

# UNITED STATES PRISON LAW

SENTENCING TO PRISON, PRISON CONDITIONS, AND RELEASE—THE COURT DECISIONS

Selected and with Comments
By

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### PREFACE TO THE SERIES

In the last decade numerous works on prison law have appeared. They devote themselves to analysis, digest, or compilation of court decisions. There is a certain distortion in the emphasis on decisions. The nature of prisons, of sentencing to prisons and release from them, the very existence of prisons, are all the products of legislation.

Why then are not the works on prison law devoted more to legislation? A few works do deal with legislation. The American Bar Association in 1972 published a compendium of Model Correctional Legislation and Standards, drawn from the publications of various organizations. But the legislative history has been so oriented to punishment and institutions, so resistant to the needs of reform, that by default the courts have become the principal avenue for ameliorating the harsh and brutal life of prisons.

This work, too, is devoted to the court decisions. Only occasionally do we point out that a decision, or a group of decisions, carry, either directly or by implication, the message that corrective legislation is needed. We shall discuss the common "hands-off" policy of most courts. The policy is one that allows full play to both administration and the legislatures. Yet there are important exceptions, where legislation is struck down because constitutionally infirm, and many more instances where administration is enjoined or held responsible for injury or abuse. Such instances occur throughout the first and other volumes.

But the true message, stated this once and hardly again, is that the basic reform of prisons must come through the legislatures. Or through administration itself. It is the administrators who, as the instruments of the statutory structure, can make the institutions, or parole, punitive or ameliorative, just as sentencing judges can make their sentences punitive or ameliorative. Numerous instances of appellate courts correcting sentencing judges appear in this volume.

Unfortunately, the almost uniform administrative policy that we see today, well reflected in the decisions, is a policy of imposing obedience on prisoners, uniformity of behavior and lassitude; and, as we shall see in volumes II and III, enforcing such aims by harsh punishments.

Therefore, again, the remedy in the courts predominates; and this, then, is another work on the decisions of the courts governing prisons. What makes this work different from others?

If there is one dominant characteristic in prison law it is that the law is evolving rapidly. Any work on the subject begins to lose its currency the day it is published. A text, digest, or any analysis suffers this loss. There is one remedy, it seems to me, one way to keep the utility of a prison law work for a fair period of time, and it has governed both the selection of cases and the structure of each volume.

With the law in this field evolving as rapidly as it is, it is important, urgent, to select cases and so treat them that the probable issues for the future are clear. While enough material is included to reflect current law, with the leading cases, those most often cited or followed, included, the emphasis is on the trend toward change. In Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 78 S. Ct. 590, 2 L. Ed. 2d 630 (1958), the Supreme Court said that the Eighth Amendment prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment "must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society." An excellent review of prison law published by the South Carolina Department of Corrections in 1972 is entitled The Emerging Rights of the Confined (our emphasis).

The statement from <u>Trop</u> v. <u>Dulles</u> is often quoted, especially by courts that undertake to implement change. It is these decisions that are brought into the volumes, in admitted disproportionate numbers. At least once we use both a lower and upper court opinion, making plain that in our view it is the lower court, that has been reversed, whose view anticipates the future. So also decisions are included for their dissents. It will be a while before those issues are well and uniformly resolved, although I hope—and expect—movement on them will be substantial.

The same endeavor—to prepare a work of enduring value in an evolving field—governs the total structure. Thus, volume I deals with a series of subjects not usually covered under the heading of prison law. Writers, the courts, and administrators, usually pay little heed that a person's basic right is to liberty. I Volume I substantiates that commitments to prison are often reexamined by appellate courts to test the commitment versus liberty, or the duration of the commitment.

Volumes II and III cover the usual content of "prison law"--discipline and due process, cruel and unusual punishment, imposed programs of work and therapy, and rights of prisoners. Most prison law books are guides, not to prisoners' rights, but to the cases that have been handed down dealing with what administrators can or cannot do, in the opinion of the courts. Prisoners' rights go far beyond that. The courts have not gone

1. Rubin, The Law of Criminal Correction, ch. 19§8, "The Law Favors Liberty" (1973).

very far, and therefore what is needed is thinking that goes further than most courts have gone. These volumes attempt to deal with the material to show the newer thinking, and how future law is likely to go.

The separation of cases and comment on them into two volumes that seemingly cover the same or intimately related subjects is a deliberate, almost artificial separation. Volume II covers the powers of administrators under the statutes, with the limited restraints required under statutes and constitutions. The emphasis in volume III is on rights, emerging, evolving, expanding. In general, I anticipate that much of the law in volume II will gradually be replaced by decisions on rights that fit into and fill out the picture of volume III.

Each volume in the series contains approximately fifty decisions—in each case, the full decision, including footnotes (but not headnotes). Few prison law books do this. But there is a special value in the full decisions not obtained in texts or digests. It is not so much the rule of law they state that we wish to convey, but the reasoning (or lack of it, in the hands—off cases) that the court expresses. Thus it is important to include contrasting cases, as is often done.

The grouping of cases in the chapters do not follow the weight and amount of cases handed down by the courts on the various subjects. Thus volume II includes only a sampling of cases on discipline, whereas in practice these cases far outweigh some of the other aspects of prison life. But such things as transfer of prisoners, or work assignments, are more important than is reflected in numbers of cases dealing with them, and the attempt is made to bring forward the importance of such incidents of prison life.

All of the foregoing criteria and trends are reflected in the contents of volume IV, on parole and other release procedures, and volume V, on the law of parolees and other former prisoners under supervision, or after it.

In the final analysis, the total work does convey, via the cases, the law as it is—a necessary base for research; but balanced by the presentation of cases that indicate the newer thinking and the trends toward reform. I trust the series of books, and supplements to follow after the publication of volume V, will be of value to prisoners and those who represent them or who are interested in them; to administrators, guards, and other who work in prisons and who are more concerned than ever with the rapid changes in law governing their powers and responsibilities; to the courts who feel they are saddled with the huge problem of correctional administration, at the center of which is prisons;

and to those whose objective or responsibility is continuing examination with a view to reform.

August, 1974

Sol Rubin

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A cumulative index will appear at the end of the fifth volume in this series.

### CHAPTER 1

## INTRODUCTION: WHEN COMMITMENTS MAY BE QUESTIONED

Prison law does not begin with life in prison, the incidents of imprisonment, and prison programs. It begins with the defendant's main concern-liberty, which need not always await service of the term of the sentence. Commitments may be questioned, and courts may grant a prisoner freedom by a new sentence of probation, suspended sentence or fine, or may reduce the previously fixed term of commitment, either as to its maximum or the term to be served before the prisoner becomes eligible for parole.

We do not address ourselves to the common issues on appeals from convictions, the stages from arrest and accusation, trial and its incidents, at which errors of procedure may result in reversal of convictions. Nor do we deal with illegal sentences, those not authorized by statute. But a correctly conducted process leading to conviction may be followed by a sentence to imprisonment that is subject to examination and revision that may alter the terms of the commitment, or even result in a change from a sentence to imprisonment to a lesser sentence.

The several situations that may give rise to such an examination and alteration of sentence are dealt with in the chapters to follow. But there are a number of general themes that operate more or less in each situation, general principles of law and policy, that are identified in this chapter.

# Appellate Review of Sentences

Appellate courts frequently protest that they do not have the power to review sentences that are not illegal, or that they will not substitute their view of what the sentence might be for that of the sentencing judge. The Supreme Court of the United States is often cited for the "hands-off" policy, but the Supreme Court itself has reviewed sentences, and has on occasion decided what the sentence, different from that of the trial judge, should be, as it did in Yates v. United States, 356 U.S. 363, 78 S. Ct. 766, 2 L. Ed. 837 (1958). It has reversed sentences that were based on faulty information (a subject we deal with in chapter 2)—Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. 736, 68 S. Ct. 1252, 92 L. Ed. 1690 (1948), and United States v. Tucker, 92 S. Ct. 589 (1972).

The federal courts are still in conflict over the issue.