

THE PERSISTENT PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY

AN INTRODUCTION TO METAPHYSICS
THROUGH THE STUDY OF
MODERN SYSTEMS

BY

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Containing a New Chapter on
Twentieth Century Philosophy

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PREFACE

I MUST admit at the outset that this book is not written to lure students, guiltless of metaphysical aspirations, into pleasant paths of philosophical speculation. It is intended rather for students and readers who are seriously concerned with the problems of philosophy and genuinely anxious to study metaphysics under the guidance of the great thinkers. The book is, none the less, designed for beginners in philosophy, as well as for those more advanced, and I have tried to make it clear in statement and logical in order. I have audaciously attempted to combine, also, what seem to me the essential features of a systematic Introduction to Metaphysics with those of a History of Modern Philosophy. This I have done both because I believe that the problems of philosophy are, at the outset, best studied as formulated in the actual systems of great thinkers, and because the historical sequence of philosophies, from Descartes's to Hegel's, seems to coincide, roughly, with a logical order.

I am well aware that in writing a book which seeks to combine two functions, often distinguished, and which attempts to meet the needs of two groups of students, I have run the risk of fulfilling neither purpose and of helping neither set of readers. I hope, however, that certain features of the book may prove useful; in particular, the plan on which it classifies metaphysical systems, the summaries it offers as well of the arguments as of the conclusions of modern philosophers, the exact quotations and multiplied text references of its expositions. If I have overloaded the book with quotations and references, it is because I have myself suffered greatly from my inability to find in the writings of the philosophers the doctrines attributed to them by the commentators. I shall be much

disappointed if these citations do not whet the appetite of the reader and send him directly to the texts of Descartes, Leibniz, Berkeley, and the rest. I cannot, indeed, too emphatically express my sense of the value of a study of texts, and my conviction that this Introduction, and any other, should be used to supplement and not to supplant a reading of the philosophers. The advanced student will, I trust, be aided in such text study by the relative abundance of bibliographical and critical material. In the main, this has been relegated, with the biographies, to the Appendix of the book, that the continuity of metaphysical discussion may not be broken.

It is only fair to point out, finally, that the book, though mainly exposition and criticism, is written from the standpoint of a metaphysical theory fairly well defined. This I have indicated in my last chapter. My philosophical predilections have inevitably colored my criticisms; but I trust that they have not distorted my interpretation of the thought of the philosophers whom I have considered, and that the book may, therefore, be of service to those who do not agree with its estimates or with its conclusions.

The succeeding chapters disclose the nature and extent of my chief intellectual obligations. But I cannot deny myself the pleasure of acknowledging my personal indebtedness to my first instructor in philosophy, Professor H. N. Gardiner, to my constant counsellor, Professor George H. Palmer, and to the teacher of my more recent student years, Professor Josiah Royce. For generous and invaluable help in the preparation of this book, I am grateful, beyond my power of expression, to my colleague, Professor Mary S. Case, who has read the book in manuscript and has criticised it in detail, to its great advantage; to my father, who has read all the proofs; and to my friend and pupil, Helen G. Hood, who has verified the citations and references of footnotes and Appendix, and has prepared the Index.

MARY WHITON CALKINS.

January, 1907.

PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION

It has been necessary to make ready the second edition of this book at a few days' notice; but I have tried, in spite of haste, to profit by the counsels of my critics. I am under special obligation to Professor Ellen B. Talbot of Mount Holyoke College, for supplementing a published review by written suggestions. The greater number of the changes which I have made affect my discussions of Hume's doctrine of causality and of Kant's doctrine of the categories. I have altered my statement of the concept of causality, in conformity with Rickert's teaching, by distinguishing (pp. 155, 161, 162, *et al.*; 213 *seq.*) between causal and natural law; I have explicitly attributed to Kant (p. 225) the conception of epistemological in addition to that of logical necessity; and I have corrected the passages (pp. 205 *seq.* and 221) in which I had carelessly identified universality and necessity. There may come a later opportunity for more detailed discussion of this whole subject through a section added to the Appendix. None of these changes involve, in my opinion, a revision of my general estimate and interpretation of Kant's teaching. To this estimate, with all respect to the views of my conservatively Kantian critics, I still adhere.

Changes of statement which involve no important alteration of doctrine are the attempt (p. 10) to include Kant, Fichte, and Schelling in my Table of Modern Philosophers; the modified exposition (p. 29) and the reformulated criticism (pp. 48-49) of one of Descartes's arguments; the reference, on p. 111, to Spinoza; the specific assertion (p. 351, footnote) that my interpretation of Schopenhauer diverges from that which is usual; and, finally, the restatement (pp. 408-409)

of the conception of self, and the comparison of this doctrine with that of 'spiritual substance.' I take this opportunity to refer readers, who are interested in the discussion of the nature of the self, to my papers in the *Journal of Philosophy* for January 30 and for February 27, 1908, and in the *Philosophical Review* for May, 1908.

The remaining changes in the body of the book are merely verbal corrections. Additions to the Bibliography are made on pp. 506, 556, and 558. The paging of the first edition is retained.

M. W. C.

February, 1908.

PREFACE TO THE THIRD EDITION

THE present revision of this book has been undertaken primarily in order to relate its conclusions to the more recent of contemporary philosophical writings and, in particular, to refer to the arguments against idealism so loudly urged by the writers who call themselves 'neo-realists.' Advantage has also been taken of the opportunity to amend and to supplement many passages of the book.

In more detail, the important additions are the following: a summary (pp. 42-43) of Descartes's philosophy of nature; a reference (p. 185, note) to modern forms of the Humian doctrine of the self; a statement (pp. 399-400) of W. P. Montague's conception of consciousness as potential energy; a section (pp. 402-404) on contemporary neo-realism; a brief statement (pp. 409-410) of the bearing of the facts of so-called multiple personality on the doctrine of the unity of the self; a summary (p. 420, note) of Russell's argument in opposition to absolutism; an indication (p. 441) of the points of contact between Bergson's conception of time and that of absolutistic personalism;

and additions to the Bibliography (pp. 557-559 *et al.*, and Supplement, pp. 564-566). The principal changes are corrections (pp. 45, 52, 53) of my earlier formulations of Descartes's criterion of certainty and of portions of his arguments for the existence of God; a correction (pp. 62-63) of my former summary of Hobbes's argument for materialism; a restatement, without essential change (pp. 122, 130), of part of Berkeley's argument; a more spiritualistic interpretation (pp. 339-342) of Schelling's identity philosophy; and a re-writing (pp. 429, 449, 451-452) of certain passages in the discussion concerning absolute will and human freedom. Minor changes occur on pages 9, 10, 69, 99, 163, 216, 237, 331, 336, 337, 407, 424, 428, 447, 485, 492, 494, 500, 515 f., 523 note, 525 note, 546, 555 note, 556. Certain sentences and paragraphs of the earlier editions have been omitted, so that the paging is, in the main, undisturbed.

Especial attention is called, in conclusion, to two points of terminology: (1) to the useful, and neglected, distinction between 'qualitatively' and 'numerically' pluralistic or monistic systems, and (2) to the use, throughout the book, of the term 'idealism' in the widest possible sense to mean 'the conception of reality as of the nature of consciousness.' The present-day tendency to identify idealism either with ideism or with subjective idealism is much to be regretted; for there is no other term by which to cover both ideism (the Humian doctrine that reality reduces to momentary states of consciousness) and spiritualism (or personalism), the doctrine that the universe is throughout personal. In this wider use, the term idealism applies not only to ideism and to subjective idealism — the form of spiritualism which teaches that the universe narrows to *my* consciousness — but also to the other forms of spiritualism; to pluralistic spiritualism, the doctrine of Leibniz and Berkeley and Ward, and to absolutistic spir-

itualism, the doctrine of Hegel, of Royce, of Bosanquet, which the last chapter of this book expounds and upholds.

M. W. C.

July, 1912.

PREFACE TO THE FIFTH EDITION

THOUGH the problems of philosophy persist, yet the stress of metaphysical interest falls differently in different periods. The systems of Descartes, Berkeley, Hume, and the rest have not changed, for worse or better, since the first appearance of this book; but its last chapter on "Contemporary Philosophy" has for some time been out-of-date, in spite of conscientious efforts, in successive editions, to rejuvenate it. It has therefore been supplanted, in this fifth edition, by a new chapter with a new title, "Twentieth Century Philosophy," and by new bibliographies to correspond (pages 584 *seq.*). Only a few paragraphs of the original concluding chapter are retained. The only other changes occur on pages 266, 285, 508, 517, and 571.

Warm thanks are due to my friend and former pupil, Edith Orr, for carrying through the intricate and laborious task of making over the Index to conform to this considerable revision.

M. W. C.

February, 1925.

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