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**INTERNATIONAL
SECURITY
IN THE
MODERN WORLD**

EDITED BY

ROGER CAREY AND

TREVOR C. SALMON

International Security in the Modern World

Edited by

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St. Martin's Press

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First published in Great Britain 1992 by
THE MACMILLAN PRESS LTD
Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 2XS
and London
Companies and representatives
throughout the world

A catalogue record for this book is available
from the British Library.

ISBN 0-333-49021-5

Printed in Great Britain by
Antony Rowe Ltd
Chippenham, Wiltshire

First published in the United States of America 1992 by
Scholarly and Reference Division,
ST. MARTIN'S PRESS, INC.,
175 Fifth Avenue,
New York, N.Y. 10010

ISBN 0-312-08375-0

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
International security in the modern world / edited by Roger Carey and
Trevor C. Salmon.

p. cm.

Includes index.

ISBN 0-312-08375-0

1. National security. 2. World politics—1989– 3. Security,
International. I. Carey, Roger, 1943– . II. Salmon, Trevor C.,
1948– .

UA10.5.I5695 1992
355'.03—dc20

92-8905
CIP

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Introduction

International Security is a complex business. There are over 160 states in the international system and the number seems set to rise further. All of these states – new and old, large and small, rich and poor – are concerned to protect the integrity of their borders and to safeguard the ‘way of life’ that is conducted within those borders. They are concerned, in other words, to safeguard their security. In the contemporary, technology-driven world there is a wide variety of means, especially of weapons and weapon systems, available to states and statesmen to seek to achieve their own security. These various means have the potential capacity to give the required ‘feeling’ of security to states. But the technological and physical components of these means, which contribute so much to the sense of security, also provide the instruments to undermine this ‘feeling’ of security in neighbouring states – the basis of the classical ‘security dilemma’. Security may, however, be more than an absence of fear of invasion. A high proportion of the population of the world is threatened by environmental catastrophe. To these people the newest and most technologically advanced means of either protecting oneself or destroying any potential opponent are a total irrelevance. In this context ‘security’ takes on a different meaning.

The volume of literature to ‘service’ the complex field of international security matches the means to achieve security that are available – there is a very rapid proliferation of volumes that become more specialised and more complex as time goes on. Many of these volumes are scholarly, erudite and informative and serve to ‘move forward’ the debate in the chosen area of expertise. However, the vast majority of these volumes assume that the reader is familiar with the basic ideas that underlie the whole of the debate about international security. There is a notable dearth of volumes that inform the ‘intelligent layman’ or the undergraduate or postgraduate, or member of the armed forces coming to international security for the first time of the ‘nature of the game’ of international security. It is to this group of people who are seeking an intelligible introduction to international security that this volume is addressed.

The initial momentum for the volume arose from the need for such an introduction in teaching undergraduates. Both of the Editors have taught International Security – in one guise or another – for more years than they care to remember. In that time ‘fashions’ have come and gone but there has remained a core of material that it has been necessary for all students

to understand if they are to go forward successfully and examine in depth the more specialised and esoteric areas of our discipline.

With the official ending of the Cold War there has begun a debate – in the West especially – about ‘The New International Order’. Underlying this debate is an assumption that the nature of international security is about to change, is changing, or has already changed. If such change had, indeed, already come about this volume would be superfluous. It is our belief that such a change has not occurred, and probably will not occur. In the next few years the *nature* of international security will remain broadly constant. There will be attention paid to different aspects of international security from time to time, the emphasis of political and academic debate will change, as has been the case over the past four decades, but the underlying nature of the international political system will not alter. International security and the need to study it arise from the nature of the international political process, from the inevitability of conflict in a world in which resources of all types are finite.

In examining the material that we considered constituted the ‘core’ of the discipline we examined several ways of organising the material into chapters that would be digestible by the reader. There is no ‘perfect’ way to organise such material. What emerges is always a compromise that is inevitable if any whole is divided into parts; there will always be ‘boundary problems’. This may be unfortunate. Where we have been extremely fortunate is in our contributors. Each contributor has written his or her chapter especially for this volume. Each received the same brief – to write on a topic that they knew well and to do so in a manner that would allow our defined ‘target readership’ to be well-informed. Each author, inevitably, has his or her own style but we believe that each succeeds in admirably fulfilling the brief.

It appeared to us that any study of International Security had to begin by discussing the nature of the matter in hand and some of the conceptual problems involved. This is the purpose of the first two chapters. Despite our view on the inevitability of conflict the international system is not totally anarchic. There are, therefore, several chapters that look at some aspects of the regulation of the security-related behaviour of states – Arms Control, Deterrence, Alliances. The Third World, if it is considered at all in studies in international security, is frequently assumed to have the same characteristics, preoccupations and problems as the developed world. A chapter questions this conventional wisdom. If conflict is inevitable between states the techniques of crisis management and crisis prevention, and the ‘allowable’ means of violent conflict seem to us to be worthy of

some examination and two chapters explore this area. If the search for security in the international system ultimately leads to warfare, either overt or covert, military might will be required to defend or project the values for which the state is alleged to stand. It seemed proper, therefore, to conclude the volume by examining the various forms of military power.

In producing this volume we have received help and encouragement from many sources, especially those who have read chapters and drafts of chapters and made comments upon them. To all of these people we record our thanks. We are also especially grateful to our Editor at Macmillan, Belinda Holdsworth, who thought she was about to receive a manuscript for some considerable time before one actually arrived – to her, our gratitude is of a special kind.

ROGER CAREY
TREVOR C. SALMON

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1 The Nature of International Security

Trevor C. Salmon

A CHANGING ENVIRONMENT

In the 1990s it has become a cliché, but true nonetheless, that it is necessary to reevaluate the concept of security, since it is clear that the antagonisms that defined the nature and scope of security for a generation have been significantly assuaged. On 19 November 1990 in Paris, for example, the member states of North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and the Warsaw Treaty Organisation signed a joint declaration 'affirming the end of the era of division and confrontation which has lasted for more than four decades'. They solemnly declared that 'in the new era of European relations which is beginning, they are no longer adversaries, will build new partnerships and extend to each other the hand of friendship'. The signatories affirmed their 'obligation and commitment to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state' and recognised that 'security is indivisible and that the security of each of their countries is inextricably linked to the security of all the States participating in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe'.¹

Such is the transformation that occurred in Europe at the end of the 1980s and at the beginning of the 1990s that, instead of being regarded merely as pious words, this declaration was regarded as serious and as setting the tone for relations between the states of Europe and the superpowers in the 1990s. The scale of the transformation in Europe has prompted many to contemplate whether the traditional conceptions of security retain any vitality or viability. Even the NATO Council in the London Declaration in July 1990 had already noted that given the changing realities in the world, 'security and stability do not lie solely in the military dimension, and we intend to enhance the political component of our Alliance'.²

This perception of the possible change in the components of security and in issues attracting priority in government attention was not, however, merely the result of the events in Eastern Europe. In 1975 Henry Kissinger, as United States Secretary of State, had spoken of 'progress in dealing with the traditional agenda' as no longer being enough, since a 'new and

unprecedented kind of issue has emerged. The problems of energy, resources, environment, population, the issues of space and the seas now rank with the questions of military security, ideology and territorial rivalry which have traditionally made up the diplomatic agenda.³ As a consequence, it has become almost routine to echo Joseph Nye's observation that 'Security problems have become more complicated as threats to state autonomy have shifted from the simply military, in which the threat is defined largely in terms of territorial integrity, to the economic.'⁴

CONFLICT AND POLITICS

This shift has in turn led some to perceive a fundamental shift in the conduct of human relations, such that it may now be possible to speak of a 'non-violent conflict culture'.⁵ This is, of course, very much like the situation in domestic politics in developed Western societies, where the disagreements that exist have become routinised, institutionalised and legitimised by agreed and well established mechanisms for resolving conflict. It is crucial to appreciate that the focus of any politics is disagreement or conflict. This is not 'to suggest that people engaged in politics never agree, or that open and flagrant disagreement is necessary before we can see politics going on; what is important is that we should recognize that conflict lies at the heart of politics. In a world of universal agreement, there would be no room for it.'⁶ Because disagreements or conflict lie at the heart of politics, so too does the concept of power, for it is power that is the mechanism for resolving these disagreements, for determining, in David Easton's famous phrase, 'the allocation of values for a society'.⁷ Domestically this is achieved by the acceptance of some procedure like (but not necessarily) elections. In some states it is still true that the procedure is the subject of contention, and there continue to be *coups*, revolutions, low-intensity wars, and usurpations.

Generally, however, a key feature of the distinction between domestic and international politics is that internationally there is no government or legitimate authority backed up by the monopoly of the use of force as the ultimate sanction. In the international arena there is no international or world government, no fully-articulated and enforceable system of international law, and no underlying consensus among the members of the international system on acceptable goals or even, on occasion, on how disagreements should be resolved. This has led to the traditional view that in the absence of world government, international politics can be seen as the constant pursuit of self-interest by the actors involved. As Reynolds

has noted, from this perspective, international politics is 'preeminently concerned with the art of achieving group ends against the opposition of other groups. But the groups are unconstrained in this competition by anything other than the limits on their power, and the losses that their controllers think they might suffer from the adoption of particular courses of action'.⁸ International politics is therefore based on the recognition of disagreement, and that the capacity to impose one's will 'is limited by the will and effective ability of other states to impose theirs. The conduct of international relations must therefore always be a delicate adjustment of power to power. . . .'⁹

Recognition of disagreement provides a link with the basic definition of politics given earlier. It also raises the issue of whether international politics in practice is completely distinct from domestic politics because, as Howard goes on to say, the delicate adjustment of power to power leads to 'an order which though fully satisfying to nobody, is just tolerable to all'.¹⁰ It is order nonetheless. Such a perspective in turn leads to the realisation that while disagreement and conflict lie at the heart of international politics, and indeed of politics in general, cooperation and agreement are also to be found in the world, even though violence is lurking in the background. This dichotomy has led historically to two major philosophical disputes about the fundamental nature of international relations: the Hobbesian state of nature versus the Lockeian, and the Realist versus Utopian debate of the first part of the twentieth century.

A QUESTION OF PERSPECTIVES

For Hobbes, writing in 1651, 'during all the time that men live without a common Power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called Warre; and such a warre, is as of every man, against every man . . . every man is Enemy to every man . . . men live without other security, other than their own strength'. In Hobbes's view this situation allowed for no industry, culture, building, art and 'no Society; and which is worst of all, continuall feare, and danger of violent death; And the life of man, solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short'. Whilst this has never existed *per se*, 'yet in all times, Kings and Persons of Sovereaign authority, because of their Independency, are in continuall jealousies, and in the state and posture of Gladiators; having their weapons pointing, and their eyes fixed on one another; that is, their Forts, Garrisons, and Guns upon the Frontiers of their Kingdoms; and continuall Spyes upon their neighbours; which is a posture of War.'¹¹ This is not, of course, an accurate reflection of con-

temporary international relations,¹² but it still encapsulates the fundamental assumptions of many about the nature of the system and of man.

Locke took a rather more optimistic view, although also writing of a state of nature. Locke did not assert, as Hobbes had done, that in such a state of nature antagonism was the supreme force between men. On the contrary, he firmly believed that sociability was the strongest bond between men. Men were equal, sociable and free; but they were not licentious because they were governed by the law of nature. He was clear that nature did not arm man against man, and that some degree of society was possible even in this state preceding government *per se*.¹³ Three centuries later the differing types of perception and assumptions about human nature that influenced Hobbes and Locke were still able to divide approaches to the study of the nature of international relations.

Modern International Relations as an academic subject grew out of the belief that war must be prevented and that there must be no more carnage like that of 1914–18. Between 1918 and 1939 the debate was renewed, this time between Utopians/Rationalists and Realists, a debate reflected in E. H. Carr's *The Twenty Year Crisis*.¹⁴ For Realists, power is the critical ingredient of international life. It cannot be eliminated, and is the primary motivation of states, and the pursuit of power is the primary obligation of states. International politics concerns survival in a hostile environment.

In the post-1945 period these ideas were classically expressed by Hans Morgenthau, who argued that 'the world, imperfect as it is from the rational point of view, is the result of forces inherent in human nature.' He went on: 'The main signpost that helps political realism find its way through the landscape of international politics is the concept of interest defined in terms of power. . . . We assume that statesmen think and act in terms of interest defined as power. . . . International politics, like all politics, is a struggle for power. Whatever the ultimate aims of international politics, power is always the immediate aim.'¹⁵

Given their pessimistic outlook, Realists also see war as a necessary evil, or at least an inherent evil in the system. This is because the basis of order is the delicate adjustment of power to power, or what came to be known as the balance of power. States provide for their security by seeking to balance the military power of their possible opponents. Periodically the perceived balance will be challenged or tested, and those tests and challenges tend to involve military power. While it is too simplistic to see this state as a reflection of 'fallen man' and 'sin', it is in marked contrast to the Utopian/Rationalist view, originating in the Enlightenment.

This view held that man is perfectible or at least capable of improvement, perhaps with the aid of some social engineering. It assumed the

inherent goodness of man. With rationality, man can achieve anything, including ways of transforming human behaviour, establishing norms and rules of conduct acceptable and apparent to all and ordering his affairs so as to avoid war and conflict. It was felt that on this basis an harmonious international political order could be achieved. This tradition made great play with the role of international institutions, international law, and the peaceful intent of public opinion. War was the result of a failure of rationality, and of a failure to follow the will of the people. The debate between these schools became entangled in the events of the 1930s and the arguments about appeasement as against more traditional views of international politics.

In the 1990s there has been a renewal of these themes, although in a different form. This can be seen in the recent emergence of the so-called 'new realism', or as William T. R. Fox puts it, the distinction between 'doctrinal' and 'empirical' Realists. The former 'assert(s) the basically rapacious character of contending great powers in a Hobbesian world', whilst an 'empirical' Realist, looking to see how states actually behave, 'discovers that most statesmen most of the time seek security rather than hegemony' and are aware of the competing demands upon resources and so on that are placed upon them and their societies.¹⁶ Whilst this new approach is still being developed, it can be seen that it takes a much broader view of both the nature of international relations as a whole and of security in particular. It has been heavily influenced by the rise in the 1970s and 1980s of the concepts of 'interdependence' and 'structuralism'.

Interdependence, in particular, has alerted the intellectual community to the complexity of today's world and to the point that governments and, perhaps more particularly, their citizens have a number of needs, values and concerns, such that simple military defence of territory is no longer in many cases the primary concern, a point made eloquently by Caroline Thomas in Chapter 6 below. Although this was apparent before the oil crisis of 1973–74, that event had a profound effect on the climate of opinion, generating work on topics like 'energy security'. It came to be more fully appreciated that security involved 'not merely . . . the maintenance of a state's physical survival and territorial security but also . . . the perpetuation of the values, patterns of social relations, life styles and varied other elements that characterize [a] . . . way of life'.¹⁷

Indeed, if survival was the original motivation for the creation of the state, or the Hobbesian Leviathan that would bring peace and order to the disordered world of a state of nature, it was an insufficient motivation once that peace and order appeared to have been secured. Then other needs, like prosperity, began to be more important, and there is an extensive

literature on individual need hierarchies, which build up from the most basic need of survival or biological continuation of the system.

This type of perspective led Keohane and Nye to the concept of 'complex interdependence'. Two characteristics of complex interdependence are especially relevant: 'The agenda of interstate relationships consists of multiple issues that are not arranged in a clear or consistent hierarchy. This *absence of hierarchy among issues means*, among other things, that military security does not consistently dominate the agenda . . . [and] Military force is not used by governments toward other governments . . . when complex interdependence prevails.'¹⁸ It is important to note that Keohane and Nye are not arguing that military force is irrelevant, but rather that in some situations, particularly among industrialised, pluralist, democratic states, force is 'unimportant as an instrument of policy' in their relations with one another. What is also noteworthy is that this interdependence does not mean there is no competition between states, but rather that the competition takes on somewhat different forms, and is limited as to means.

Structuralism is based upon assumptions relating to the politics of dominance and dependence. An outgrowth of the work of Marx and Lenin, structuralism has been the subject of renewed interest since the 1950s, as greater attention was paid to the issues of colonialism, imperialism, and the problems of the lack of socioeconomic development in the newly-independent and emerging states. As the term implies, structuralism takes the view that '[a]lthough the state still acts as a focus of activity and coercive power, it stands in a particular structural relationship to dominant economic and political interests, which use it as a channel or a support for the pursuit of their aims'.¹⁹

In effect, the assumption is that the real forces at work, or actors at work, are the dominant classes or economic interests, and that the 'structural relationship' in the international political and economic system means that those in dependent positions are prevented by the *status quo* of current structures from achieving real independence and influence. Especially important, therefore, in this view is the position a state occupies in the system, and this has led to great emphasis being placed upon the centre-periphery relationship, 'in which the major determinant of international action has been seen as the confrontation between the dominant "centre" of developed capitalism and the dependent "periphery" of the less developed areas.'²⁰ Such considerations structure all the relationships of those involved, including security.

While no one perspective alone is now regarded as entirely satisfactory, the traditional perspective focusing upon power is still strong in govern-

mental circles and tends still to predominate in debates about security, although this is less true than used to be the case.

THE CURRENT DEBATE: OPTIMISM AND PESSIMISM

These questions about perspectives are relevant to the current position in Europe and to views about security, as there still remain pessimists and optimists about state behaviour and human nature. Recently this has been seen in the quite different perspectives offered by Ken Booth and John J. Mearsheimer. Booth has promoted the 'New Thinking About Strategy and International Security'.²¹ Optimists believe that the end of the Cold War in Europe could bring about a complete change in the way in which states think of themselves, others and security. They argue that the situation in Europe might be transformed such that the whole of Europe can enjoy the type of relationship that has prevailed amongst the states of Western Europe for a generation or more, such that 'war is not merely unthinkable but materially impossible',²² it being inconceivable that Britain and France, for example, would go to war against each other. The goal is the creation of international security, such that a condition exists 'in which states have a justifiably high expectation that there will not be a major war, and that in the peace that prevails their core values will not be under threat. . . . International security will exist when the members of international society reach common consent about the rules of behaviour between them and about the practical implementations of those rules.'²³ A model for such transformation exists in the European Community and, indeed, the objective of such a transformation was the basic rationale of the founders. Whatever the merits and demerits of the EC, whatever it may or may not have achieved, it has among its members most assuredly fulfilled its original purpose. Those who take this view would go on to argue that this shows that it is false to say – or assume – that war is a necessary or inherent feature of the international political system.

Karl Deutsch, of course, observed many years ago that 'certain areas . . . have, in the past, 'permanently' eliminated war . . . war has been eliminated permanently, for all practical purposes, over large areas'. Deutsch invokes the notion of 'security-community' in which, among a group of people within a territorial area, a 'sense of community' had developed. A concomitant of this was the development of a set of institutions and practices strong enough to assure for a long period dependable expectations of peaceful change, expectation of peaceful change being a defining characteristic of community.²⁴ This conception of community

conjures up also Kenneth Boulding's view of peace as other than 'the absence of something – the absence of turmoil, tension, conflict, and war'. Peace is better to be seen as 'a condition of good management, orderly resolution of conflict, harmony associated with mature relationships, gentleness, and love'.²⁵

For others this was and will be too high an expectation, incapable of fulfilment. Pessimists argue, *à la Hobbes*, that we are merely witnessing the transformation of systems, that while one form of conflictual relationship in Europe has ended, another is already emerging, with the rise of nationalist/ethnic disputes. They take the view that the wave of the future is not community and peace but several states being torn apart, with Yugoslavia as a more reliable precursor of the future. Thus Mearsheimer is pessimistic about the future in Europe 'on the argument that the distribution and character of military power are the root causes of war and peace'.²⁶ Thus, along with John Lewis Gaddis, author of *The Long Peace*, he stresses the role of power.²⁷ Mearsheimer is clear that the 'peacefulness of the postwar era arose for three principal reasons: the bipolarity of the distribution of power on the Continent, the rough equality in military power between those two polar states, and the appearance of nuclear weapons, which vastly expanded the violence of war, making deterrence more robust', that is, it was based on power.²⁸

It is difficult to gainsay the impact of nuclear weapons, although it is as well to remember that there had been an expansion of violence in the generations leading up to Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945. It was not nuclear weapons that had already left a scene in Europe in May 1945 where 'In the cities, the skyline was jagged with destruction: amid the ruins and craters, rubble and wreckage blocked the streets . . . machinery rusted in bombed-out factories. . . . Roads were pitted with shell-holes. . . . Much of the countryside was charred and blackened . . . in some areas, unchecked by peasant bows and arrows, herds of wild pigs roamed the land for forage. Yet amid the destruction there were people. . . . The survivors . . . for them, this wasteland of rubble, rags and hunger was a prison without privacy or dignity; and like all prisons it smelled . . . of sweat and vomit, dirty socks and excrement; of decay and burning and the unburied dead.'²⁹ No wonder Churchill described it as a 'charnel-house'.

It has been this expansion of force, magnified and exacerbated by nuclear weapons, that has made the debate about analytical perspectives not just an arcane debate among academics but a central issue of our time. It is not just the degree of the destructive power of these weapons that is important. What has also proved to be unique is their speed of delivery and

both their relative ease of delivery and penetration, so that it is no longer necessary to defeat an enemy before destroying them. The Gulf War was a demonstration of the contemporary firepower available, its accuracy, and its destructive capability. The Gulf, the Iran–Iraq war, the Falklands, Afghanistan and the Middle East have all also demonstrated that despite all the well-known horrors of war, it remains, in some situations, an instrument of policy for both defensive and offensive purposes.

It remains so because, as noted earlier, disagreement is at the heart of politics, whether domestically or internationally. The question then becomes how that disagreement will be resolved. The answer to that question will depend upon the analytical perspective or paradigm used. It ought to be clear from the foregoing that the perspective or paradigm used will affect the questions one asks about the world, the type of information and evidence sought, the type of answer that emerges and – perhaps most crucially – the explanation with which one concludes. This in turn profoundly affects the view of the future one holds – whether to be optimistic or pessimistic – and it will even more importantly affect the approach of individual statesmen to questions of security.

PERCEPTIONS AND THREATS

The question of perception is crucial because ‘State action is the action taken by those acting in the name of the state. Hence the state is the decision-makers.’³⁰ Action is not the result of some deterministic logic or unseen hand or plan. It requires decision-makers to decide and individuals to act. The fact that individuals are so important has significant implications, because they act on their perception of what the world is like. They do not act on the basis of what some omniscient, objective observer may know the world to be like. This is critical because it raises the vexed question of perceptions.

Despite the reconnaissance revolution (the development of reconnaissance satellites and so on), policymakers cannot ‘know’ what the other side is thinking or will do. Indeed, the very definition of a state as the ‘other side’ is subjective. It is interesting how subjective this is. Bernard Cohen has observed that ‘if we knew of certainty that no nation was in a state of preparedness to undertake war with any prospect of success . . . there would be a profound change in the climate of international relationships’.³¹ Nuclear weapons may have now brought that situation about, but it is still worthy of note that it is not nuclear weapons themselves that neces-