

BUSINESS  
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READINGS

实用

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英语阅读教程

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## 前 言

随着改革开放政策的不断深入,市场经济的不断发展,我国经济活动趋于国际化,同世界经济接轨的进程日渐加快,我国同世界各国的经济贸易更加频繁,合作的领域更加广泛。二十一世纪经济的发展迫切需要一大批既有丰富的国际商务专业知识,又能熟练地运用英语进行工作交流的人才。近年来,为适应社会需要,国内一些大专院校相继开设了商务英语专业,但相关的教材建设一时还难以满足教学的需要。这本《实用商务英语阅读教程》就是为配合该专业的需要而编写的。

本书选材广泛,内容涉及国际贸易、国际投资、商务招标、证券和债务、外汇贸易、商务保险、市场、跨国公司、公司组织和管理等。这些文章涵盖了最基本的经济理论与常识;我国涉外经济活动相关政策与法规;以及国际商务活动的惯例,具有鲜明的时代特征和较强的实用性。

每篇课文后都配有必要的注释和练习,旨在帮助学生和其他读者正确地理解文章的含义,掌握国际商务活动的基本常识,同时培养和训练使用英语表达这些知识的能力。

本书材料均选自近年来英语国家出版的经贸类论著、教材、报刊和杂志。同时也参考了国内同类教材或辞书,在此一并向有关的编著者表示敬意和感谢。

本教材语言规范、难度适中,既适用于大专院校经济类专业的泛读教材,又可供从事涉外经济工作人员参考。

本书承蒙河南大学外语系王宝童教授对本书逐篇进行了审阅和修改。河南人民出版社的领导和编辑给予我们大力的支持和帮助,马怀松教授为该书提出了许多宝贵的意见,在此一并向他们表示衷心的感谢。

本教材共收录文章五十一篇,其中王祖兴十一篇,贾琰十四篇,吕珊菁十四篇,许师范七篇,王健五篇,并集录和整理了单词表和短语表。

限于编者水平和条件,书中难免疏漏和差错,敬请同行专家和广大读者批评指正。

《实用商务英语阅读教程》编写组

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## Deng Xiaoping Calls for Speedup in Reform

China is now carrying out a reform. I am all in favour of that. There is no other solution for us. After years of practice it turned out that the old stuff didn't work. In the past we copied foreign models mechanically, which only hampered<sup>1</sup> the development of our productive forces, and kept people and grass-roots units from taking any initiative. We made some mistakes of our own as well, such as the "great leap forward" and the "cultural revolution". I would say that since 1957 our major mistakes have been "left" ones. The "cultural revolution" was an ultra-left mistake. In fact, during the two decades from 1958 through 1978, China remained at a standstill. There was little economic growth and not much of rise in the people's standard of living. How could we go on like that without introducing reforms? So in 1978, at the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee, we worked out a new basic political line: to give first priority to the drive for modernization and strive to develop the productive forces. In accordance with<sup>2</sup> that line we drew up<sup>3</sup> a series of new principles and policies, the major ones being reform and the open policy. By reform we mean reform of both the

economic structure and the political structure and corresponding changes in all other areas. By the open policy we mean both opening to all other countries and opening at home, which means invigorating<sup>4</sup> the domestic economy.

We introduced reform and the open policy first in the countryside. Why did we start there? It is because that is where 80 percent of China's population lives. An unstable situation in the countryside would lead to an unstable political situation throughout the country. If the peasants did not shake off poverty, it would mean that the majority of the people remained poor. So after the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee, we decided to carry out reform, giving more decision-making power to the peasants and the grass-roots units. By so doing we immediately brought their initiative into play<sup>5</sup>. And by adopting a policy of diversifying agriculture, we substantially increased not only the output of grain but also the output of cash crops. The rural reform has achieved much faster results than we had anticipated. Frankly, before the reform the majority of the peasants were extremely poor, hardly able to afford enough food, clothing, shelter and transportation. Since the rural reform began they have shown their initiative. Bearing local conditions in mind, they have grown grain and cash crops in places suited to them. Since the peasants were given the power to decide for themselves what to produce, they have brought about a dramatic change in the rural areas. The reform was so successful that in many places it yielded very good results within just one year. The peasants' income has increased substantially, sometimes even doubling or quadrupling<sup>6</sup>.

Generally speaking, once the peasants' initiative was brought

into play, the rural reform developed very quickly. Our greatest success —and it is one we had by no means anticipated —has been the emergence of a large number of enterprises run by villages and townships. They were like a new force that just came into being spontaneously. These enterprises engage in the most diverse endeavours, including both manufacturing and trade. The annual output value of these village and township enterprises has been increasing by more than 20 percent every year. This increase in village and township enterprises, particularly industrial enterprises, has provided jobs for 50 percent of the surplus labour in the countryside. Instead of flocking into<sup>7</sup> the cities, the surplus farm workers have been building up a new type of villages and townships. If the Central Committee made any contribution in this respect, it was only by laying down the correct policy of invigorating the domestic economy. The fact that this policy has had such a favourable result shows that we made a good decision. In short, the rural reform has produced rapid and noticeable results. Of course, that doesn't mean all the problems in the countryside have been solved.

The success of the reform in the countryside encouraged us to apply the experience we had gained from it to economic restructuring in the cities. That too has been very successful, although it is more complicated than rural reform.

In the meantime, the policy of opening China's doors to the outside world has produced the results we hoped for. We have implemented that policy in various ways, including setting up special economic zones and opening 14 coastal cities. Wherever the open policy has been implemented there have been notable results. First we established the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone. It was the leaders

of Guangdong Province who came up with the proposal that special zones be established, and I agreed. We decided to set up three more special zones in addition to Shenzhen, Zhuhai and Shantou, both also in Guangdong Province, and Xiamen in Fujian Province. I visited Shenzhen a couple of years ago and found the economy flourishing there. The Shenzhen people asked me to write an inscription<sup>8</sup> for them, and I wrote: "The development and experience of the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone prove the correctness of our policy of establishing such zones." The Shenzhen Special Economic Zone has achieved remarkable successes since it was established almost eight years ago. This zone is an entirely new thing, and it is not fair for the people who run it not to be allowed to make mistakes. If they have made mistakes, they were minor ones. The people in Shenzhen reviewed their experience and decided to shift the zone's economy from a domestic orientation to an external orientation, which meant that Shenzhen would become an industrial base and offer its products on the world market. It is only two or three years since then, and already the situation in Shenzhen has changed greatly. The comrades there told me that more than 50 percent of their products were exported and that receipts and payments of foreign exchange were in balance.

I am now in a position to say with certainty that our decision to establish special economic zones was a good one and has proved successful. All scepticism<sup>9</sup> has vanished. Recently a comrade told me that the Xiàmen Special Economic Zone is developing even faster than Shenzhen. When I visited Xiamen in 1984, there was only an airport surrounded by wasteland. Great changes have taken place there since then. Now we are preparing to make all of Hainan Island

a special economic zone. Hainan Island, which is almost as big as Taiwan, has abundant natural resources, such as iron ore and oil, as well as rubber and other tropical and subtropical crops. When it is fully developed, the result should be extraordinary.

Our achievements in the last few years have proved the correctness of our policies of reform and of opening to the outside world. Although there are still problems in various fields, I don't think they will be too hard to solve, if we go at it systematically. Therefore, we must not abandon these policies or even slow them down. One of the topics we have been discussing recently is whether we should speed up reform or slow it down. That's because reform and the open policy involve risk. Of course we have to be cautious but that doesn't mean we should do nothing. Indeed, on the basis of our experience to date, the Central Committee has been considering to accelerate the reform and our opening to the outside world.

#### Notes:

1. hampered: 妨碍, 阻碍
2. in accordance with: 依照, 依据
3. draw up: 制定
4. invigorate: 搞活, 使充满生气
5. bring their initiative into play: 调动他们的积极性
6. quadrupling: 翻两番
7. flocking into: 涌入
8. inscription: 题词
9. scepticism: 怀疑主义

## Exercises:

### I . Answer the following questions:

1. What do reform and open policy mean?
2. Why was the reform in the countryside so successfully?
3. How many special economic zones had been established before 1988? What did the practice of the SEZ prove?
4. Why must we accelerate the implementation of reform and open policy?
5. What's the result of the quickly developing rural reform?

### II . Translate the following into Chinese:

1. the old stuff
2. copy foreign models mechanically
3. to give first priority to the drive for modernization and strive to develop the productive force
4. decision making power
5. cash crops
6. food, cloth, shelter and transportation
7. come into being spontaneously
8. shift the zone's economy from a domestic orientation to an external orientation

### III . Translate the following into English:

- |              |              |
|--------------|--------------|
| 1. 基层单位      | 2. 人民生活水平的提高 |
| 3. 经济和政治体制改革 | 4. 摆脱贫困      |
| 5. 农业多种经营    | 6. 乡镇企业      |
| 7. 经济特区      | 8. 丰富的自然资源   |

### IV . True or false:

1. The "cultural revolution" was an ultra-right mistake.
2. So in 1978, at the Second Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee, we worked out a new basic political line.

3. So after the Third Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee, we decided to carry out reform, giving less decision-making power to the peasants and the grass-roots units.
4. Since the rural reform began, they have shown their initiative. Bearing local conditions in mind they have grown grain and cash crops in places suited to them.
5. The success of the reform in the countryside encouraged us to apply the experience we had gained from it to economic restructuring in the cities.
6. The policy of opening China's doors to the outside world has got the results we hoped for.
7. I am now in a position to say with certainty that our decision to establish special economic zones was a good one and has proved successful.
8. Our achievements in the last few years have proved the correctness of our policies of reform and of opening to the outside world.

## China Turns to Market Economy

The 14th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC), which concluded its session in October, 1992, declared that reform of China's economic structure is aimed at<sup>1</sup> establishing a socialist market economic system. This important decision, which grew out of<sup>2</sup> Deng Xiaoping's theories, is attractive, popular and generally welcomed by public opinion at home and abroad.

Integrating socialism with the market economy does not mean putting a political lable on the market; it instead marks a milestone in China's market-oriented economic reform. It is also a logical conclusion drawn from China's persistence in making the public economy the leading factor<sup>3</sup>, drastically cutting mandatory planning, constantly strengthening the role of market forces and rapidly developing the economy during the past 14 years.

Since economic reform began in 1978 with the introduction of the contract responsibility system based on household production, with remuneration linked to output in rural areas<sup>4</sup> and the opening of free markets, most Chinese agricultural and sideline products have ceased to be produced according to mandatory plans and prices have been decontrolled. Today, the prices of only six products —grain, cotton, tobacco, raw silk, tea and timber —are still set by the



state, and they are all very close to market prices.

During the same period the proportion of industrial production subject to<sup>5</sup> mandatory planning decreased from the original 97 percent to the present 11.6 percent. In 1991, the proportion of consumer goods sold at state-set prices dropped to 21 percent and that of capital goods<sup>6</sup> to 36 percent. A further fall in the number of goods carrying state-set prices is expected this year.

Over the past 14 years, individual, private and foreign-funded enterprises, which supplement China's public economy and are encouraged by state preferential policies, have developed from non-existence at rapid rates. In 1991, the value of their industrial output represented about 10 percent of the nation's total. Enterprises owned by the whole people and urban and rural collective enterprises<sup>7</sup> have also undergone great development, maintaining their position as the mainstay of the economy.

It goes without saying that putting forward<sup>8</sup> the new concept of a socialist market economy represents a major theoretical breakthrough. It has broken down<sup>9</sup> the outdated notion that a planned economy means socialism and a market economy capitalism. Just as Deng Xiaoping remarked during his inspection tour of south China: "Whether the emphasis is on planning or on market regulation is not the essential distinction between socialism and capitalism. Both planning and market regulation are economic means."

This idea of Deng's can be traced back to the initial period of reform and opening up. While meeting foreign guests on November 26, 1979, Deng said, "The saying that the market economy is limited to capitalism is definitely incorrect. Why can't socialism go in for<sup>10</sup> the market economy? There had been an embryonic market e-