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SECULAR BELIEFS
AND HUMAN RIGHTS
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*Religion,
Secular Beliefs
and
Human Rights*

25 YEARS AFTER THE 1981 DECLARATION

NATAN LERNER

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Religion, Secular Beliefs and Human Rights

25 Years After the 1981 Declaration

By
Natan Lerner

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For Bertha,

*Lidia, Rut, Ana, and Isar,
and my grand-children Roni, Gil, Ziv, and Keren,
with the hope that, in the world in which my
grand-children will grow, freedom of religion, all
beliefs, and human rights will be fully respected*

FOREWORD

“It was the best of times, it was the worst of times, it was the age of wisdom, it was the age of foolishness, it was the epoch of belief, it was the epoch of incredulity, it was the season of Light, it was the season of Darkness, it was the spring of hope, it was the winter of despair.” Charles Dickens opened his *Tale of Two Cities* with these famous words to describe the paradoxes of the eighteenth-century French Revolution fought for the sake of “the rights of man and citizen.” These same words aptly describe the paradoxes of the twentieth-century world revolution fought in the name of human rights and democratization for all.

The world has entered something of a “Dickensian era” in the past three decades. We have seen some of the best of human rights protections inscribed on the books, but some of the worst of human rights violations inflicted on the ground. We have celebrated the creation of more than thirty new constitutional democracies since 1980, but lamented the eruption of more than thirty new civil wars. We have witnessed the wisest of democratic statecraft and the most foolish of autocratic belligerence. For every South African spring of hope, there has been a Yugoslavian winter of despair, for every Ukrainian season of light, a Sudanese season of darkness.

These Dickensian paradoxes of the modern human rights revolution are particularly striking when viewed in their religious dimensions. On the one hand, the modern human rights revolution has helped to catalyze a great awakening of religion around the globe. In regions newly committed to democracy and human rights, ancient faiths once driven underground by autocratic oppressors, have sprung forth with new vigor. In the former Soviet bloc, for example, numerous Buddhist, Christian, Hindu, Jewish, Muslim, and other faiths have been awakened, alongside a host of exotic goddess, naturalist, and personality cults. In post-colonial and post-revolutionary Africa, these same mainline religious groups have come to flourish in numerous conventional and inculturated forms, alongside a bewildering array of Traditional groups. In Latin America, the human rights revolution has not only transformed long-standing Catholic and mainline Protestant communities but also triggered the explosion of numerous new Evangelical, Pentecostal, and Traditional movements. Many parts of the world have seen the prodigious rise of a host of new or newly minted faiths—Adventists, Bahi’as, Hare Krishnas, Jehovah’s Witnesses, Mormons, Scientologists, Unification Church members, among many others—some wielding ample material, political, and media power. Even in modern day Israel, Natan Lerner shows us, new religious movements have added to an already surprisingly wide religious pluralism.

One cause and consequence of this great awakening of religion around the globe is that the ambit of religious rights has been substantially expanded. In the past three decades, hundreds of major new statutes, cases, and constitutional provisions on religious rights have been promulgated in nation-states—many replete with generous protections for liberty of conscience and freedom of religious exercise, guarantees of religious pluralism, equality, and nondiscrimination, and several other special protections and entitlements for religious individuals and religious groups. These national guarantees have been matched by a growing body of regional and international norms that have expanded the important religious rights provisions of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights and 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights—most notably the 1981 UN Declaration on Religious Intolerance and Discrimination Based Upon Religion and Belief, the 1989 Vienna Concluding Document, and the 1992 UN Declaration on Minorities.

On the other hand, this very same world human rights revolution has helped to catalyze new forms of religious and ethnic conflict, oppression, and belligerence that have sometimes reached tragic proportions. In some communities, such as the former Yugoslavia and Chechnya, local religious and ethnic rivals, previously kept at bay by a common oppressor, have converted their new liberties into new licenses to renew their ancient hostilities, with catastrophic results. In Sudan and Rwanda, ethnic nationalism and religious extremism have conspired to bring violent dislocation or death to hundreds of rival religious believers each year, and persecution, false imprisonment, forced starvation, and savage abuses to thousands of others. In France, political secularism, laicization, and nationalism have combined to threaten a sort of civil denial and death to a number of believers, particularly “sects” and “cults” of high religious temperature or of low cultural conformity. In the United States, political messianism and Christian fundamentalism have intersected to inspire a growing “clash-of-civilizations” ethic that has encouraged bigotry against minorities at home and belligerence against the “axis of evil” abroad. In still other communities, from Asia to the Middle East, Christians, Jews, and Muslims, when in minority contexts, have faced sharply increased restrictions, repression, and martyrdom. And, in many parts of the world today, barbaric Islamicist terrorists have wrapped their cunning belligerence around a distorted and destructive theory of a jihad that is being waged against all manner of religious, cultural, and ethnic enemies, real and imagined.

In parts of Russia, Eastern Europe, Africa, and Latin America today, this human rights revolution has brought on something of a new war for souls between indigenous and foreign religious groups. This is the most ironic chapter in the modern Dickensian drama of religion and human rights. With the political transformations of these regions in the past two decades, foreign religious groups were granted rights to enter these regions for the first time in

decades. Beginning in the early 1990s, they came in increasing numbers to preach their faiths, to offer their services, to convert new souls. Initially, local religious groups—Orthodox, Catholic, Protestant, Sunni, Shi'ite, and Traditional alike—welcomed these foreigners, particularly their foreign co-religionists with whom they had lost contact for many decades. Today, local religious groups have come to resent these foreign religions, particularly those from North America and Western Europe who assume a democratic human rights ethic. Local religious groups resent the participation in the marketplace of religious ideas that democracy assumes. They resent the toxic waves of materialism and individualism that democracy inflicts. They resent the massive expansion of religious pluralism that democracy encourages. They resent the extravagant forms of religious speech, press, and assembly that democracy protects.

A new war for souls has thus broken out in these regions, a war to reclaim the traditional cultural and moral souls of these new societies, and a war to retain adherence and adherents to the indigenous faiths. In part, this is a theological war, as rival religious communities have begun to demonize and defame each other and to gather themselves into ever more dogmatic and fundamentalist stands. The ecumenical spirit of the previous decades is giving way to sharp new forms of religious balkanization. In part, this is a legal war, as local religious groups have begun to conspire with their political leaders to adopt statutes and regulations restricting the constitutional rights of their foreign religious rivals. Beneath shiny constitutional veneers of religious freedom for all and unqualified ratification of international human rights instruments, several countries of late have passed firm new anti-proselytism laws, cult registration requirements, tightened visa controls, and various other blatantly discriminatory restrictions on new or newly arrived religions. Indeed, many parts of the world seem to be on a new dawn of Islamic or Christian religious establishment.

Such Dickensian paradoxes have exposed the limitations of a human rights paradigm standing alone. They have inspired the earnest search for additional resources to deter violence, resolve disputes, cultivate peace, and ensure security through dialogue, liturgical healing, reconciliation ceremonies, truth commissions and other means. Such Dickensian paradoxes have also underscored an elementary, but essential, point—that human rights norms need a human rights culture to be effective. Human rights norms, including those protecting religion, have little salience in societies that lack constitutional processes that will give them meaning and measure. They have little value for parties who lack basic rights to security, succor, and sanctuary, or who are deprived of basic freedoms of speech, press, or association. They have little pertinence for victims who lack standing in courts and other basic procedural rights to pursue apt remedies. They have little cogency in communities that lack the ethos and ethic to render human rights violations a source of shame and regret,

restraint and respect, confession and responsibility, reconciliation and restitution. As we have moved from the first generation of human rights declaration following World War II to the current generation of human rights implementation, this need for a human rights culture has become all the more pressing.

Such is the state of religion and human rights today that Professor Natan Lerner so ably analyzes on the pages that follow. Professor Lerner has long been one of the masters of international human rights law. He has written several path-breaking studies on the rights of racial, ethnic, and linguistic groups, including two landmark volumes published by Brill's subsidiary Martinus Nijhoff: *Group Rights and Discrimination in International Law* (1991, 2d ed. 2003) and *The UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination* (1965, 2d ed. 1980). In this new volume, he focuses his expertise on religious rights, or more accurately: (1) the rights of individuals to thought, conscience, and belief and the corresponding rights to assemble, speak, worship, proselytize, educate, parent, travel, or to abstain from the same on the basis of their beliefs; and (2) the rights of religious groups to attain legal status or legal personality in a community and their corresponding rights to corporate property, collective worship, organized charity, parochial education, freedom of press, autonomy of governance, and more.

This volume is vintage Lerner—a wise and accessible, lucid and learned, comprehensive and efficient treatment of many of the hardest legal questions on religion and belief that are now facing nation-states and human rights organizations around the world. The chapters analyze and contextualize every relevant provision on religious rights offered by the modern international human rights instruments since the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights as well as selected regional instruments and bilateral treaties and concordats. This feature alone is worth the price of admission. No other book that I know of provides such a penetrating and pithy probing of all the relevant international legal instruments that protect religion and belief.

Particularly novel and powerful is Professor Lerner's treatment of religious group rights, and their many chronic abuses in recent campaigns of ethnic cleansing, national xenophobia, religious establishment, and anti-proselytism. Here, he uses his deep expertise on group rights, racial discrimination, genocide and other forms of international crime to lift up many provisions of the international human rights instruments that have not received sufficient attention from religious rights activists. Also highly valuable is his long chapter on the modern problems of proselytism and conversion in international and domestic law. Here, the legal questions are almost overwhelming: How does the state balance one community's right to exercise and expand its faith versus another person or community's right to be left alone to its own traditions? How does the state protect the juxtaposed rights claims of majority and minority religions, or of foreign and indigenous religions? How does the state

craft a general rule to govern multiple theological understandings of conversion or change of religion—particularly the sharply juxtaposed understandings of Christians who have easy conversion into and out of the faith, and Muslims who have easy conversion into the faith but allow for no conversion out of it? These are not new questions, Professor Lerner shows us. They confronted the drafters of the international bill of rights from the very beginning. But some of the compromises of 1948 and 1966 have today begun to betray their limitations acutely. The chapter includes a number of smart and practical suggestions to tamp down the hottest flashpoints of difference and controversy on this perennially contested issue.

The reader cannot help but be troubled by Professor Lerner's learned critique throughout the volume of the many limitations and compromises that are still betrayed by the international human rights instruments—particularly in the 1981 UN Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief. While some of the limitations of the 1981 UN Declaration have been offset by subsequent instruments like the 1989 Vienna Concluding Document and the 1992 UN Declaration on Minorities, religious rights remain underdeveloped, and sometimes under attack, in many parts of the world. Even developed countries in Western Europe and North America, which historically played such a vital role in the development of religious rights protections, have shown surprising indifference to religious rights of late. Thus, on this silver anniversary year of the 1981 Declaration, Professor Lerner renews his call for the United Nations to move from a mere declaration on religious tolerance to a binding covenant or convention on religious rights that will help build a better human rights culture dedicated to the full protection of religion and belief.

Regional instruments, while valuable, are alone not sufficient, Professor Lerner shows us, to provide the kind of rigorous religious rights protection that is needed. The 1960 American Convention on Human Rights, for example, has had precious little influence on American laws of religious freedom, and has done far too little to blunt the growing clashes among Catholic, Protestant, Pentecostal, and Traditional groups in various Latin American nation-states. Some of the regional human rights instruments of Africa, notably the 1990 Cairo Declaration on Human Rights, give undue preferences to Islam, and these documents have been exploited both by Islamicist nation-states and transnational jihadist groups to visit their prejudices on religious minorities at home and abroad. The 1950 European Charter on Human Rights, in practice, accords such a wide "margin of appreciation" to its member nation-states that religious minorities have fared poorly when they have challenged the secular policies of Turkey, the laicization policies of France or Belgium, or the religious establishment policies of Ireland, Germany, or Greece. The recent Turkish headscarf case before the Strasbourg

Court, which Professor Lerner analyzes in detail, is only the most recent and most sensational illustration of the limitations of the 1950 Charter in action.

This is not to say that regional instruments, bilateral charters, and national constitutions cannot serve effectively to protect religious rights and freedoms. The recent concordats between the Papal See and various nation-states, including Israel, Professor Lerner shows us, are signal examples of forceful and foresightful protections for religious rights and freedoms. Also exemplary are selected judgments of high courts in Australia, India, Israel, Europe, and the United States to which Professor Lerner adverts intermittently throughout the volume. But too many religious minorities remain exposed to local prejudice and to vicious treatment for the world to rest content with this patchwork normative quilt. The world needs a comprehensive binding international instrument to protect everyone's essential freedoms of religion and belief.

Lest any reader think that all this enthusiasm for religious rights is merely an elaborate form of parochial self-service, Professor Lerner makes clear throughout the volume, but especially in chapter nine, that he defends religious rights on non-religious or secular grounds. He respects those who argue for religious rights on and with religious terms, and he recognizes that religious prophets and groups were among the early architects of religious freedom in the past. But he does not think religious rights to be "ineliminably religious" in nature, and does not rest his case on religious conviction and argument alone. To the contrary, he argues that secular rationales are a necessary feature of, and can be a sufficient ground for, the robust protection of a human rights regime dedicated to the protection of thought, conscience, and belief. This is a striking argument and no doubt will be highly controversial for some readers. But it makes the case even more powerful that the world needs a binding universal convention on religious rights and freedom for all, even those who freely eschew religion.

I have had the privilege of working with Professor Lerner over the past dozen years, and I have watched him develop a number of the keen insights that are reflected in this volume. This is a man of enormous integrity, humanity, and wisdom, who reveals in his person and in his scholarship the true meaning of excellence, tolerance, and respect for all. The world would be much a better place if we would follow his example and heed the instruction that he offers us in the pages that follow.

John Witte, Jr.
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Emory University, Atlanta

PREFACE

This is not entirely a new book. In the following pages I have incorporated a large portion of a former book, *Religion, Beliefs, and International Human Rights*, published in 2000 by Orbis Books, Maryknoll, New York, as part of the Religion and Human Rights Series of Emory University, Atlanta, the editors of which are John Witte, Jr. and Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im. I have updated the sections dealing with implementation, summarizing developments of the last five years.

I have added to it a number of articles written in different times that have appeared in several journals, as well as some unpublished material. All deal with, or are relevant to, the relationship between religion, beliefs and international human rights, against the background of changes and problems that became central in the 21st century in this area and of the impact that such relationship is having on the world scene. Religion, and secular or non-religious beliefs related to religion, and their interaction with human rights, are not any more a discipline demanding essentially the interest of theologians, philosophers and historians of culture. They are today a major item in any serious and responsible discussion on the factors influencing international affairs, from the legal, political, ideological, social and even security perspectives.

Religion, or rather the religions, are a basic dimension in the world of today. The law, international law and human rights law in particular, have to take into consideration that dimension, and to some extent have done it. The treatment of religious minorities, frequently the victims of discrimination and persecution; the confrontation between some regimes and religious groups, and between such groups themselves; the difficulties that religious rights and freedoms are exposed to in different countries and regions; the controversies around what freedom of religion means for individuals and communities, all this is today a subject which governments, international organizations, and legal scholars cannot address any more as a theoretical issue reserved to specialists. It belongs now to the permanent agenda of all those who aspire to influence international life and ensure respect for fundamental freedoms.

One of the most disturbing issues on that agenda is the extent to which there is a relationship between religion and terrorism, a complex and dangerous phenomenon demanding the preoccupation of many governments. International organizations have devoted meetings and conferences to this theme, undoubtedly controversial and extremely sensitive for some religious communities and some countries. There seems to be no doubt that religion, or rather religious fanaticism, became a major source of terrorist activity. On

the other hand, such relation should not become an argument to stigmatize some faiths or their members in an indiscriminate way. This theme plays already a role in international and domestic legislation. Some very grave developments in different geographic areas have even had a strong impact on disciplines such as international criminal law. I have incorporated a chapter on this issue, emphasizing recommendations made at a 2005 OSCE meeting in Vienna.

The international community will mark, in 2006, the 25th anniversary of the 1981 United Nations Declaration on the Elimination of Discrimination and Intolerance Based on Religion or Belief. I felt that this is an appropriate date for this publication, although the date is of course mainly a good reason, or pretext, to reiterate, and perhaps add a few more, thoughts relevant to the growing interest that States, peoples, international organizations and non-governmental world-wide associations are showing in the subject of religion, beliefs and human rights. More specifically, it may also hopefully induce a renewal of the unfinished debate on the scope of international legislation in this respect. As we shall see, the 1981 Declaration, which involves measures of implementation, performed a useful and constructive task in the promotion of religious freedom, the prevention of discrimination based on religion or belief, and the protection of endangered religious communities. The question to be asked is if this is enough, against the background of events in the twenty five years that elapsed since the adoption of the Declaration.

The claim may be advanced that it is not enough, and the issue of the adoption of a mandatory treaty inspired by the Declaration should again be raised. Many States that have supported in the past the idea of a convention may feel that they were right and could retake their arguments. Others, and some major religious groups that opposed, for well known reasons, such a treaty may now rethink the matter, in view of the fact that members of such groups, on right or wrong grounds, are now feeling the need to have their religious freedoms stronger protected, with the help of clear-cut, positive provisions of an obligatory treaty widely ratified.

The undoubtedly constructive use of the Declaration can however be invoked, as it was in the past, as a justification to preserve the present situation. It can be argued that a Declaration that is being implemented in practice, despite not being mandatory, is preferable to a convention that may be ratified only by a part of the international community and may therefore be not obligatory for States that refuse to ratify the treaty. This is an argument that should not be ignored. But, on the other hand, it belongs rather to the sphere of tactics. As a matter of principle, in this first decade of a new millennium, when international institutions have elaborated and are promoting so many obligatory treaties concerning a wide range of areas of human life, freedoms related to religion should not remain a neglected field.

Among the complicated subjects related to religion that developed in recent decades is the fascinating controversy around the legitimacy of the use of religious symbols in non-religious environments. To what extent is the ostentation of religious-induced clothing or symbols an indisputable right emanating from freedom of religion? When can they be seen as provocation? What margin of discretion has a state to decide by itself these issues? When can the individual right to express religious affiliation be limited? In some countries – France, Turkey, the United States, Great Britain and others– the subject required judicial determination. International tribunals, like the European Court of Human Rights, have dealt with the matter. I have included in the book – under the title “How Wide the Margin of Appreciation? The Turkish Headscarf Case, the Strasbourg Court, and Secularist Tolerance”– a critical article on a case decided by the European Court of Human Rights in 2004. I found the Court’s ruling inconsistent with prior decisions and contrary to some basic human rights norms concerning the expression of freedom of religion or beliefs. The article appeared in the *Willamette Journal of International Law and Dispute Resolution*, of the Willamette University College of Law, Salem, Oregon, Volume 13, 2005.

The last decades also witnessed the development of international criminal law. An International Criminal Court with worldwide jurisdiction has been established; special tribunals were put in charge of tragic situations in some parts of the world. The interaction between that area of law and the issue of religious freedom cannot be ignored.

All these problems have been dealt with by the international community as a whole but also by regional institutions. Some States also felt the need to adopt measures extending their jurisdiction or intervention to situations abroad. This again caused controversy.

It is the array of complex and delicate situations like those described that will be addressed in the following pages. The result will not be a strictly coherent and well planned volume. There may be a lack of unity and repetitions. The author, who teaches international law, human rights, and state and religion subjects, felt that it is a timely publication, that responds to the needs of his students and legal scholars, as well as the general public concerned in one way or another with these topics.

It starts with a short Introduction, based on the opening remarks of my article in a recent volume on “Facilitating Freedom of Religion or Belief: A Deskbook”, edited by Tore Lindholm, W. Cole Durham, Jr. and Bahia G. Tahzib-Lie (Brill/Nijhoff, 2004). Following is a general overview of the legal meaning of religion and beliefs, as it developed particularly during the United Nations era, with a view to determine the minimum international standards regarding freedom of religion or belief. As said, the 25th anniversary of the 1981 Declaration is an excellent pretext to review its implementation process

and to continue the already mentioned debate on the necessity and convenience of a mandatory treaty. It may be mentioned that between the Declaration on Racial Discrimination and the adoption of a Convention on the subject only very few years elapsed; in the case of religion, the issues have been more complicated and, a quarter of a century later, the matter is still open, although it must be admitted that a real reconsideration of the subject has not taken place.

Religious groups or communities are frequently minorities and, therefore, instruments on the rights of minorities are an essential ingredient in every discussion on freedom of religion or belief. Under the title "The 1992 UN Declaration on Minorities", I have reproduced a commentary that I have written more than a decade ago, on the 1992 UN Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to Minorities, in Volume 23 (1994) of the *Israel Yearbook on Human Rights*. This declaration is a modest step forward in the recognition of religious, ethnic and cultural minorities and their protection by international law. Still, it implies improvement in comparison with the approach of Article 27 of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. This is a dimension that should not be neglected in an updated discussion on religious freedom.

I have also included in this volume a short review essay that I have written for the *Journal of Law and Religion*, sponsored by the Hamline University School of Law (Vol. XIV, No. 1, 1999–2000), under the title "A Secular View of Human Rights". I take issue with the views exposed by a distinguished American scholar, Michael J. Perry, in an enjoyable book on the idea of human rights, where he claims that this idea is inescapably religious. My own views, as a "secular enthusiast of human rights", are based on the conviction that there is an intelligible secular version of human rights free from the need of religious justification, and this is the prevailing view after the second world war, at least from a legal perspective.

I have included a full chapter to the issue of proselytism, change of religion, conversion, and international human rights, on the basis of a lengthy article published in 1998 in the *Emory International Law Review*, Vol. 12, No.1. The question of proselytism was the main obstacle to the adoption of a mandatory treaty on freedom of religion and beliefs, and it may also have the same effect on any renewed attempt to achieve one. The issue became of great international interest after the political changes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, and was frequently discussed in international fora.

The reciprocal impact of law and religion is particularly complex in some societies. One of them is the State of Israel. A prominent Catholic author, Robert J. Drinan, S.J., has stressed in a recent book on the balance between religious freedom and international law ("Can God & Caesar Coexist", Yale University Press, 2004) that the "church-state arrangement in Israel does not fit easily into any single category of religion-state relations." "The centrality

of Judaism in Israel must be viewed in line with its Declaration of Independence, which states that “Israel will guarantee freedom of religion and conscience, of language, education and culture.” “The government of Israel—he adds—exemplifies in a unique way the dilemmas facing a new nation whose institutions and laws reflect the international human rights that since 1948 have become customary international law.” “Should Israel—Drinan asks—seek to be a dramatic example of a government that neither subsidizes nor discourages any religious group?”

I share Drinan’s view that the case of Israel is a good example of the dilemmas and difficulties surrounding the law and religion relationship. I have therefore incorporated in the book a paper on Israel that I submitted to a recent International Conference on the State and Religious Communities organized by the Japanese Association of Comparative Constitutional Law, chaired by Professor Hiroaki Kobayashi of Nihon University. In the same context I thought that it will be useful to reproduce a short article that I have written several years ago on human rights in the bilateral agreement between the Holy See and the State of Israel (12/13 “La Porta d’Oriente”, 1998).

I am grateful to the publishers and journals that authorized me to reproduce these earlier articles. I am deeply indebted and grateful to Professor John Witte, Jr., head of the Center for the Study of Law and Religion at Emory University and general co-editor of the series on religion and human rights, which includes the former book largely reproduced in this volume. Professor Witte encouraged me to prepare this new publication and provided me with guidance, constructive criticism, and most valuable advice throughout.

It is my hope that this volume, beyond technicalities, will be useful to all those interested in the interaction between religion, secular beliefs, and human rights.

NATAN LERNER
Kiriath Ono, Israel

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

This section provides an overview of the nature and scope of the minimum standards for freedom of religion or belief in the international community, as regulated by the principal international norms. Although the international community had already addressed racial discrimination, racial hatred, and other human rights issues, the United Nations did not address racial and *religious* discrimination and intolerance until the early sixties, following a series of anti-Semitic outbursts. The United Nations separated the issues and promptly drafted a declaration and a convention against racial discrimination. However, the United Nations did not draft a declaration regarding religion and belief until 1981. Moreover, it does not appear the United Nations will draft a convention regarding religion and belief any time soon, for reasons discussed hereafter.

Scholarly literature regarding human rights was criticized for similarly failing to sufficiently address religion, belief, and related issues. This deficiency has been remedied in recent years. Today, there are a fair number of books and articles that address religion and beliefs and the minimum standards and norms that prevail in the area. Among them, mention should be made, first of all, of two major collective works, *Religious Human Rights in Global Perspective*, edited by Johan D. van der Vyver and John Witte Jr., in two volumes that were the impressive outcome of an international conference at Emory University in Atlanta in 1996, and *Facilitating Freedom of Religion and Belief: A Deskbook*, edited by Tore Lindholm, W. Cole Durham, Jr., and Bahia G. Tahzib-Lie. Both collective books have been published by Martinus Nijhoff.¹ *Religious Liberty and International Law in Europe*, by Malcolm D. Evans (1997), *Religion and Human Rights: Basic Documents*, edited by Ted Stahnke and J. Paul Martin (1998), *Freedom of Religion or Belief: Ensuring Effective International Legal Protection*, by Bahiyyih G. Tahzib, the result of a 600-page doctoral thesis (1996), *Freedom of Religion and Belief: A World Report*, edited by Kevin Boyle and Juliet Sheen (1997), and *The Influence of Religion on the Development of International Law*, edited by Mark W. Janis (1991) also deserve mention. My own *Religion, Beliefs and International Human Rights*, published in 2000 by Orbis Books, is

¹ The following pages are part of my article on *The Nature and Minimum Standards of Freedom of Religion or Belief*, included in this collective book.