

# THEORIES OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

*By*

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## PREFACE

The literature of international relations has expanded greatly within recent years. Many stout volumes, as well as innumerable monographs and articles dealing with various aspects of international law and relations, have served to open up this *terra incognita* to students and scholars if not to the man in the street. Several excellent surveys intended to acquaint the general reader or the less advanced student with the elements of international politics and with the current problems of international relations have appeared since the World War. Moreover, there have been a number of treatises on international law, volumes dealing with diplomacy and foreign policy, and studies of nationalism, imperialism, international organization, and international administration.

The present volume represents a new approach. It is designed to do for the field of international relations what historical surveys of political theory have done for the entire field of political thought. Up to the present there has been no survey of the development of man's ideas concerning the relationship of independent political communities. Works embracing the field of political theory in general have either ignored or treated inadequately this important area of political and social relationships. It is true that certain writers in the field of international relations, as well as many in international law, have made valuable contributions to various phases of international political thought. For example, Christian Lange, in his *Histoire de l'Internationalisme* (Christiania, 1919) and in his *Histoire de la Doctrine Pacifique* (Paris, 1927), has made a signal contribution to pacifist and internationalist thought. And as regards the development of ideas of international organization, Jacob ter Meulen's two volumes, *Der Gedanke der Internationalen Organisation in Seiner Entwicklung* (The Hague, 1917-1929) are likewise excellent. Others, as well, might be mentioned, such as F. Laurent's *Histoire du Droit des Gens et des Relations Internationales: Études sur l'Histoire de l'Humanité*, 18 vols. (Brussels, 1861-1870); A. C. F. Beale's *The History of Peace* (London and New York, 1931); and F. M. Stawell's suggestive little volume in the Home University Library

series, *The Growth of International Thought* (New York and London, 1930). However, there is no book in any language, as far as I know, that attempts to present from the earliest times, and in the light of environmental influences, the more significant ideas, whatever their character or implications may be, that men have entertained concerning international relations. The author, although painfully aware of the shortcomings of his own effort in this direction, and cognizant of the fact that others in the field who might have set their hand to this task could have done it better than he, hopes that his own venture may be regarded as not altogether unworthy. Moreover, he dares to believe that, for the thoughtful reader, it may contribute toward the attainment of a better perspective in the field of international relations.

It is a pleasure to record my gratitude to those who have aided me in one way or another in bringing this work to completion. My wife has stood by at all times to render needed assistance. Professor Frederic A. Ogg, general editor of the Century Political Science Series, has gone over the manuscript and made many valuable suggestions to improve the style. He and the officials of the D. Appleton-Century Company with whom I have dealt have been most courteous and helpful at all times. Eleanor van Horn, Assistant in the Bureau of International Relations at the University of California, has, in the midst of numerous and exacting duties, labored hard and long to save me from as many errors as humanly possible, in connection with the preparation of the manuscript for publication, and has given me invaluable assistance throughout. Mr. A. Manell, one of my graduate students, has done me a great service in checking the page proofs and in preparing the index.

FRANK MARION RUSSELL

BERKELEY, CALIFORNIA.

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**THEORIES OF  
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS**



## CHAPTER I

### INTRODUCTION: PRIMITIVE MAN AND INTER-GROUP RELATIONSHIPS

UNTIL recently, political philosophers and theorists have, with few important exceptions, dealt with the subject of international relations only incidentally. Their attention has been focused chiefly upon questions concerning the origin, nature, and justification of the state, the source of political authority, and the organization and functions of government. That this has been true need occasion no surprise. Until the nineteenth century, conditions were not conducive, except at particular periods in limited areas, to the elaboration of a theory of international relations. A world made up of relatively isolated and, for the most part, largely self-contained states, with vast cultural if not racial differences, did not furnish the physical foundation, at any rate, upon which to build a realistic theory of international solidarity. With the industrial revolution, however, forces were set in motion which were to broaden and multiply the contacts of sovereign states and provide the conditions for continuous and fruitful international intercourse and likewise for harmful collision. The industrial revolution led to an enormous increase in economic productivity and, along with the development of rapid transportation on land and water and eventually instantaneous communication over great areas, to the development of a world-wide commerce. On the other hand, the invention of new weapons of tremendous destructive power, for use on land and sea and in the air, revolutionized warfare and made it increasingly costly and devastating. These developments, and a world war that shook the foundations of the civilized world, have finally pushed problems of international relations to the front and compelled attention to them.

It is also to be noted that, almost up to the present time, theories of international relations have been concerned to a very considerable extent with the most disturbing element in the relationship of organized

independent communities, i.e., war. Even among primitive peoples, as we shall see, notions were developed as to its justification, as to the manner in which it should be conducted, and the circumstances under which it should be terminated. Today war brings in its train such evil consequences to victors and vanquished alike that less thought is being given to the formulation of "rules of war" than formerly, and more attention to the building of an organized world community. Nevertheless, until states perfect alternative methods of adjusting their differences, abandon the principle of self-help, and "outlaw" violence as they have done within their borders, international political thought must continue to concern itself with war as the central problem, and be conditioned by the necessity of devising institutions to control it.

International political thought in the strict sense may be regarded as including the reflections, speculations, ideas, and conclusions of men concerning the interrelations of the national states composing the modern international community. Broadly speaking, however, international political thought is as old as the existence of separate independent political communities, whether primitive tribes or ancient city-states and empires. Many of the institutions, practices, and ideas bearing on present-day international relations, commonly regarded as originating in the early modern period in Western Europe, were known to the ancients and were to be found in rudimentary form even among primitive peoples.<sup>1</sup> Anyone attempting, therefore, to deal with the development of international political thought for purposes of orientation and perspective cannot afford to neglect altogether the thought of primitive and ancient peoples as revealed chiefly, in their customs, practices, and institutions.

The life of prehistoric man is, and is likely to remain, a closed book, or at best a matter of speculation. The earliest humans did not chronicle their adventures, nor did they fashion tools or weapons. The guesses that scientists make today as to what they were like and what they did, are based, in part, upon scattered and fragmentary remains

<sup>1</sup> S. A. Korff, "An Introduction to the History of International Law," *American Journal of International Law*, XVIII (1924), 246-247. Paul Vinogradoff, *Outlines of Historical Jurisprudence*, 2 vols. (London, 1920-22), Vol. I, Ch. X. Some writers deny that international law was known to the ancient world. For example, see F. Laurent, *Histoire de Droit des Gens et des Relations Internationales: Études Sur l'Histoire de l'Humanité*, 18 vols. (Brussels, 1861-70), Vol. I, Ch. I.

left not by them but by their distant descendants, and upon a study of the habits of animals supposed to be nearest to man in the scale of life. More extensive studies have likewise been made of present-day primitives, who, though they are much farther advanced than prehistoric man, may afford some clue to the nature and social characteristics of our early ancestors.

Despite the poverty of evidence concerning prehistoric man, the majority of writers who have speculated on the subject do not paint a flattering portrait of him. Lagorgette, after remarking that primitive man was unacquainted with labor, knew no society, and had no moral code, says further that to these defects "he added a ferocity and aggressiveness, a lust for violence, which led him to commit the most useless cruelties, and to appeal to arms to settle the slightest quarrel."<sup>2</sup> Another writer also asserts quite positively that in all savage races the rule of force existed unadulterated, and that only after the advent of civilization was primitive violence somewhat mitigated.<sup>3</sup> Still others, without necessarily sharing completely this view of man's innate human pugnacity, subscribe to the opinion that frequent conflict was in the nature of things more or less characteristic of the early stages of human development. Ratzenhofer, for example, points out that in the early stages of culture, before inter-tribal trade developed, war was almost the only form of contact between alien groups.<sup>4</sup>

Other writers have emphasized fear rather than ferocity as an important factor making for conflict between early primitive groups, asserting that when hordes came into contact they fell into a frenzy of fear and terror from which bloodshed was likely to result.<sup>5</sup> The view that primitive man in any case was predisposed toward violence has also received support from psychologists on the basis of observation of his civilized descendants. The wars of civilized societies, for example, are from this point of view reversions to a primordial animal-human type of behavior. They furnish a desired relaxation from the restraints of civilization, for, as expressed by Nietzsche, "men have always wanted

<sup>2</sup> *Le Rôle de la Guerre* (Paris, 1906), p. 53.

<sup>3</sup> Raoul de la Grasserie, "The Evolution of Civil Law," in Kocourek and Wigmore, comps., *Formative Influences of Legal Development* (Boston, 1918), p. 649.

<sup>4</sup> *Wesen und Zweck der Politik* (Leipzig, 1893), p. 9.

<sup>5</sup> A. W. Small, "Types of Conflict Situations," in Park and Burgess, *Introduction to the Science of Sociology* (Chicago, 1921), p. 586. See also L. R. Aldrich, *The Primitive Mind and Modern Civilization* (London, 1931), Ch. XII.

not peace but battle.”<sup>6</sup> Whenever the restraints of civilization are removed, the fighting instinct breaks out with slight stimulus.<sup>7</sup>

These views have been challenged vigorously within recent years on several grounds. How, it is asked, can it be known with such certainty and precision what man was like several hundred thousand years ago, in view of the fact that no actual evidence is available?<sup>8</sup> On the other hand, it is asserted that there is indirect and circumstantial evidence sufficient to refute the claim that man was at first dominated by a fighting instinct and only gradually and imperfectly brought it under control with the growth of civilization. Man is not “an animal with a musket.” His nearest animal relatives, the anthropoid apes, are not combative by nature. Vacher de Lapouge points out that neither collective violence nor individual murder are found among them, and that the criminal instinct “appears to be developed in a measure as our species has disengaged itself from the rest of the animal kingdom. Murder and war . . . are human acts and not the atavistic legacies of far distant ancestors.”<sup>9</sup>

That violent human behavior and war came with the development of civilization rather than in the earlier stages of man’s life on the planet, is asserted also by the English scientist, W. J. Perry,<sup>10</sup> who remarks: “The prehistoric food-gatherers of Europe—the men of the Old Stone Age—do not seem to have been concerned with combat. They do not appear to have made weapons of stone. They may, of course, have made them of wood; but it is hardly likely that, since they were masters of stone-working, they would have failed to make serviceable weapons for combat if they needed them. . .” Perry also cites the apparent absence of special weapons for fighting among other early peoples, and draws the conclusion that the “bloody savage” view cannot be sustained: “Are we thus to look back into a Golden Age of peace, when violence was practically absent from human relations? I see no other interpretation of the facts. It may be admitted that occasional violence was present, but it

<sup>6</sup> G. T. W. Patrick, “The Psychology of War,” *Popular Science Monthly*, LXXXVII (1915), 166-168.

<sup>7</sup> H. R. Marshall, *War and the Ideal of Peace* (New York, 1915), pp. 96-110.

<sup>8</sup> G. Nasmyth, *Social Progress and the Darwinian Theory* (New York, 1916), p. 157.

<sup>9</sup> *Les Sélections Sociales* (Paris, 1896), p. 209. See also G. Ratzenhofer, *Die Sociologische Erkenntniss* (Leipzig, 1898), p. 133; Nasmyth, *op. cit.*, p. 164; G. M. Stratton, *Social Psychology of International Conduct* (New York, 1929), p. 231.

<sup>10</sup> *The Growth of Civilization* (London, 1924), pp. 191-197.

certainly was not enough to cause men to make special weapons for the purpose of fighting as they did later on." According to the same writer's view, war arose along with the development of the institution of private property, and the rise of ruling groups seeking greater power. It increased in frequency once it became established in human society due to a variety of causes associated with the fears and ambitions and rivalries of ruling aristocracies.<sup>11</sup>

Another adherent of this view holds, in language reminiscent of Rousseau, that although "all men will fight in defence of their lives and for the safeguarding of their families," the necessity for doing so has arisen as a result of a "departure from the original Arcadian manner of living." Man is innately peaceful, but civilization has brought strains and stresses which prevent the true expression of his nature. "Most of the friction and discords of our lives are obviously the result of such exasperations and conflicts as civilization itself creates."<sup>12</sup>

Other writers taking a similar position base their contentions on the actual observations that have been made of behavior of primitive peoples in different parts of the world. The testimony of the Norwegian explorer, Dr. Nansen, is cited to show that ferocity is not ingrained in man and that violence is no necessary characteristic of human existence. Fighting and brutality, according to Nansen, are unknown, and murder is very rare, among the Greenlanders. To them war is "incomprehensible and repulsive, a thing for which their language has no word. . ."<sup>13</sup> Westermarck,<sup>14</sup> and Davie,<sup>15</sup> although taking the position that the number of primitive peoples living in a continual state of war outnumber those which are peaceful, give a number of instances of tribes which maintain amicable relations with their neighbors, and a few which carry their pacifism to the length of non-resistance when injured.

Nevertheless, it seems to be true that most of the primitive peoples whose manners and customs have been observed or studied, know war

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.* See also Havelock Ellis, *The Philosophy of Conflict* (Boston, 1919), p. 42, and R. M. MacIver, *The Modern State* (Oxford, 1926), pp. 241-242, for substantially the same view.

<sup>12</sup> G. Elliott Smith, *Human History* (New York, 1929), p. 174.

<sup>13</sup> *Eskimo Life* (London, 1893), p. 162.

<sup>14</sup> *The Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas*, 2 vols. (New York, 1906-1908), I, 334-336.

<sup>15</sup> *The Evolution of War* (New Haven, Conn., 1929), pp. 48-49. See R. Holsti, *The Relation of War to the Origin of the State* (Helsingfors, 1913), pp. 70-75, for collected testimony of numerous authorities as to the peaceable character of many primitive communities.

and evince a disposition not infrequently to employ it. How is this to be explained? The upholders of the "gentle savage" thesis reply that in many instances these peoples have been corrupted by unhappy contacts with civilized peoples, that they have developed a militant character as a result of the aggressive actions of civilized visitors, the introduction of firearms, and the resultant disruption of their life.<sup>16</sup>

The character of warfare as observed among various primitive communities, and the expedients used to overcome the reluctance of those expected to engage in it, have also been advanced as evidence that there is no natural urge in men to fight and that the asserted ferocity of primitive tribes is the exception rather than the rule. It is pointed out, for example, that in many cases savages have to be prodded and stimulated in one way or another before they can work up the necessary enthusiasm for combat.<sup>17</sup> Thus they are abused or ridiculed by their women who call them cowards if they do not exhibit a belligerent spirit, and in some instances their women folk accompany them to the battlefield in order to spur them on by visible evidence of continued moral support. Before the battle, oratorical appeals are usually made to the perhaps not altogether happy warriors, reminding them of the bravery of their ancestors, telling them they are fighting for their wives and children, for the honor of the tribe, and suggesting also that cowardice will result in punishment.<sup>18</sup> On the other hand, marks of distinction and rewards will be bestowed upon them if they are brave—perhaps the right to wear an ostrich feather, or to marry.<sup>19</sup>

Religious superstition, it is pointed out, also often plays a part in the attainment of martial ardor. Perhaps it is believed that some deity

<sup>16</sup> R. Holsti, *op. cit.*, pp. 94-102, cites a number of authorities who offer various explanations for the development of war among these peoples, none of which have their foundations in a fighting instinct.

<sup>17</sup> The war dance, found among nearly all savage peoples, is for the purpose of getting the support of the gods in the coming struggle with the enemy, and to work the dancers up to such a frenzy that they will rush into battle and show no mercy. L. Havemeyer, *The Drama of Savage Peoples* (New Haven, Conn., 1916), pp. 157-158.

<sup>18</sup> R. H. Lowie, *Primitive Society* (New York, 1920), p. 356, says that "the Plains Indian fought not for territorial aggrandizement nor for the victor's spoils, but above all because fighting was a game worth while because of the social recognition it brought when played according to the rules." This writer also makes the following interesting generalization (p. 357): "Primitive man is not a miser nor a sage nor a beast of prey, but, in Tarde's happy phrase, a peacock."

<sup>19</sup> R. Holsti, *op. cit.*, p. 58, quotes from the declamation of a chief who suggested to the young warriors that it would be "far better to die in war than to live to be assassinated at home or to die of a lingering disease."



can be propitiated only by the slaughter of tribal enemies, and will support the warriors in the undertaking. The latter also are taught that the souls of brave warriors will spend an eternity in dancing, feasting, and experiencing all kinds of bliss; the souls of cowards, on the other hand, will be doomed to wander about in regions of darkness and encounter all manner of hardships.<sup>20</sup>

Although the use of such stimuli is common where fighting is more deadly, primitive warfare in general consists chiefly in shouting and attempting to terrify the enemy rather than in serious fighting. In some cases, in fact, there is no bloodshed at all, the opposing groups satisfying their martial ardor with threats and vociferations, and speeches of defiance. In others, the fighting is confined to individuals selected from the opposing tribes. In instances in which actual fighting is started, it often ceases when some one on either side is wounded or killed.<sup>21</sup> As a matter of fact, there is much testimony to the effect that the warfare of simple societies is often largely ceremonious in character, and therefore relatively innocuous.<sup>22</sup> Altogether there is considerable evidence of this character to sustain the position of those who contend that uncivilized man was essentially peaceful, or at least to cast considerable doubt on the opposite and more generally accepted thesis that he was by nature predisposed to slaughter. As one writer<sup>23</sup> reminds us, if men were wholly unsocial, war, which requires group cooperation and individual sacrifice on behalf of the community, could never have arisen. Men could have engaged in single combat only.

Nevertheless it is not to be denied that certain characteristics of human nature, working under the environmental influences that in general seem to have obtained among primitive groups, furnished the conditions under which war might, and did, grow. As Stratton<sup>24</sup> has pointed out, man is a creature with innate desires and is also endowed with impulses to action to achieve these desires, whether for food or drink or glory. He is also subject to the passions of anger and fear when these desires are thwarted or their realization endangered, and

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 48-52, 57.

<sup>21</sup> Deniker, *Les Races et Peuples de la Terre* (Paris, 1900), pp. 305 ff., cited in Holsti, *op. cit.*, p. 39. See also M. R. Davie, *op. cit.*, Appendix C, for a number of instances of mild warfare among primitive peoples, gathered from different parts of the world.

<sup>22</sup> W. H. R. Rivers, ed., *Psychology and Ethnology* (London, 1926), pp. 295-296.

<sup>23</sup> G. M. Stratton, *op. cit.*, p. 243.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 237-241.