

# AMERICA'S DESTINY

by

*Herman Finer*

NEW YORK

THE MACMILLAN COMPANY

1947

## AMERICA'S DESTINY

The nether sky opens, and Europe is disclosed as a prone and emaciated figure, the Alps shaping like a backbone, and the branching mountain-chains like ribs, the peninsular plateau of Spain forming a head. Broad and lengthy lowlands stretch from the north of France across Russia like a grey-green garment hemmed by the Ural mountains and the glistening Arctic Ocean.

The point of view then sinks downwards through space, and draws near to the surface of the perturbed countries, where the peoples, distressed by events which they did not cause, are seen writhing, crawling, heaving, and vibrating in their various cities and nationalities.

—THOMAS HARDY, *The Dynasts*,  
Part First, Fore Scene, stage direction



THE MACMILLAN COMPANY

NEW YORK • BOSTON • CHICAGO • DALLAS  
ATLANTA • SAN FRANCISCO

MACMILLAN AND CO., LIMITED

LONDON • BOMBAY • CALCUTTA • MADRAS  
MELBOURNE

THE MACMILLAN COMPANY

OF CANADA, LIMITED

TORONTO

## *Preface*

THE WORD "destiny" used in the title of this book is neither a preachment of duty nor the call to a crusade. It simply recognizes the fact that the jigsaw-puzzle fragments of civilization, shaped by thousands of years of history, have been tossed onto the world's table in such a way as to leave an empty space which can be filled by America alone.

It is vain to believe that the responsibilities thus conjured up can be satisfied by occasional gifts or loans of money, however generous. It is also vain to hope that imperative obligations can be met by a glorious and valiant rescue at the moments most threatening to an almost lost democratic cause. No! The Furies of obligation continue to call out, "For the peaceful there is no peace." Security, in short, is not to be had by paying tribute or by acting the knight errant in "the imminent deadly breach." Continuous effort and sense of obligation are the essence of peace because they are the essence of government.

Those who seek peace of mind will lose both peace and mind. For mind is life, and life is not peace when mind is surrendered; it is not peace that comes, but enslavement to the mind of another. If mind is valued, then it is best served by striving, striving which includes the persistent struggle for peace.

It is possible to have peace if life is extinguished or the mind is drugged. But while there is life there is power, for every individual is a mass of explosive energy, with physical power, spiritual value, and moral force. Power politics begins with the individual, and while he remains as he is, power politics must continue. It will be less of a moral struggle if he decides to abdicate rather than contribute his mind, conscience, and substance to the effort. It is of no use to blame the Secretary of State, the Foreign Secretary, the Commissar for Foreign Affairs for a harsh world! They merely transmit the power that emanates from the people. They would be broken if they failed to transmit it. As soon as the in-

dividuals that form the nations stop giving their secretaries of state and other representatives the impression that this is how they want the world conducted, these gentlemen will be able to satisfy their oft reiterated longing to retire from arduous and nasty duties. A continuing duty, then, lies with the people of whom the secretaries are merely the anxious agents. Some exception may be made for nations governed by despotic power.

Juvenal declared, "The motto, '*Know thyself!*' was sent down from Heaven." This observation was nothing but a Latin and Greek paraphrase of a later dictum: "Don't kid yourself that you are not to blame for contributory negligence!"

*Copyright, 1947, by*  
**HERMAN FINER.**

---

All rights reserved—no part of this book  
may be reproduced in any form without  
permission in writing from the publisher,  
except by a reviewer who wishes to quote brief  
passages in connection with a review written  
for inclusion in magazine or newspaper.

---

First Printing.

---

**PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA**

## *Contents*

CHAPTER	PAGE
I. NO TIME FOR PEACE OF MIND	1
II. PEACE, JUSTICE, AND SECURITY	31
III. WORLD GOVERNMENT AND WAR'S CAUSES	43
IV. PROMISES MUST BE KEPT BETWEEN NATIONS	75
V. NATIONALISM, NOT SOVEREIGNTY, THE ENEMY	96
VI. THE ATOM BOMB: NO WILL, NO WAY	133
VII. THE TROUBLES OF THE THREE: GREAT BRITAIN ENTANGLED	172
VIII. THE SOVIET DESPOTISM IN RUSSIA	219
IX. THE SOVIET MINORITY IN THE WORLD	254
X. PERSUASION OR FORCE?	294
XI. FACE TO FACE WITH DUTY	323
XII. DESTINY FOLLOWS POWER	367
INDEX	403

## CHAPTER I

### *No Time for Peace of Mind*

---

FURY:

The good want power, but to weep barren tears.  
The powerful goodness want: worse need for them.  
The wise want love; and those who love want wisdom;  
And all best things are thus confused to ill.  
Many are strong and rich, and would be just,  
But live among their suffering fellow-men  
As if none felt: they know not what they do.

PROMETHEUS:

Thy words are like a cloud of winged snakes;  
And yet I pity those they torture not.

—SHELLEY, *Prometheus Unbound*, Act I.

THE PEACE of the world is not in our time to be won by peace of mind. No moral narcotics will banish war. Just the contrary. For an unappeasable anxiety haunts the world. Men seem to question whether the First World War did or could possibly close the era of wars. It is held by some that the "war to end war" may actually have opened the way to more wars.

The world cries out for a constitution: mankind is convulsed in its quest of a livable constitution. The United Nations Organization is one attempt at such. On all sides, better ones are being invented. Indeed, the path to peace is strewn with the remnants of ineffective ingenuity. Yet, unmistakably those who draft world constitutions are tormented by their inability to agree, even though they have had the best education of our age, and even when they happen to be citizens of the same nation.

What torments them? This, that among friends a constitution is unnecessary; but where moral dissension prevails, the promise

of good behavior cannot be sincerely given, fully believed, un equivocally expressed, or faithfully observed. Where nations lack assurance, they are full of fear. Fear breeds preparation for self-defense; and self-defense dry-rots promises into deposits of suspicion. That, broadly, is the relationship between the nations today, though among some of them—for example, the United States, Great Britain, Canada, France, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Norway and Sweden—a sufficient like-mindedness exists to support the presumption of fair dealing and peace without even a verbal pledge.

Men are not the pilgrims of a single and uniform wish, but creatures of intense and contending appetites. They declare, most fervently, their desire for peace. The end of World War II was to see its advent. Yet, proceedings in the United Nations Security Council provide no full confidence. Indeed, world affairs are being conducted at two levels simultaneously by the same men. On the first, the assumption is that the United Nations alone can secure peace. This is the outward pose of all foreign departments. It is unavoidable, because otherwise immediate war preparations should be undertaken. But another attitude is also manifest. Some insist that real dangers to peace are involved in not forthrightly admitting the vanity of hopes in the United Nations. Without candor, the mind and spirit of men, they argue, will not be raised adequately to bear the burdens of a coming war, or the force required to deter aggression, or the sacrifices required to avert it. This approach, also, is unavoidable.

For the truth is that in spite of the defeat of the Nazis, the Fascists, and Japanese militarists, and in spite of so many sincerely contrived schemes of postwar reconstruction, numerous anxieties still bedevil the world.

#### CAUSES FOR ANXIETY

(1) The world is not divisible, physically, economically, or morally, into regions entirely separate from one another.

(2) The many nations are on extremely different levels of culture, government, and wealth, which provoke warlike tensions.

(3) Weapons of mass destruction exist and are being improved; and the atomic bomb, although chief, is only one of these.

(4) War has become total in its conduct.

(5) The United Nations is riven by hostility stemming from deep moral dissensions.

(6) After the experience of the League of Nations there no longer prevails a romantic confidence that peace is easy to secure.

(7) Finally, perhaps, the greatest power in the world, the United States of America, is not altogether ready for the task that falls to her to fulfill if the world is to be not only at peace, but contented. No one pines for the peace of the graveyard.

(8) Romantic belief in international institutions has declined. A brief explanation of these anxieties is proper here.

#### THE INSEPARABILITY OF NATIONS

If regions could be physically severed from one another, with so massive and impermeable a defense line or chasm as to be completely invasion-proof, then each region might peacefully bask in its own "way of life." However keen the pain its manners, morals, religion, color, or race might give to sensitive souls in the rest of the world, severance would mean peace. But this is impossible.

In the best attempt yet made to delimit regions, Walter Lippmann, in *U.S. War Aims*, sees three communities. Of these, the Atlantic Community includes the United States, Great Britain and the British Commonwealth, France, Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Spain, Portugal, Italy, Greece, Switzerland, Central and South America, and the various bases (Iceland, Greenland, etc.). In it, after a time, Germany would be included. A second community is the Russian Orbit; that is, Russia west to the German frontier, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Finland, Rumania, Belgium, Yugoslavia, Hungary and Austria, and east to Vladivostok. The third community is the Chinese Orbit (presumably including Japan), southward to the borders of India, Burma, Thailand, Indo-China. In the course of time there would be other regions, for example, emergent Asia. Peace might be organized within each of these regions, and between them.

Mr. Lippmann, wisely, never forgets the physical contact of the regions. He very strongly stresses the moral interpenetration, and draws some firm conclusions regarding the Soviet Union's obligations to avert an intercommunity war.

Yet, the present anxiety is still the necessary continued strategic and economic interpenetration of these communities. (In the very long run, this may be salvation.) Each has "vital interests" in the areas of the others, especially so in a world where each nation is a law to itself, not beneath the rule of a common superior. For, so long as the communities are not physically disjoined and invulnerable, no one of them can deny its interest in extending its reach like a boxer, and getting under the guard of another community. This process of getting under one another's guard can be seen operating in the Middle East, in the struggle over Japan, northern China, and Manchuria, in the establishment of the Outer Mongolia People's Republic, in the conflict over Greece, in Bulgarian demands for a Mediterranean port, in American interests in Iceland, Greenland, and Spitzbergen and the Azores, in the tension between the western powers and the Soviet government over "the freedom of the Danube," the dispute over the status of the Dardanelles, and the ever poignant situation of the Kingdom of Iran, and the Soviet Union's veto of the otherwise overwhelming vote of the Security Council (March 25, 1947) that Albania must have had knowledge of the mining of Adriatic waters, causing the loss of two British destroyers and forty-four seamen.

Regions are not separable, because no wall is high enough to resist artillery, atomic bombs, airplanes, rocket weapons; no trench deep enough to prevent armies from moving in. Nor is the sea a barrier. D-Day in Europe decisively destroyed the vaunted immunity of areas hitherto protected by the sea. In the west, Germany threatens to step on the heart of France; in the east, the heart of Russia. For the Soviet government, Greece and Trieste are beach heads held by enemies, and the Dardanelles is a waterway leading to the very soft underbelly of Rumania and the Ukraine. The direct route to China from the United States is across Russia. And everywhere the connections are legion. The world cannot be torn apart: yet, the seventy nations are separate.

The common truth that the maximum economic welfare can be obtained only by the world-wide division of labor and skill and free exchange, is not the most significant sense of the dictum that nations are economically interdependent. Much graver is the truth that the "way of life" of nations, their culture and happi-

ness, have come to depend on, even in important respects to be, their economic well-being. Not one of them will lightly surrender a claim to some resource or commodity which happens to lie within or contiguous to the territory of another nation. Every addition to a nation's economic strength is a support of its "way of life." It has an interest in continued access to that commodity, and often in depriving others of approach thereto lest their strength for a possible war be increased.

Nations are not isolable as nations; nor, when they are grouped in communities, are the communities separable. Regionalism has no point if the regions are not different in culture and morality; if they are, conflict threatens. For they cannot leave the physical planet. Their fates are physically joined even at tangential points: a tangent is enough to cause war, for the point gets under the skin.

The moral or cultural factor prevents insulation. Many people in all countries, democratic or dictatorial, are politically deaf, dumb, and blind: perhaps they can smell. Their appetites, as Plato might have ventured, are so swinish that the interest of the community is of no concern to them, certainly of no sacrificial concern; their horizon is the pungent rim of the trough. Yet, a large and influential number respond with keen emotion to moral questions raised anywhere: Tsarist oppression and pogroms, Turkish atrocities against the Armenians, the invasion of Belgium in 1914, the Matteotti Affair, Hitler's infamies, lynchings in the United States, British internment camps in the Boer War, and Soviet oppression of the Russian people since 1918.

Democracies, in particular, cannot practice moral isolation: a democracy without the cultivation of charity, justice, and nobility in its citizens is a land of logrollers, and nothing more. These virtues are indispensable to the just solution of its problems at home, to self-control in the day of distress, and survival in war. A nation is not founded on material utility alone; it cannot flourish without the avowal of obligation. Hence, it cannot be indifferent to what occurs abroad; and so long as it is free at least some of its citizens will be passionate. But moral events and ideas, above all, are not divisible by national lines. Distance from the place of occurrence, so long as discovery and communication are possible, cannot abolish feeling and protest or approval. For some people, at all events, the moral law does not evaporate at

the frontier. Injustices in some countries could not and ought not be met by complacency elsewhere.

The most remarkable quality of mankind, from the dawn of history to our own time, is not what William James called "the rooted bellicosity of human nature." For men do not *fight* without purpose. Their most distinguishing propensity, at once terrible and sublime, is that they become excited, impassioned, inflamed, about *moral* questions, to a point where mere striving sharpens to fighting and killing for their solution. The moral attitude and emotions of men may range all the distance from the trivial values and exigencies of personal pride or jealousy or material goods, to the most elevated of ethical standards and the sublimest of religious creeds.

While any man lives he is a greater or a smaller power, but a power he is. For every man disposes in some measure of physical strength, brains, purpose, and passions, the four constituents of power. All "power politics" emanates in the end from the individual. For the individual is a nucleus of explosive force, of striving, bursting energies, whether he seeks to grow or merely to preserve, whether he is rampant to expand or concerned only to defend. He cannot abdicate power altogether: he ceases to be a force only when he is dead. That is one kind of peace. Only with death can politics cease or power evaporate: only with the satisfaction or decease of his moral spirit can the individual's struggle with and against others, and at the extreme, killing, be abated or ended.

Yet, dotted everywhere,  
Ironic points of light  
Flash out wherever the Just  
Exchange their messages . . .

Neither physical, nor economic, nor moral isolation is possible. The world is laced together. Sooner or later it vomits forth, because it cannot help itself, any markedly foreign national body.

#### DIVERSITIES OF CULTURE

It would be less dangerous for peace if, the world being physically and morally one network, the nations were on the same or approximately similar levels of culture, government, and wealth. But after many centuries of nearly isolated growth they

incarnate vastly different levels of "civilization," however much they may have in common. Arriving on the world stage at the same point of time, with the most diverse loyalties, ideas, and strengths, they have become inextricably mixed up. All seek justice, in a world where their respective claims on one another are extremely divergent: territory, independence, immunity from subversive doctrines, protection, economic assistance, freedom and assurance of transit, respect for their ideas and government. To level the dissimilar mounds produced in four hundred years, in four, or in forty is to ask the impossible and wish the undesirable.

#### WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

Weapons have become drastically fatal. The merciful will rejoice that in World War II some areas escaped violence. As a teacher of duty to a world community, equal and heavy direct damage would have been salutary. The veterans cannot tell all; if they did they would not be believed: tales are no substitute for suffering. But a reminder is always necessary. The old, relatively easy-going conduct of domestic and foreign policies, with the assumption of a risk of war, has suffered a dreadful shock. The new weapons intensify and bring fears to a frenzy, spur on the new weapons and defensive tactics, and so, paradoxically, provoke thoughts of war in order to avert its consequences if it came as a hazard. "Preventive war" is discussed more seriously than in 1936, when Hitler reoccupied the Rhineland. At the minimum, there is an end to tranquillity, or, as the United Nations Charter has it, "security." In concentrating on the atom bomb, the scourge of biological war is not ignored.<sup>1</sup>

On August 5, 1946, an atomic bomb was dropped at Hiroshima, and two days later, another at Nagasaki—the first use of the *split nuclei* of uranium as a destructive force.

The destruction and loss of life were beyond the imagining of those who had hitherto used bombs from planes in warfare, even in the latter years of World War II. The devastation was so great that figures rather stupefy than vivify the imagination.

---

<sup>1</sup> Cf. survey of bacterial warfare by Theodore Roseburg and E. A. Kabat in *Journal of Immunology* (New York), May, 1947.

The atomic bomb will unite the world—whether by force or by persuasion, is as yet obscure.

At Hiroshima the dropping of one single atomic bomb by one airplane crew, on one mission alone, resulted in 70,000 to 120,000 killed or missing, and 75,000 to 200,000 injured; that is, in casualties to half the city. Almost everything within a radius of about one and one half miles was burned as well as blasted. Up to two miles from the detonation everything was blasted, with some damage from burning. In the third mile, everything was half destroyed. Beyond the three-mile radius, damage was minor. Twenty masonry and steel structures remained standing in the city's center, but they all were gutted and their windows blown out. Most bridges remained intact, except for the handrails and sidewalks. The area of total destruction was twelve square miles; the area of destruction and substantial damage, twenty-seven square miles.

This one bomb made 16,000 casualties among the 20,000 army personnel; and of the 9,000 at headquarters only 2,000 survived.

At Nagasaki a more powerful bomb was used; owing to the shape of the city, this one stroke brought only 40,000 to 50,000 dead and missing, and 40,000 injured. The industrial section was the target; the residential section, therefore, escaped lightly.

Great fires swept these cities. Radioactive dust caused hideous internal illnesses, sometimes leading to horrible death. Radium burns and blotches and exudations of blood through the skin afflicted many people. The blood-forming tissue in the bone marrow was affected by radiation, the white defensive corpuscles of the blood disappeared, and infections set in.

Up to two thousand feet away from the explosion in Nagasaki, nine-inch concrete walls were destroyed; and four thousand feet away, brick smokestacks with eight-inch walls were displaced, cracked, and overturned. The length of the burning area was three miles; its widest part, six thousand feet. Professor Oppenheimer asserts that if there had been ten miles to take out of Nagasaki, the bomb used there would have done it, and more.

Those who, in a lesser blow, might have assisted the wounded and fought the fires, could not do so at Hiroshima, and were only rather better off in Nagasaki: they or their apparatus and supplies were destroyed. At Hiroshima twenty-seven out of thirty-three fire stations were wrecked; three out of every four fire

fighters were killed or severely injured. Hospital staffs were killed or wounded, from the top men down. Of 298 doctors only 30 could be of help. Of 2,400 staff nurses only 600 could come to the rescue. The power stations, the railroads, the streetcars, telephone and telegraph exchanges, were destroyed. Only one hospital out of seven escaped severe damage. The people on the outskirts could not bring aid to the stricken, for their leaders, their equipment, their organization and buildings were destroyed.

No warning was given as there used to be, when whole flights of planes were needed to wreak any substantial damage on a city. The swiftness, the compactness, the size of the injury from one bomb, and one plane, are crushing.

A bomb can be vastly improved, and every effort continues to do better. Professor M. L. E. Oliphant, the British scientist, writes in *Nature* that, whereas the Hiroshima bomb was equal to 20,000 tons of TNT (the wickedest explosive till then invented), the future bomb may well be from fifty to a hundred times that force! Already a forty-pound atom bomb is as superior in explosive and destructive force to a forty-pound ordinary bomb, as a one-ton block buster is to gunpowder the size of a five-grain aspirin tablet.

Even with the bomb as it is, a city can be made almost to disappear in the fraction of a second, with anything up to ten bombs, according to the shape and size of the city. Its walls will dissolve into dust and smoke; human bodies, disintegrate. The heat that rages for a split second at the point of explosion is about 10,000,000° Centigrade; yet 100° Centigrade is enough to scald, and 800° to cremate. A hurricane of fire and air rushes upon and through the city.

All the cities of the greatest nation on earth can be wiped out in one single attack by, say, five hundred bombs (two hundred and fifty would be enough). Carried by five hundred planes with, let us say, a thousand others to decoy the defenders, they could kill some fifty million people, and put the rest out of any inclination or capacity to fight. All this in a few minutes. This is roughly the number Major General L. R. Groves calculates might be killed in the first surprise attack on the United States—a third of the population. *In crowded Britain, this number constitutes the whole population.*

One B-29 airplane, with one bomb, one crew only, on one

mission, can do as much destruction as hitherto required by five hundred bombers. If the atomic bomb, instead of the TNT, were used, all the wear and tear, the expense, and the loss of crews would be saved.

No more for Britain, after such an attack, the lion's roar, "We shall go on to the end . . . we shall never surrender." The time for such valor will never be past. But the atomic bomb allows no time for *growth* of confidence or power. It expunges "we shall" where "shall" is a verb of futurity: the beginning is the end.

The U.S.S.R.—as a state, not as a nation—could be destroyed, if attacked with 1,000 properly placed bombs, in spite of her vast spaces; for the centers of Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev, Kursk, Dneprostroi, Odessa, Baku, Batum, Magnitogorsk and the Ural mines and factories, Archangel, Petsamo, Tallinn, and more, would be dust.

*A nation is subordinated not so much by the pulverization of its armed forces, as by the destruction of the state; that is, the organized will and integrating leadership of the community. That was the point of Hitler's blitz tactics. The new lightning not only lacerates but inflicts internal injuries on the state structure. For it can replace organized resolution by the panic and paralysis of overwhelming terror.*

The atomic bomb is far cheaper than the most effective weapons now used. It cost the United States Government about ten dollars to deliver each pound of high explosive to the enemy target. Granted steady production, an atomic bomb costs \$1,000,000; the cost of the flight of the bombing plane and of weather and reconnaissance planes, \$240,000. For this total, an average (Hiroshima and Nagasaki) of 2.4 square miles is destroyed per bomb, or \$500,000 per square mile. This is one-sixth the cost of comparable bombing in World War II.

Another kind of comparison ought to be made.<sup>2</sup> To kill 305,000 and injure 780,000 in Germany, the American and British air forces dropped nearly 3,000,000 short tons of bombs in nearly 1,500,000 bomber sorties, together losing in action 160,000 men and 40,000 planes. The losses to Germany, including destruction or heavy damage to one-fifth of all dwelling units, utilities, and factories, took some four *years* to inflict. Such losses could be in-

---

<sup>2</sup> Figures from U.S. *Strategic Bombing Survey*, 1946.