

Undergraduate Texts in Mathematics

H.-D. Ebbinghaus


J. Flum

W. Thomas

Mathematical Logic

Second Edition

数理逻辑 第2版



Springer

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Preface

What is a mathematical proof? How can proofs be justified? Are there limitations to provability? To what extent can machines carry out mathematical proofs?

Only in this century has there been success in obtaining substantial and satisfactory answers. The present book contains a systematic discussion of these results. The investigations are centered around first-order logic. Our first goal is Gödel's completeness theorem, which shows that the consequence relation coincides with formal provability: By means of a calculus consisting of simple formal inference rules, one can obtain all consequences of a given axiom system (and in particular, imitate all mathematical proofs).

A short digression into model theory will help us to analyze the expressive power of the first-order language, and it will turn out that there are certain deficiencies. For example, the first-order language does not allow the formulation of an adequate axiom system for arithmetic or analysis. On the other hand, this difficulty can be overcome—even in the framework of first-order logic—by developing mathematics in set-theoretic terms. We explain the prerequisites from set theory necessary for this purpose and then treat the subtle relation between logic and set theory in a thorough manner.

Gödel's incompleteness theorems are presented in connection with several related results (such as Trahtenbrot's theorem) which all exemplify the limitations of machine-oriented proof methods. The notions of computability theory that are relevant to this discussion are given in detail. The concept of computability is made precise by means of the register machine as a computer model.

We use the methods developed in the proof of Gödel's completeness theorem to discuss Herbrand's Theorem. This theorem is the starting point for a detailed description of the theoretical fundamentals of logic programming. The corresponding resolution method is first introduced on the level of propositional logic.

The deficiencies in expressive power of the first-order language are a motivation to look for stronger logical systems. In this context we introduce,

among others, the second-order language and the infinitary languages. For each of them we prove that central facts which hold for the first-order language are no longer valid. Finally, this empirical fact is confirmed by Lindström's theorems, which show that there is no logical system that extends first-order logic and at the same time shares all its advantages.

The book does not require special mathematical knowledge; however, it presupposes an acquaintance with mathematical reasoning as acquired, for example, in the first year of a mathematics or computer science curriculum.

Margit Meßmer prepared the English translation of the extended German edition and the \LaTeX -version of the book. We wish to thank her for her efficient and diligent work. For additional \LaTeX -editing thanks are due to A. Miller and O. Matz. For helpful suggestions and/or careful proof-reading we also thank U. Bosse, G. Geisler, H. Imhof and J. C. Martinez.

Freiburg and Kiel, July 1993

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PART A

I

Introduction

Towards the end of the nineteenth century *mathematical logic* evolved into a subject of its own. It was the works of *Boole*, *Frege*, *Russell*, and *Hilbert*, among others¹, that contributed to its rapid development. Various elements of the subject can already be found in traditional logic, for example, in the works of *Aristotle* or *Leibniz*. However, while traditional logic can be considered as part of philosophy, mathematical logic is more closely related to mathematics. Some aspects of this relation are:

(1) *Motivation and Goals*. Investigations in mathematical logic arose mainly from questions concerning the foundations of mathematics. For example, Frege intended to base mathematics on logical and set-theoretical principles. Russell tried to eliminate contradictions that arose in Frege's system. Hilbert's goal was to show that "the generally accepted methods of mathematics taken as a whole do not lead to a contradiction" (this is known as *Hilbert's program*).

(2) *Methods*. In mathematical logic the methods used are primarily *mathematical*. This is exemplified by the way in which new concepts are formed, definitions are given, and arguments are conducted.

(3) *Applications in Mathematics*. The methods and results obtained in mathematical logic are not only useful for treating foundational problems; they also increase the stock of tools available in mathematics itself. There are applications in many areas of mathematics, such as algebra and topology, but also in various parts of theoretical computer science.

However, these mathematical features do not mean that mathematical logic is of interest solely to mathematics or parts of computer science. For example, the mathematical approach leads to a clarification of concepts and problems that are important in traditional logic and also in other fields, such as epistemology or the philosophy of science. In this sense the restriction to mathematical methods turns out to be very fruitful.

¹Aristotle (384 - 322 B.C.), G. W. Leibniz (1646 - 1716), G. Boole (1815 - 1864), G. Frege (1848 - 1925), D. Hilbert (1862 - 1943), B. Russell (1872 - 1970).

In mathematical logic, as in traditional logic, *deductions* and *proofs* are central objects of investigation. However, it is the methods of deduction and the types of argument as used in *mathematical proofs* which are considered in mathematical logic (cf. (1)). In the investigations themselves, mathematical methods are applied (cf. (2)). This close relationship between the subject and the method of investigation, particularly in the discussion of foundational problems, may create the impression that we are in danger of becoming trapped in a vicious circle. We shall not be able to discuss this problem in detail until Chapter VII, and we ask the reader who is concerned about it to bear with us until then.

§1. An Example from Group Theory

In this and the next section we present two simple mathematical proofs. They illustrate some of the methods of proof used by mathematicians. Guided by these examples, we raise some questions which lead us to the main topics of the book.

We begin with the proof of a theorem from group theory. We therefore require the *axioms of group theory*, which we now state. We use \circ to denote the group multiplication and e to denote the identity element. The axioms may then be formulated as follows:

(G1) For all x, y, z : $(x \circ y) \circ z = x \circ (y \circ z)$.

(G2) For all x : $x \circ e = x$.

(G3) For every x there is a y such that $x \circ y = e$.

A *group* is a triple (G, \circ^G, e^G) which satisfies (G1), (G2), and (G3). Here G is a set, e^G is an element of G , and \circ^G is a binary function on G , i.e., a function defined on all ordered pairs of elements from G , the values of which are also elements of G . The variables x, y, z range over elements of G , \circ refers to \circ^G , and e refers to e^G .

As an example of a group we mention *the additive group of the reals* $(\mathbf{R}, +, 0)$, where \mathbf{R} is the set of real numbers, $+$ is the usual addition, and 0 is the real number zero. On the other hand, $(\mathbf{R}, \cdot, 1)$ is not a group (where \cdot is the usual multiplication). For example, the real number 0 violates axiom (G3): there is no real number r such that $0 \cdot r = 1$.

We call triples such as $(\mathbf{R}, +, 0)$ or $(\mathbf{R}, \cdot, 1)$ *structures*. In Chapter III we shall give an exact definition of the notion of "structure."

Now we prove the following simple theorem from group theory:

1.1 Theorem on the Existence of a Left Inverse. *For every x there is a y such that $y \circ x = e$.*

Proof. Let x be chosen arbitrarily. By (G3) we have for suitable y ,

$$(1) \quad x \circ y = e.$$

Again from (G3) we get, for this y , an element z such that

$$(2) \quad y \circ z = e.$$

We can now argue as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} y \circ x &= (y \circ x) \circ e && \text{(by (G2))} \\ &= (y \circ x) \circ (y \circ z) && \text{(from (2))} \\ &= y \circ (x \circ (y \circ z)) && \text{(by (G1))} \\ &= y \circ ((x \circ y) \circ z) && \text{(by (G1))} \\ &= y \circ (e \circ z) && \text{(from (1))} \\ &= (y \circ e) \circ z && \text{(by (G1))} \\ &= y \circ z && \text{(by (G2))} \\ &= e && \text{(from (2)).} \end{aligned}$$

Since x was arbitrary, we conclude that for every x there is a y such that $y \circ x = e$. □²

The proof shows that in every structure where (G1), (G2), and (G3) are satisfied, i.e. in every group, the theorem on the existence of a left inverse holds. A mathematician would also describe this situation by saying that the theorem on the existence of a left inverse *follows from*, or is a *consequence* of the axioms of group theory.

§2. An Example from the Theory of Equivalence Relations

The theory of equivalence relations is based on the following three axioms (xRy is to be read as “ x is equivalent to y ”):

(E1) For all x : xRx .

(E2) For all x, y : If xRy then yRx .

(E3) For all x, y, z : If xRy and yRz then xRz .

Let A be a nonempty set, and let R^A be a binary relation on A , i.e., $R^A \subset A \times A$. For $(a, b) \in R^A$ we also write $aR^A b$. The pair (A, R^A) is another example of a structure. We call R^A an *equivalence relation on A* , and the structure (A, R^A) an *equivalence structure*, if (E1), (E2), and (E3) are satisfied. For example, (\mathbf{Z}, R_5) is an equivalence structure, where \mathbf{Z} is the set of integers and

$$R_5 = \{(a, b) \mid a, b \in \mathbf{Z} \text{ and } b - a \text{ is divisible by } 5\}.$$

²From now on, □ denotes the end of a proof.

We now prove a simple theorem about equivalence relations.

2.1 Theorem. *If x and y are both equivalent to a third element, they are equivalent to the same elements. More formally: For all x and y , if there is a u such that xRu and yRu , then for all z , xRz if and only if yRz .*

Proof. Let x and y be given arbitrarily; suppose that for some u

$$(1) \quad xRu \text{ and } yRu.$$

From (E2) we then obtain

$$(2) \quad uRx \text{ and } uRy.$$

From xRu and uRy we deduce, using (E3),

$$(3) \quad xRy,$$

and from yRu and uRx we likewise get (using (E3))

$$(4) \quad yRx.$$

Now let z be chosen arbitrarily. If

$$(5) \quad xRz,$$

then, using (E3), we obtain from (4) and (5)

$$yRz.$$

On the other hand, if

$$(6) \quad yRz,$$

then, using (E3), we get from (3) and (6)

$$xRz.$$

Thus the claim is proved for all z . □

As in the previous example, this proof shows that every structure (of the form (A, R^A)) which satisfies the axioms (E1), (E2), and (E3), also satisfies Theorem 2.1, i.e., that 2.1 follows from (E1), (E2), and (E3).

§3. A Preliminary Analysis

We now sketch some aspects which the two examples just given have in common.

In each case one starts from a system Φ of propositions³ which is taken to be a *system of axioms* for the theory in question (group theory, theory

³Here we use the notion of proposition in a naive way. For example, we make no distinction between propositions and formulas.

of equivalence relations). The mathematician is interested in finding the propositions which *follow* from Φ , where the proposition ψ is said to follow from Φ if ψ holds in every structure which satisfies all propositions in Φ . A *proof* of ψ from a system Φ of axioms shows that ψ follows from Φ .

When we think about the scope of methods of mathematical proof, we are led to ask about the *converse*:

(*) Is every proposition ψ which follows from Φ also provable from Φ ?

For example, is every proposition which holds in all groups also provable from the group axioms (G1), (G2), and (G3)?

The material developed in Chapters II through V and in Chapter VII yields an essentially positive answer to (*). Clearly it is necessary to make the concepts "proposition", "follows from", and "provable", which occur in (*), more precise. We sketch briefly how we shall do this.

(1) *The Concept "Proposition."* Usually the mathematician uses his everyday language (e.g. English or German) to formulate his propositions. But since sentences in everyday language are not, in general, completely unambiguous in their meaning and structure, one cannot specify them by precise definitions. For this reason we shall introduce a *formal language* L which reflects features of mathematical statements. Like programming languages used today, L will be formed according to fixed rules: Starting with a set of symbols (an "alphabet"), we obtain so-called *formulas* as finite symbol strings built up in a standard way. These formulas correspond to propositions expressed in everyday language. For example, the symbols of L will include \forall (to be read "for all"), \wedge ("and"), \rightarrow ("if ... then"), \equiv ("equal") and variables like x , y and z . Formulas of L will be expressions like

$$\forall x x \equiv x, \quad x \equiv y, \quad x \equiv z, \quad \forall x \forall y \forall z ((x \equiv y \wedge y \equiv z) \rightarrow x \equiv z).$$

Although the expressive power of L may at first appear to be limited, we shall later see that many mathematical propositions can be formulated in L . We shall even see that L is, in principle, sufficient for all of mathematics. The definition of L will be given in Chapter II.

(2) *The Concept "Follows From" (the Consequence Relation).* Axioms (G1), (G2), (G3) of group theory obtain a meaning when interpreted in structures of the form (G, \circ^G, e^G) . In an analogous way we can define the general notion of an L -formula holding in a structure. This enables us (in Chapter III) to define the consequence relation: ψ *follows from* (is a consequence of) Φ if and only if ψ holds in every structure where all formulas of Φ hold.

(3) *The Concept "Proof."* A mathematical proof of a proposition ψ from a system Φ of axioms consists of a series of *inferences* which proceeds from axioms of Φ or propositions that have already been proved, to new propositions, and which finally ends with ψ . At each step of a proof the mathematician writes something like "From ... and ... one obtains

directly that $\sim\sim\sim$,” and he expects it to be clear to anyone that the validity of ... and of - - - entails the validity of $\sim\sim\sim$.

An analysis of examples shows that the grounds for accepting such inferences are often closely related to the meaning of *connectives*, such as “and”, “or”, or “if-then”, and *quantifiers*, “for all” or “there exists”, which occur there. For example, this is the case in the first step of the proof of 1.1, where we deduce from “for all x there is a y such that $x \circ y = e$ ” that for the given x there is a y such that $x \circ y = e$. Or consider the step from (1) and (2) to (3) in the proof of 2.1, where from the proposition “ xRu and yRu ” we infer the left member of the conjunction, “ xRu ”, and from “ uRx and uRy ” we infer the right member, “ uRy ”, and then using (E3) we conclude (3).

The formal character of the language L makes it possible to represent these inferences as formal operations on symbol strings (the L -formulas). Thus, the inference of “ xRu ” from “ xRu and yRu ” mentioned above corresponds to the passage from the L -formula $(xRu \wedge yRu)$ to xRu . We can view this as an application of the following rule:

- (+) It is allowed to pass from an L -formula of the form $(\varphi \wedge \psi)$ to the L -formula φ .

In Chapter IV we shall give a finite system \mathfrak{S} of rules which, like (+), correspond to elementary inference steps the mathematician uses in his proofs.

A *formal proof* of the L -formula ψ from the L -formulas in Φ (the “axioms”) consists then (by definition) of a sequence of formulas in L which ends with ψ , and in which each L -formula is obtained by application of a rule from \mathfrak{S} to the axioms or to preceding formulas in the sequence.

Having introduced the precise notions, one can convince oneself by examples that mathematical proofs can be imitated by formal proofs in L . Moreover, in Chapter V we return to the question (*) at the beginning of this section and answer it positively, showing that if a formula ψ follows from a set Φ of formulas, then there is a proof of ψ from Φ , even a formal proof. This is the content of *Gödel's Completeness Theorem*.

§4. Preview

Gödel's Completeness Theorem forms a bridge between the notion of proof, which is formal in character, and the notion of consequence, which refers to the meaning in structures. In Chapter VI we show how this connection can be used in algebraic investigations.