

**Joel
Feinberg**

**REASON &
RESPONSIBILITY**

**Readings in
Some Basic
Problems
of Philosophy**

Sixth Edition

REASON
AND
RESPONSIBILITY

READINGS
IN SOME BASIC PROBLEMS
OF PHILOSOPHY

Sixth Edition

WADSWORTH PUBLISHING COMPANY
BELMONT, CALIFORNIA
A DIVISION OF WADSWORTH, INC.

Philosophy Editor: Kenneth King
Production Editor: Robin Lockwood
Copy Editor: Naomi Steinfeld

© 1985, 1981 by Wadsworth, Inc.
Copyright © 1965, 1971, 1975, 1978 by Dickenson Publishing
Company, Inc. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be
reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transcribed, in any form
or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording,
or otherwise, without the prior written permission of the publisher,
Wadsworth Publishing Company, Belmont, California 94002, a
division of Wadsworth, Inc.

Printed in the United States of America

4 5 6 7 8 9 10—89 88 87 86

ISBN 0-534-03873-5

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data

Main entry under title:
Reason and responsibility.

Bibliography: p.

1. Philosophy—Addresses, essays, lectures.

I. Feinberg, Joel, 1926–

B29.R367 1984 100 84-17334

ISBN 0-534-03873-5

P R E F A C E

The conviction underlying this volume is that introducing the modern college student to philosophy by means of a few representative problems examined in great detail is far preferable to offering a “little bit of everything,” with each “branch” of philosophy, each major “ism,” and each major historical period represented with scrupulous impartiality (even though the articles may have little relevance to one another). Accordingly, I have selected articles from both classical and contemporary sources on such topics as religion, knowledge, mind, personal identity, death, freedom, responsibility, duty, and selfishness. The problems that concern philosophers under these headings are not mere idle riddles, but rather questions of vital interest to any reflective person. Each set of problems is plumbed in considerable depth in essays expressing different, and often opposing, views. My hope is that exposure to this argumentative give-and-take will encourage students to take part in the process themselves, and through this practice to develop their powers of philosophical reasoning.

This sixth edition of *Reason and Responsibility* represents a substantial revision of the earlier editions. It opens with a Platonic dialogue, the *Euthyphro*, which many teachers have recommended as a useful illustration of philosophical argumentation that arises spontaneously in the course of an ordinary discussion. Furthermore, it convincingly illustrates Socrates’ general conviction that even in the world of practical affairs, people who have not thought their way through to the ultimate philosophical presuppositions of their conduct quite literally don’t know what they are doing. The *Euthyphro* also makes a natural transition to the philosophy of religion treated in Part One (this part remains the same as in previous editions).

Part Two is unchanged except for the addition of those excerpts from Locke’s essay (defending the causal theory of perception) that Berkeley seems to be attacking in his *Three Dialogues*, the selection immediately following.

Part Three, on the philosophy of mind, is the most thoroughly restructured section of this book: It contains five new selections. As before, the mind-body problem and standard proposals for its solution are presented in traditional ways; but this new edition reveals the subtle ways in which developments in the cognitive sciences, especially in computer studies, have altered the terms of the problem and inspired new proposals for dealing

with it. Jerry Fodor and John Searle discuss these developments from quite different perspectives. Traditional problems of personal identity have also been sharpened and made more challenging by recent scientific developments, as Daniel Dennett's science fiction (or philosophical fiction) story and Thomas Nagel's discussion of brain bisections demonstrate.

Part Four also has been restructured. Hard determinism is now represented in part by Arthur Schopenhauer's classic, *Essay on the Freedom of the Will*. Soft determinism is defended in various representative ways by David Hume, and Walter Stace. Part Four's subsection on punishment has been shortened; it has also been enriched by the addition of two strikingly contrasting essays written by American psychiatrist Karl Menninger and by the British critic and theologian, C. S. Lewis. A brief selection from Dostoevsky's memoir of life in a Siberian prison camp completes the additions to Part Four.

Part Five now has a section that includes Ruth Benedict defending ethical relativism and Walter Stace criticizing that view. I have added selections from John Rawls' *A Theory of Justice*. The inclusion of selections from W. D. Ross and Immanuel Kant shifts the primary emphasis from the book's previous focus on egoism and utilitarianism and their problems to a focus on duty.

One important change that was made in the fourth edition has been preserved in this edition. Part Two, "Human Knowledge: Its Grounds and Limits," does not adhere to the general principle of organization by specific separate problems that characterizes the rest of the book. Part Two now has no subsections. This structure allows me to avoid the proliferation of inappropriately technical essays on riddles concerning the various types of knowledge—our knowledge of the past, of the future, of ourselves, of other minds, of mathematical truths, and so on—and also, I hope, to avoid offensively splintering classic texts into little bits and snippets. Instead, both Descartes' *Meditations* and Berkeley's *Three Dialogues* appear in their entirety. There is also a very substantial part of Hume's "Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding" (which is now augmented by the new chapter on "Liberty and Necessity" in Part Four). These systematic works develop answers to the smaller questions in a natural manner and sequence, and enable the student to study fully elaborated systems of thought in their original sources.

This volume currently contains six classics: two that are complete (Descartes' *Meditations* and Berkeley's *Dialogues*); one that is presented in actual or virtual totality (Hume's *Dialogues*); and three that appear in very substantial sections (Hume's "Inquiry," Mill's *Utilitarianism*, and Plato's *Republic*). The text can now be used to teach an introductory course based solidly on a reading of these classics; more recent articles are thrown in as a kind of dividend. The book contains many articles by contemporary philosophers, including six that are addressed specifically to beginning students and that were written expressly for this book by William Rowe, Wesley Salmon, John Perry, Howard Kahane, and the editor.

I do not presume to dictate that there is one "necessary and natural" order of sequence in which to read these materials. The book begins with the philosophy of religion, since its problems are likely to already be familiar to many beginners. But it is just as "natural" to begin with Part Two, since the question of our knowledge of God presupposes the question of the "grounds and limits of human knowledge" generally. Similarly, there is no reason why one could not begin with the mind-body problem (Part Three) or the problem of determinism and free will (Part Four). Indeed, many professors have told

me that they prefer to begin with ethics (Part Five) and work their way toward the front of the book.

In selecting materials for this sixth edition, I have been helped by the advice, positive and negative, of the following critics: Robert M. Harnish and Henning Jensen, University of Arizona; Robert Brandon, Duke University; Angelo A. Calvello, DePaul University; David H. Jones, College of William and Mary; William Prior, University of Colorado; and Glenn Lesses, Texas Christian University. I am grateful for their help, and also for the skillful typing and assistance of Willa Green in assembling the manuscript.

Joel Feinberg

PROLOGUE

A Philosophical Dialogue

The *Euthyphro*, one of the shorter dialogues of Plato (428 B.C.–348 B.C.), gives the student a typical example of Plato’s own teacher, Socrates, at work. Here, Socrates is eliciting a philosophical definition from Euthyphro, a smug person who is content that he knows what he is up to. Socrates then demolishes this definition by a few “innocent” questions, thereby revealing that the self-satisfied fool has no more understanding of what he is doing, and of the concepts he employs to explain what he is doing, than does a parrot or an automaton who might mouth the same words. Socrates and Euthyphro meet at the law court, where both of them have business. Socrates is about to be tried on the charge of impiety; Euthyphro is on his way to bring formal indictment of his own father—also for impiety. Surely there can be no doubt in this instance that the philosophical inquiry into the nature of piety and impiety has a clear relevance to the way people govern their lives! The reader should be warned that the English words “piety” and “impiety,” with their narrow religious meanings, are at best only approximate renderings of the Greek terms used by Socrates and Euthyphro. To the Athenians of their time, “piety” blended a sense of responsibility, trustworthiness, and loyalty under one heading: “religious piety for the Greeks enforced all the obligations that bind an individual to others, and engage his personal responsibility to his family and friends, and his political loyalty to the state and its traditions”¹ In any case, Euthyphro is incapable of explaining what this conscientious loyalty really is, and his bumbling efforts at definition are circular or otherwise defective. To this day, Socrates’ cross-examination remains one of the best introductions to philosophical reasoning and argument.

¹Robert D. Cumming, “Introduction,” *The Euthyphro, Apology, and Crito of Plato* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1948), p. x.

PLATO

Euthyphro*

CHARACTERS—*SOCRATES* and *EUTHYPHRO*.

SCENE—*The Hall of the King*

Euthyphro. What in the world are you doing here in the king's hall,¹ *Socrates*? Why have you left your haunts in the Lyceum? You surely cannot have a suit before him, as I have.

Socrates. The Athenians, *Euthyphro*, call it an indictment, not a suit.

Euth. What? Do you mean that someone is prosecuting you? I cannot believe that you are prosecuting anyone yourself.

Socr. Certainly I am not.

Euth. Then is someone prosecuting you?

Socr. Yes.

Euth. Who is he?

Socr. I scarcely know him myself, *Euthyphro*; I think he must be some unknown young man. His name, however, is Meletus, and his district Pitthis.

Euth. I don't know him, *Socrates*. But tell me, what is he prosecuting you for?

Socr. What for? Not on trivial grounds, I think. It is no small thing for so young a man to have formed an opinion on such an important matter. For he, he says, knows how the young are corrupted, and who are their corrupters. He must be a wise man who, observing my ignorance, is going to accuse me to the state, as his mother, of corrupting his friends. I think that he is the only one who begins at the right point in his political reforms; for his first care is to make the young men as good as possible, just as a good farmer will take care of his young plants first, and, after he has done that, of the others. And so Meletus, I suppose, is first clearing us away who, as he says, corrupt the young men growing up; and then, when he

has done that, of course he will turn his attention to the older men, and so become a very great public benefactor. . . .

Euth. I hope it may be so, *Socrates*, but I fear the opposite. It seems to me that in trying to injure you, he is really setting to work by striking a blow at the foundation of the state. But how, tell me, does he say that you corrupt the youth?

Socr. In a way which sounds absurd at first, my friend. He says that I am a maker of gods; and so he is prosecuting me, he says, for inventing new gods and for not believing in the old ones.

Euth. I understand, *Socrates*. It is because you say that you always have a divine guide. So he is prosecuting you for introducing religious reforms; and he is going into court to arouse prejudice against you, knowing that the multitude are easily prejudiced about such matters. . . . Well, *Socrates*, I dare say that nothing will come of it. Very likely you will be successful in your trial, and I think that I shall be in mine.

Socr. And what is this suit of yours, *Euthyphro*? Are you suing, or being sued?

Euth. I am suing.

Socr. Whom?

Euth. A man whom people think I must be mad to prosecute.

Socr. What? Has he wings to fly away with?

Euth. He is far enough from flying; he is a very old man.

Socr. Who is he?

Euth. He is my father.

Socr. Your father, my good man?

Euth. He is indeed.

Socr. What are you prosecuting him for? What is the accusation?

Euth. Murder, *Socrates*.

Socr. Good heavens, *Euthyphro*! Surely the multitude are ignorant of what is right. I take it that it is

*Translated by F. J. Church and revised by Robert D. Cumming. Published in *The Euthyphro, Apology, and Crito of Plato* (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1956). Substantial excerpts included here. Reprinted by permission of the publisher.

not everyone who could rightly do what you are doing; only a man who was already well advanced in wisdom.

Euth. That is quite true, Socrates.

Socr. Was the man whom your father killed a relative of yours? But, of course, he was. You would never have prosecuted your father for the murder of a stranger?

Euth. You amuse me, Socrates. What difference does it make whether the murdered man were a relative or a stranger? The only question that you have to ask is, did the murderer kill justly or not? . . . In the present case the murdered man was a poor laborer of mine, who worked for us on our farm in Naxos. While drunk he got angry with one of our slaves and killed him. My father therefore bound the man hand and foot and threw him into a ditch, while he sent to Athens to ask the priest what he should do. While the messenger was gone, he entirely neglected the man, thinking that he was a murderer, and that it would be no great matter, even if he were to die. And that was exactly what happened; hunger and cold and his bonds killed him before the messenger returned. And now my father and the rest of my family are indignant with me because I am prosecuting my father for the murder of this murderer. They assert that he did not kill the man at all; and they say that, even if he had killed him over and over again, the man himself was a murderer, and that I ought not to concern myself about such a person because it is impious for a son to prosecute his father for murder. So little, Socrates, do they know the divine law of piety and impiety.

Socr. And do you mean to say, Euthyphro, that you think that you understand divine things and piety and impiety so accurately that, in such a case as you have stated, you can bring your father to justice without fear that you yourself may be doing something impious?

Euth. If I did not understand all these matters accurately, Socrates, I should not be worth much. . . .

Socr. Then, my dear Euthyphro, I cannot do better than become your pupil and challenge Meletus on this very point before the trial begins. I should say that I had always thought it very important to have knowledge about divine things; and that now, when he says that I offend by speaking carelessly about them, and by introducing reforms, I have become your pupil. And I should say, "Meletus, if you ac-

knowledge Euthyphro to be wise in these matters and to hold the correct belief, then think the same of me and do not put me on trial; but if you do not, then bring a suit, not against me, but against my master, for corrupting his elders—namely, myself whom he corrupts by his teaching, and his own father whom he corrupts by admonishing and punishing him." And if I did not succeed in persuading him to release me from the suit or to indict you in my place, then I could repeat my challenge in court.

Euth. Yes, by Zeus! Socrates, I think I should find out his weak points if he were to try to indict me. I should have a good deal to say about him in court long before I spoke about myself.

Socr. Yes, my dear friend, and knowing this I am anxious to become your pupil. I see that Meletus here, and others too, seem not to notice you at all, but he sees through me without difficulty and at once prosecutes me for impiety. Now, therefore, please explain to me what you were so confident just now that you knew. Tell me what are righteousness and sacrilege with respect to murder and everything else. I suppose that piety is the same in all actions, and that impiety is always the opposite of piety, and retains its identity, and that, as impiety, it always has the same character, which will be found in whatever is impious.

Euth. Certainly, Socrates, I suppose so.

Socr. Tell me, then, what is piety and what is impiety?

Euth. Well, then, I say that piety means prosecuting the unjust individual who has committed murder or sacrilege, or any other such crime, as I am doing now, whether he is your father or your mother or whoever he is; and I say that impiety means not prosecuting him. And observe, Socrates, I will give you a clear proof, which I have already given to others, that it is so, and that doing right means not letting off unpunished the sacrilegious man, who-soever he may be. Men hold Zeus to be the best and the most just of the gods; and they admit that Zeus bound his own father, Cronos, for wrongfully devouring his children; and that Cronos, in his turn, castrated his father for similar reasons. And yet these same men are incensed with me because I proceed against my father for doing wrong. So, you see, they say one thing in the case of the gods and quite another in mine.

Socr. Is not that why I am being prosecuted, Euthyphro? I mean, because I find it hard to accept such stories people tell about the gods? I expect that I

shall be found at fault because I doubt those stories. Now if you who understand all these matters so well agree in holding all those tales true, then I suppose that I must yield to your authority. What could I say when I admit myself that I know nothing about them? But tell me, in the name of friendship, do you really believe that these things have actually happened?

Euth. Yes, and more amazing things too, Socrates, which the multitude do not know of.

Socr. Then you really believe that there is war among the gods, and bitter hatreds, and battles, such as the poets tell of. . . .

Euth. Yes, Socrates, and more besides. As I was saying, I will report to you many other stories about divine matters, if you like, which I am sure will astonish you when you hear them.

Socr. I dare say. You shall report them to me at your leisure another time. At present please try to give a more definite answer to the question which I asked you just now. What I asked you, my friend, was, What is piety? and you have not explained it to me to my satisfaction. You only tell me that what you are doing now, namely, prosecuting your father for murder, is a pious act.

Euth. Well, that is true, Socrates.

Socr. Very likely. But many other actions are pious, are they not, Euthyphro?

Euth. Certainly.

Socr. Remember, then, I did not ask you to tell me one or two of all the many pious actions that there are; I want to know what is characteristic of piety which makes all pious actions pious. You said, I think, that there is one characteristic which makes all pious actions pious, and another characteristic which makes all impious actions impious. Do you not remember?

Euth. I do.

Socr. Well, then, explain to me what is this characteristic, that I may have it to turn to, and to use as a standard whereby to judge your actions and those of other men, and be able to say that whatever action resembles it is pious, and whatever does not, is not pious.

Euth. Yes, I will tell you that if you wish. Socrates. . . . What is pleasing to the gods is pious, and what is not pleasing to them is impious.

Socr. Fine, Euthyphro. Now you have given me the answer that I wanted. Whether what you say is true, I do not know yet. But, of course, you will go on to prove that it is true.

Euth. Certainly.

Socr. Come, then, let us examine our statement. The things and the men that are pleasing to the gods are pious, and the things and the men that are displeasing to the gods are impious. But piety and impiety are not the same; they are as opposite as possible—was not that what he said?

Euth. Certainly. . . .

Socr. Have we not also said, Euthyphro, that there are quarrels and disagreements and hatreds among the gods?

Euth. We have.

Socr. But what kind of disagreement, my friend, causes hatred and anger? Let us look at the matter thus. If you and I were to disagree as to whether one number were more than another, would that make us angry and enemies? Should we not settle such a dispute at once by counting?

Euth. Of course.

Socr. And if we were to disagree as to the relative size of two things, we should measure them and put an end to the disagreement at once, should we not? . . . And should we not settle a question about the relative weight of two things by weighing them?

Euth. Of course.

Socr. Then what is the question which would make us angry and enemies if we disagreed about it, and could not come to a settlement? Perhaps you have not an answer ready; but listen to mine. Is it not the question of the just and unjust, of the honorable and the dishonorable, of the good and the bad? Is it not questions about these matters which make you and me and everyone else quarrel, when we do quarrel, if we differ about them and can reach no satisfactory agreement?

Euth. Yes. Socrates, it is disagreements about these matters.

Socr. Well, Euthyphro, the gods will quarrel over these things if they quarrel at all, will they not?

Euth. Necessarily.

Socr. Then, my good Euthyphro, you say that some of the gods think one thing just, the others, another; and that what some of them hold to be honorable or good, others hold to be dishonorable or evil. For there would not have been quarrels among them if they had not disagreed on these points, would there?

Euth. You are right.

Socr. And each of them love: what he thinks honorable, and good, and just; and hates the opposite,

does he not?

Euth. Certainly.

Socr. But you say that the same action is held by some of them to be just, and by others to be unjust; and that then they dispute about it, and so quarrel and fight among themselves. Is it not so?

Euth. Yes.

Socr. Then the same thing is hated by the gods and loved by them; and the same thing will be displeasing and pleasing to them.

Euth. Apparently.

Socr. Then, according to your account, the same thing will be pious and impious.

Euth. So it seems.

Socr. Then, my good friend, you have not answered my question. I did not ask you to tell me what action is both pious and impious; but it seems that whatever is pleasing to the gods is also displeasing to them. And so, Euthyphro, I should not be surprised if what you are doing now in punishing your father is an action well pleasing to Zeus, but hateful to Cronos and Uranus, and acceptable to Hephaestus, but hateful to Hera; and if any of the other gods disagree about it, pleasing to some of them and displeasing to others.

Euth. But on this point, Socrates, I think that there is no difference of opinion among the gods: they all hold that if one man kills another unjustly, he must be punished.

Socr. What, Euthyphro? Among mankind, have you never heard disputes whether a man ought to be punished for killing another man unjustly, or for doing some other unjust deed?

Euth. Indeed, they never cease from these disputes, especially in courts of justice. They do all manner of unjust things; and then there is nothing which they will not do and say to avoid punishment.

Socr. Do they admit that they have done something unjust, and at the same time deny that they ought to be punished, Euthyphro?

Euth. No, indeed, that they do not.

Socr. Then it is not the case that there is nothing which they will not do and say. I take it, they do not dare to say or argue that they must not be punished if they have done something unjust. What they say is that they have not done anything unjust, is it not so?

Euth. That is true.

Socr. Then they do not disagree over the question that the unjust individual must be punished. They

disagree over the question, who is unjust, and what was done and when, do they not?

Euth. That is true.

Socr. Well, is not exactly the same thing true of the gods if they quarrel about justice and injustice, as you say they do? Do not some of them say that the others are doing something unjust, while the others deny it? No one, I suppose, my dear friend, whether god or man, dares to say that a person who has done something unjust must not be punished.

Euth. No, Socrates, that is true, by and large.

Socr. I take it, Euthyphro, that the disputants, whether men or gods, if the gods do disagree, disagree over each separate act. When they quarrel about any act, some of them say that it was just, and others that it was unjust. Is it not so?

Euth. Yes.

Socr. Come, then, my dear Euthyphro, please enlighten me on this point. What proof have you that all the gods think that a laborer who has been imprisoned for murder by the master of the man whom he has murdered, and who dies from his imprisonment before the master has had time to learn from the religious authorities what he should do, dies unjustly? How do you know that it is just for a son to indict his father and to prosecute him for the murder of such a man? Come, see if you can make it clear to me that the gods necessarily agree in thinking that this action of yours is just; and if you satisfy me, I will never cease singing your praises for wisdom.

Euth. I could make that clear enough to you, Socrates; but I am afraid that it would be a long business.

Socr. I see you think that I am duller than the judges. To them, of course, you will make it clear that your father has committed an unjust action, and that all the gods agree in hating such actions.

Euth. I will indeed, Socrates, if they will only listen to me.

Socr. They will listen if they think that you are a good speaker. But while you were talking, it occurred to me to ask myself this question: suppose that Euthyphro were to prove to me as clearly as possible that all the gods think such a death unjust, how has he brought me any nearer to understanding what piety and impiety are? This particular act, perhaps, may be displeasing to the gods, but then we have just seen that piety and impiety cannot be defined in that way; for we have seen that what is displeasing to the gods is also pleasing to them. So I will let you off on this point, Euthyphro; and all the gods shall agree in thinking your father's action wrong and in hating it, if

you like. But shall we correct our definition and say that whatever all the gods hate is impious, and whatever they all love is pious; while whatever some of them love, and others hate, is either both or neither? Do you wish us now to define piety and impiety in this manner?

Euth. Why not, Socrates?

Socr. There is no reason why I should not, Euthyphro. It is for you to consider whether that definition will help you to teach me what you promised.

Euth. Well, I should say that piety is what all the gods love, and that impiety is what they all hate.

Socr. Are we to examine this definition, Euthyphro, and see if it is a good one? . . .

Euth. For my part I think that the definition is right this time.

Socr. We shall know that better in a little while, my good friend. Now consider this question. Do the gods love piety because it is pious, or is it pious because they love it?

Euth. I do not understand you, Socrates.

Socr. I will try to explain myself: we speak of a thing being carried and carrying, and being led and leading, and being seen and seeing; and you understand that all such expressions mean different things, and what the difference is.

Euth. Yes, I think I understand.

Socr. And we talk of a thing being loved, of a thing loving, and the two are different?

Euth. Of course.

Socr. Now tell me, is a thing which is being carried in a state of being carried because it is carried, or for some other reason?

Euth. No, because it is carried.

Socr. And a thing is in a state of being led because it is led, and of being seen because it is seen?

Euth. Certainly.

Socr. Then a thing is not seen because it is in a state of being seen: it is in a state of being seen because it is seen; and a thing is not led because it is in a state of being led: it is in a state of being led because it is led; and a thing is not carried because it is in a state of being carried: it is in a state of being carried because it is carried. Is my meaning clear now, Euthyphro? I mean this: if anything becomes or is affected, it does not become because it is in a state of becoming: it is in a state of becoming because it becomes; and it is not affected because it is in a state of being affected: it is in a state of being affected because it is affected. Do you not agree?

Euth. I do.

Socr. Is not that which is being loved in a state either of becoming or of being affected in some way by something?

Euth. Certainly.

Socr. Then the same is true here as in the former cases. A thing is not loved by those who love it because it is in a state of being loved; it is in a state of being loved because they love it.

Euth. Necessarily.

Socr. Well, then, Euthyphro, what do we say about piety? Is it not loved by all the gods, according to your definition?

Euth. Yes.

Socr. Because it is pious, or for some other reason?

Euth. No, because it is pious.

Socr. Then it is loved by the gods because it is pious; it is not pious because it is loved by them?

Euth. It seems so.

Socr. But, then, what is pleasing to the gods is pleasing to them, and is in a state of being loved by them, because they love it?

Euth. Of course.

Socr. Then piety is not what is pleasing to the gods, and what is pleasing to the gods is not pious, as you say, Euthyphro. They are different things.

Euth. And why, Socrates?

Socr. Because we are agreed that the gods love piety because it is pious, and that it is not pious because they love it. Is not this so?

Euth. Yes.

Socr. And that what is pleasing to the gods because they love it, is pleasing to them by reason of this same love, and that they do not love it because it is pleasing to them.

Euth. True.

Socr. Then, my dear Euthyphro, piety and what is pleasing to the gods are different things. If the gods had loved piety because it is pious, they would also have loved what is pleasing to them because it is pleasing to them; but if what is pleasing to them had been pleasing to them because they loved it, then piety, too, would have been piety because they loved it. But now you see that they are opposite things, and wholly different from each other. For the one is of a sort to be loved because it is loved, while the other is loved because it is of a sort to be loved. My question, Euthyphro, was, What is piety? But it turns out that

you have not explained to me the essential character of piety; you have been content to mention an effect which belongs to it—namely, that all gods love it. You have not yet told me what its essential character is. Do not, if you please, keep from me what piety is; begin again and tell me that. Never mind whether the gods love it, or whether it has other effects: we shall not differ on that point. Do your best to make clear to me what is piety and what is impiety.

Euth. But, Socrates, I really don't know how to explain to you what is on my mind. Whatever statement we put forward always somehow moves round in a circle, and will not stay where we put it. . . .

Socr. Then we must begin again and inquire what piety is. I do not mean to give in until I have found

out. Do not regard me as unworthy; give your whole mind to the question, and this time tell me the truth. For if anyone knows it, it is you; and you are a Proteus whom I must not let go until you have told me. It cannot be that you would ever have undertaken to prosecute your aged father for the murder of a laboring man unless you had known exactly what piety and impiety are. You would have feared to risk the anger of the gods, in case you should be doing wrong, and you would have been afraid of what men would say. But now I am sure that you think that you know exactly what is pious and what is not; so tell me, my good Euthyphro, and do not conceal from me what you think.

Euth. Another time, then, Socrates, I am in a hurry now, and it is time for me to be off.

NOTE

1. The anachronistic title "King" was retained by the magistrate who had jurisdiction over crimes affecting the state religion.—Ed.

CONTENTS

	Preface	xi
	Prologue: A Philosophical Dialogue	
	PLATO	
	from the <i>Euthyphro</i>	xiv
PART	1	
	REASON AND RELIGIOUS BELIEF	2
	Introduction	2
	<i>The Existence and Nature of God</i>	6
	SAINT ANSELM	
	The Ontological Argument, from <i>Proslogium</i>	6
	WILLIAM L. ROWE	
	“The Ontological Argument”	8
	SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS	
	The Five Ways, from <i>Summa Theologica</i>	17
	SAMUEL CLARKE	
	A Modern Formulation of the Cosmological Argument, from <i>A Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God</i>	19
	WILLIAM L. ROWE	
	“The Cosmological Argument”	20
	WILLIAM PALEY	
	The Argument from Design, from <i>Natural Theology</i>	28
	DAVID HUME	
	<i>Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion</i> , II–XI	33

J. L. MACKIE
"Evil and Omnipotence" 64

Religious Propositions 71

ANTONY FLEW, R. M. HARE, BASIL MITCHELL
Symposium on Theology and Falsification 71

Religious Experience and Mysticism 77

WALTER T. STACE
"What Is Mysticism?" 77

BERTRAND RUSSELL
Critique of Mysticism, from *Religion and Science* 85

Reason and Faith 89

BLAISE PASCAL
The Wager, from *Thoughts* 89

STEPHEN P. STICH
Pascal's Wager and Doomsday Scenario Arguments 91

WILLIAM JAMES
from "The Will to Believe" 92

PART **2** HUMAN KNOWLEDGE: ITS GROUNDS
AND LIMITS 100

Introduction 100

RENÉ DESCARTES
Meditations on First Philosophy (complete) 106

JOHN LOCKE
The Causal Theory of Perception,
from *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding* 136

GEORGE BERKELEY
Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous (complete) 144

BERTRAND RUSSELL
"Appearance and Reality," and "The Existence of Matter," from
The Problems of Philosophy 188

DAVID HUME
An Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding, II, IV–VII 195

	WESLEY C. SALMON	
	“An Encounter with David Hume”	218
PART	3	MIND AND ITS PLACE IN NATURE 236
	Introduction	236
	<i>The Mind-Body Problem</i>	243
	C. D. BROAD	
	from “The Traditional Problem of Body and Mind,” in <i>The Mind and Its Place in Nature</i>	243
	J. J. C. SMART	
	“Sensations and Brain Processes”	251
	JEROME A. SHAFFER	
	“The Subject of Consciousness,” from <i>Philosophy of Mind</i>	259
	<i>Minds and Machines</i>	273
	JERRY A. FODOR	
	Functionalism and Explanation by Simulation	273
	JOHN R. SEARLE	
	“Minds, Brains, and Programs”	286
	<i>The Self and Its Identity</i>	298
	JOHN LOCKE	
	The Prince and the Cobbler, from <i>An Essay Concerning Human Understanding</i>	298
	DAVID HUME	
	The Self, from <i>A Treatise of Human Nature</i>	300
	DANIEL C. DENNETT	
	“Where Am I?” from <i>Brainstorms</i>	303
	THOMAS NAGEL	
	“Brain Bisection and the Unity of Consciousness”	311
	<i>Personal Identity and the Survival of Death</i>	320
	JOHN PERRY	
	“A Dialogue on Personal Identity and Immortality”	320

PART 4 DETERMINISM, FREE WILL, AND RESPONSIBILITY 338

Introduction 338

*Hard Determinism: The Case for Determinism and Its
Incompatibility With Any Important Sense of
Free Will* 347

ARTHUR SCHOPENHAUER

from *Essay on the Freedom of the Will* 347

JOHN HOSPERS

“Free Will and Psychoanalysis” 359

*Soft Determinism: The Case for Determinism and Its
Compatibility With the Most Important Sense of
Free Will* 370

DAVID HUME

“Liberty and Necessity” from *An Inquiry Concerning
Human Understanding*, VIII 370

WALTER T. STACE

The Problem of Free Will, from
Religion and the Modern Mind 379

*Libertarianism: The Case for Free Will and Its
Incompatibility With Determinism* 384

RICHARD TAYLOR

From “Freedom and Determinism” in *Metaphysics* 384

C. A. CAMPBELL

“Has the Self ‘Free Will’?” 390

Deliberation, Prediction, and Foreknowledge 401

ALVIN I. GOLDMAN

“Actions, Predictions, and Books of Life” 401

Determinism and Blame 410

ELIZABETH L. BEARDSLEY

“Determinism and Moral Perspectives” 410

Responsibility for Character 422

ARISTOTLE

Conditions of Responsibility for Action, from
The Nicomachean Ethics 422