

Public

11th Edition

Administration
and Public Affairs

Henry

ELEVENTH EDITION

PUBLIC
ADMINISTRATION
AND
PUBLIC AFFAIRS

Nicholas Henry

Georgia Southern University

New York San Francisco Boston
London Toronto Sydney Tokyo Singapore Madrid
Mexico City Munich Paris Cape Town Hong Kong Montreal

*To my mother, Ann Henry,
whose company never ceases to delight.*

Editor-in-Chief: Eric Stano
Marketing Manager: Lindsey Prudhomme
Production Manager: Kathy Sleys
**Project Coordination, Text Design, and Electronic
Page Makeup:** Shiji Sashi/Integra Software Services, Ltd.
Cover Design Director: Jayne Conte
Cover Designer: Margaret Kenselaar
Cover Illustration/Photo: Getty Images, Inc.
Printer and Binder: Hamilton Printing Company
Cover Printer: Lehigh-Phoenix Color Corp.

For permission to use copyrighted material, grateful acknowledgment is made to the copyright holders on the appropriate page within the text.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Henry, Nicholas.
Public administration and public affairs / Nicholas Henry.—11th ed.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN-13: 978-0-205-68551-6 (alk. paper)
ISBN-10: 0-205-68551-X (alk. paper)
1. Public administration. I. Title.
JF1351.H45 2010
351—dc22

2008050353

Copyright © 2010, by Pearson Education, Inc.

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the prior written permission of the publisher. Printed in the United States.

Longman
is an imprint of




www.pearsonhighered.com

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10—HT—12 11 10 09
ISBN-13: 978-0-205-68551-6
ISBN-10: 0-205-68551-X

Why You Need this New Edition

This eleventh edition provides students with a trove of new material, ranging from the technical to the theoretical issues of public administration and public affairs.

- New sections on e-government, information systems, technology assessment and technological forecasting address the functionality and failure of information technology projects.
- This edition includes the Honest Leadership and Open Government Act of 2007 and examines the effects of lobbying on public administration.
- The book analyzes the backlash against affirmative action and includes a new section on the unique experiences of minority and women public administrators.
- A new look at the mismanagement of the occupation in Iraq is included, along with corruption and whistle blowing in public affairs.
- The recent scandal and failure of Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae is included in Chapter 11.
- The extensive “Notes” section at the end of each chapter provides readers with far more information than simple bibliographic citations.
- New appendices are included in this edition with information on what kinds of jobs are available in the public and nonprofit sectors, tools for finding and applying for those jobs, and ways to track down federal assistance and scholarships for acquiring a masters degree in public administration.



PEARSON

Preface



Public administration. The words conjure nightmares of green eyeshades; faceless, pitiless, and powerful bureaucrats; and a misdirected, perhaps misanthropic, governmental juggernaut crushing all who question it.

Public affairs. The phrase connotes visions of fearless and free debate; ennobling social missions; and the surging sweep of civic life.

We title this book *Public Administration and Public Affairs* because it examines the realities underlying the stereotypes that are brought out by both terms. Public administration always will be the grubbing, tedious execution of public policies, but it also always will be an endeavor of soaring drama and colossal consequences. Public affairs always will be the ultimate and finest expression of democracy, but it also always will be a demeaning chore of cutting sleazy deals and micromanaging corrupt and rapacious special interests. *Public Administration and Public Affairs* is, at root, about the public interest. It explains both the means used to fulfill the public interest and the human panoply that is the public interest.

Over the preceding four decades or so, *Public Administration and Public Affairs*, despite its orientation toward U.S. readers, has been translated and published in Chinese, Japanese, and Romanian, and portions of it in Spanish. There is also an Indian edition and other national editions in English. We relate this polyglot publishing history to demonstrate that, with accelerating appreciation, public administration is seen around the globe as central to “good government,” and good government, as we explain in the

introduction to Part I, is seen by the world’s people as central to the good life.

An innovation of the eleventh edition is that the Notes concluding each chapter, in Parts I, III, and IV, often provide far more information than merely bibliographic citations; readers will not waste their time by occasionally checking the endnotes.

For the sake of improved coherence and clarity, some discussions have been reorganized and consolidated, such as the treatments of bureaucratization in Chapter 4, corruption in Part I and Chapter 7, taxes in Chapter 8, privatization in Chapter 11, and regulatory federalism in Chapter 12.

There also is a trove of new material. Among the new, seriously revised, or significantly expanded discussions in this edition, listed in rough order of their appearance, are the following:

- The case *for* corruption: “efficient grease,” and why it is far from efficient.
- The Native American and English origins of the American social contract.
- Media’s portrayal of bureaucrats and nonprofit administrators.
- The constraints of direct democracy: referenda, initiatives, recalls, and term limits.
- Why governments grow.
- President George W. Bush’s and other presidents’ questionable control of the federal bureaucracy.
- The powers of bureaucrats: staying, discretionary, stopping, and policy making.
- A resurgent politics/administration dichotomy.

- Comparative and development administration.
- The record of governing by network and the future of public administration.
- Mentoring in government.
- The question of rational interest in organizations and the quirk in collective action.
- The inescapability of power and manipulation in organizational life.
- Internal and external sources of organizational uncertainty.
- Organized anarchies and the garbage can of decision making.
- A new box: A Monumental Map Mess in Georgia.
- The fickle oversight of public agencies.
- Administration and its tactics in public and nonprofit organizations.
- The squelching of innovative employees in government.
- The costs—and the benefits—of hierarchy and red tape.
- Why governments cannot be made less bureaucratic?
- The “bureaucratic personality” and the “unbureaucratic personality.”
- A new box: Getting Ahead.
- The impact on agency policy making of agency advisory boards, the notice-and-comment process, and the press.
- “Cow psychology,” organizational culture, and leadership.
- E-government and geographic information systems.
- Why information technology projects so frequently fail?
- Corruption: kinds, pervasiveness, and public productivity.
- Benchmarking: its limits and benefits.
- The options for federal tax reform and the threats to state and local revenue.
- A new figure: Intergovernmental Revenue as Percentages of State and Local Governments’ Total Revenue.
- Budget maximizing and budget minimizing, bureaucrats.
- The crumbling of the congressional budget process and fiscal discipline in Washington, the biggest bailout in history, and the implications of one humongous national debt.
- Human capital reform and the not-so-slow death of the Civil Service System.
- Whistle blowing and its consequences.
- A new box: Federal Human Capital: A Question of Competence.
- The gross mismanagement of the occupation of Iraq.
- The politicization of the Federal Emergency Management Agency.
- The unique experiences of minority and women public administrators.
- The backlash against affirmative action.
- Is diversity desirable? The evidence suggests that it is.
- A new box: Truly Universal Strategic Planning.
- Technology assessment and technological forecasting.
- Lobbying, revolving doors, and the Honest Leadership and Open Government Act of 2007.
- The failure of the federal privatization reforms of the 1990s.
- Washington’s government-sponsored enterprises, including the perilous times and federal bailout of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.
- A new figure: Paths of Federal Funds to Nonprofit Organizations.
- Governments’ use of volunteers and vouchers, including school vouchers.
- Lobbying by state and local governments.
- Regulatory federalism: trends in mandates and regulations.
- A logical sorting out of federal, state, and local responsibilities.
- Washington, regional governance, and its privatization.
- City–county consolidations, municipal annexations, and metropolitan government.
- The connection between high ethics and successful public-sector careers.
- Does a philosophy of the public interest matter?

Also revised in the eleventh edition are the seven extensive appendices that have made *Public Administration and Public Affairs* a useful reference work for students, professors, and professionals alike.

Appendix A lists information sources, journals, and organizations by subfield. It is designed to facilitate the reader’s ability to identify resources that are available in his or her particular area of interest, and draws its listing of information sources, journals, and organizations from the three more extensive appendices (i.e., Appendices B, C, and D) that follow.

Appendix B lists and annotates bibliographies, encyclopedias, dictionaries, and directories in public administration and related fields. Library of Congress call numbers are included for the user’s convenience.

Appendix C is an expanded list of selected journals and periodicals that are relevant to public administration. As with Appendix B, Appendix C features Library of Congress call numbers, as well as brief explanations of the publications listed.

Appendix D lists selected academic, professional, and public interest organizations. It includes their Web sites and descriptions of what they do.

Appendix E provides the correct forms of address and salutation for a pod of public officials. This is somewhat arcane information, but knowing and using it polishes one's professionalism.

Appendix F explains what kinds of jobs are available in the public and nonprofit sectors, and the salaries that one might expect. It lists numerous new Web sites for tracking down federal assistance and scholarships, and covers acquiring a master's degree in public administration, résumé writing (including a sample résumé), networking and interning opportunities, and how to find job openings. A new section

discusses applying for, and following up, jobs in agencies and nonprofit organizations, and the popular discussion of interviewing for a job has been expanded.

Appendix G reprints the Code of Ethics of the American Society for Public Administration, which is the single most comprehensive association of public administrators in all specializations and at all governmental levels.

Nicholas Henry
Savannah, Georgia

Acknowledgments



In the first edition of this book, I stated that I owed an intellectual debt to at least three of my teachers, Lynton Keith Caldwell, Jack T. Johnson, and York Y. Wilbern. I still owe my teachers an intellectual debt. Although it has been some time since I sat in their classrooms, their impact has waxed, not waned, over the years.

I have since added a fourth person to this small circle: Frank J. Sackton. Professor Sackton (also Lieutenant General Sackton, retired) introduced me to the classroom of the practical world during the dozen years that I spent at Arizona State University. It was a rare education indeed, and one that I shall always treasure.

I am indebted to my editors at Pearson Longman: Eric Stano, Editor-in-Chief for Political Science; Donna Garnier, Associate Development Editor; Lindsey Prudhomme, Executive Marketing Manager;

Kathy Sleys, Production Manager; and my Project Coordinator and Copyeditor at Integra, Shiji Sashi, for their good cheer, hard work, and solid advice in producing what you are reading.

I also am indebted to my colleagues, students, and the book's reviewers who have had such a constructive influence on the continuing evolution of *Public Administration and Public Affairs*.

As always, my wife, Muriel, and my children, Adrienne and Miles, and their spouses, Kevin and Anna, provided the deepest level of support. The book is for them, and, much to my gratification, my grandchildren, Callum, Margaret, and Charlotte.

This edition is dedicated to my Mom, whose company is an unending joy.

Nicholas Henry

Contents



Preface x

Acknowledgments xii

Part I: Paradigms of Public Administration 1

Do We Need Government? 1

Is Graft Good? 1

What Is Good Government? 2

Chapter 1 Big Democracy, Big Bureaucracy 5

An Unpromising Precipice 5

A Culture of Constraint 7

The Consequences of Constraint 8

The Bureaucrat: Brained, Blamed, and Bouncing Back 10

Infernal Vernon: A Case of Unconstrained Public Administration 11

The Paradoxical Power of the Public Administrator 13

Noetic Authority: The Base of Bureaucratic Power 18

Chapter 2 Public Administration's Century in a Quandary 27

The Beginning 27

Paradigm 1: The Politics/Administration Dichotomy, 1900–1926 28

Paradigm 2: Principles of Public Administration, 1927–1937 29

The Challenge, 1938–1950 30

Paradigm 3: Public Administration as Political Science, 1950–1970 32

Paradigm 4: Public Administration as Management, 1950–1970 34

The Forces of Separatism, 1965–1970 36

Paradigm 5: Public Administration as Public Administration, 1970–Present 37

Public Administration as Neither Management Nor Political Science 37
Paradigm 6: Governance, 1990-Present 38
Public Administration, Happy at Last 40

Part II: Public Organizations 46

Chapter 3 The Threads of Organization: Theories 47

The Closed Model of Organizations 47
The Open Model of Organizations 49
Closed or Open Organizations? 54
The Closed and Open Models: The Essential Differences 55
Conjoining Opposites: The Drive to Reduce Uncertainty 59
Are Public Organizations Different? 60

Chapter 4 The Fabric of Organizations: Forces 64

Assessing Organizational Worth 64
Organizational Knowledge 65
Decision Making in Organizations 67
A Monumental Map Mess in Georgia 71
Administration in Organizations 72
Limited Change: The Impact of Technology and People on the Public Organization 74
Deep Change: The Impact of the Environment on the Public Organization 75

Chapter 5 The Fibers of Organizations: People 90

Why Work for the People? 90
The Behavioral Bureaucrat 91
Growing into the Organization 93
National Culture and the Organization 94
Getting Ahead 97
Organizational Politics 97
What Is Leadership? 99
Learning Leadership: The Evolution of a Theory 101
Leading the Public Organization 104

Part III: Public Management 114

Chapter 6 Clarifying Complexity: The Public's Information Resource 117

Policy *versus* Privacy: The Particular Problem of the Public Computer 117
A Case of Unmatched Failure 119
The Crusade for Secure Data 120
Knowledge Management: Managing the Public's Information Resource 121
E-Gov: Lean, Seen, and Clean Government 124
Clarifying Public Decisions 125
Best Practices for Knowledge Management 126
The Information Resource and the Future of Governing 127

Chapter 7 Public Productivity: Corruption's Consequence 133

- Comprehending Corruption 133
- Understanding Public Productivity 138
- The Evolution of Public Productivity 139
- Katrina, Crisis, and Collapse* 143
- Measuring Public Performance 145
- Permutations and Practices of Performance Measurement 147
- Evaluating Public Programs 151
- Public Program Evaluation in Practice 154
- Using Public Program Evaluations 156

Chapter 8 The Public Trough: Financing and Budgeting Governments 165

- Public Finance: Paying for Public Policy 165
- Taxing Times 172
- The Federal Government and the National Economy 175
- A Founder on Debt* 180
- Public Budgeting: Spending for Public Policy 181
- Line-Item Budgeting, 1916–1939 181
- Program/Performance Budgeting, 1940–1964 183
- Planning–Programming–Budgeting, 1965–1971 185
- Budgeting-by-Objectives, 1972–1977 186
- Zero Base Budgeting, 1977–1980 187
- Target Base Budgeting, 1981–Present 188
- Budgeting for Results, 1993–Present 190
- Old Budget Systems Never Die . . . 192
- Acquiring Budgets: Agencies and Arguments 193
- Legislating Budgets 194

Chapter 9 Managing Human Capital in the Public Sector 206

- Who Wants to Work for Government? And Who Does? 206
- The Evolution of Public Human Capital Management 208
- The Civil Service System: The Meaning of Merit 210
- The Slippage of the Civil Service System 218
- The Collective System: Blue-Collar Bureaucrats 221
- The Political Executive System: Politics in Administration 224
- Specialized Public Professional Systems: The Person Over the Position 227
- The Professional Public Administration System: Embracing the Professions of Politics and Management 228
- Federal Human Capital: A Question of Competence* 230
- Race, Sex, and Jobs: The Challenge of Affirmative Action 232

Part IV: Implementing Public Policy 259**Chapter 10 Understanding and Improving Public Policy 261**

- Public Policy Analysis: A Brief History 261
- The Incrementalist Paradigm of Public Policy Making 262
- The Rationalist Paradigm of Public Policy Making 266

The Strategic Planning Paradigm of Public Policy Making 271
Truly Universal Strategic Planning 275

Chapter 11 Intersectoral Administration 279

Collaboration and Privatization 279
Federal Privatization 281
Privatizing in the States 290
Privatizing by Local Governments 291
Is Business Better? The Case for Competition 294
Practical Privatization: Lessons Learned 295
The Businesses of Governments 295
The Independent Sector: Experiences in Interdependence 300
A Case of Independent Governance: Neighborhoods Renascent 303
Implementation by Individuals: Volunteers and Vouchers 305

Chapter 12 Intergovernmental Administration 321

The Constitution and the Courts: Setting the Rules 321
The Evolution of Intergovernmental Administration 323
Fiscal Federalism 325
Regulatory Federalism 329
Money, Mandates, and Washington: Now What? 332
Federalism among Equals: The States 333
Intergovernmental Administration in the States 334
Intergovernmental Administration among Local Governments 335
A Load of Local Governments: Definitions, Scope, Services, Revenue Sources, Government, and Forms of Government for Counties, Municipalities, Townships, School Districts, and Special Districts 337
Place, People, and Power: The Puzzle of Metropolitan Governance 344

Chapter 13 Toward a Bureaucratic Ethic 357

Codes and Commissions: The Rise of Public Sector Ethics 357
Practicing Ethical Public Administration 358
Do Morals Matter? 359
Bureaucracy's Bane: Determining the Public Interest 360
Can Normative Theory Help? Four Philosophies of the Public Interest 362
The Passion of Public Administration 364
Big Bureaucracy, Big Decisions 365

Appendix A: Information Sources, Journals, and Organizations in Public Administration by Specialization 368

Budgeting and Finance 368
Criminal Justice 369
Ethics 369
Federal Government 369
Human Capital Management 369
Independent Sector 370
Information Resource Management 370

Intergovernmental Administration	370
Local Government	370
Minority and Gender Affairs	371
Planning	371
Program Evaluation and Performance Measurement	371
State Government	372
Welfare, Health, and Public Safety	372
Appendix B: Annotated Information Sources in Public Administration and Related Fields	373
Appendix C: Selected Annotated Journals Relevant to Public Administration	376
Appendix D: Selected Academic, Professional, and Public Interest Organizations with Web Sites and Descriptions	380
Appendix E: Correct Forms of Address for Public Officials	385
Appendix F: Becoming a Public or Nonprofit Administrator	387
How Many Jobs? How Much Pay?	387
Preparing for a Position: Education, Résumés, Networking, and Interning	388
Finding a Position	394
The Application	395
The Interview	395
Appendix G: American Society for Public Administration Code of Ethics	399
Index	401

PART I

Paradigms of Public Administration



Bureaucracy is in our bones. Prehistoric evidence unearthed at archeological digs suggests that the rudiments of a bureaucratic social order were in place 19,000 years ago.¹ Bureaucratic governance predates, by many millennia, *Homo sapiens*' earliest experiments with democracy.

Do We Need Government?

Not everyone agrees that government and bureaucracy are basic to society. Some argue, in a distorted extension of Thomas Jefferson's dictum, that the best government is the least government, that the very best government is no government at all. "They want the government to go away. That is what holds together the conservative movement."² It has been argued that, when those who subscribe to this ideology are in power, they act as a "wrecking crew" that deliberately sabotages governmental competence, privatizes core public responsibilities, irresponsibly deregulates, and ignores, even encourages, corruption in an effort to de-legitimate government.³

Assuming that government will never go away, is the next best thing—that is, inept, graft-ridden government—a good thing? Some scholars think so.

Is Graft Good?

Some suggest that, although corruption's short-term costs are embarrassingly obvious, graft munificently paves the way for longer-term prosperity. "Grease money" amounts to "speed money," in that bribes used to circumvent a blocking bureaucracy accelerate a nation's economic development.⁴

Ideas have power. The "efficient grease hypothesis" has long been used as a rationale to ignore rampant corruption in allocating international development funds; consequently, according to the World Bank, corruption has been "treated as a taboo subject" by the development community for decades.⁵

Facts belie the belief in efficient grease; corruption actually retards economic development. None of the nineteen impoverished nations that have been granted debt service relief through the

Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative is rated as having anything better than “serious to severe” governmental corruption.⁶

The rate of investment in countries with high and unpredictable rates of corruption is almost half of that in low-corruption countries.⁷ An analysis of more than a hundred countries over thirteen years found that when corruption increases by about two points on a ten-point scale, investment decreases by 4 percent, and gross domestic product falls by half a percent.⁸ Corruption inflates the prices of goods by as much as a fifth,⁹ and severely curtails income growth for the poor.¹⁰

Governments are not immune. Corruption slashes governments’ legitimate revenues by as much as half, and adds from 3 to 10 percent to the cost of public services because citizens must bribe officials to acquire those services.¹¹

The dollars lost to global corruption roughly match the annual budget of the federal government,¹² so obviously some people—the corruptors—are making a ton of money, right? Well, no. Bribery costs even the bribers. Three surveys of 2,400 businesses in fifty-eight nations found that “firms that pay more bribes are also likely to spend more, not less, management time with bureaucrats negotiating regulations, and face higher, not lower, costs of capital.”¹³ The more that firms pay in bribes to corrupt officials, the lower their annual growth rates.¹⁴

When countries reduce corruption, good things happen: Poverty and child mortality rates decrease, and per capita income and literacy rates increase, among other benefits.¹⁵

What Is Good Government?

The inarguable economic and social benefits of uncorrupted government lead us to our second inquiry: What is good government?

Democracy, Honesty, and Competency

Good government is democratic, honest, and able.

Good Government Is Democratic. Democracy is good government. A massive and ongoing study, begun in the 1970s, of citizens in seventy-two countries on six continents finds that “the basic ideas of democracy are virtually universally accepted around the world,” regardless of culture, and that these ideas are “viewed as the only game in town,” even by the residents of dictatorships.¹⁶

Good Government Is Uncorrupted. Aside from a few intellectuals who mud-wrestle on the slippery slope of “efficient grease,” everyone knows this. Majorities of citizens in thirty-four out of forty-seven countries on five continents, or nearly three-quarters of the nations surveyed, think that “corrupt political leaders” are their top national problem. Globally, the leading “very big problem,” out of eleven possible problems ranging from AIDS to crime, is corrupt political leaders.¹⁷

What the planet’s peoples viscerally understand is that one can have neither prosperity nor democracy unless there is first honest government.

Although, as we have detailed, uncorrupted government seems to be essential if an economy is to develop, democratic government is not. No political system has a lock on economic acuity. Democracies have made dumb economic decisions, and dictatorships have made adroit ones.¹⁸

Honest government, however, *does seem* to be a prerequisite for democratic government. Where there is honest government, there also is vibrant democracy—that is, large numbers of citizens voting repeatedly in competitive elections.¹⁹ The stirring, mass revolutions—from Kiev to Kyrgyzstan, from Beirut to Budapest, from Tblisi to Tiananmen—that began in 1974 with the Portuguese people’s overthrow of their Fascist rulers invariably demand two reforms of government: honesty and democracy. Whether consciously or subliminally, humanity comprehends that honest government is inseparable from democratic government.

Good Government Is Able. There is a third component of good government: Competence.

Just as honest government seems to be a needed first phase before prosperity and democracy can emerge, it also appears that uncorrupted government is essential to competent democratic government. In other words, the position long trumpeted by some political scientists that political machines “work”—that is, they provide services more efficiently than reformed governments can—does not hold up empirically. An analysis of surveys conducted in sixteen “mature and newly established democracies around the globe” found that corruption positively correlates with “more negative” popular evaluations of the political system and “lower levels of trust in civil servants,”²⁰ both of which are necessary if democratic governments are to effectively implement public policy.²¹

As with democratic and uncorrupted government, well-managed government enhances the daily lives of people. A study of the American states found that a high level of “state management capacity . . . clearly . . . contributes directly to improving the overall quality of life for state citizens.”²²

It is at last dawning on scholars and policy makers that good governments need not necessarily be big, but they must be strong, supple, and able.²³ Governments’ often-heroic response to the terrorist attacks of 2001 brought a doubling in popular trust in government.²⁴

Conversely, the price of weak, brittle, and clumsy government can be steep. Governments’ bungled response to Hurricane Katrina in 2005 resulted in a ten-point plummet in Americans’ faith in their governments’ ability to protect them,²⁵ and “crystallized negative perceptions about [President George W.] Bush’s performance” from which he never recovered.²⁶

The Place of Public Administration

Good government, then, rests on three pillars: honesty, democracy, and competency. Public administrators, as we shall see throughout this book, are essential to each of these pillars.

Public administration is a broad ranging and amorphous combination of theory and practice; its purpose is to promote a superior understanding of government and its relationship with the society it governs, as well as to encourage public policies more responsive to social needs and to institute managerial practices attuned to effectiveness, efficiency, and the deeper human requisites of the citizenry. Admittedly, the preceding sentence is itself rather broad ranging and amorphous (although one reviewer of this book described our definition as “a classic”²⁷), but for our purposes it will suffice.

In Part I, we begin our book’s discussion of the place of public administrators in assuring good government by offering two histories of public administration. The first is cultural, and the second intellectual.

In Chapter 1, we review the longstanding and everlasting tension between bureaucracy and democracy in the United States. We find that American culture constrains administrative action in the public sector, and, while most Americans cheer this constraint, there is a downside.

In Chapter 2, we review the intellectual evolution of public administration. How public administrators see themselves and their proper field of action in a democracy deeply affects the health of democracy itself. This perspective is formed more in the halls of academe than in the corridors of power, so we devote some pages to the history of ideas in public administration.

So welcome to *Public Administration and Public Affairs*, and welcome to one of the most exciting and rewarding career possibilities on earth.

Notes

1. Scott Van Nystrom and Luella C. Nystrom, “Bureaucracy in Prehistory: Case Evidence from Mammoth Bone Dwellers on the Russian Steppes,” *International Journal of Public Administration* 21 (Winter 1998), pp. 7–23. Archeological evidence found near Kiev, Ukraine, leads these scholars to conclude (p. 7) that “rudiments of bureaucracy, as an organizing principle, likely existed at least 12,000 to 19,000 years ago.”
2. Newt Gingrich, former Republican Speaker of the House, as quoted in John Cassidy, “The Ringleader,” *The New Yorker* (August 1, 2005), p. 46.

3. See, for example, Thomas Frank, *The Wrecking Crew: How Conservatives Rule* (New York: Macmillan, 2008).
4. Daniel Kaufmann and Shang-Jin Wei, "Does 'Grease Money' Speed Up the Wheels of Commerce?" *NBER Working Paper No. W7093* (July 1999), Social Science Research Network, <http://ssrn.com>.
5. Rick Stapenhurst and Sahr Kpundeh, eds., *Curbing Corruption: Toward a Model for Building National Integrity* (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1999), http://publications.worldbank.org/e-commerce/catalog/product-detail?product_id=208301&.
6. World Bank Institute, as cited in Transparency International, *Perceived Corruption Index*, 2005 (Berlin: Author, 2005). None of the nineteen countries scored above 4 out of 10 possible points in 2005.
7. World Bank, *World Development Report, 1997* (Washington, DC: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 102–104.
8. Paolo Mauro, *Why Worry About Corruption?* Economic Issues No. 6 (Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, 1997), pp. 9–10. Figures are for 1982–1995.
9. Stapenhurst and Kpundeh, *Curbing Corruption*.
10. Sanjeev Gupta, Hamid Davoodi, and Rosa Alonso-Terme, *Does Corruption Affect Income Inequality and Poverty?* IMF Working Paper 98-76 (Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, 1998).
11. Stapenhurst and Kpundeh, *Curbing Corruption*.
12. World Bank calculation as cited in John Ashcroft, *Prepared Remarks of Attorney General John Ashcroft at the World Economic Forum*, Davos, Switzerland, January 22, 2004 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, 2004), p. 2. Global corruption costs countries \$2.3 trillion per year in 2004 dollars.
13. Kaufmann and Wei, "Does 'Grease Money' Speed Up the Wheels of Commerce?" abstract page.
14. R. Fisman and J. Svensson, "Are Corruption and Taxation Really Harmful to Growth? Firm Level Evidence," *Journal of Development Economics* 83 (May 2007), pp. 63–75. This is a study of 173 Ugandan firms. A 1 percent rise in the rate of bribery payments correlated with a 3.3 percent drop in the firms' annual growth rate.
15. Stapenhurst and Kpundeh, *Curbing Corruption*.
16. Pippa Norris, as quoted in Richard Morin, "Islam and Democracy," *Washington Post* (April 28, 2002). Norris and Ron Inglehart examined data from more than 100,000 interviews conducted between 1995 and 2001 as part of Harvard's World Values Study.
17. Pew Global Attitudes Project, *Global Opinion Trends, 2002–2007* (Washington, DC: Author, 2008), p. 34. Figures are for 2007.
18. Edward Glaeser, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer, *Do Institutions Cause Growth?* NBER Working Paper No. 10568 (June 2004), National Bureau of Economic Research, <http://www.nber.org>. Evidence supporting this observation is not hard to find. The democratic Weimar Republic made such poor economic decisions that Hitler slid into power; the Fuehrer steadily improved Germany's economy until he started World War II. Mao Zedong, as dictator of the Peoples Republic of China, made spectacularly destructive economic decisions, a trend dramatically reversed after his death in 1976 by Deng Xiaoping, another dictator.
19. Alok K. Bohara, Neil J. Mitchell, and Carl F. Mittendorf, "Compound Democracy and the Control of Corruption: A Cross-Country Investigation," *Policy Studies Journal* 32 (Winter 2004), pp. 481–499. This is a global study based on the World Bank Institute's rruption data for 1996, 1998, and 2000, and the annual corruption perception surveys coordinated by Transparency International.
20. Christopher J. Anderson and Yuliya V.Tverdova, "Corruption, Political Allegiances, and Attitudes Toward Government in Contemporary Democracies," *American Journal of Politics* 47 (January 2003), pp. 91–109. The quotations are on p. 91.
21. Christopher A. Cooper, H. Gibbs Knotts, and Kathleen M. Brennan, "The Importance of Trust in Government for Public Administration: The Case of Zoning," *Public Administration Review* 68 (May/June 2008), pp. 459–467.
22. Jerrell D. Cogburn and Sandra K. Schneider, "The Relationship between State Government Performance and State Quality of Life," *International Journal of Public Administration* 26 (December 2003), pp. 1337–1358. The quotation is on p. 1337.
23. Francis Fukuyama, *State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004).
24. G. Calvin McKenzie and Judith M. Labiner, *Opportunity Lost: The Rise and Fall of Trust and Confidence in Government after September 11* (Washington, DC: Brookings, 2002), p. 3. In July 2001, 29 percent of respondents in a national survey said they trusted the government in Washington to do the right thing just about always or most of the time, compared with 57 percent in October 2001.
25. Kathy Frankovic, "Polls Show Skepticism of Katrina Recovery," *CBS News* (August 29, 2007), <http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2007/08/29/opinion/pollpositions/main3216082.shtml>.
26. Dan Balz, "Bush's Hurricane Damage," *Washington Post* (August 28, 2007). This is an analysis of numerous national polls. "The storyline of a bungling administration was far from fully realized before Katrina hit the coast," and Bush's approval ratings tanked steadily after Katrina until the close of his presidency.
27. William H. Harader, "Whither Public Administration?" *Public Administration Review* 37 (January/February 1977), p. 98.

CHAPTER 1

Big Democracy, Big Bureaucracy



The public bureaucracy is the arm of the state's civil power. In the United States, that arm appears to be atrophied, at least in comparison with its counterparts in most other developed democracies. This apparent bureaucratic flaccidity is a consequence of national culture and careful political design.

An Unpromising Precis

The roots of Americans' profound suspicion of executive authority are deeply sunk, and are apparent in the nation's earliest influences and origins.

The Indians and the English

One such influence was that of the Native Americans, who surrounded the early European settlers for centuries. Hence, the "framers of the Constitution . . . were pervaded by Indian images of liberty."¹ The Iroquois Confederation, a vast alliance of tribes that stretched from Kentucky, to the Great Lakes, to the Eastern seaboard, was emblematic of executive constraint: "Their whole civil policy was averse to the concentration of power in any single individual."²

Another influence was that of the English, who governed their colonists with a firm hand, but resisted royal rule on their own sceptral isle. No less an authority than Woodrow Wilson, the acknowledged founder of

American public administration, observed that "The English race long and successfully studied the art of curbing executive power to the constant neglect of the art of perfecting executive methods."³

The Indians and the English set a governing tone that, in the eighteenth century, expressed itself in three formats that outlined Americans' enduring *social contract*, or the unwritten agreement between the governed and their governments, often more understood than expressed, that defines and limits the responsibilities of both of them.

Administration by Ambassadors: The Articles of Confederation

One such format was the woefully misnamed Articles of Confederation and Perpetual Union, which, from 1781 to 1789, provided the first framework for the new nation, and exemplified Americans' contempt for princely prerogatives.

There was no chief executive. In fact, the first draft of the Articles, written in 1776, was rejected by the Second Continental Congress on the specific grounds that it had proposed an executive, and this bias against executive authority extended to *every* national officeholder; under the Articles, every continental official had a one-year term, and each one was subject to term limits.⁴