

A. VYSHINSKY

**ON ELIMINATING
THE DANGER OF A NEW WAR
AND STRENGTHENING
THE PEACE AND SECURITY
OF NATIONS**

*Speech Delivered
in the Political Committee
of the United Nations
General Assembly,*

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On September 20, the delegation of the U.S.S.R. submitted to the General Assembly proposals designed to eliminate the danger of a new war and to strengthen the peace and security of nations.

In a statement made in the General Assembly, the U.S.S.R. delegation has already indicated the basic motives which have induced the Soviet Government to propose that the fifth session of the General Assembly examine this question and adopt the Declaration on the subject submitted by the Soviet delegation. We also stressed how immense would be the importance of the adoption by the General Assembly of the Declaration we propose, which calls for vigorous and energetic measures to eliminate the danger of another war and to safeguard the peace and security of nations.

The adoption of such a Declaration would be of particular importance in the present world situation, in face of the war raging in Korea and in other areas of the Far East, and of the never-ceasing machinations of the fomenters of a new war that would menace the vital interests and the welfare of all mankind.

On the other hand, millions upon millions of labouring people are, with unparalleled insistence, raising their mighty voice in protest against the preparation of another war, and are demanding that the governments of their countries take vigorous and consistent measures

to safeguard peace, to eliminate the threat of another war and to ensure the security of the nations.

Now more than ever before, in the opinion of the Soviet delegation, the consistent fulfilment by the General Assembly of its tasks in the matter of defending peace acquires exceptional importance in the activities of the United Nations. The purpose of the proposals submitted by the Soviet Union delegation is precisely to ensure the carrying out of these tasks, which are set forth and defined in Chapter I of our Charter, dealing with the purposes and principles of the United Nations. It is precisely this idea of the struggle for peace that is the keynote of our draft Declaration. Its preamble stresses that the events now taking place in Korea and other parts of the Pacific confirm with renewed force how exceptionally important and urgent it is for the cause of peace and security of nations to unite the peace efforts of the five Powers who are the permanent members of the Security Council and who bear special responsibility for the maintenance of international peace.

There is no need to stress that the efforts of the permanent members of the Security Council for the safeguarding of peace are closely linked with the efforts of all other peace-loving states, medium and small, of all who are striving to avert the calamity of war, which would spell unspeakable misery and suffering for the peoples, of all who are striving to preserve and strengthen peace throughout the world by promoting friendly relations among the nations and their mutual cooperation in solving international problems.

In spite of the numerous obstacles standing in the way of strengthening peace and cooperation among nations, this is the path the Soviet Union is persistently and firmly following, in the knowledge and firm conviction that this fully accords with the hopes and aspirations of the Soviet people and of all other peace-loving

peoples, that it accords with the interests of all mankind.

Numerous facts and documents in the history of the Soviet state and its foreign policy bear witness that the Soviet Government has invariably and determinedly striven for peace and the promotion of international co-operation. These facts bear witness that the Soviet Government has throughout its existence, ever since the first day of the Great October Revolution, made tremendous efforts and displayed unfailing initiative for the accomplishment of its peaceful ends and for creating the conditions for the building of a socialist society, a socialist workers' and peasants' state. The Soviet people are absorbed in peaceful constructive labours, and nothing is farther from their thought than belligerent designs and warlike plans. To them war is abhorrent, and they are making gigantic efforts to remove the danger of another war and to guarantee peace and security, which are so essential to our people for the successful accomplishment of the majestic tasks of socialist construction. All the creative forces of the Soviet land and of our great people are concentrated on the attainment of peaceful ends. Our science and engineering are dedicated to the service of peace, of peaceful constructive labour. This too is the trend of development of all our Soviet industry, of all our Soviet economy.

Life in the Soviet Union is entirely imbued with the idea of peace and peaceful construction, and no matter what the warmongers may say, and how they may try to deceive the people by defaming the Soviet Union, we are convinced that there is no honest person to be found anywhere in the world who believes the slanderous fabrications that the Soviet Union harbours warlike designs against other states, against other nations.

Whatever efforts unscrupulous persons may make in furtherance of their own self-seeking interests to shake

the faith of the peoples in the Soviet policy of peace, by disseminating malicious fabrications and slanderous allegations regarding the Land of Socialism, they cannot obliterate from the minds of tens and hundreds of millions of common folk all over the world the firm conviction that it is the Soviet Union that is the bulwark of peace, its staunch and sincere champion, that the Soviet Union, as J.V. Stalin, the head of the Soviet Government, has said, is a country which is capable of pursuing, and is actually pursuing, a policy of peace, not pharisaically, but honestly and frankly, determinedly and consistently.

No attempt to gull people on this score can succeed, because no one will succeed in concealing his hostile designs against the Soviet Union by hysterically shouting that the Soviet Union considers it impossible for socialist countries and capitalist countries to live side by side in peace, and that the Soviet Union is supposedly not striving for cooperation and friendly relations with other countries, in particular, with countries belonging to a different social and political system.

All these hostile machinations against the Soviet Union are countered by numerous and convincing facts, by the over thirty years of history of the Soviet state, and by the whole trend and character of the peaceful Soviet foreign policy.

What, indeed, is the truth concerning the question that is so often raised at international conferences and, in particular, within the United Nations—the question whether it is possible for the U.S.S.R., a socialist country, and the countries of the capitalist system to live together in peace and cooperation? This question has already attracted considerable attention and has been broadly treated at earlier sessions of the General Assembly, although by some delegations it was treated incorrectly and in distortion of historical fact. But, apparently, this question has not yet been exhausted, inasmuch as

certain delegations have made attempts to revert to it at this session too. While desirous of avoiding repetition, I nevertheless consider it necessary, for my part, to dwell on this question too, and to recall certain important facts which throw full light on the matter.

Here are these facts.

In the interview he gave the first American labour delegation in 1927, J. V. Stalin pointed out that the existence of two antithetical systems—the capitalist system and the socialist system—did not preclude the possibility of agreements with capitalist states in matters pertaining to industry, trade and diplomatic relations.

J. V. Stalin said at this interview: "I think that such agreements are possible and expedient in conditions of peaceful development.

"Export and import are the most suitable bases for such agreements. We need machinery, raw materials (cotton, for example), semimanufactures (metallic, etc.); the capitalists need markets for such commodities. Here you have a basis for agreement. The capitalists need oil, timber, cereals, while we need markets for such commodities. Here you have a basis for agreement. We need credits; the capitalists need good interest on credits. Here you have another basis for agreement, this time in the line of credits, and it is moreover well known that Soviet agencies are the most punctual repayers of credits."

Much time has elapsed since then, and our needs have changed. There are many things we no longer need from the capitalist countries in the way of trade relations; nevertheless, trade relations have not lost their value; they have not lost their importance in the matter of strengthening international ties. I have recalled what the head of the Soviet Government said in 1927 to the American labour delegation chiefly in order to show how many are the opportunities—given the good will and the honest desire for real cooperation—for the establish-

ment and consolidation of international ties, which, in their turn, would help to consolidate the peace and security of nations.

In this interview, J. V. Stalin stressed that the Soviet Union was pursuing a policy of peace, and was prepared to conclude pacts of nonaggression with bourgeois states, was prepared to come to agreement on the question of disarmament, and so forth. Referring to the agreements which had been concluded at that time with other countries, J. V. Stalin, in this same interview he gave the American delegation, stated that we should like these agreements to be more or less enduring, pointing out, however, that "this, of course, depends not only on us but also on the other parties."

Being in favour of peaceful cooperation with other countries, even though they belonged to a different social, economic and political system, the Soviet Union secured an improvement of relations with a number of countries and the conclusion of a number of treaties with them on trade, technical assistance and so on, in spite of the fact that some countries, the United States of America, for example, at that time—and later too, for sixteen years—did not recognize the Soviet Union and wilfully refused to recognize it, resisting the demand of the American public and the progressive circles of other capitalist countries that it abandon its absurd policy of boycotting the young Soviet Republic.

Yet precisely at this time the Soviet Union, notwithstanding the boycott to which it was subjected by some of the capitalist countries, including such big ones as the United States of America, associated itself with the Kellogg Pact, signed protocols with other states along the lines of this pact and developed an active struggle for collective security. The Soviet Union took an active part in a number of conferences held at that time under the aegis of the League of Nations, beginning with the

twenties. It was no other than the Soviet Government that in February 1933 proposed that a definition of aggression and of the aggressor be adopted. Although it was supported in this initiative by many states, and although the majority in the Security Committee, which was composed of representatives of 17 states, in the main approved this proposal, it was nevertheless rejected by the conference, which was dominated by the representatives of the British and French governments of that time.

Nevertheless, pacts defining the aggressor were concluded by the Soviet Union with the majority of its neighbours in the West, and the South, including Finland and Poland, as well as with the countries of the so-called Little Entente. Then, too, pacts of nonaggression were concluded with these same neighbouring states, as well as with France and Italy.

The majority in the League of Nations resisted this trend of international policy for which the Soviet Union was energetically fighting, and rejected the Soviet Union's peaceful proposals. Nevertheless, overcoming all these obstacles, the Soviet Union persisted in this path of promoting peace, and, on its own initiative and supporting the initiative of certain other states, concluded treaties and agreements—which were of course not empty words, but practical deeds. This is what certain delegates do not appreciate when they reply to our proposals for peace, to the measures we propose for strengthening peace, with the invariable phrase: "Prove by deeds that these are not just words, but that you are really prepared to carry out these measures in practice."

Are not the facts I have just mentioned an eloquent refutation of all these attempts, by putting such questions, to escape the necessity of supporting the Soviet proposals, to torpedo the Soviet proposals, on the pretext, as

I have said, that these are only words, and by saying: "Show by your deeds how you intend to put these words and proposals of yours into actual practice."

Well, these facts I have cited show that Soviet words and proposals are invariably put into practice, into actual deed, provided these proposals receive even the slightest support from the other delegations, from the other states; provided these states evince an elementary desire actually to come to agreement on some real basis with the Soviet Union, with the Soviet Government.

Such was the peaceful Soviet foreign policy at that time. The years immediately preceding the Second World War and the years following it have provided numerous examples of the establishment—and not merely of proposals for the establishment—of friendly and business-like ties and relations with other states, undertaken on the initiative and thanks to the efforts of the Soviet Union.

The leaders of the Soviet state have declared time and again that the Soviet Union's foreign policy is based upon confidence in the inevitability and possibility of the prolonged coexistence of the socialist and capitalist systems, that peaceful cooperation is quite feasible and possible between the U.S.S.R. and all states that are prepared to reciprocate and conscientiously carry out the international obligations they assume.

When, in September 1946, J. V. Stalin, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R., was asked by A. Werth, Moscow correspondent of the *Sunday Times*, whether, with the further progress of the Soviet Union towards Communism, the possibilities of peaceful cooperation between the Soviet Union and the outside world would not decrease, the head of the Soviet Government, J. V. Stalin, replied:

"I do not doubt that the possibilities of peaceful cooperation, far from decreasing, may even grow."

In that same year, 1946, J. V. Stalin was asked by Elliott Roosevelt whether it was possible for the U.S.A. to live peaceably side by side with a communist form of government like the Soviet Union's and with no attempt on the part of either to interfere with the internal political affairs of the other.

J. V. Stalin's reply was: "Yes, of course. This is not only possible. It is wise and entirely within the bounds of realization. In the most strenuous times during the war, the differences in government did not prevent our two nations from joining together and vanquishing our foes. Even more so is it possible to continue this relationship in time of peace."

In May 1948 J. V. Stalin reaffirmed that the Government of the U.S.S.R. considered that "in spite of differences in economic systems and ideologies, the coexistence of these systems and the peaceful regulation of differences between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. is not only possible but absolutely necessary in the interests of universal peace."

Well known, too, are J. V. Stalin's historic replies to the questions of Kingsbury Smith, European General Manager of the International News Service, in which the head of the Soviet Government said: "Naturally, the Government of the U.S.S.R. could cooperate with the Government of the United States of America in implementing measures aimed at the realization of a Pact of Peace and leading to gradual disarmament."

These words of the great leader of the Soviet Union define the whole trend of Soviet foreign policy, which unswervingly pursues objectives conforming with the fundamental interests of the Soviet people and of all peace-loving peoples.

These facts, it seems to me, should be quite sufficient to silence, at last, the calumniators—all those who have made it their profession to blacken and defame the Soviet

Union, its foreign policy, its sincerity, its earnest desire for cooperation in the interests of all peace-loving nations.

And what is the foreign policy of the United States of America? The facts show that the foreign policy of the United States is of quite a different character. Of a different character, too, is American diplomacy, which the head of the State Department, in a speech on February 16 called, by analogy with "total war"—"total diplomacy."

This definition in itself is enough to show quite clearly what U.S. diplomacy really is. In order to leave no doubt on this score, Mr. Acheson declared in this same speech that America's leaders were *against good-natured tolerance* in relations, say, with the Soviet Union, that allegedly "the only way to deal with the Soviet Union is to create situations of strength."

Mr. Acheson expressed the same idea, only in more developed form, on another occasion, when speaking of Soviet-American relations. Speaking of the foreign policy of the U.S.A., he said the following: "It has been our basic policy to build situations which will extend the area of possible agreement; that is, to create strength instead of the weakness which exists in many quarters...." He further said that the whole purpose of the economic recovery program in Western Europe was to create strength instead of weakness, adding "that is the purpose of the arms program, that is the purpose of the point 4 program."

And so, if we analyze Mr. Acheson's statements—and there have been very many of them, I have cited only a few, and perhaps not sufficiently striking ones, but at any rate, it seems to me, they are clear enough—we shall find that the U.S. State Department—which of course is chiefly answerable for the foreign policy of the United States—as well as other responsible U.S. leaders, who, naturally, are also answerable for its foreign policy,

can only conceive of settling problems of foreign policy, can only conceive of foreign policy being conducted with the help of force, of pressure and dictation, with the backing of such solid arguments as armed forces—the army, the navy and the air fleet.

The significance of force in the foreign policy of the American Government is systematically stressed by U.S. political leaders in all their speeches, as if they were making a parade of it. This gives us every justification to say that force is the basis of the foreign policy of the entire Anglo-American bloc. I say Anglo-American bloc, although I realize full well that the decisive role in the matter belongs to the United States of America, whose lead is followed by Britain and France, to say nothing of other countries which, unfortunately, are economically very much dependent on the United States. It is not only U.S. leaders and statesmen who affirm that force is the main instrument and lever in the regulation of international relations; this viewpoint is repeated by the Ministers of other countries.

To judge, for instance, from what Mr. Bevin, the Foreign Secretary of Great Britain, says, this too is the trend of British foreign policy. The *New York Times* reported Mr. Bevin as having said the other day that since the strength of the West was growing there might again come a situation in which world problems could be settled by means of direct negotiations between the Great Powers.

What does this mean? It means that you can only negotiate with the Soviet Union when you feel you have the power in your hands. In other words, when states which intend to negotiate with the Soviet Union for the settlement of some or other unsettled international problem are armed from head to foot. It is obvious what the result may be of such an attitude towards states one wants to negotiate with, when one beforehand brandishes the

mailed fist and all the other requisites of one's "diplomatic" readiness for negotiations.

It follows from what Bevin says that force is the preliminary condition for the settlement of world problems, that they can be settled only by threatening to use armed force if one doesn't get one's way. These words express the real trend of the foreign policy of the Anglo-American bloc.

Referring to the discussion in the United Nations of the Anglo-American proposal on United Action for Peace—the second item on our agenda, which we have just disposed of—Mr. Bevin tried to make out that if the General Assembly is given the disposal of armed forces, this will facilitate the regulation of unsettled issues through negotiations with the states concerned. Thus, here too it is quite obvious that what he had in mind was the power factor, I would even say the factor of intimidation, of striking fear in the other side.

It need scarcely be said that a policy based on such principles is altogether reckless and futile, and still more so when applied to the Soviet Union.

Such arguments as armed force, or the threat of untoward consequences, can yield only negative results when employed in respect to the Soviet Union. Other partners should be chosen for such experiments; the Soviet Union is certainly not the appropriate partner for this.

Mr. Bevin dotted the i's and crossed the t's when he said that the British Government, while it retained its faith in the United Nations as a mechanism for the settlement of international disputes, deemed it desirable "to build up a position of strength by means of the North-Atlantic Treaty organization and similar measures."

Mention of the North-Atlantic Treaty in this connection is very significant, since the aggressive character of this treaty is pretty well known to all and requires no particular proof, although I shall not refuse, if any ob-

jections are offered to this, to bring proof of the correctness of my assertion.

In order to leave no doubt as to what Mr. Bevin had in mind with regard to the Soviet Union, attention should be drawn to that passage in his statement where he expressed the conviction that "before any good could come of such four-power talks, it was essential that the Western powers be strong." This statement of Mr. Bevin's attracted the attention of the press. For instance the *New York Times*, a paper you all know, when commenting on these words of Bevin's, recalled—and not without good reason—Churchill's statement to the effect that future developments would depend on how effectively Western diplomacy made use of the "breathing space" which, he claimed, the atomic bomb "still gives the West." Commenting on Bevin's speech, the paper said that "the only way to security lies in a recrudescence of the old military strength of Western Europe."

Can there be anything more shameful than to declare that the atomic bomb—that inhuman and barbarous weapon of mass annihilation—affords a "breathing space" between wars, in other words, to boost the atomic bomb as a means of defending peace, to depict this brutal weapon of death as a source of life! A more disgraceful spectacle it would be hard to imagine.

The cult of force, the cult of the atomic weapon, is proclaimed by the leaders of the Anglo-American bloc to be the prime mover in foreign relations, the principal lever, the backbone of the entire foreign policy of the U.S.A., Great Britain and the other members of the North-Atlantic bloc.

It is facts like these that show the character of the foreign policy of the U.S.A. and of its allies—Britain and France.

As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, it is clear that the leaders of the Anglo-American camp are trying

to base their relations with that country, as well as with the People's Democracies, on force, and they want to make the degree of force—the armed force, let me stress—at their disposal the measure of the possibility of cooperating with the Soviet Union.

That force determines the whole trend of American foreign policy was confirmed in the speech Mr. Truman recently delivered in San Francisco. In this speech the President of the United States attempted to justify in some measure the present aggressive policy of America's ruling circles by trying to make out that it was a policy they were "compelled" to adopt. Nor was there any lack in this speech of anti-Soviet allegations, designed to conceal the real nature and character of this policy of frenzied armament building and instigation of a new war, which is in clear contradiction to the unctuous talk about peace.

And it is no chance accident that this speech contained a warning to the American people that a still greater burden of military expenditure awaited them, and that the United States, in Mr. Truman's words, "must devote more of its resources to military purposes, and less to civilian consumption."

Why, this is nothing but the old and well-known formula which originated in the camp of Hitler reaction—"guns before butter."

We know that the U.S. Senate Finance Committee has already approved a program envisaging increased taxation to a total of five billion dollars, which increases the individual income tax by an average of 16 per cent, and also increases other taxes, as of October 1 of this year.

In the face of these facts, what is the worth of the flowery talk about collective security and desire for peace, which Mr. Acheson said must be a "moral peace," one that will allow people to "unite in brotherhood"!