(英文版)

于海主编

Western Social Theory

Classic and Contemporary Readings

Edited by
Yu Hai



復旦大學出版社
Fudan University Press

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图书在版编目(CIP)数据

西方社会学文选/于海主编. —上海: 复旦大学出版社, 2002. 8
ISBN 7-309-03256-X

I. 西… II. 于… III. 社会学-西方国家-文集-英文 IV. C91-53

中国版本图书馆 CIP 数据核字(2002)第 041237 号

出版发行 复旦大学出版社

上海市国权路 579 号 邮编: 200433

86-21-65118853(发行部) 86-21-65642892(编辑部)

fupnet@fudanpress.com <http://www.fudanpress.com>

经销 新华书店上海发行所

印刷 上海第二教育学院印刷厂

开本 787×1092 1/16

印张 46.25

字数 1332 千

版次 2002 年 8 月第一版 2002 年 8 月第一次印刷

印数 1-3 000

定价 68.00 元

如有印装质量问题, 请向复旦大学出版社发行部调换。

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编者序言

本书为 20 世纪西方社会理论文选。全书分经典与当代两大部分,当代理论再分为美国、德国、英国和法国等四个小部分,选入过去 100 年在西方产生过最重要影响的欧美社会理论家 50 多位,文献 78 篇。本书可作为社会学专业学生的专业英语教材,也可用作社会科学的基本原典文献。

Anthony Giddens 曾这样区分“社会理论”和“社会学”,他将“社会理论”等同于各门社会科学所共同关注的论题领域,如行动与行动者的性质,互动与制度的关系等。而认为“社会学”只是社会科学的一门分支,只关注“发达的”或现代的社会。^① 本文选以“Social Theory”为篇名,依据了 Giddens 的这一分别,透过诸如行动、自我、互动、符号、结构、知识、权力等具有分析性和实质性意义的范畴在本文选所占之篇幅,表明了编者确定的重点,这些内容也就是通常所谓“方法论”、“理论视角”或“理论范式”的问题。但这种分别不应是僵硬的和机械的。离开西方现代社会的真实进程和实质分析,社会理论就将失去与生活世界的真实联系,从而丧失解释力量。正如 Hegel 所坚持的那样,方法是贯穿于过程始终的精神,而非游离在外的窍门。Durkheim、Weber、Wallerstein、Giddens、Foucault、Baudrillard 等人的社会分析同样也是在诸如“分工社会”、“官僚社会”、“现代世界体系”、“自反性现代性”、“规训社会”及“拟像社会”的阐述中展开的,也就是说,这些有关现代西方社会的实质理论本身具有方法论的意义。

本文选参考了西方学者(主要为美国学者)编的社会理论文选,它们是:Talcott Parsons 等编的 *Theories of Society* (The Free Press, 1961); Randall Collins 编的 *Three Sociological Traditions* (Oxford University Press, 1985); Lewis A. Coser 等编的 *Sociological Theory* (Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc., 1982), 以及 Charles Lemert 编的 *Social Theory* (Westview Press, 1999)。本文选充分借鉴了这些文本对经典理论的选择成果,事实上在经典篇目的确定和选择上西方社会学界已经形成高度共识,如 Durkheim《宗教生活的基本形式》中的结论部分,Weber《经济与社会》的第一章“社会学的基本概念”,Mead《心灵、自我和社会》中“玩耍、游戏、普遍化他人”章节等,都是各选本必选篇目。在当代理论方面,各选家的重点已显分化,但仍然存有共识,如 Parsons 的单位行动与模式变项理论,Berger 和 Luckmann 的知识社会学的现象学界定,Lévi-Strauss 的神话的结构分析,Foucault 的真理与权力的谈话等。本文选也参考了上述编者的工作,在这些方面我们的工作是非原创。但这是一本编给中国学生阅读的社会理论文选,因而在入选人物、篇目、文选结构等方面都有异于上述文本的考虑和安排。首先,本文选是按年代与国家安排篇章次序和不同部分的,以期展现社会理论的发展脉络和国别特点,而为中国学生提供把握理论脉络的直观时空框架。其次,本文选在国别分类中加入了学派分类,将入选人物依学派勾连起来,凸现理论传统的源流与分合,减少了人物众多无从入手的散漫性。这样的学派分际之于具体人物不可能圆满契合,削足适履亦恐难

^① Anthony Giddens, *The Constitution of Society* (Polity Press, 1984), Introduction. 参见中译本《社会的构成》(北京三联书店,1998年)第35页。

免,却也不妨为理论学习的方便导引,无论如何在对 20 世纪主要社会理论传统的认定上仍然存在着基本的共识。最后,本文选入选人物是以一个中国学者的眼光选择的,待入选人物的重要性很大程度上也是依据其在中国的影响力来判定的,并力求平衡地对待不同国家的入选人数,避免厚此薄彼,这对标以“西方社会理论”的文选来说是一必不可少的要求。正是鉴于在美国学者编选的文本中德国与法国的篇幅显得薄弱,本文选给予德法社会理论家更多的关注。我们选入不应遗漏的 Scheler、Luhmann 和 Danrendorf(德国)及 Touraine、Crozier 和 Boudon(法国);增加 Habermas、Giddens 和 Bourdieu 的篇幅。事实上,Parsons 以后,法国和德国较之美国更应被称为社会理论富有活力的中心。本文选并不忽视美国社会理论的贡献,战后 Parsons 代表的美国社会学成为主流理论,“整个世界的社会学都为美国社会学所主宰,社会理论里深深地刻下了 Parsons 的印记”(Giddens 语),它所占的篇幅仍是最大的一块,但这并不意味着 Parsons 仍然要占有最重的分量。今天我们应该有足够的眼光给予其他美国社会理论家更公正的关注,力求不遗漏当代重要而活跃的美国社会理论家(如 Collins)。

Comte 通常被视为西方社会学鼻祖,这种说法的象征意义远大于其实质意义。Comte 生活的时代诞生了现代意义的社会学,Comte 自有贡献,但比起 Marx 的贡献来是微不足道的。19 世纪社会学真正可称为经典的人物只有 Marx 一人。在 Marx 传统之外,所有重要的社会理论传统和主流学派都是在 20 世纪发展起来的。从这个意义上说,本文选不说包含了全部的“现代社会理论”,确也涵盖了它的大部。

本书入选文献,除已经过了版权保护年限成为公众共享的篇目外,我们都向作者或出版机构申请重印许可。我们已经得到下列作者的无偿授权:法国巴黎索邦大学 Raymond Boudon,法国国家研究中心 Alain Touraine 和 Erhard Friedberg,英国伦敦经济学院 Anthony Giddens,美国耶鲁大学 Jeffrey Alexander,宾夕法尼亚大学 Randall Collins,加州大学伯克利分校 Nancy Chodorow 等。在此谨向他们表示由衷的感谢。

中国优秀的大学都在倡导使用国外原版教材,编选本书算是一个积极的响应,在我也是一个新的尝试,期待海内外方家不吝赐教。

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Part One

Classic Social Theory

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- ◆ Psychologism: Freud
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- ◆ Interpretative Sociology: Simmel, Weber
- ◆ Action Theory: Pareto
- ◆ Social Psychology: Cooley, Thomas, Mead



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


University of Heidelberg



University of Chicago

Emile Durkheim (1858 – 1917)



Emile Durkheim was born on April 15, 1858, in Epinal, France. He was descended from a long line of rabbis and himself studied to be a rabbi, but by the time he was in his teens, he had rejected his heritage and become an agnostic. From that time on, his lifelong interest in religion was academic rather than theological. He was dissatisfied not only with his religious training but also with his general education and its emphasis on literary and esthetic matters. He longed for schooling in scientific methods and in the moral principles needed to guide social life. He rejected

a traditional academic career in philosophy and sought instead to acquire the scientific training needed to contribute to the moral guidance of society. Although he was interested in scientific sociology, there was no field of sociology at that time, so between 1882 and 1887 he taught philosophy in a number of provincial schools in the Paris area.

His appetite for science was whetted further by a trip to Germany, where he was exposed to the scientific psychology being pioneered by Wilhelm Wundt. In the years immediately after his visit to Germany, Durkheim published a good deal, basing his work, in part, on his experiences there. These publications helped him gain a position in the department of philosophy at the University of Bordeaux in 1887. There Durkheim offered the first course in social science in a French university. This was a particularly impressive accomplishment, because only a decade earlier, a furor had erupted in a French university by the mention of Auguste Comte in a student dissertation. Durkheim's main responsibility, however, was the teaching of courses in education to schoolteachers, and his most important course was in the area of moral education. His goal was to communicate a moral system to the educators, who he hoped would then pass it on to young people in an effort to help reverse the moral degeneration he saw around him in French society.

The years that followed were characterized by a series of personal successes for Durkheim. In 1893 he published his French doctoral thesis, *The Division of Labor in Society*, as well as his Latin thesis on Montesquieu. His major methodological statement, *The Rules of Sociological Method*, appeared in 1895, followed (in 1897) by his empirical application of those methods in the study *Suicide*. By 1896 he had become a full professor at Bordeaux. In 1902 he was summoned to the famous French university, the Sorbonne, and in 1906 he was named professor of the science of education, a title that was changed in 1913 to professor of the science of education *and sociology*. The other of his most famous works, *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life*, was published in 1912.

Durkheim had a profound influence on the development of sociology, but his influence was not restricted to it. Much of his impact on other fields came through the journal *L'année sociologique*, which he founded in 1898. An intellectual circle arose around the journal with Durkheim at its center. Through it, he and his ideas influenced such fields as anthropology, history, linguistics, and—somewhat ironically, considering his early attacks on the field—psychology.

Durkheim died on November 15, 1917, a celebrated figure in French intellectual circles, but it was not until over twenty years later, with the publication of Talcott Parsons's *The Structure of Social Action* (1937), that his work became a significant influence on American sociology.

(From George Ritzer)

1. On Mechanical and Organic Solidarity

This work had its origins in the question of the relations of the individual to social solidarity. Why does the individual, while becoming more autonomous, depend more upon society? How can he be at once more individual and more solidary? Certainly, these two movements, contradictory as they appear, develop in parallel fashion. This is the problem we are raising. It appeared to us that what resolves this apparent antinomy is a transformation of social solidarity due to the steadily growing development of the division of labor. That is how we have been led to make this the object of our study.

* * *

The social relations to which the division of labor gives birth have often been considered only in terms of exchange, but this misinterprets what such exchange implies and what results from it. It suggests two beings mutually dependent because they are each incomplete, and translates this mutual dependence outwardly. It is, then, only the superficial expression of an internal and very deep state. Precisely because this state is constant, it calls up a whole mechanism of images which function with a continuity that exchange does not possess. The image of the one who completes us becomes inseparable from ours, not only

because it is frequently associated with ours, but particularly because it is the natural complement of it. It thus becomes an integral and permanent part of our conscience, to such a point that we can no longer separate ourselves from it and seek to increase its force. That is why we enjoy the society of the one it represents, since the presence of the object that it expresses, by making us actually perceive it, sets it off more. On the other hand, we will suffer from all circumstances which, like absence or death, may have as effect the barring of its return or the diminishing of its vivacity.

As short as this analysis is, it suffices to show that this mechanism is not identical with that which serves as a basis for sentiments of sympathy whose source is resemblance. Surely there can be no solidarity between others and us unless the image of others unites itself with ours. But when the union results from the resemblance of two images, it consists in an agglutination. The two representations become solidary because, being indistinct, totally or in part, they confound each other, and become no more than one, and they are solidary only in the measure which they confound themselves. On the contrary, in the case of the division of labor,

Source: Emile Durkheim, *The Division of Labor in Society*, trans. George Simpson (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1949), Preface, pp. 37 - 38; Book I, chap. i, 61 - 62, 64 - 65, 68 - 69; chap. ii, pp. 109 - 110; chap. iii, pp. 111 - 115, 127 - 131.

they are outside each other and are linked only because they are distinct. Neither the sentiments nor the social relations which derive from these sentiments are the same in the two cases.

We are thus led to ask if the division of labor would not play the same role in more extensive groups, if, in contemporary societies where it has developed as we know, it would not have as its function the integration of the social body to assure unity. It is quite legitimate to suppose that the facts which we have just observed reproduce themselves here, but with greater amplitude, that great political societies can maintain themselves in equilibrium only thanks to the specialization of tasks, that the division of labor is the source, if not unique, at least principal, of social solidarity.

* * *

But social solidarity is a completely moral phenomenon which, taken by itself, does not lend itself to exact observation nor indeed to measurement. To proceed to this classification and this comparison, we must substitute for this internal fact which escapes us an external index which symbolizes it and study the former in the light of the latter.

This visible symbol is law. In effect, despite its immaterial character, wherever social solidarity exists, it resides not in a state of pure potentiality, but manifests its presence by sensible indices. Where it is strong, it leads men strongly to one another, frequently puts them in contact, multiplies the occasions when they find themselves related. To speak correctly, considering the point our investigation has reached, it is not easy to say whether social solidarity produces these phenomena, or whether it is a result of them, whether men relate themselves because it is a driving force, or whether it is a driving

force because they relate themselves. However, it is not, at the moment, necessary to decide this question; it suffices to state that the two orders of fact are linked and vary at the same time and in the same sense. The more solidary the members of a society are, the more they sustain diverse relations, one with another, or with the group taken collectively, for, if their meetings were rare, they would depend upon one another only at rare intervals, and then tenuously. Moreover, the number of these relations is necessarily proportional to that of the juridical rules which determine them. Indeed, social life, especially where it exists durably, tends inevitably to assume a definite form and to organize itself, and law is nothing else than this very organization in so far as it has greater stability and precision. The general life of society cannot extend its sway without juridical life extending its sway at the same time and in direct relation. We can thus be certain of finding reflected in law all the essential varieties of social solidarity.

* * *

To proceed scientifically, we must find some characteristic which, while being essential to juridical phenomena, varies as they vary. Every precept of law can be defined as a rule of sanctioned conduct. Moreover, it is evident that sanctions change with the gravity attributed to precepts, the place they hold in the public conscience, the role they play in society. It is right, then, to classify juridical rules according to the different sanctions which are attached to them.

They are of two kinds. Some consist essentially in suffering, or at least a loss, inflicted on the agent. They make demands on his fortune, or on his honor, or on his life, or on his liberty, and deprive him of something he enjoys. We call them repres-

sive. They constitute penal law. It is true that those which are attached to rules which are purely moral have the same character, only they are distributed in a diffuse manner, by everybody indiscriminately, whereas those in penal law are applied through the intermediary of a definite organ; they are organized. As for the other type, it does not necessarily imply suffering for the agent, but consists only of *the return of things as they were*, in the reestablishment of troubled relations to their normal state, whether the incriminated act is restored by force to the type whence it deviated, or is annulled, that is, deprived of all social value. We must then separate juridical rules into two great classes, accordingly as they have organized repressive sanctions or only restitutive sanctions. The first comprise all penal law; the second, civil law, commercial law, procedural law, administrative and constitutional law, after abstraction of the penal rules which may be found there.

* * *

There exists a social solidarity which comes from a certain number of states of conscience which are common to all the members of the same society. This is what repressive law materially represents, at least in so far as it is essential. The part that it plays in the general integration of society evidently depends upon the greater or lesser extent of the social life which the common conscience embraces and regulates. The greater the diversity of relations wherein the latter makes its action felt, the more also it creates links which attach the individual to the group; the more, consequently, social cohesion derives completely from this source and bears its mark. But the number of these relations is itself proportional to that of the repressive rules. In determining what fraction of the juridical system penal law represents, we,

at the same time, measure the relative importance of this solidarity. It is true that in such a procedure we do not take into account certain elements of the collective conscience which, because of their smaller power or their indeterminateness, remain foreign to repressive law while contributing to the assurance of social harmony. These are the ones protected by punishments which are merely diffuse. But the same is the case with other parts of law. There is not one of them which is not complemented by custom, and as there is no reason for supposing that the relation of law and custom is not the same in these different spheres, this elimination is not made at the risk of having to alter the results of our comparison.

Organic Solidarity Due to the Division of Labor

The very nature of the restitutive sanction suffices to show that the social solidarity to which this type of law corresponds is of a totally different kind.

What distinguishes this sanction is that it is not expiatory, but consists of a simple *return in state*. Sufferance proportionate to the misdeed is not inflicted on the one who has violated the law or who disregards it; he is simply sentenced to comply with it. If certain things were done, the judge reinstates them as they would have been. He speaks of law; he says nothing of punishment. Damage-interests have no penal character; they are only a means of reviewing the past in order to reinstate it, as far as possible, to its normal form. Tarde, it is true, has tried to find a sort of civil penalty in the payment of costs by the defeated party. But, taken in this sense, the word has only a metaphorical value. For punishment to obtain, there would at least have to be some relation

between the punishment and the misdeed, and for that it would be necessary for the degree of gravity of the misdeed to be firmly established. In fact, however, he who loses the litigation pays the damages even when his intentions were pure, even when his ignorance alone was his culpability. The reasons for this rule are different from those offered by Tarde; given the fact that justice is not rendered gratuitously, it appears equitable for the damages to be paid by the one who brought them into being. Moreover, it is possible that the prospect of such costs may stop the rash pleader, but that is not sufficient to constitute punishment. The fear of ruin which ordinarily follows indolence or negligence may keep the negotiant active and awake, though ruin is not, in the proper sense of the word, the penal sanction for his misdeeds.

Neglect of these rules is not even punished diffusely. The pleader who has lost in litigation is not disgraced, his honor is not put in question. We can even imagine these rules being other than they are without feeling any repugnance. The idea of tolerating murder arouses us, but we quite easily accept modification of the right of succession, and can even conceive of its possible abolition. It is at least a question which we do not refuse to discuss. Indeed, we admit with impunity that the law of servitudes or that of usufructs may be otherwise organized, that the obligations of vendor and purchaser may be determined in some other manner, that administrative functions may be distributed according to different principles. As these prescriptions do not correspond to any sentiment in us, and as we generally do not scientifically know the reasons for their existence, since this science is not definite, they have no roots in the majority of us. Of course, there are exceptions. We do not

tolerate the idea that an engagement contrary to custom or obtained either through violence or fraud can bind the contracting parties. Thus, when public opinion finds itself in the presence of such a case, it shows itself less indifferent than we have just now said, and it increases the legal sanction by its censure. The different domains of the moral life are not radically separated one from another; they are, rather, continuous, and, accordingly, there are among them marginal regions where different characters are found at the same time. However, the preceding proposition remains true in the great majority of cases. It is proof that the rules with a restitutive sanction either do not totally derive from the collective conscience, or are only feeble states of it. Repressive law corresponds to the heart, the centre of the common conscience; laws purely moral are a part less central; finally, restitutive law is born in very ex-centric regions whence it spreads further. The more it becomes truly itself, the more removed it is.

This characteristic is, indeed, made manifest by the manner of its functioning. While repressive law tends to remain diffuse within society, restitutive law creates organs which are more and more specialized; consular tribunals, councils of arbitration, administrative tribunals of every sort. Even in its most general part, that which pertains to civil law, it is exercised only through particular functionaries: magistrates, lawyers, etc., who have become apt in this role because of very special training.

But, although these rules are more or less outside the collective conscience, they are not interested solely in individuals. If this were so, restitutive law would have nothing in common with social solidarity, for the relations that it regulates would bind individuals to one another without