# BOMB SECURITY GUIDE

By Graham Knowles

A Step-by-Step Emergency
Response Program Against Bomb
Threats and Letter Bombs

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PREFACE

This bomb threat emergency response guide has been developed primarily to assist organizations and their security officers in contingency planning for bomb threats and incidents.

The first section introduces the bomb risk situation as it exists in society today, and provides essential data on perpetrators of threat calls and their motivations. It is followed by a comprehensive guide to preventive security systems, the essential basis of an anti-bomb threat program.

Succeeding chapters cover the recognition of hazardous devices and steps to minimize device activation risks; telephone operators' reporting procedures; a basic security response plan, including the key element of evacuation methods and evaluation and search procedures; and the special problems of letter bombs. A step-by-step emergency response check list is incorporated, which may be used for tactical operation exercises.

A bomb threat security response requires cooperation between internal security and law enforcement agencies, fire and medical departments, and sometimes even military explosive ordnance personnel (EOD) from the armed services. An effective bomb threat response program requires integrated planning and inter/intra-departmental cooperation. For this reason it is essential that the security plan receive the full support of an organization's administration.

A preventive security system may be set up by an organization's own security director or by an outside security consultant. In either case, in this writer's view it is beneficial to have an external consultant evaluate an organization's security effectiveness. When developing preventive security programs, one should think of the tactics from the terrorist's or bomber's point of view. How would you penetrate the organization's perimeter and plant a device? Such questions are often most efficiently answered by an independent outside consultant, who is also in a position to make objective

recommendations (as in the expensive area of hardware) for developing a cost-effective security program.

While this manual provides essential planning and operational information, it cannot provide efficiency in its use. Each organization must effect an ongoing program of training and evaluating its security efficiency. There is no substitute for operational exercises and staff education. Training and preparation are key elements in an effective anti-bomb threat program.

The major objective of telephoned bomb threats is usually psychological and financial harassment. Time spent in testing and practicing security responses will be amply returned in time saved during actual bomb threat situations.

Finally, the liability that might be held to exist for damages and personal injury resulting from a bomb incident will vary in different areas and specific circumstances. Organizations are therefore urged to investigate that potential liability in the applicable jurisdiction. But whatever the legal and insurance considerations that apply, the general responsibility of a company to provide for the safety and well-being of its employees and others on its premises offers another compelling argument, if one were needed, for developing and instituting a sound bomb security policy and procedure, and for thorough training of responsible personnel.

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Chapter 1

THE BOMB RISK

Excerpt from FBI Uniform Crime Reports:

BOMB HIGHLIGHTS — 1975

A total of 2,074 bombing incidents were reported to the FBI for the year 1975. In 1974, a total of 2,044 incidents occurred.

Two thousand four hundred and nineteen devices were used in connection with the 2,074 bombing incidents. Sixty percent or 1,451 were explosive in nature, while 40 percent or 968 were incendiary.

Sixty-nine deaths and 326 injuries were reported to have occurred as a result of bombing incidents. Two hundred and seventy-three injuries and 45 deaths occurred in connection with explosive incidents, and 53 injuries and 24 deaths with incendiary.

The total value of property damaged due to bombings was $27,003,981. Explosive bombs resulted in $24,896,292 damage while incendiary devices caused $2,107,689 damage. *

In March, 1970, coordinated explosions extensively damaged the Manhattan skyscraper offices of Socony Mobile Oil, General Telephone & Electronics, and International Business Machines (IBM). These attacks seemed to signal a new phase of urban guerrilla warfare and terrorism to usher in the decade of the 1970's. The weapons chosen for terrorist actions, primarily by left-wing organizations, included assassination, kidnaping and psychological warfare. Psychological and actual sabotage were achieved by means of explosive

bombs, incendiary devices and telephoned bomb threats. One of the most dramatic incidents involved a bomb which damaged the U.S. Capitol building.

In the years that followed the 1970 wave of bombings, such explosive attacks have occurred on an almost daily basis. The escalating situation was the subject of a Senate Subcommittee inquiry chaired by Senator John L. McClellan. For a 105-day period from January to April, 1972, the committee received reports on 4,330 bombings and arson attacks, plus 1,475 attempted bombings and 35,129 bomb threats. Property damage was estimated at a minimum of $21 million. Despite the fact that militants claimed attacks were made only against property, during the period in question 40 people were killed and 384 injured and maimed by explosive attacks.

During 1972 the New York Police Department received over 10,000 bomb reports. This was three times as many as in 1970, and at least ten times as many as in 1968, just four years earlier. Only three percent of the calls involved actual explosives, and the total of malicious false alarms was approximately 9,700. For the 105-day period studied by the Senate Subcommittee, the man-hour loss figure for New York City alone from malicious false alarm bomb threats was estimated at $350 million . . . a figure which, as events have proved, the beleaguered city could hardly afford.

This steadily rising pattern of bombing incidents has continued, as illustrated in Figure 1. The unusually large number of deaths and injuries, and the high damages to property, in 1975 were the result of three major incidents among the 2,074 reported for the year. One was a January, 1975, explosion in a commercial building in New York City. Another involved the detonation of three explosive devices in an industrial building in Connecticut, and the third was the December explosion at LaGuardia Airport in New York. In these three incidents alone 15 persons died, 107 more were injured, and property damage was in excess of $15 million.

The siege continues. Daily the news media demonstrate that the threat of explosive or incendiary attack against commercial, industrial, government and political organizations is real. In the continuing escalation of urban guerrilla/terrorist operations in countries throughout the world, almost any organization or event can become the target of a bomb or bomb threat. No organization can afford to

Year	Total Actual and Attempted Bombings	Actual		Attempt		Property Damage (Dollar Value)	Personal Injury	Death
		Explo.	Incend.	Explo.	Incend.			
1972	1,962	714	793	237	218	7,991,815	176	25
1973	1,955	742	787	253	173	7,261,832	187	22
1974	2,044	893	758	236	157	9,886,563	207	24
1975	2,074	1,088	613	238	135	27,003,981	326	69

Figure 1. Bombing Incidents: 1972 through 1975. Data from FBI Uniform Crime Reports, *Bomb Summary: A Comprehensive Report of Incidents Involving Explosive and Incendiary Devices in the Nation—1975,* United States Department of Justice, 1976.

be complacent about the risks of a bomb threat to their personnel or resources. No organization is immune.

Bomb Threat Targets

Bomb attacks, threats and hoaxes are received by offices, factories, hospitals, transport stations and terminals, libraries, exhibitions and entertainment centers. A bomber may strike against an obvious target, such as a government munitions factory, where he will achieve politico-military advantages; or against an old people's home or children's party, where the advantage to be gained is purely psychological. He may even strike for no visible motive, as in the case of the bomb which exploded in the baggage claim area at LaGuardia Airport on December 29, 1975, killing at least 11 persons and injuring about 75 others.

Although any organization may receive a bomb threat, there are some more likely and therefore high-risk terrorist targets. Examples of these are government and political centers, buildings containing civil dignitaries or VIP's, defense-related industries, fuel and chemical installations, power stations and the like. To this civil list must be added almost any military target, from an active installation to vehicles in transit to recruitment offices and ex-servicemen's clubs.

The primarily left-wing underground press frequently provides explicit details of various factories and organizations which they

consider to be unacceptable parts of the free world "system." By these and other subversive methods, potential targets are indicated to terrorist cells and lone extremists.

High-risk targets must, of course, be especially prepared and their staffs trained to counter the risks of bombing. A high-risk target may have to integrate its security response plan with local disaster forces, as in the case of fuel or chemical installations. While the material damage from bombings is usually minor, a strike against a high-risk installation could cause hundreds of injuries and widespread physical destruction.

Motivations of the Bomber

A bomber or arsonist may be motivated by many different factors. These include racial strife, color, a specific terrorist campaign, religion, personal animosity, crime, political and quasi political strife, mental illness, and many other real or imagined sources of grievance.

Because of these widely differing motivations, a bomber may vary considerably in his intellectual level and psychological profile. His abilities as a terrorist will also be variable. Hazardous devices encountered may vary from a simple, improvised device to a complex, booby-trapped bomb. Information and instructions on the use of explosives are available through courses in Communist countries, subversive and radical groups organized within our own country, and the underground press.

Bomb hoaxes usually have clearly defined motivations. Hoax calls are most commonly received from dissatisfied employees, overt political groups and extremists, unthinking or drunken practical jokers, mentally disturbed individuals—and even children.

Unfortunately, it is not often possible to determine whether a threat call originates from a harmless crank or a determined terrorist. Each threat, therefore, should be considered as a genuine danger until the fact that it is a hoax can be established.

Organized Terrorism

As indicated above, bombings are perpetrated by terrorists, criminals, mentally deranged persons, or even those acting out of

Target	No. of Incidents	Actual		Attempted	
		Explo.	Incend.	Explo.	Incend.
Residences	582	234	255	42	51
Commercial Operations	485	275	127	56	27
Vehicles	273	134	70	47	22
School Facilities	165	87	48	18	12
Law Enforcement	76	31	27	12	6
Government Property	62	37	13	9	3
Persons	43	26	4	12	1
Public Utilities	41	33	1	6	1
Recreation Facilities	33	21	4	4	4
Communication Facilities	32	31	1	—	—
Other	282	179	63	32	8
TOTALS	2074	1088	613	238	135

Figure 2. Bombing Incidents by Target — 1975. Data from FBI Uniform Crime Reports, *Bomb Summary,* pp. 5-6.

Apparent Motive	No. of Incidents	Casualties	
		Injury	Death
Malicious Destruction	745	38	—
Personal Animosity	723	93	38
Unknown Motive	192	74	13
Labor Dispute	75	2	1
Extremist	73	7	—
Political (U.S./Foreign)	62	66	6
Monetary Gain	57	9	4
Civil Rights	47	—	—
Anti-Establishment	46	15	1
Racketeering	16	1	2
Other	38	21	4
TOTALS	2074	326	69

Figure 3. Bombing Incidents by Apparent Motive — 1975. Data from FBI Uniform Crime Reports, *Bomb Summary,* p. 16.

personal animosity. Terrorist actions, however, account for most real bombing incidents. It may therefore be useful to examine briefly the makeup and purposes of organized terrorist groups.

Terrorism may be defined as "violent criminal activity, designed to intimidate for political purposes." Terrorist actions are intended to focus attention on a particular cause. Bombings and bomb threats are used to de-stabilize economy, to reduce the public's confidence in the government or police, to cause terror and thus dramatize a grievance.

Theories of revolutionary warfare show that there are at least five phases of a complete revolutionary campaign. Terrorism is normally the third phase.

An organizational phase comes first, in which unions and societies are formed, infiltrated into sectors of industry, students and public life. These are gradually prepared and motivated toward forms of revolution. Next comes a phase of political action, in which the masses or minority groups are motivated and approached for support. This phase includes financial de-stabilizing tactics such as strikes, work stoppages and other forms of indirect sabotage.

This is usually followed by a period of prolonged or intermittent terrorist activity. Such actions may include assassination, kidnaping, air or sea craft hijacking, bombing, arson or bomb threats. As attention or support is focused upon the revolutionary aims, the campaign may then escalate into guerrilla warfare.

This fourth phase, guerrilla warfare, may be divided into two forms, urban and rural warfare. These differ not only in locality but also in some tactics. Guerrilla tactics are generally more diversified than those used by terrorists; the guerrilla may use terrorism, political maneuvering, or many other means to achieve his ends. Bombing may be one of them, but it is mainly a terrorist act directed against government or its delineations.

A period of successful guerrilla warfare may be followed by a limited mobile warfare phase, fought by "conventional" weapons and tactics. However, at any time the revolutionaries may adopt one or more of the former phases to suit the tactical situation.

It should be emphasized that terrorism can quickly escalate into phases of guerrilla or even limited mobile warfare. The recent history of guerrilla actions, ranging from Indo-China to South America, Africa and some European countries, reveals that a major contribu-

tive factor in successful revolutionary campaigns was the ability of the revolutionaries to build up their organization, communications, expertise, weapons and manpower well before government or police forces realized the revolutionaries' strength and scale. Thus, when the political and tactical climate was right, the terrorist phase moved quickly into guerrilla warfare, catching government forces unprepared, ill-equipped and often undermanned.

The Terrorist Bomber

The very nature of revolutionary parties requires a secure structure of organization. Usually, terrorist units are designed for and capable of independent operation from the main party or organization. This ensures against discovery by government or police forces, and can also prevent publicly unacceptable acts of terrorism from being directly associated with the revolutionary party.

Terrorist units are usually commanded by highly trained and politically motivated and educated leaders, working from behind the front action line. The perpetrator of terrorist actions, however, is not often a skilled or highly educated guerrilla. The perpetrator's involvement with the terrorist unit may be politically inspired, but he may also have deeper motivations, such as an assumed glamorous or exciting group association. This is true especially if the unit has a reputation or public image, like the I.R.A. (Irish Republican Army), Bader-Mienhoff Gang, Angry Brigade, Symbionese Liberation Army, etc.

The bomber tends to be an individual with a weak personality, whose life has mainly been a failure, or at least non-distinctive. His ego may therefore be boosted by newspaper and television publicity. Bombing is a way of proving himself and establishing a viable self-image. It is for this reason that publicity about bomb incidents should be minimized wherever possible, and certainly not turned into media shows that glamorize group identities. Terrorism is, as we have defined it, merely violent criminal activity; it should not be allowed to develop martyrs or heroes.

Terrorist units frequently use the type of individual described to perpetrate their actions. Often the actual bomb planter or assassin has little real political connection with the revolutionary party. He is used and maneuvered, but he enjoys the glamorous associations and

group identity, and may also feel that his actions are making a personal impact upon society.

The materials and training for bombing are easily obtained. Numerous subversive groups provide training in the construction and tactics of hazardous devices. Devices are obtained from stolen military or commercial sources, or by improvisation from common chemicals. The underground press, as we have indicated, not only frequently details targets in government and industry, but also disseminates detailed information on the construction and use of explosive devices. Further, international links exist between many subversive groups, for the communication of political information, explosives, weapons and instructors.

Roles of Public and Private Security

A bomb or bomb threat, particularly one which is part of a terrorist campaign, has two targets. The first, which may be a private organization's property or facility, is the physical location against which the attack or threat is made. The second target is society itself or the particular government. We have already made note of the economic de-stabilizing effects caused by bombings and bomb threats. It follows that the obviously damaging effects of such terrorist activities must be minimized by a combined public and private security counter-force.

To provide an effective counter-force, the separate roles of government police forces and private security should be established and understood, so that their roles may complement each other.

The main role of the police or military is intelligence acquisition, local counter-actions, and area security. For public police forces to concentrate upon these operations, they require coordinated assistance from private security agencies.

The role of internal security is essentially in the hands of private security. The greater the efficiency of private security in handling internal bomb security, the less time is taken away from public police for their maintenance of external security. Seen in this light, the development of internal bomb security systems and personnel training is not only essential for an organization's own protection, but it can also have a major effect upon external security affairs and the very stability of society.

Target Risk Evaluation

The primary stage in developing a security program of any kind is risk assessment. Is the organization a potential bomb target? Would bomb damage be unacceptable? What is the nature and extent of the potential risk? Is the organization in question a high-risk target, or one with unacceptably high personnel casualty probabilities, such as leisure, entertainment and public service industries?

Telephoned bomb threats and explosive incidents are best considered as acts of sabotage. There are six basic forms of sabotage:

1. *Mechanical:*   breakage, the insertion of abrasives, inserting foreign bodies, failure to lubricate, maintain and repair, omission of parts.

2. *Chemical:*   the insertion or addition of destructive, damaging or polluting chemicals in supplies, raw materials, equipment, product or utility systems.

3. *Fire:*   ordinary means of arson, including the use of incendiary devices ignited by mechanical, electrical or electronic means.

4. *Electric/ Electronic:*   interfering with or interrupting power, jamming communications, interfering with electric and electronic processes.

5. *Explosive:*   damage or destruction by explosive devices; the detonation of explosive raw materials or supplies.

6. *Psychological:*   riots, mob activity, the fomenting of strikes, jurisdictional disputes, boycotts, unrest, personal animosities, including excessive spoilage, doing inferior work, causing slowdown of operations, provocation of fear or work stoppage by false alarms, character assassination, bomb threats.

For the purposes of bomb security risk evaluation, we are concerned with three of the above areas of sabotage. These are (3) fire, (5) explosive, and (6) psychological sabotage.

What are the risks involved in a bomb threat or explosion? If we

analyze these hazards, we can develop appropriate preventive security and emergency procedure systems to neutralize them.

Briefly, the potential effects of a telephoned bomb threat are:

1. A diversion for a crime
2. Panic
3. Loss of public and/or staff confidence
4. Loss of production time
5. Evacuation injuries through panic and confusion
6. Psychological harassment and stress

The risks of an explosion, in addition to all of those involved in a bomb threat listed above, can be summarized as follows:

1. Deaths
2. Severe injuries
3. Material damage
4. Cosmetic damage
5. Structural damage

Preventive security programs are designed to reduce these risks to acceptable levels. However, a manpower response is necessary for control and investigation of threat situations. Since the cost of security manpower is high, personnel numbers must be minimized, and those involved must be trained to control situations with such speed and efficiency as to reduce their damaging and de-stabilizing effects.

The second stage of risk evaluation, then, involves analyzing an organization's capability to handle bomb threat situations. The following questions should be considered. Do your security personnel:

1. Know how to prevent a devious bomber's entry?
2. Have explosive detection equipment?
3. Know how to handle bomb threat calls?
4. Know how to evaluate real and hoax threat calls?
5. Know how to conduct a safe evacuation?
6. Know the difference between fire and bomb alert procedures?