Cultural Diplomacy: Beyond the National Interest?

Edited by
Ien Ang, Yudhishthir Raj Isar and
Phillip Mar

ROUTLEDGE

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Cultural diplomacy: beyond the national interest?

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The field of cultural diplomacy, which looms large in present-day cultural pol-
icy and discourse, has been insufficiently analysed by the cultural disciplines.
This special issue engages with the task of filling the gap. The present essay
sets out the terms in which the authors have taken up this engagement, focusing
principally on Australia and Asia. Distinguishing between cultural diplomacy
that is essentially interest-driven governmental practice and cultural relations,
which is ideals-driven and practiced largely by non-state actors, the authors pur-
sue a twofold aim. First, to demystify the field, especially when it is yoked to
the notion of 'soft power'; second, to better understand how actually-existing
discourses of cultural diplomacy and/or cultural relations operate in different
national contexts. The essay seeks in particular to scrutinize the current confu-
sion surrounding cultural diplomacy and, in the context of the changing role of
the nation-state, to explore its possibilities as an instrument for going beyond
the national interest.

Introduction

The term 'cultural diplomacy' looms large today in the foreign policy practice of
nation-states as well as in cultural discourse. Yet there is often a distinct lack of
clarity in the way the notion is used, on exactly what its practice involves, on why
it is important, or on how it works. Much of this indeterminateness stems from the
conflation of cultural diplomacy *stricto sensu*, which is essentially interest-driven
governmental practice, with cultural relations, which tends to be driven by ideals
rather than interests and is practiced largely by non-state actors. Given the present-
day intrications between trans-national cultural connections and cultural practice
within nations, this phenomenon should be an important concern of the cultural
disciplines. Yet so far they have paid scant attention to cultural diplomacy as a key
component of the contemporary cultural policy landscape.

While the last decade and a half has seen a wealth of interest in the topic – and
the broader rubric of public diplomacy – among specialists in international rela-
tions, with an emphasis on the evolution of the so-called 'new public diplomacy'
(notably Melissen 2005, Cull 2009, Davis Cross and Melissen 2013; Hayden
2011), critical analysis from the perspectives of Cultural Studies, Cultural Policy

Studies or Cultural Sociology, is almost non-existent (but see Clarke 2014 and also Paschalidis 2009 in this journal). By 'critical' here we do not mean simply a dismissive stance, but a rigorous, theoretically informed analysis which locates actually existing cultural diplomacy practices within their social, political and ideological contexts and examines the complex and sometimes contradictory ways in which they operate. This special issue seeks to engage with the task of beginning to fill this gap, with a specific focus on Australia and Asia. The aim is twofold. First, to demystify cultural diplomacy, notably by deconstructing the 'hype' that nowadays accompanies it – especially when it is yoked to the notion of 'soft power'; second, to better understand how it actually operates across the world today. Such an analysis would also facilitate a consideration of preferred policy parameters in the field and of the question whether, when seen through a cultural lens, there can be such a thing as a cultural diplomacy that operates 'beyond the national interest.'

Untangling key discursive terms

Apart from the term cultural diplomacy itself, the discourse of the field this special issue explores is dominated by two other notions, 'soft power' and 'public diplomacy.' The purpose of this section is to set out briefly the frame of reference the three terms together provide. Given that the authors of the other contributions will take these understandings as points of departure, this introductory iteration will help avoid repetition further on.

The three notions have entered the lexicon of international relations and have become standard terms in foreign policy thinking. They are also factored into the policy mix by national, regional and local governments (e.g. cities), as well as by supranational organizations such as the European Union. As mentioned earlier, however, the processes these terms entail have rarely been critically examined. Their emergence as tools of national self-promotion or what Raymond Williams (1984) once called the 'cultural policy of display' has been insufficiently unpacked (Paschalidis 2009). Nor has there been much analysis of their place in discourses of cultural nationalism, which is arguably a key dimension of cultural diplomacy as a governmental practice (Isar's paper in this volume uses Bhabha's (1990) distinction between 'pedagogical' and 'performative' dimensions of nationalist cultural display to address this issue).

The semantic field of the term cultural diplomacy has broadened considerably over the years. It now applies to pretty much any practice that is related to purposeful cultural cooperation between nations or groups of nations. In the process, the term has floated some distance away from its original semantic moorings. The American diplomat turned writer Richard Arndt made the necessary distinction between cultural *relations* that 'grow naturally and organically, without government intervention' and 'cultural *diplomacy* [that] can only be said to take place when formal diplomats, serving national governments, try to shape and channel this natural flow to advance national interests' (Arndt 2006, p. xviii). This distinction has become increasingly blurred.

Although countries such as France have used the term since the late nineteenth century, cultural diplomacy entered common parlance in most other countries only in the 1990s. It was originally used to refer to the processes occurring when diplomats *serving national governments* took recourse to cultural exchanges and flows or sought to channel them for the advancement of their perceived national interests.

But soon it was expanded into 'the exchange of ideas, information, art and other aspects of culture among nations and their peoples in order to foster mutual understanding' (Cummings 2003, p. 1). In point of fact, mutual understanding is only sometimes the object. The true protagonists of cultural diplomacy are never abstract 'nations' or generalized 'peoples.' *Governmental* agents and envoys are. In other words, cultural diplomacy is a governmental practice that operates in the name of a clearly defined ethos of national or local representation, in a space where nationalism and internationalism merge. Yet as the reigning culturalism of our time has made the term increasingly appealing, the ambit of cultural diplomacy has broadened considerably. Thus the term has come to be used as a partial or total replacement for many previously used notions such as foreign cultural relations, international cultural relations (ICR), international cultural exchange or international cultural cooperation. The different terms in this semantic constellation tend to be used interchangeably (Mitchell 1986), making it a true floating signifier.

The second leading term, *soft power*, was coined by the Harvard political scientist Joseph Nye in 1990. Since then, it has taken international relations and public diplomacy by storm, often in ways that are far removed from what its inventor had envisaged. Nye (1990) distinguished between the command power – economic carrots and military sticks – that the United States of America possessed in ample measure and the co-optive or 'soft' power of 'getting others to want what you want.' This rests on the attraction of one's ideas or on the ability to set the political agenda in a way that shapes the *preferences* that others are led to express. As Nye observed,

> political leaders and philosophers have long understood the power that comes from setting the agenda and determining the framework of a debate. The ability to establish preferences tends to be associated with intangible power resources such as culture, ideology and institutions. (Nye 1990, p. 32)

The soft power Nye was advocating that the USA deploy alongside – *not instead of* – its hard power was the universal appeal of its popular culture, as embodied in cultural goods and services, as well as the international influence of what he called the 'ethnic openness' of its way of life, or the political appeal of the American *values* of democracy and human rights. In other words, the soft power a country may project is not simply a question of culture, but rests also on 'its political values (when it lives up to them at home and abroad), and its foreign policies (when they are seen as legitimate and having moral authority)' (Nye 1990, p. 196). While the cultural policy literature presents a number of functionalist descriptions of the governmental apparatuses and discourses deployed in the name of culture as soft power, there has been next to no analysis of the polysemy of the term or of its implications. In this issue Robert Albro underlines how soft power is a peculiarly American articulation: driven by the sheer volume of cultural goods and services the US exports globally, the concept promises influence as a kind of neoliberal deployment based upon the global reach of American-inflected cultural consumption. A later idea of Nye's that is equally premised on core elements of the American ethos was that of 'meta–soft power,' which is a nation's capacity and introspective ability to criticise itself that contributes to its international attractiveness, legitimacy and credibility (Nye 2002).

A point that has been missed in most writing on soft power is that cultural attractiveness per se is *not* soft power on its own. It can be a soft power resource, provided it is deployed to achieve clearly defined policy objectives under a thought-out strategy. It is not intended to replace 'hard' power, but rather to complement it. Nor can there ever be such a thing as a State or supranational entity that defines itself as 'a soft power,' but this strange notion is nevertheless sometimes deployed.

In the course of its discursive expansion, cultural diplomacy has also been yoked to the cause of *public diplomacy*, advocated as a more citizen-oriented form of diplomacy than the standard model, whose 'targets' are no longer other governments so much as diverse national and global audiences and publics. It is increasingly understood as a trans-national process that can be engaged upon not just by governments and their agencies but by civil society and/or private sector stakeholders as well (Cull 2009), a form of intercultural dialogue based on mutuality and reciprocal listening. This term is also of American coinage. It was launched in 1965 by Edmund Gullion, Dean of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University (and founder of the Edward R. Murrow Center of Public Diplomacy that would be set up there) in order apparently to overcome the negative connotations associated with the word propaganda (Cull 2006). By the present century, it had become firmly anchored in US public discourse and had spread to Europe and beyond. Like cultural diplomacy, the practice of public diplomacy has gradually been taken over by branches of government other than foreign ministries and has been deployed in the service of goals such as nation branding and portfolio promotion. At the same time, cultural diplomacy is now often understood as a particular form or dimension of public diplomacy, as a result of which the distinction between the two has become rather blurred.

Take, for example, this first paragraph of the Executive Summary of a landmark US Department of State report, *Cultural Diplomacy: The Linchpin of Public Diplomacy*, published in 2005:

> Cultural diplomacy is the linchpin of public diplomacy; for it is in cultural activities that a nation's idea of itself is best represented. And cultural diplomacy can enhance our national security in subtle, wide-ranging, and sustainable ways. Indeed history may record that America's cultural riches played no less a role than military action in shaping our international leadership, including the war on terror. For the values embedded in our artistic and intellectual traditions form a bulwark against the forces of darkness. (US Department of State 2005, p. 1)

Encapsulated in this paragraph is a clear articulation of cultural diplomacy as a national endeavour, conducted in the national interest: it involves the instrumental use of national culture with a view to enhancing national security and the nation's international standing. The *Linchpin* report was published in response to the fallout from the US's disastrous invasion of Iraq, which had led to a plummeting of international public opinion against the United States, especially in the Arab world. The report argues that culture – through its deployment in cultural diplomacy – can reverse the erosion of trust and credibility that the US has suffered across the world, and help shape global public opinion in favour of America and the values it claims to stand for. However, while the report clearly considers that advancing the US national interest is foundational, some of the things the work of cultural diplomacy arguably does, as listed by the report, point clearly to outcomes that go far

beyond narrow national interest. These include creating a 'foundation of trust' between peoples, providing 'a positive agenda of cooperation in spite of policy differences,' creating 'a neutral platform for people-to-people contact' and serving as 'a flexible, universally acceptable vehicle for rapprochement with countries where diplomatic relations have been strained or absent.'

Cultural diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific: in or beyond the national interest?

The brief genealogy offered above shows the deep entanglement of the terms cultural diplomacy, cultural relations, soft power and public diplomacy. As a semantic constellation, they occupy a discursive field centrally focused on a concern with the management of the problematic relationship between the nation-state and its others in the international arena. Needless to say, this concern has become particularly salient in this era of globalisation and the geopolitical shifts in the distribution of economic and political power in the world. The papers brought together in this special issue all engage frontally with these new dynamics, with a particular emphasis on the complex roles cultural diplomacy policies and practices in the Asia Pacific region play in the context of evolving cultural self-representations in the societies concerned.

The point of departure for the special issue was a symposium held at the Institute for Culture and Society, University of Western Sydney in October 2013. The papers presented at this symposium provided a critical scan of the cultural diplomacy landscape of the Asia Pacific region. Although there was a particular focus on Australia, many of the issues that arise in the definition and assessment of that country's cultural diplomacy practice are germane elsewhere, for several reasons. To begin with, Australian practice in this field has crystallised only fairly recently. In the process it has both drawn upon the established notions discussed above and has also struck out in some new ways. In particular, Australian cultural diplomacy today has a strong regional focus, one that is also becoming increasingly relevant in other regions, as the regional scale is perceived to offer a counterpoise to global forces. There is strong political and policy consensus in Australia that it is in the country's national interest to establish closer links with the countries in the geopolitical region it finds itself in: Asia or, more broadly, the Asia-Pacific (see Australian Government 2012).[1] Cultural diplomacy is thought to play a major role in this effort of rapprochement: several essays (Lowe, Carter, Roesler) foreground this. At the same time, governments in the region – including those featured in this special issue, China, Japan and South Korea – have strongly stepped up their cultural diplomacy efforts, each with their own distinctive rationales and methods, as discussed in the papers by Wanning Sun (China), Koichi Iwabuchi (Japan) and Hyungseok Kang (South Korea).

The special issue is bookended by Robert Albro, who compares US and Chinese cultural diplomacy and soft power strategies, and Yudhishthir Raj Isar, who traces the policy evolution of 'culture in EU external relations,' the phrase used as an euphemism for cultural diplomacy by the institutions of the European Union, in other words at the supra-national scale. While both these papers underscore the fundamentally nationalist underpinnings of cultural diplomacy visions worldwide, they also point towards different strategies now being advocated with a view to going beyond the national interest. These include an emphasis on dialogue and collaboration based on shared interests that are not articulated in the name of

the nation-state. They also point to the question of whether cultural workers such as artists and arts organizers are actually motivated by such lofty interests, rather than by more concrete purposes such as mutual learning; pooling of resources; co-financing; technical assistance; joint reflection, debate, research and experimentation; and 'in its most complex forms, cooperation in the creative processes, the creation of new artistic works' (Klaic 2007, p. 46). Cull recognizes (2009, p. 19) that 'discomfort with advocacy roles and overt diplomatic objectives have led some Cultural Diplomacy organizations to distance themselves from the term.' On the other hand, they are unlikely to distance themselves equally from the grants the term now brings within their grasp. Recourse to grand cultural narratives such as intercultural dialogue makes it easier for them to adopt this kind of opportunistic stance, just as it makes it easier for governments to advance the national interest cloaked in their mantle (Isar 2010).

The cultural diplomacy landscape that emerges from all the contributions encompasses a complex and sometimes contradictory range of practices, in which objectives, techniques of delivery, and assumed impacts and effects are often misaligned. In this landscape, the scope of what is seen as cultural diplomacy may be very broad, entailing many forms of cultural recognition between nations and cultures, many but not all of which are mediated in some way by states – or narrower – as an 'overplayed hand,' prone to 'ambiguous and overstated' claims, such as its ability to 'manage the international environment' (Isar 2010, citing Cull 2009).

Overall, then, we are faced with a rather confusing terrain, littered by a mismatch between overblown rhetoric and on-the-ground reality. The central contradiction behind this mismatch may be summed up as follows: on the one hand, cultural diplomacy is supposed to advance the national interest by presenting the nation in the best possible light to the rest of the world; on the other hand, it is expected (mainly by non-state actors) to promote a more harmonious international order to the benefit of all. This contradictory understanding rests on the widely held tendency, in current discourses, to elide the fundamental institutional location of cultural diplomacy within the machinery of government and, therefore, the inevitable restrictions imposed on it in terms of the interests it is meant to serve. As noted above, this elision stems from the ambiguity in the ways in which cultural diplomacy is conflated with the broader notion of ICR.

While the distinction between the two must remain analytically important, the pervasive tendency to conflate cultural relations and cultural diplomacy is a significant indicator of the uncertainty, not only about what cultural diplomacy is or should be, but about what it can achieve. Cummings' definition cited above does not refer to 'the national interest' at all, and appears to suggest that the work of cultural diplomacy, while initiated by governments, is capable of going beyond any partisan, national interest by fostering mutual understanding, which presumably is of common interest. However, it is reasonable to assume that there is a tension between national interest and common interest. Since this tension cannot simply be swept under the carpet, how might it be reconciled? To put it more precisely, how can cultural diplomacy be *both* in the national interest *and* go beyond the national interest? Hence the question mark at the end of this special issue's title.

The nation-state in a world of flux

The current modishness of cultural diplomacy – and public diplomacy more gener-ally – should be seen in the context of the changing architecture of international relations in an increasingly interdependent and interconnected world. Nation-states are still the primary actors in the international political arena, but their sovereign status has been steadily eroded by globalising forces which have heightened the transnational – and often disjunctive – flows of people, products, media, technology and money (Appadurai 1996). The fact that cultural diplomacy is often folded into cultural relations is in itself a reflection of the diminishing authority and capacity of national governments to act as the pre-eminent representatives of 'the national interest' (or even to define what the latter consists of). As Rosenau (2003) has observed, in the past few decades the world stage has become ever more dense, with a vast range of non-governmental actors, operating both locally and globally and interacting with each other horizontally through transnational communication networks, often intersecting with or even contradicting government-defined purposes and objectives. 'In earlier epochs,' says Rosenau (2003, pp. 61–62), the global stage was occupied mainly by states and their intergovernmental organizations, but in the emergent epoch the cast of characters has multiplied time and time again. States still occupy important roles in the routines of world affairs, but their ranks have become thin relative to all the organizations that now reach across boundaries to conduct their affairs. As a consequence, national governments have seen a decline in 'their ability to claim the final word at home or speak exclusively for the country abroad' (Rosenau 2003, p. 69).

This has serious implications for the governmental practice of cultural diplo-macy. If cultural diplomacy, to reiterate Arndt's (2006) definition once again, per-tains to orchestrated government intervention to channel the flow of culture to advance national interests, then in the new world (dis)order it will have to compete with an flood of other transnational flows of culture, which are beyond the control of governments and may or may not be in line with their definitions of the national interest at all. For example, Cynthia Schneider, a prominent American advocate for cultural diplomacy, in critiquing the apparent reliance of the US government on the free market distribution of US popular culture to do the work of cultural diplomacy, comments: 'While popular culture contributes – sometimes positively, sometimes not – to communicating American ideas and values, the most effective interface between government-sponsored cultural diplomacy and the free flow of popular cul-ture has yet to be determined, or even analysed' (Schneider 2005, p. 161). Schnei-der goes on to suggest that US cultural diplomacy could deploy popular culture proactively to help restore the global reputation of the US after it nose-dived in the wake of the widely-condemned War on Terror in the early 2000s: 'Strategically investing in popular culture by targeting the distribution of desirable products would reap rewards in the court of world opinion' (Schneider 2005, p. 164). How-ever, this begs a number of questions: who should decide what 'desirable products' are, and what criteria should be used? How exactly does popular culture communi-cate 'American ideas and values?' How does one know whether and which prod-ucts will have a positive impact on 'world opinion?' How can one ensure that 'desirable' products are received in 'desirable' ways, for whom and according to whom? For example, when Michael Moore, the controversial US documentary film-maker, won the *Palme d'Or* at the 2004 Cannes Film Festival for *Fahrenheit 9/11*,

his highly critical film about George W. Bush's war on terror, was this a triumph for American cultural diplomacy, as Schneider's advocacy might seem to suggest? Or did the film's success only add further fuel to anti-Americanism around the world? Albro also points in this issue to the naivety of 'allowing the entertainment sector to assume the job of communicating the US's image to the world,' when commodified popular culture products express 'a US-specific lexicon of personal freedoms exercised as consumer choices in ways that often fail to engage with the perspectives or grievances of foreign publics.' In this view, the prevailing cultural policy of display elides dialogical processes in adhering to a 'correspondence theory of truth,' which is ill equipped to account for the nature of audiences and diverse ways of interpretation.

In short, government-driven cultural diplomacy is only one strand of cultural flow in the web of intersecting cultural relations being spun incessantly by myriad small and large players between nation-states and across the globe. Moreover, in a world where opportunities for global exchange and networking are ubiquitous, the rise of counter-hegemonic forms of cultural diplomacy, driven by forces that are working *against* established nation-states, is a distinct possibility. The concerted publicity stunts of the terrorist organisation ISIS, such as the dissemination of sensationalist videos of beheadings of hostages on the Internet as a recruitment tool for new jihadists among disaffected youth in the West, is an extreme case in point, highlighting that the domain of ICR is an intensely contested one in the current global condition, in which the role of government-initiated cultural diplomacy is highly circumscribed.

We would argue that it is precisely because the global cultural arena is now inhabited by ever denser flows of ideas, images, perceptions and messages, in which a wide range of people are taking part in ever greater numbers, that the stakes in the struggle to shape ICR through cultural diplomacy have become so much higher for nation-states, even as success in this field becomes ever more difficult to achieve. This is a point Holden (2013) gestured at in his British Council report *Influence and Attraction: Culture and the Race for Soft Power in the 21st century*. Holden observed that the appetite to invest in cultural diplomacy is especially high in newly 'emerging' nations such as the BRICS countries, whose governments are deploying heightened cultural diplomacy activities to raise their international profile and standing befitting their rising global economic power. Wanning Sun's paper in this issue, focusing on China, provides ample empirical support for this observation. Chinese analysts are well aware of the incongruence between China's growing economic clout and the country's political credibility. The major weak link is seen to be the interface with foreign media and reporting on China. The contradiction here is that while the Chinese government is clearly at pains to lift its credibility and legitimacy through its 'Going Global' media policy, its often heavy-handed approach runs the risk of achieving the opposite effect. Sun notes that the term 'external propaganda' (*wai xuan*) is still in use in Chinese policy writings: few academics or policy-makers are willing to abandon the paradigm of propaganda and control in which the media are expected to be the 'throat and tongue' of the Party.

The appearance of independence from state control requires a balancing act for all players in the international communications field. For instance, the UK's recognition of the value of arms-length bodies like the BBC World Service and the British Council to provide 'global public goods,' based on a stance of