

The Age of Migration

International population Movements in the Modern World

THE AGE OF MIGRATION

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in the Modern World

Stephen Castles
Mark J. Miller

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STEPHEN CASTLES
MARK J. MILLER

1

Introduction

The year 1992 had more than its fair share of dramatic events. In May, the Los Angeles riots shocked the American nation. At first they were widely portrayed as black-white race riots – a return of the ghetto insurrections of the mid-1960s, which helped to bring about civil rights laws and President Johnson's 'Great Society' programme. But a closer look showed that the 1992 riot had a new character. Few of the businesses destroyed by arson and looting were white-owned: about half belonged to Koreans, and around a third to Latinos – mainly Mexican Americans and Cubans. Most of the looters were black, but there was a sizable share of whites. Moreover one-third of those killed were Latinos, and so were about one-third of the 13 000 people arrested in the week of mayhem. About 1200 of those arrested were illegal immigrants, who were turned over to the Immigration and Naturalisation Service for deportation. The white against black violence of the Rodney King (a black motorist beaten up by the police) case may have precipitated the disturbances, but other ethnic and social divisions played a major part. An article in New York's radical *Voice* spoke of 'the first multicultural riots' (Kwong, 1992), while another writer referred to 'the nation's first multi-ethnic riot' (Rutten, 1992).

In August and September, Europe was alarmed by an almost daily series of neo-Nazi onslaughts on refugee hostels in Germany. The attacks were marked by extreme violence, the apparent inability of the police to prevent them, and by the incapacity of the political parties to get a grip on the root causes. Most of the attacks were in the area of the former German Democratic Republic, where the collapse of the communist regime had left a legacy of unemployment, poor

environmental conditions and a disintegration of social institutions. Young Germans seemed to be flocking to extreme-right organisations as the only groups able to fill the void in their lives. But there were disturbing reminders of the past: the neo-Nazis used the symbols and methods of the 1930s, while the main target among the refugees – Eastern European gypsies – were one of the groups to which Hitler had applied his ‘final solution’. Many Europeans feared the beginning of a new period of political conflict and instability in Germany.

Throughout 1992, the world watched helplessly while Yugoslavia disintegrated into warring fragments. Shelling of civilians, concentration camps and ‘ethnic cleansing’ became instruments of politics, as elites claiming to represent distinct historical peoples struggled to create new states. Millions of people sought refuge from the war in nearby countries, which were reluctant to receive them, because they added to the already insoluble problems of the European refugee crisis.

All of these happenings were linked to mass international population movements and to the problems of living together in one society for ethnic groups with diverse cultures and social conditions. The list could easily be extended. The year also witnessed mass refugee movements in Africa, arising from wars and political upheavals but also from environmental catastrophes; movements of Jews from the former Soviet Union to Israel, which added to political tensions in the region; a refugee outflow from Burma to Bangladesh, which put a great strain on the resources of one of the world’s poorest countries; the turning back by the US Coastguard of desperate attempts of Haitian boat-people to reach Florida; and, in every continent, large-scale movements of labour migrants and their families.

The events of 1992 were symptomatic of major changes in international relations and in the societies of both highly-developed and less developed countries. New forms of global migration and growing ethnic diversity are related to fundamental transformations in economic, social and political structures in this post-modern and post-Cold War epoch. These changes took on momentum at the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s. Developments included the upheavals in the former Soviet Bloc; the Gulf War; the Intifada in occupied Palestine; the crumbling of apartheid in South Africa; wars, famines and crises throughout Africa; rapid growth and development

in Asia; a shift from dictatorships to unstable and debt-plagued democracies in Latin America; and growing economic and political integration in Western Europe. All these developments have one thing in common: they have been linked in various ways with mass population movements. It therefore seems fitting to predict that the last decade of the twentieth century and the first of the twenty-first will be the age of migration.

Millions of people are seeking work, a new home or simply a safe place to live outside their countries of birth. In many underdeveloped countries of origin, emigration is one aspect of the social crisis which accompanies integration into the world market and modernisation. Population growth and the ‘green revolution’ in rural areas lead to massive surplus populations. Large-scale rural–urban migration is the result: people move to burgeoning cities, where employment opportunities are inadequate and social conditions miserable. Massive urbanisation outstrips the creation of jobs in the early stages of industrialisation. Some of the previous rural–urban migrants embark on a second migration, seeking to improve their lives by moving to highly-developed countries.

Only a minority of the inhabitants of less-developed countries take this step, but their numbers still total millions. The movements take many forms: people migrate as manual workers, highly-qualified specialists, entrepreneurs, refugees or as family members of previous migrants. Whether the initial intention is temporary or permanent movement, many migrants become settlers. Migratory networks develop, linking areas of origin and destination, and helping to bring about major changes in both. Migrations can change demographic, economic and social structures, and bring a new cultural diversity, which often brings into question national identity.

This book is about contemporary international migrations, and the way they are changing societies. The perspective is international: large-scale movements of people arise from the accelerating process of global integration. Migrations are not an isolated phenomenon: movements of commodities and capital almost always give rise to movements of people. Global cultural interchange, facilitated by improved transport and the proliferation of print and electronic media, also leads to migration. International migration is not an invention of the late twentieth century, nor even of modernity in its twin guises of capitalism and colonialism. Migrations have been part of human history from the earliest times. However international

migration has grown in volume and significance since 1945 and most particularly since the mid-1980s. The perspective for the 1990s and the early part of the next century is that migration will continue to grow, and that it is likely to be one of the most important factors in global change.

There are several reasons for this assumption: growing inequalities in wealth between the North and South are likely to impel increasing numbers of people to move in search of better living standards; political, ecological and demographic pressures may force many people to seek refuge outside their own countries; the end of the Cold War, which led to massive population movements in Europe, could in the future do the same in Asia; increasing ethnic strife in a number of regions could lead to future mass flights, as has already happened, for instance, in Palestine and Yugoslavia; and the creation of new free trade areas will cause movements of labour – whether or not this is intended by the governments concerned. One corollary is the virtual certainty that states around the world will be increasingly affected by international migration, either as receiving societies, lands of emigration, or both.

No one knows exactly how many international migrants there are worldwide. In 1990, the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) ventured an estimate of over 80 million persons, including all types of migrants whether documented or not (IOM, 1990). Out of this total 15 million were refugees and asylum seekers. By 1992, some estimates put the total of number of migrants at over 100 million, of whom 20 million were refugees and asylum seekers. The 1990 figure was about equal to the population of united Germany, and suggests that about 1.7 per cent of the world's population lives abroad, which approximates the annual increase in the world's population. This indicates that the vast majority of human beings reside in their countries of birth and citizenship, and that taking up residence abroad is the exception, not the rule.

Yet the impact of migration is much greater than the small percentage suggests. People tend to move not individually but in groups. Their departure may have considerable consequences for social and economic relationships in the area of origin. In the country of immigration, settlement is closely linked to employment opportunities, and is almost always concentrated in industrial and urban areas, where the impact on receiving communities is considerable. Migration thus affects not only the migrants themselves but the


sending and receiving societies as a whole. There can be few people in either industrial countries or underdeveloped countries today who do not have personal experience of migration and its effects. For example, some 25–30 million of the estimated 80 million recent immigrants are thought to be foreign workers. They are believed to remit over \$67 billion annually to their homelands. If accurate, this figure would place labour second only to oil in world trade (Martin, 1992).

Contemporary migrations: an overview

International migration is part of a transnational revolution that is reshaping societies and politics around the globe. It has affected the world's regions in different ways. Some areas, like the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand or Argentina, are classical countries of immigration. Their populations consist mainly of European immigrants and their descendants. The aboriginal populations of these countries have been partially destroyed and dispossessed; today the survivors have a marginal and discriminated existence. In the last 20 years the USA, Canada and Australia have experienced large-scale immigration from new source countries, particularly from Asia. The USA also has large influxes of migrant workers from Mexico and other countries of Latin America and the Caribbean.

Another striking development of recent years has been the growing number of countries that have experienced immigration in addition to the classical cases. Virtually all of Northern and Western Europe was affected by labour migration between 1945 and the early 1970s, and must now be considered an immigration area. Even Southern European states like Greece, Italy and Spain, which long were zones of emigration, have become immigration areas. Several Central and Eastern European states, particularly Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia, are becoming immigration lands.

The Middle East is affected by complex population movements. Turkey is both a country of emigration and of immigration. In the 1960s and 1970s millions of Turks went to work in Germany and other Western European countries. When labour recruitment stopped, family reunion and refugee movements took over, while workers started to go to the oil states of the Persian Gulf. Turkey has also been a haven for ethnic Turks and Muslims encountering



MAP 1.1
Global migratory movements from 1973

persecution in Eastern Europe, as witnessed by the influx of some 370 000 Bulgarian Turks in 1989. In addition, Turkey has received large numbers of Iranian and Kurdish refugees. To its south, Syria has been a major recipient of Palestinian refugees, as has Lebanon. Israel is a state whose *raison d'être* is the gathering in of Jews from around the world. Jordan serves as a refuge for hundreds of thousands of Palestinian refugees and hosts many other immigrants as well. The oil-rich Gulf Arab states, particularly Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, became major magnets to immigrants from the Arab world and Asia following the oil-price explosion of the 1970s.

Migration plays an important role in Africa too. In the past, colonialism and white settlement led to the establishment of migrant labour systems for plantations and mines. The largest international recruitment system was set up by South Africa, and continues to function in a modified form. West Africans from former French colonies still go in search of work to the former colonial power. Algeria had mass emigration to France until recently, but also has a significant refugee population from the Western Sahara. The Sudan, which is one of the world's poorest nations despite its enormous resources, houses a huge population of refugees. Indeed throughout Africa there were an estimated five million refugees in 1989. Many African states, such as Nigeria and the Ivory Coast, also receive foreign workers, both legal and illegal.

In Asia, large-scale international migrations have also become frequent. Iran houses millions of Afghan refugees, as does Pakistan. Several Indian states have received inflows of immigrants from Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Nepal. To the north, in the area of the ex-Soviet Union, the potential for migration unleashed by the momentous changes of recent years seems enormous. In East and Southeast Asia, the emerging industrial and economic powers, Japan, Hong Kong, Taiwan and Singapore, have all joined the ranks of immigration lands. Malaysia also receives hundreds of thousands of foreign workers, many of whom arrive illegally. Outflows of refugees from Indo-China have greatly affected Thailand, Malaysia, Hong Kong and other states. Large proportions of the population of some of the smaller Pacific Islands have migrated to New Zealand or the USA.

Virtually all Latin American countries experience movements of refugees or foreign workers. Venezuela, Brazil, the Dominican Republic and Argentina are major poles of immigration. Many

countries are simultaneously countries of emigration and immigration. Dominican emigrants journey northward to the East Coast of the United States while Haitian cane-cutters traditionally are employed during the Dominican Republic's sugar cane harvest. Large-scale labour migration (often illegal) across the long border between Mexico and the USA is of great economic and political significance. There have been mass labour migrations from Jamaica and other Caribbean countries to the USA, while refugees from Cuba and Haiti continue to arrive and settle in the USA.

Comparing migration movements around the world, it is possible to identify certain general tendencies, which are likely to play a major role in the next 20 years.

- The first might be referred to as the *globalisation of migration*, the tendency for more and more countries to be affected by migratory movements at the same time. Moreover, the diversity of the areas of origin is also increasing, so that most immigration countries have entrants from a broad spectrum of economic, social and cultural backgrounds.

- The second tendency is the *acceleration of migration*, the fact that migrations are growing in volume in all major regions at the present time. Clearly this quantitative growth increases both the urgency and the difficulties of government policies.

- The third tendency is the *differentiation of migration*: most countries do not simply have one type of immigration, such as labour migration, refugee or permanent settlement, but a whole range of types at once. Typically, migratory chains which start with one type of movement often continue with other forms, despite (or often just because of) government efforts to stop or control the movement. This differentiation presents a major obstacle to national and international policy measures.

- The fourth tendency is the *feminisation of migration*: women play an increasing role in all regions and all types of migration. In the past most labour migrations and many refugee movements were male-dominated, and women were often dealt with under the category of family reunion. Since the 1960s, women have played a major role in labour migration: for instance, Turkish women often preceded their men to Germany. Today women workers form the majority in movements as diverse as those of Cape Verdians to Italy, Filipinos to the Middle East and Thais to Japan. Some refugee movements,

including those from the former Yugoslavia, are marked by a majority of women. The feminisation of migration raises new issues both for policy-makers and for those who study the migratory process.

Migration and international politics

Issues linked to international migration play a surprisingly large part in the problems confronting the world today. In 1992, for instance, direct links could be seen in several of the major conflicts which hit the headlines: recent Hispanic and Asian immigrants were involved both as looters and as victims in the Los Angeles riots; the war in the remnants of Yugoslavia led to a new refugee emergency in Europe; migration to Israel continued to exacerbate the political conflict over the future of Palestine; in Germany neo-Nazi violence against foreigners (especially gypsies from Romania) caused a major political crisis, leading to calls for changes in the Constitution. Two examples of recent political upheavals are discussed in Exhibits 1.1 and 1.2, to give an idea of the complex ramifications of migratory movements.

Until recently, international migration was generally not seen by governments as a central political issue. Rather migrants were divided up into categories, such as permanent settlers, foreign workers or refugees, and dealt with by a variety of special agencies, such as immigration departments, labour offices, aliens police, welfare authorities and education ministries. It was only in the late 1980s that international migration began to be accorded high-level and systematic attention. For example, as the European Community countries removed their internal boundaries, they became increasingly concerned about strengthening external boundaries, to prevent an influx from the South and the East. It became clear that the old distinctions between types of migration were losing their validity: a migratory chain that started with workers could continue with family reunion or refugees. By the 1990s, the successful mobilisation of extreme-right groups over immigration and supposed threats to national identity helped bring these issues to the centre of the political stage. States found it increasingly difficult to find satisfactory solutions.

Starting with the 1985 Schengen Agreement between Germany, France and the Benelux countries, there was a series of conferences

EXHIBIT 1.1**The Gulf War**

After the oil-price leap of 1973, the oil-rich states of the Persian Gulf recruited masses of foreign workers from both Arab and Asian countries for construction and industrialisation. At first most were men; later many female domestic servants were recruited from the Philippines and Sri Lanka. Resentments over the status accorded to various categories of aliens in Kuwait became a major factor in Iraq-Kuwait tensions. At the beginning of the Gulf Crisis in 1990 there were 1.1 million foreigners in Iraq, of whom 900 000 were Egyptians and 100 000 Sudanese. Kuwait had 1.5 million foreigners – two thirds of the total population. The main countries of origin were Jordan/Palestine (510 000 people), Egypt (215 000), India (172 000), Sri Lanka (100 000), Pakistan (90 000) and Bangladesh (75 000).

The Iraqi occupation of Kuwait and the subsequent war led to mass departures of foreign workers. Most Egyptians left Iraq, hundreds of thousands of Palestinians and other migrants fled Kuwait, and perhaps a million Yemenis were forced out of Saudi Arabia when their government sided with Iraq. An estimated five million persons were displaced, resulting in enormous losses in remittances and income for states from Southeast Asia to North Africa.

The Gulf War suggested, as perhaps never before, the centrality of migration in contemporary international relations. Migrants were viewed as potentially subversive – a fifth column – by the major Arab protagonists, and became scapegoats for domestic and international tensions. Hundreds of migrants were killed in the outbreaks of violence. The political realignments occasioned by the conflict had major repercussions upon society and politics in the Arab region and beyond. For example, emigration had long served as a safety-valve for Palestinian Arabs in the Israeli-occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip. The War foreclosed the possibility of emigration to the Gulf, further exacerbating tensions in the Gaza Strip. Hundreds of thousands of Palestinians forced out of Kuwait found refuge in the Kingdom of Jordan. The new influx of Palestinian refugees threatened to compound Jordan's severe economic and political difficulties.

and treaties between Western European countries designed to improve control of migration. This took on new momentum after 1989, as both South-North and East-West movements escalated. In North America and Australia, public debates took place on the volume of immigration and its changing character. Government commissions of inquiry were set up, and new legislation was enacted. In 1991, the so-called G-7 Group, the leaders of the seven major industrial democracies, declared that '[international] migration has made and can make a valuable contribution to economic and social development [and that] . . . there is a growing concern about worldwide migratory pressures, which are due to a variety of political, social and economic factors'. This declaration constituted

EXHIBIT 1.2**Eastern Europe and the collapse of the Berlin Wall**

Migration played an important part in the political transformation of Central and Eastern Europe. The Hungarian government, under the pressure of a wave of would-be emigrants to the West, dismantled the border barriers with Austria in late 1989. This destroyed a major symbol of the Cold War and created the first opportunity for emigration for East Germans since the construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961. Tens of thousands rushed to depart. The steady haemorrhage to the West helped create a political crisis in the German Democratic Republic, forcing a change in leadership. In a final gambit to maintain control, the new government opened the Wall, enabling East Germans to travel freely to West Germany. The communist regime quickly collapsed and Germany was reunited in 1990. Large-scale migration continued: at least one million East Germans moved West from the opening of the Wall to the end of 1991.

The collapse of East Germany had a 'domino effect' upon other communist regimes. The political transformation of the region enabled hundreds of thousands to emigrate. During 1989 alone, some 1.2 million people left the former Warsaw Pact area. Most were ethnic minorities welcomed as citizens elsewhere: ethnic Germans who had the right to enter the Federal Republic, ethnic Greeks going to Greece, or Jews who automatically become citizens according to the Israeli Law of Return. The mass arrival of Soviet Jews in Israel was viewed with alarm by Arabs who feared that one result would be further dispossession of the Palestinians.

The spectre of uncontrolled mass emigration from Eastern Europe became a public issue in the West. Before long, Italy deployed troops to prevent an influx of Albanian asylum-seekers, while Austria used its army to keep out Romanian gypsies. For Western European leaders, the initial euphoria prompted by the destruction of the barriers to movement was quickly succeeded by a nostalgia for the ease of migration control of an earlier epoch.

The disintegration of the USSR led to the creation of a plethora of successor states. Some of the 25 million or so ethnic Russians living outside the Russian Republic suddenly confronted the possibility of losing their citizenship. The crisis in the new Republic of Moldova in April 1992, where Russians fought the desire of the ethnic Romanian majority for unification with Romania, was indicative of things to come. Economic crisis and the potential for inter-ethnic violence attendant on the reshaping of the former Warsaw Bloc area made emigration a preferred option for many. But the great mass of Eastern Europeans did not see the welcome mat rolled out for them. Even in Germany, Greece and Israel, there was resentment over the massive arrival of newcomers from the ex-USSR and Warsaw Bloc states.

a watershed (Martin, 1992: 171). Against the backdrop of the enormous changes associated with the end of the Cold War period, and the groping efforts to inaugurate a 'New World Order', the significance of international migration as a major determinant of global politics was finally coming into focus.

Ethnic diversity, racism and multiculturalism

Regulation of international migration is one of the two central issues arising from the mass population movements of the current epoch. The other is the effects of growing ethnic diversity on the societies of immigration countries. Settlers are often distinct from the receiving populations in various ways: they may come from different types of societies (for example, agrarian-rural rather than urban-industrial) with different traditions, religions and political institutions. They often speak a different language and follow different cultural practices. They may be visibly different, through physical appearance (skin colour, features, hair type and so on) or style of dress. The distinction is often a socioeconomic one: some migrant groups become concentrated in certain types of work (generally of low social status) and live segregated in low-income residential areas. The position of immigrants is sometimes marked by a specific legal status: that of the foreigner or non-citizen. The differences are often summed up in the concepts of 'ethnicity' or 'race', which will be discussed in Chapter 2. Immigration societies are frequently seen as being made up of distinct ethnic groups. In many cases, immigration complicates existing conflicts or divisions in societies with long-standing ethnic minorities.

The social meaning of ethnic diversity depends to a large extent on the significance attached to it by the populations and states of the receiving countries. The classical immigration countries have generally seen immigrants as permanent settlers who were to be assimilated or integrated. However not all potential immigrants have been seen as suitable for assimilation: the USA, Canada and Australia all had policies to keep out non-Europeans and even some categories of Europeans until the 1960s. Countries which emphasised temporary labour recruitment – Western European countries in the 1960s and early 1970s, more recently the Gulf oil states and some of the fast-growing Asian economies – have tried to prevent family reunion and permanent settlement. Despite the emergence of permanent settler populations, such countries have declared themselves not to be countries of immigration, and have denied citizenship and other rights to settlers. Between these two extremes are a wealth of variations, which will be discussed in later chapters.

Culturally distinct settler groups almost always maintain their languages and some elements of their homeland cultures, at least for a

few generations. Where governments have wanted or recognised permanent settlement, there has been a tendency to move from policies of individual assimilation to acceptance of some degree of long-term cultural difference. The result has been granting of minority cultural and political rights, as embodied in the policies of multiculturalism introduced in Canada, Australia and Sweden since the 1970s. Governments which reject the idea of permanent settlement also oppose pluralism, which they see as a threat to national unity and identity. In such cases, immigrants tend to turn into marginalised and discriminated ethnic minorities. In other cases (France, for example), governments may accept the reality of settlement, but demand individual cultural assimilation as the price for granting of rights and citizenship. This can lead to serious contradictions.

Whatever the policies of the governments, the cultural and social changes resulting from immigration may lead to strong reactions from some sections of the population. Immigration has often taken place at the same time as economic restructuring and major changes in political and social structures. Immigration and growing ethnic diversity can appear threatening: people whose conditions of life are already changing in an unpredictable way often see the newcomers as the cause of insecurity. They fear that they are being 'swamped' by forces beyond their control. One of the dominant images in the highly-developed countries today is that of masses of people flowing in from the poor South and the turbulent East, taking away jobs, pushing up housing prices and overloading social services. Migrations and minorities are seen as a danger to living standards, life styles and social cohesion. Extreme-right parties have grown and flourished through anti-immigrant campaigns. Hostility to immigrants and ethnic minorities – whether labelled racism, xenophobia or ethnocentrism – has become a major political issue in most countries of immigration. Racism is a threat, not only to immigrants themselves, but also to democratic institutions and social order. Analysis of the causes and effects of racism must therefore take a central place in any discussion of international migration and its effects on society.

International migration does not always create diversity. Some migrants, such as Britons in Australia or Austrians in Germany, are virtually indistinguishable from the general population. Other

groups, like western Europeans in North America, are quickly assimilated. 'Professional transients', that is highly-skilled personnel who move temporarily within specialised international labour markets, are rarely seen as presenting an integration problem. But these are the exceptions; in most instances, international migration increases diversity within a society. This presents a number of problems for the state. The most obvious is that of shaping social policies so that they meet the needs of the various groups. Social services may have to be planned and delivered in new ways to correspond to different life situations and cultural practices.

More serious is the challenge to national identity presented by growing diversity. The nation-state, as it has developed since the eighteenth century, is premised on the idea of cultural as well as political unity. In many countries, ethnic homogeneity, defined in terms of common language, culture, traditions and history, has been seen as the basis of the nation-state. This unity has often been fictitious – a construction of the ruling elite which claimed to express it – but it has provided powerful national myths. Immigration and ethnic diversity threaten such ideas of the nation, because they create a people without common ethnic origins. The classical countries of immigration have been able to cope with this situation most easily, since absorption of immigrants has been part of their myth of nation building. But countries which place common culture at the heart of their nation-building process (Germany is the most obvious case) have found it very difficult to resolve the contradiction.

One of the central ways in which the link between the people and the state is expressed is through the rules governing citizenship and naturalisation. States which readily grant citizenship to immigrants, without requiring common ethnicity or cultural assimilation, seem most able to cope with ethnic diversity. On the other hand, states which link citizenship to cultural homogeneity tend to have exclusionary policies which marginalise and disadvantage immigrants. This distinction is related to, but not identical with, that between classical immigration countries and labour migration countries, to be discussed in more detail in Chapter 8.

It is one of the central themes of this book that continuing international population movements will increase the ethnic diversity of more and more countries. This has already called into question prevailing notions of the nation-state and citizenship. New approaches are being sought. They seem most likely to develop out

of the multicultural models which are currently evolving in certain countries of immigration. But countries must adapt foreign models to meet their own circumstances and needs. Debates over how best to do so will shape the politics of many countries in coming decades.

Aims and structure of the book

The first goal of this book is to describe and explain contemporary international migration. We set out to show the enormous complexity of the phenomenon, and to communicate both the variations and the common factors in international population movements as they affect more and more parts of the world.

The second goal is to explain how migrant settlement is bringing about increased ethnic diversity in many societies, and how this is related to broader social, cultural and political developments. Understanding these changes is the precondition for political action to deal with problems and conflicts linked to migration and ethnic diversity.

The third goal is to link the two discourses, by showing the complex interaction between migration and growing ethnic diversity. There are large bodies of empirical and theoretical work on both international migration and on ethnic diversity. However the two are often inadequately linked. There is a tendency towards specialisation both in academic circles and among policy-makers. Many of the research institutes which deal with migration are distinct from those concerned with ethnic relations. For instance, the International Sociological Association has separate research committees for 'ethnic, race and minority relations' and for 'sociology of migration'. Similarly many governments have one ministry or agency to deal with immigration, and another to deal with ethnic or race relations.

Immigration and ethnic relations are closely interrelated in a variety of ways. The linkages can best be understood by analysing the migratory process in its totality. It is an ambitious (some would say elusive) undertaking to try to do this on a global level in one short book. Hence accounts of the various migratory movements must inevitably be concise, but a global view of international migration is the precondition for understanding each specific flow. The central aim of this book is therefore to provide an introduction to the subject

of international migration and the emergence of multicultural societies, which will help readers to put more detailed accounts of specific migratory processes in context.

The book is structured as follows: Chapter 2 examines some of the theories and concepts used to explain migration and formation of ethnic minorities, and emphasises the need to study the migratory process as a whole. Chapter 3 describes the history of international migration up to 1945. There is some discussion of the role of migration in the period leading up to the emergence of European nation-states, but the main focus is the migrations brought about by capitalism and colonialism, in the process of creating a world market.

Chapter 4 is concerned with migration to industrial countries since 1945. It shows the patterns of labour migration which developed during the post-war boom and discusses the differences and similarities between permanent, post-colonial and guestworker migration systems. The major changes in migratory patterns after the oil shock of 1973 are examined. Finally the increasing volume and complexity of migrations in the late 1980s and early 1990s are discussed. (Japan, although an industrial country of immigration, is not discussed here because the migratory movement is too new to permit adequate comparison. Instead Japan is discussed in the context of Asian regional migration in Chapter 6.)

Chapter 5 presents studies of the migratory process in two countries which appear at first sight to have had almost diametrically opposed experiences of immigration: Australia and Germany. The aim is to show both parallels and differences, and to discuss the factors which determine them.

Chapter 6 shows how major political, social and economic changes are leading to mass movements from and within specific regions: the Middle East, Eastern Europe, Africa, Latin America and Asia. These areas are major sources of migrants to highly-developed countries, and it is from here that the 'next waves' are likely to come. But, as the chapter shows, movements within these regions are of growing importance, particularly where the emergence of new industrial countries is leading to growing economic and demographic imbalances.

Chapter 7 considers the economic position of immigrants in highly-developed countries, looking at labour market segmentation, the role played by immigrants in economic crisis and why employment of migrants can continue despite high unemployment. The recent

history of foreign worker employment in the French motor construction and building industries is used as an example. Chapter 8 looks at the position of immigrants within the societies of some of the main countries of immigration, examining factors such as legal status, social policy, formation of ethnic communities, racism, citizenship and national identity. It discusses the reasons for the different policies and attitudes in the various countries, as well as their possible consequences.

Chapter 9 examines some of the key political effects of increasing ethnic diversity, looking both at the involvement of minorities in politics and at the way mainstream politics are changing in reaction to migrant settlement. Perspectives for the emergence of multicultural societies are discussed. Chapter 10 sums up the arguments of the book and presents some conclusions on the future of international migration, and what it is likely to mean for individual societies and for the global community as a whole.

2

The Migratory Process and the Formation of Ethnic Minorities

International migration is hardly ever a simple individual action, in which a person decides to move in search of better life-chances, pulls up his or her roots in the place of origin and quickly becomes assimilated in the new country. Much more often migration and settlement is a long-drawn-out process, which will be played out for the rest of the migrant's life, and affect subsequent generations too.¹ It is a collective action, arising out of social change and affecting the whole society in both sending and receiving areas. Moreover the experience of migration and of living in another country often leads to modification of the original plans, so that migrants' intentions at the time of departure are poor predictors of actual behaviour. Similarly no government has ever set out to build an ethnically diverse society through immigration, yet labour recruitment policies often lead to the formation of ethnic minorities, with far-reaching consequences for social relations, public policies, national identity and international relations.

The aim of the chapter is to link two bodies of theory which are often dealt with separately: theories on migration and settlement, and theories on ethnic minorities and their position in society. It will start by looking at the concept of the migratory process, and then go on to examine theories of ethnicity and racism. These will be related to the process of ethnic minority formation, which in turn will be discussed in relation to concepts of nation, state and citizenship. In this

chapter, the theories will be discussed mainly in abstract terms (though with some examples). The discourse provides a framework for understanding the more descriptive accounts of migration, settlement and minority formation in later chapters. However the reader may prefer to read those first and come back to the theory later.

Explaining migration and settlement

There are a variety of theoretical approaches to explaining international migration. One reason for this is that the study of migration cannot be confined to a single social-scientific domain: the explanations offered by geographers, demographers, economists, sociologists and political scientists often derive from different premises and methodologies. Beyond this, though, is a fundamental difference of paradigms between approaches which aim at generalisations based on quantitative analysis from large numbers of individual cases, and more collectivist and institutional approaches, which seek to examine migrations within the historical context of an emerging global economy.

The earliest systematic approaches to migration derive from the nineteenth-century work of the geographer Ravenstein, who advocated the formulation of statistical laws of migration (Ravenstein, 1885 and 1889). These took the form of general statements unconnected with any actual migratory movement and were generally quite ahistorical (Cohen, 1987: 34–5; Zolberg, 1989: 403–5). This tradition remains alive in the work of many demographers, geographers and economists (for example, Jackson, 1969). The 'general theories' advocated in such work emphasise tendencies of people to move from densely to sparsely populated areas, or from low to high-income areas, or link migrations to fluctuations in the business cycle. Such approaches are often known as 'push-pull' theories, because they perceive the causes of migration in a combination of 'push factors', impelling people to leave the areas of origin, and 'pull factors', attracting them to certain receiving countries. 'Push factors' include demographic growth, low living standards, lack of economic opportunities and political repression, while 'pull factors' are demand for labour, availability of land, good economic opportunities and political freedoms.

This type of model is essentially individualistic and ahistorical. It emphasises the individual decision to migrate, based on rational comparison of the relative costs and benefits of remaining in the area of origin or moving to various alternative destinations. Constraining factors, such as government restrictions on emigration or immigration, are either ignored or dealt with as distortions of the rational market, which should be removed. Clearly the model has much in common with neo-classical theories of the labour market, and indeed this approach is currently mainly found in the work of neo-classical economists. For example Borjas (1989 and 1990) puts forward the model of an immigration market:

Neoclassical theory assumes that individuals maximise utility: individuals 'search' for the country of residence that maximises their well-being . . . The search is constrained by the individual's financial resources, by the immigration regulations imposed by competing host countries and by the emigration regulations of the source country. In the immigration market the various pieces of information are exchanged and the various options are compared. In a sense, competing host countries make 'migration offers' from which individuals compare and choose. The information gathered in this marketplace leads many individuals to conclude that it is 'profitable' to remain in their birthplace . . . Conversely, other individuals conclude that they are better off in some other country. The immigration market nonrandomly sorts these individuals across host countries. (Borjas, 1989: 461)

Borjas claims that 'this approach leads to a very clear – and empirically testable – categorisation of the types of immigrant flows that arise in a world where individuals search for the "best" country' (Borjas, 1989: 461). On the basis of this theory, one would expect the most disadvantaged people to move from the poor countries to richer areas. Moreover it would appear that the mere existence of economic disparities between various areas would be sufficient to generate migrant flows. In the long run, such flows should help to equalise wages and conditions in underdeveloped and developed regions, leading towards economic equilibrium.

However, in recent literature, such theories have been criticised as simplistic and incapable of explaining actual movements or predicting future ones (see Sassen, 1988; Portes and Rumbaut, 1990; Boyd, 1989). For instance, empirical study shows that it is rarely the poorest

people from the least-developed countries who move to the richest countries. More frequently the migrants are people of intermediate social status from areas which are undergoing economic and social change. Similarly a push-pull model would predict movements from densely populated areas to more sparsely peopled regions, yet in fact countries of immigration like the Netherlands and Germany are amongst the world's more densely populated. Finally a push-pull model cannot explain why a certain group of migrants goes to one country rather than another, for example, why have most Algerians migrated to France and not Germany, while the opposite applies to Turks?

Many researchers therefore suggest that migratory movements generally arise from the existence of prior links between sending and receiving countries based on colonisation, political influence, trade, investment or cultural ties. Thus migration from Mexico to the USA originated in the southwestward expansion of the USA in the nineteenth century and the deliberate recruitment of Mexican workers by US employers in the twentieth century (Portes and Rumbaut, 1990: 224–30). The migration from the Dominican Republic to the USA was initiated by the US military occupation in the 1960s. Similarly both the Korean and the Vietnamese migrations were the long-term consequence of US military adventures in the countries of origin (Sassen, 1988: 6–9). The migrations from India, Pakistan and Bangladesh to Britain are clearly linked to the British colonial presence on the Indian sub-continent. Similarly Caribbean migrants have tended to move to their respective former colonial power: for example, from Jamaica to Britain, Martinique to France and Surinam to the Netherlands. The Algerian migration to France (and not to Germany) is explained by the French colonial presence in Algeria, while the Turkish presence in Germany is the result of direct labour recruitment by Germany in the 1960s and early 1970s.

This discussion indicates a further problem of 'push-pull' and neo-classical models: they tend to treat the role of the state as an aberration which disrupts the 'normal' functioning of the market (Borjas, for instance, suggests that the US government should 'deregulate the immigration market' by selling visas to the highest bidder: 1990: 225–8). But examination of most historical and contemporary migrations (see Chapters 3, 4, 5 and 6 below) shows that the state almost invariably plays a major role in initiating,

shaping and controlling movements. Although governments of countries of origin play a part in encouraging or restricting migration, it is particularly the governments of potential immigration areas which permit, restrict or prohibit movements. The most common reason to permit entry is the need for workers – with states sometimes taking on the role of labour recruiter on behalf of employers – but demographic or humanitarian considerations may also be important. Immigration as part of nation building has played a major role in new world countries such as the USA, Canada, Argentina, Brazil and Australia. State policies on refugees and asylum-seekers are major determinants of contemporary population movements.

Thus the idea of individual migrants who make free choices which not only 'maximise their well-being' but also 'lead to an equilibrium in the marketplace' (Borjas, 1989: 482) is so far from historical reality that it has little explanatory value. It seems better, as Zolberg suggests, to analyse labour migration 'as a movement of workers propelled by the dynamics of the transnational capitalist economy, which simultaneously determines both the "push" and the "pull"' (Zolberg, 1989: 407). This implies that migrations are collective phenomena, which should be examined as sub-systems of an increasingly global economic and political system.

Fawcett and Arnold argue that migrations can best be understood by using the conceptual framework of a 'migration system', which refers to a set of places linked by flows and counterflows of people. The migration systems approach means examining both ends of the flow, putting a specific flow or destination in the context of other possible flows or destinations, and studying all the linkages between the places concerned: not just movements of people, but also of information, goods, services and ideas. These linkages can be categorised as 'state-to-state relations and comparisons, mass culture connections and family and social networks' (Fawcett and Arnold, 1987: 456–7).

Another way of stating the migrations systems approach is to say that each specific migratory movement can be seen as the result of interacting macro- and micro-structures. Macro-structures refer to large-scale institutional factors, while micro-structures embrace the networks, practices and beliefs of the migrants themselves. This type of analysis presupposes an historical approach based on a concept of global interdependence: 'Immigration, like other international

processes, does not so much take place between compartmentalised nation units as within an overarching system, itself a product of past historical development' (Portes and Böröcz, 1989: 626).

The macro-structures include the political economy of the world market, inter-state relationships, and the laws, structures and practices established by the states of sending and receiving countries to facilitate or to prevent migration and to control settlement. The evolution of production, distribution and exchange over the last five centuries – with a tendency towards ever-greater integration of the world economy – has clearly been a major determinant of migrations (and not merely of labour migration but also of nation-building migrations and refugee flows). The role of international relations and of the states of both sending and receiving areas in organizing or facilitating movements is also significant (Dohse, 1981; Böhning, 1984; Cohen, 1987; Fawcett, 1989; Mitchell, 1989; Manfrass, 1992). Industrial states guard their borders and admit workers or refugees as exceptions, rather than the rule, so 'it is necessary to account for the wall they have erected as well as for the small doors they have provided in it' (Zolberg, 1989: 408).

The micro-structures are the informal networks developed by the migrants themselves, in order to cope with migration and settlement. Earlier literature used the concept of 'chain migration' to refer to such networks (for example, Price, 1963: 108–10). Today many authors emphasise the role of information and 'cultural capital' (knowledge of other countries, capabilities for organising travel, finding work and adapting to a new environment) in starting and sustaining migratory movements. Informal networks include psychological adaptations, personal relationships, family and household patterns, friendship and community ties, and mutual help in economic and social matters. Informal networks bind 'migrants and nonmigrants together in a complex web of social roles and interpersonal relationships' (Boyd, 1989: 639). These bonds are double-sided: they link migrants with non-migrants in their areas of origin, but also connect settlers with the receiving populations in relationships of co-operation, competition and conflict. Such networks can be understood as dynamic cultural responses, which are at the basis of ethnic community formation and the maintenance of family and group ties which transcend national boundaries.

Macro- and micro-structures are linked at all levels with each other. Together they can be examined as facets of an overarching