


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STRATEGIC CRIMINAL JUSTICE PLANNING



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Public Health Service

Alcohol, Drug Abuse, and Mental Health Administration

**CRIME AND DELINQUENCY ISSUES:
A Monograph Series**

**STRATEGIC CRIMINAL
JUSTICE PLANNING**

by
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U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE
Public Health Service
Alcohol, Drug Abuse, and Mental Health Administration

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Center for Studies of Crime and Delinquency
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FOREWORD

Strategic Criminal Justice Planning, The second Crime and Delinquency monography by Dr. Daniel Glaser, joins his *Routinizing Evaluation: Getting Feedback on Effectiveness of Crime and Delinquency Programs* (DHEW Publication No. (ADM) 76-369, 1976) as an important contribution to the improvement of programs in the juvenile and criminal justice systems. While Glaser's monograph on evaluation focused on the design, conduct, and use of impact studies for improving or eliminating programs in the crime and delinquency field, the current monograph considers the various planning processes needed to reach those goals.

In his most recent effort, Dr. Glaser develops a number of important topics. These include the planning process in our modern, highly complex society; the importance of valid information, and the organization of that information within a conceptual-policy oriented framework; the utilization of available data and research findings; and the generation of additional data when needed. These considerations, along with several theoretical orientations to crime, are developed by Dr. Glaser to make specific suggestions about improving planning as a process in the juvenile and criminal justice systems. Moreover, he develops a set of planning propositions and outlines specific programs to provide guidance to planners and policymakers.

As in *Routinizing Evaluation*, we provided the author complete freedom to develop the various issues on the topic of planning. No detailed specifications or outline were set in advance and no substantive changes have been made by the National Institute of Mental Health. The views expressed are those of the author.

SALEEM A. SHAH

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PART I:

Introduction

Chapter 1

PLANNING IN AN AGE OF TENTATIVITY

Criminal justice is a major American industry. It supports millions of people, directly or indirectly, and consumes much public and private wealth. Yet few are very satisfied with the justice system as a whole, and each of its major parts—police, courts, correction, and prevention—evokes many complaints.

Public discontent with the criminal justice system stimulates frequent change. Pressures for change reflect, in part, new developments in society that create new conceptions of crime and delinquency, new dimensions in the behavior previously called crime, and new distributions of political power and influence among persons affected by both crime and criminal justice agencies.

The Federal Government's Law Enforcement Assistance Administration annually disburses hundreds of millions of dollars to expedite improvements in the criminal justice system, and many other Federal, State, and local agencies augment these expenditures. In an effort to bring order to their alterations, organizations in this system increasingly emphasize planning. Federal funding policy requires that each State have a criminal justice planning agency and that it work with regional planning groups within the State. In addition, large police, court, and correctional organizations have their own planning units. Most important for our concerns is a polar duality in approaches to planning.

Tactical Versus Strategic Planning

Most long-established service agencies of government prepare their plans by projecting the past into the future. They compile statistical tables and plot graphs to reveal trends in the volume and type of clientele received and services provided during a preceding decade or two. Estimates of future needs are then made by extending these trends into the next 3, 5, or even 10 years. Personnel and facility requirements for the coming years are thereby assessed, allowing for population migration or other demographic shifts that might affect potential clientele. Current practices and standards of service provide the primary basis for these estimates, although plans usually call for some upgrading of services, thus requiring additional funding. Little more increase is requested than is assumed will be tolerated by budget-reviewing authorities, who customarily demand some cut backs in all plans.

The process previously described often is called "long-range planning," even when it is but an extension, without great methodological innovation, of the 1-or-2 year budget planning that is routine in all government and much business. It is tactical in the sense that it is concerned only with specific and immediately foreseeable contingencies. This procedure rests on confidence that current developments or the recent past are the best predictors of the impending future, an assumption that is often valid. For many decades, organizations with such diverse functions as postal service, highway maintenance, food inspection, and the manufacture of nuts and bolts, as well as police, courts, and correctional agencies, have employed these planning methods.

All such tactical planning is a variation of what Robert N. Anthony calls management control, which he defines as:

. . . the process by which managers assure that resources are obtained and used effectively and efficiently in the accomplishment of the organization's objectives (1966, p. 17).

Such procedures are based on an assumption that the agency's objectives and its resources will not change appreciably. Whenever this assumption is rejected, as it increasingly should be in much of the criminal justice system, management control must be replaced by what Anthony calls strategic planning defined as:

. . . the process of deciding on objectives of the organization, on changes in these objectives, on the resources used to attain these objectives, and on the policies that are to govern the acquisition, use, and disposition of these resources (1966, p. 16).

Tactical planning corresponds closely to what John Friedmann (1973, p. 17) calls "allocative planning," which he describes as concerned with "the distribution of resources among competing users." Strategic planning corresponds to what Friedmann calls "innovative planning," which is concerned with "producing a structural change in a system of social relations." Therefore, strategic or innovative planning must be less inhibited than tactical or allocative planning in contemplating the alteration of long-institutionalized organizational and even societal arrangements. To be effective, however, strategic planning no less than management control requires feedback on effectiveness and close integration of planning and operational leadership and staffs. This implies what Friedmann calls "the transactive style of planning," which emphasizes a continuous dialog among planners, researchers and action specialists, whereby all share in learning through experimental evolution.

Strategic planning is consistent with Bennett's (1973) theme that changing the system can more dramatically affect the crime problem than merely trying to change the offender within the existing system.

Just changing the system, however, does not guarantee progress; research on effectiveness still is needed to permit innovators to respond rationally to negative results as well as to justify their cautious acceptance of success. Progress in crime control probably will occur in periodic leaps of strategic innovation, rather than as a continuous process because, as Kuhn (1962) pointed out, the growth of knowledge occurs more by periodic jumps of reconceptualization than by routine refinements and extensions.

Increasingly in recent years, criminal justice planning by tactical methods misleads all branches of government that depend upon it, as well as the public. For example, the California Board of Corrections in 1964 planned to construct 10 new correctional institutions in the next 10 years—an average of one per year—at a cost exceeding \$90 million in 1964 or much more with the inflation of the decade that followed (Smith 1972, p. 11). This was a logical plan based on the growth of California's population from about 7 million in 1940 to 10 million in 1950 and 16 million in 1960. It took into account the increase of inmates in California Youth Authority institutions from 3,758 on January 1, 1958, to 6,656 by the beginning of 1964. It also reflected the population growth in its prisons for adults from 11,056 at the end of 1950 to 21,660 by the end of 1960, a growth that continued at this approximately thousand-per-year expansion rate during the early sixties. Thus, the construction planning was all very logical. It did not work, however, because the Probation Subsidy Act and other factors produced a sudden spurt in use of probation and local detention during the last half of the sixties, making the proposed State institutions unnecessary. By the early seventies only three of the projected 10 new facilities had been constructed, and these were all or mostly empty much of the time.

One implication of many recent criminal justice developments is that strategic planning cannot be done by any component within the system acting alone. This is evident from the probation subsidy experience, for example, which drastically affected both courts and institutions. It is also evident in police diversion of juveniles from the courts. Another example is in the effort of crime prevention agencies to provide trade training as a condition for pretrial release for those whose poor employment record makes them unable to post bail as well as poor risks for unconditional recognizance. All these practices indicate that changes in police activities will affect courts, that changes in the courts will affect both police and correction, that changes in correction will affect police and courts, and that any effective crime prevention measures will affect all criminal justice agencies.

Because of this interdependence of parts—because, though poorly coordinated, criminal justice is indeed a system—strategic planning is

best done by government agencies that are superordinate to police, courts, corrections, and prevention agencies, though receiving advice and information from all of them. This monograph, therefore, is addressed to those concerned with the totality of criminal justice services in a nation, State, or local community, rather than just with a particular type of justice agency or occupation. Furthermore, since criminal justice systems and even total governments are parts of larger systems that we call societies, this monograph is concerned with linking strategic criminal justice plans to trends in society as a whole.

The primary source of literature for most current training on criminal justice planning appears to be public administration and business writings on the planning process. While much of this training literature calls for strategic rather than tactical thinking about the criminal justice system, its rhetoric is rooted more in popular "futurology" than in rigorous social science; it seldom gets to specifics when exhorting planners to think imaginatively, scientifically and in systems theory terms. This monograph tries to supplement such training literature by showing criminal justice officials more specifically what they can learn for policymaking and strategic planning from the social and behavioral sciences, especially sociology and psychology.

In all industrially advanced nations there have been relatively rapid changes in the definitions of crime and in the reactions of the State to offenses as well as in the public's behavior. Strategic criminal justice planning copes with such developments not just by projecting past trends to estimate future demands for correctional services, but by investigating the causes of these trends and their probable modification with new developments in society. In an age of rapid change, predictions cannot be accurate if they are very specific. What is dependable are not statistical projections of current or past conditions, but generalizations on the scientific principles that explain change and permit us to cope with it realistically.

Strategic planning is not intended to replace tactical planning, but to subordinate tactics to long-term concerns whenever possible. Although specific projections and budget estimations for personnel recruitment and training, contracted services and construction, for example, will be continuing components of tactical planning, strategic plans give them direction. The strategic plans are statements of objectives to be sought and perspectives to be maintained in spite of the immediate pressures and vested interests or habits that dictate tactics too exclusively; expediency rules most readily when no strategic principles are formulated, or when those that are asserted are not grounded in scientific rationales and data. This monograph presents and tries to justify guideline propositions useful in strategic

planning for the criminal justice system of any State, region, or locality of the United States. Of course, this monograph itself is not a plan for any specific jurisdictional area; any such plan will have to be formulated with detailed propositions addressed to the unique history, circumstances, and criminal justice problems of its particular area.

Stages of Strategic Planning

The first stage in strategic criminal justice planning should be to identify the general principles which determine shifts in the definition of crime and the reaction to offenses. As chapter 2 indicates, patterns in the evolution of criminal law are evident that account for changes in both clientele and objectives of police, courts, and corrections. Analysis of these trends is most useful if it goes beyond description to explanation, for only if change is understood rather than just described can there be a solid foundation, hence less guesswork, when anticipating the future.

An understanding of criminal law changes can approach adequacy only if it takes account of developments in the total society, apart from the justice system. Thus an understanding of societal evolution in our time must be the basis for strategic criminal justice planning if it is to be effective in an age when all anticipations of specific crime rates and State practices must be tentative. These changes too are concerns of the next chapter.

The second stage of strategic criminal justice planning is to determine, as rigorously as possible, the causes of the behavior that society designates as criminal. A key aspect of both the first and second stages is the differentiation of offenses and offenders along critical dimensions, so as to identify types that call for variations in planning because of differences in societal reaction to them as well as differences in their causation. Scientific assessment of causal theories requires examination of the empirical evidence that tests these theories. Such assessment will be a concern of the second and third parts of this monograph, each consisting of several chapters and discussing separately four broad types of offender—the adolescent, the violent, the addicted, and the adult property offender.

These types are not set forth as mutually exclusive. When individual persons fit more than one of them, the considerations discussed under more than one of these rubrics may be applicable. Other types could also be differentiated, and indeed, further distinctions are made in analyzing these four, but it is believed that this quartet of broad categories covers the offenders that most concern current criminal justice agencies and are likely to be among their central problems for some decades to come. Evidence of growing attention of criminal justice systems to other types of offender, such

as corporate predators, will also be pointed out, however, especially in chapters 2 and 8.

The focus on demographic trends that distinguishes traditional tactical planning for management control also is relevant to strategic criminal justice planning, but it becomes most useful if guided by sound criminological knowledge. Pertinent statistics do not just project crime and population trends, but relate them together in a manner that furthers or tests causal explanation of crime trends. Such statistical analysis is necessary for effective criminal justice strategies.

The third broad stage in strategic criminal justice planning is to devise policies for the allocation of resources and responsibilities among various agencies, in and out of the justice system, that are optimum for accomplishing three functions with particular types of offender: identification, modification, and prevention. We shall recognize frequently that practices oriented primarily to only one of these functions may also affect the others, and that preferred strategies for accomplishing any of them will vary with subcategories of offense and offender. By identification we refer not only primarily to police and court functions in the determination of guilt, but also to the classification of offenders for correctional purposes. Since, as we shall point out, correctional concerns often shape even the earliest police and court activities in a case, and since both identification and modification policies vary somewhat with the type of offender, the second and third stages of planning are discussed in the sections of this book on specific kinds of criminals.

Any generalizations on criminal justice policy that are true and useful derive their validity from the fact that they are deducible from valid abstract propositions on human psychology and on social relationships. Identifying the grounding of criminal justice policies in more abstract scientific theory facilitates sound revision of plans, perhaps extending them to new subjects or new situations, through understanding the principles on which planned policies have been based rather than applying them in an arbitrary and dogmatic manner. Indeed, all levels of abstractness in knowledge are tested simultaneously and thereby enhanced, only if all levels—from the most abstract general proposition to the most specific statement on a particular case and situation—are conceptually connected so that findings on one level can be interpreted in terms of implications on the other. This broad statement will be illuminated here by relating social and behavioral science theory to the criminal justice policies that concern us.

It should be stressed that in the ongoing activities of many organizations, especially those of the criminal justice system, decisions cannot wait for absolutely certain knowledge. Responses of police,

courts, and correctional agencies to crimes, criminals, victims, and other persons or agencies must instead be made only by whatever seems the soundest judgment available at the moment when action is required. Strategic planners are less pressed for time than operations personnel, but plans also cannot always be deferred until all their details express principles validated by rigorously procured scientific data. Among the distinctive features of strategic policy guidelines such as those in this monograph, however, are the following:

- (a) Each basic proposition summarizing a policy recommendation is accompanied by synopses of the evidence and inference on which it is based.
- (b) The scientific adequacy of this knowledge is indicated.
- (c) Statements also are made on the types of research needed to reduce deficiencies in this knowledge.

This brings us to the final component of the strategic planning process that will be distinguished here.

The fourth stage in strategic criminal justice planning is to provide for steady improvement of planning in the future. This requires procurement of better information for tactical planning as well as sounder ideas and data on which to base strategic plans. Thus, the fourth stage is to plan a knowledge-building apparatus, to try to institutionalize research organizations and procedures for evaluating criminal justice practices, and to deliver feedback on effectiveness to key decisionmakers. This implies that a well-planned criminal justice system is prepared to be self-correcting should its initial plans and policies prove deficient. This fourth stage is the concern of part 4 of this book.

This introduction should also point out that a number of topics appropriate to strategic criminal justice planning are not covered in this monograph, which deals mainly with correction and prevention, although touching on the performance of these functions by police and courts as well as by correctional and other agencies. For example, we discuss procedures for identification of offenders mainly as an aspect of policies for modifying criminal behavior. Yet other aspects of the identification process also are important to the criminal justice system, such as criminalistics (scientific detection and analysis of evidence on crime), as well as efficient and fair court procedures. These are topics that must be left to other writings.

Conclusion

Several works on planning were quoted, and more could be cited (e.g., Mayer 1972; Michael 1973) that set forth conceptions of a type of planning that can be called strategic, as most appropriate in an era of rapid change. Strategic plans are based on broad trend projections, not on numerical forecasts. They produce policy guidelines, not