中國文化与文明

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Translated by Edmund Ryden

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

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The Culture & Civilization of China

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Translator's Preface

As I came to the end of my doctoral studies at the School of Oriental and African Studies in London, Dr. Sarah Allan asked me to consider translating the present work for Yale University Press. I had in fact bought a copy myself the previous year, 1993, while cycling past the Publishing House of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in Beijing. I little realized that this slim volume of 248 pages would become my companion for the next few years.

In the early spring of 1995 Yale arranged for me to spend six weeks in Beijing working with Professor Zhang. I met him in his apartment, crowded with books, and discussed with him how I would set about translating the book. Two points in particular deserve mention. The order of the 64 concepts as laid out in the original would not make much sense to a Western reader, so, while retaining the broad categories of the original, I rearranged the concepts so as to give a better idea of how they fitted together. Professor Zhang not only gave his blessing but also expressed his thanks. The second point I noticed was that in places the text betrayed signs of Marxist jargon. This was not consistently employed throughout, and I felt uncomfortable with it. Professor Zhang explained that in the early years he was obliged to put this in, but since the political climate had improved he was no longer under such an obligation. Hence he authorized me to remove it.

My greatest task for the first few months was to check every single quotation in reliable editions. This was necessary for a twofold reason. First, a Western reader would expect to find detailed footnotes and references and, second, the original text was marred by poor proofreading. Indeed, the work of checking was to go on for several years, and some passages still elude me.

The actual work of translating was begun in London and helped along by a winter stay at the Australian National University thanks to the kindness of Professor Bill Jenner and the hospitality of Dr. John Eddy, S. J. It was completed in Taibei and the first draft was sent to Professor Zhang in early 1996. I saw him again, briefly, that year to finalize a few points.

Changes made in the course of translation fall into three categories.

First, as mentioned above, occasionally comments by the author were omitted. Second, passages were rearranged. The Chinese custom is to place quotations first and then provide the analysis, whereas the Western reader may need a little introduction before being faced with the text as such. This meant placing the comments before the quotations. Third, comments were added. These were of three kinds: those necessary to ensure the flow of a paragraph, those which provided information that the Western reader would need, such as dates and basic biographical information, and some essential comments of a text-critical nature.

In 1996 Professor Allan suggested that I add an introductory paragraph to each section. This may have been the place to give a full summary of Western scholarship and a translation of each term. That would have entailed a new book, however, so the introductions have been kept brief. With the introductory paragraphs in place, I revised the text, making a final check for passages as yet unlocated. I hope that the book serves as a useful guide to the Chinese text, which is the norm to which the reader should refer.

In the course of my work I have become acquainted with a broad range of Chinese philosophical texts. Professor Zhang's ability to cite some obscure phrase from the vast corpus of Zhu Xi or to pull out an important but rare piece by Ouyang Jian is something that deserves admiration. Indeed, this is the work's real value. It is a gateway to the whole field of Chinese philosophy. Lately there has been a tendency for historians of Chinese philosophy to establish a neat system of concepts and categories. It may look good on paper, but, as Professor Zhang himself indicated to me, it is too arbitrary. Awareness of the broad spectrum of Chinese philosophy and its lack of "system" is not a defect but a sign that the philosophical culture of a nation cannot be consigned to the pigeon holes of a modern author. It is this sense of history and of the texts that have emerged in history that gives Professor Zhang's work its own special trait.

It would be wrong, then, to expect to find here a complete treatise on Chinese philosophy or a compendium of the essence of Chinese philosophy. Rather, what the reader will find are the salient comments of key thinkers concerning the important concepts of Chinese philosophy. Of course, what counts as an important concept is a matter of personal judgement, as Professor Zhang admits in the conclusion of his preface. In this

regard, perhaps the most obvious omission is the concept of *li*, the rites or ritual. "It is not a philosophical term," Professor Zhang assured me, with a wry smile. He is, after all, a man of his time, the brother of Zhang Shenfu, Bertrand Russell's admirer, and of the New China. Confucius is not his idol. Professor Chen Kuying suggested that Zhang Dainian be considered as the founder of New Daoism, but, when I put this to Professor Zhang in 1996, he replied that that title should go to Chen.

In fact, Zhang Dainian has contributed in a seminal way to the school of *qi*, sometimes translated rather awkwardly as "Materialism." He sees himself as standing in line with a tradition found in the *Guanzi* and exemplified in Zhang Zai, Wang Fuzhi, and Dai Zhen, whom he loves to quote. Dai Zhen, in particular, serves as a role model. Dai devoted himself to exegesis and saw his philosophical work as exegetical, bringing out the true meaning of ancient texts. At the same time he had a perspective on the wholeness of the human person, which he held in contrast to what he saw as Zhu Xi's division of man into a rational part devoted to "principle" and an unruly part dominated by passions. Dai Zhen argued that principle lay in the passions, that a human being fully alive need not exclude essential parts of his nature. Principle is in *qi* and *qi* is not without principle. Zhang Dainian's choice of texts, although trying to be a faithful mirror of history, is nonetheless marked by this same orientation. There is no unbiased history, yet the historian's work can be considered valuable inasmuch as it gives a new angle from which to view the past. This is something Zhang Dainian has succeeded in doing and for which he deserves every credit. If I may count myself among his students, it would be a great honor.

Edmund Ryden

Preface

During thirty years spent in the study of the history of Chinese philosophy, I have paid particular attention to analyzing and investigating the significance of the concepts and categories of classical Chinese philosophy. In 1935 I wrote *Zhongguo Zhexue Dagang* and approached the development of Chinese philosophy from the point of view of the philosophical problems raised. In so doing a preliminary sketch of fundamental categories and concepts was undertaken. Yet the emphasis was placed on the system of philosophical questions without concentrating on the concepts and categories as such. My 1955 essay *Zhongguo Gudian Zhexue zhong Ruogan Jiben Gainian Qiyuan yu Yanbian* only touched on some categories. More than twenty years were to pass before, at the Party Congress in 1978, scholars won a second spiritual liberation. It was then that I decided to write a book specifically dealing with the concepts and categories of Chinese philosophy. In 1981 I wrote the articles on Heaven, the Way, *Qi*, and Principle but, owing to other duties, I was unable to devote all my effort to the task. In 1983 I had to spend a lot of time editing the entry on Chinese philosophy for the philosophy section of the Chinese Encyclopaedia (*Zhongguo Da Baike Quanshu*). In 1985, at the instigation of a number of colleagues, I wrote *Zhongguo Lunli Sixiang Yanjiu*, while at the same time I was often asked to write many shorter articles. Thus my work on the concepts and categories was pushed aside. The years slipped by until in the summer of 1987 I decided to complete my draft. In fact, other things intervened, so it was not until the end of November that the book was by and large completed. I had never before been so remiss in my work.

'Concept' (*gainian*) and 'category' (*fanchou*) are both translations of Western terms. In the pre-Qin era thinkers spoke of 'names' (*ming*); after the Song dynasty the term was 'term' (*zi*). Chen Liang of the Southern Song (1127–1279) wrote *The Meaning of Terms* (*Zi Yi*), and Dai Zhen in the Qing dynasty (1644–1911) wrote *An Evidential Study of the Meaning of Terms in the* Book of Mencius (*Mengzi Zi Yi Shuzheng*). In both of these works the word 'term' (*zi*) means 'concept' or 'category.' 'Name' and 'term' are both based on grammatical function, whereas 'concept' and 'category' refer to the content of the terms. The Chinese term for 'cate-

gory' (*fanchou*) comes from the *Classic of History*, which talks about the "Great Plan (*fan*) and Nine fields (*chou*)," which refers to the nine kinds of basic principles. This use is rather like the Western use of the term 'category.' In the history of Western philosophy since the time of Aristotle, each school of thought has had its own understanding of the categories. Even today scholars continue to give new interpretations. In brief, 'concepts' express the kinds of ideas, and 'categories' are universal concepts, which express the fundamental kinds of ideas.

Classical Chinese philosophical concepts and categories can be divided into three major kinds: the first are those of natural philosophy, the second those of anthropology, and the third those of epistemology. In traditional terms, the first are the names associated with the Way of heaven, the second the Way of man, and the third the method of study. These three kinds are all interconnected. Some of those that are in the Way of man could equally well be put in the method of study, for instance, but in order to make the exposition clearer, distinctions have to be made.

The concepts and categories of classical Chinese philosophy cover a very broad spectrum. Here the emphasis will be placed on those whose meaning is deeper and more difficult to grasp or whose range of different meanings is greater. As for those that are less meaningful or easier to understand, they will not be discussed. There are also a certain number of terms that appear in the Ming-Qing period (1368–1911) and are now in common use but were rare in philosophical works prior to 1368, such as 'relationship' (*guanxi*). Despite its being an important category, it will not be discussed here because it is not a fundamental concept in classical Chinese philosophy.*

Philosophical concepts and categories all go through a process of emergence, development, diversification, and synthesis. Different thinkers

*Author's note: The term *guanxi* first appears in works of the Ming era, such as *Jottings from the Pea Garden* (*Shu Yuan Za Ji*) by Lu Rong (1436–1494), *juan* 9: "The Commissioner of the Office of Transmission, in acting as spokesman for the King's command, is like the throat and tongue of the court. He proclaims to the people below and thus makes the court clear and manifest, and so this relationship [*guanxi*] with the body politic is the most important." *Juan* 10 of the *Great and Full Explanation on Reading the Four Books* (*Du Sishu Daquan Shuo*) by Wang Fuzhi (1619–1692) reads, "Except for this it was a matter of great relevance [*guanxi*], as Confucius' not attaining to an official job, one may suppose that the *qi* was not forthcoming and fate had not determined it." There have been those who have claimed that *guanxi* is a foreign term. This is incorrect.

and schools have differing interpretations of the same category. Philosophers of rival schools rarely have an unbiased view of the concepts and categories of their opponents. This raises an important question: Is it possible for human beings to communicate with each other? Can the past and present speak to each other? It is not possible here to give a complete answer to this problem. I now believe that, to a certain extent, people can communicate with each other. To a certain extent the past and future can speak to each other. If communication were impossible, then society itself would not be possible. If the past could not speak to the present, then human history would be incomprehensible. The very existence of society is proof enough that human beings can communicate with each other. The existence of historical research is ample evidence to demonstrate that the past can speak to the present. The historian Sima Qian said, "Delighting in study, entering deeply into thought; this is something of which the mind knows the meaning." I believe that this is a pointer to research in the history of philosophy. Dispassionate seeking for the truth is possible.

This book is devoted to the study of the concepts and categories of Chinese thought. The origins of Chinese culture lie far back. Even before the oracle bones (c. 1350–1100 B.C.) there was a long history. Yet the oracle bones predate the emergence of philosophy. They mark what could be called a philosophical "prehistory." Some words of those early times are related to later terms; others are not. Insofar as this book takes into account the ancient meaning of the terms it refers to the common usage current since the Western Zhou (1121–771 B.C.) and so does not engage in a study of the origin of Chinese characters.

The material for Chinese philosophy covers all four sections of the *Complete Repository of Books in Four Sections* (*Siku Quanshu*). Here only the key works by representative philosophers will be selected and the main outlines laid clear without going into great detail. The book is limited to expounding the concepts and categories that arose and were in use in classical Chinese philosophy. It thus excludes terms found in Buddhism, Daoist religion (barring those in common with Daoist philosophy), technical terms from fields such as astronomy, divination, and medicine, literary and artistic terms such as those employed in poetry, art, and music, or those that are not part of the mainstream of Chinese philosophy and that I myself have not sufficiently studied. Apart from these I trust the reader to forgive the omission of any others.

From my heart I thank the Publishing House of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences for undertaking to publish this work.

Zhang Dainian
Beijing University
December 1987

Introduction: On the System of Categories

Recently scholars of the history of Chinese philosophy have turned their attention to the question of the system of categories of ancient Chinese philosophy. This problem is indeed an important one for the history of philosophy. We often say that Chinese philosophy has its own set of categories, in which case there must be a specific system of these categories. The systematization is a very complex problem. In the history of Chinese philosophy each category has its own path of emergence, development, and change such that even philosophical categories of the same period will be different according to different schools of thought. Which categories belong to the system of ancient Chinese philosophy? How do they relate to each other? These questions call for further research.

'Concept' and 'Category' in Ancient Chinese Philosophy

'Concept' and 'category' are foreign terms that have been imported into Chinese. Although the "Great Plan" chapter of the *Book of History* uses the terms *fan* and *chou* ("Great Plan [*fan*] and Nine Fields [*chou*]"), in ancient Chinese the two terms were never linked as one word. In ancient Chinese philosophy the terms that came closest to the modern words for 'concept,' *gainian* and *fanchou*, are 'name' (*ming*) and 'appellation,' or 'term' (*zi*). Confucius talks about the rectification of names:

> If names are not rectified then speech does not match. (*Analects* 13, *Zi Lu* #3, p. 263)

In the *Technique of the Mind A* of the *Guanzi* names and forms are spoken of as follows:

> Things have definite forms. Forms have definite names. One who makes names conform [to real objects] is called a sage. (*Guanzi* 48, *Technique of the Mind A*, 2:9)

The *Zhuangzi* reads,

> Names are what correspond to realities. (*Zhuangzi* 1, *Going Rambling Without a Destination*, line 25)

The *Gongsun Long* says,

> Names are the appellations of things. (*Gongsun Long* 6, *Discussion of Names and Real Objects*, p. 40)

In the logic sections of the *Mozi*, it is said,

> One uses names to refer to real objects. (*Later Mohist Logic*, p. 482)

Thus for all these schools of thought 'names' are what things are called.

The *Mohist Canons* distinguish three kinds of names:

> '*Ming*' (name). Unrestricted: classifying: private.

These terms are explained in the *Explanations*:

> 'Thing' is 'unrestricted'; any real object necessarily requires this name. Naming something 'horse' is 'classifying'; for 'like the real object' we necessarily use this name. Naming someone 'Jack' is 'private'; this name stays confined in this real object. (*Later Mohist Logic*, p. 325)

Unrestricted names are those that name universals. Generic names are the names of genera. Both unrestricted and generic names are what we now call concepts. Unrestricted names are universal concepts; generic names are concepts of a given kind of thing. Private names are the names of individuals and are not concepts.

The *Xunzi* distinguishes between common names and generic names:

> For although the myriad things are innumerable, sometimes we want to speak of them as a whole and so we call them 'things.' 'Things' is a great common name.... Sometimes we want to speak of one section of things, and so we call them 'birds' and 'beasts.' 'Birds' and 'beasts' are great particular names. (*Xunzi* 22, *On the Rectification of Names*, lines 23–24)

The great common names are what the Mohists called 'unrestricted names,' whereas the great particular names are what the Mohists called 'classifying names.'

Hence unrestricted names and generic names refer to what we now call 'concepts.' The term 'concept' is said from the point of view of thought,

whereas 'name' is a linguistic term. Thought and language may be compared as contents to form. Thought is always expressed in language. There can be no thought that is removed from language. Hence 'names' and 'concepts' are the same.

"'Thing' is 'unrestricted'; any real object necessarily requires this name." This refers to what we now call a *fanchou*, category. The term 'category' comes from ancient Greece. Aristotle described the system of categories. He mentions ten: substance, quantity, quality, relation, location, time, aspect, situation, action, and undergoing. In modern times Kant discussed categories from the point of view of a priori aperception. Hegel discussed categories from the point of view of objective idealism. When we now talk about categories we believe that they are the formal patterns of thought that reflect the unity and universality of things. In other words, they are fundamental concepts with a necessary and universal nature. Ancient Chinese philosophy lacks a system of categories such as that of Aristotle.

The *Zhuangzi* refers to 'quantity' (*liang*) and 'time' (*shi*), as Aristotle does, but there is very little further discussion of the terms:

> The quantity of things is endless; time is without end; kinds without fixed norms; ending and beginning never return to the same old place. (*Zhuangzi* 17, *Autumn Floods*, line 15)

In the *Mencius* and in the *Commentaries on the* Book of Changes the term 'time' refers simply to the ordinary sense of the word.

Han Yu, in his *Inquiry on the Way*, makes a distinction between 'empty positions' and 'definite names':

> Benevolence and justice are definite names. The Way and Virtue are empty positions. (SBBY: *Collected Works of Mr. Chang Li* 11.1, *An Inquiry on the Way*, p. 129a)

Definite names are names that have a definitive content; empty positions are empty boxes that can be filled differently by different schools of thought. Confucians and Daoists both speak of the Way, but what they mean by the 'Way' is different. As for benevolence and justice, they have a determined meaning. Confucians promote benevolence and justice; Daoists oppose them, but the terms 'benevolence' and 'justice' cannot be borrowed so as to give them a different meaning. The Daoists are simply critical of the two