

The Criminal Appeal Reports (Sentencing) 1992

Editor David Thomas, LL.D.

Consultant Editor
David Evans, Barrister

Editorial Contributor
T. Rees, M.A., LL.M., Barrister

Volume 13



This volume should be cited as 13 Cr.App.R. (S.)

ISBN 0 421 46820 3

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, or stored in any retrieval system of any nature, without the written permission of the copyright holder and the publisher, application for which shall be made to the publisher.

Reprinted 2005 by TJI Digital, Padstow, Cornwall

Table of Cases

AIMED (1984)	CAIN (1984)
Aslam Mohammed (1987)	Cook (1988) 257, 258 Crarioto (1990) 342, 345 Crosbie (1990) 36, 37, 124, 125, 126 Cullen (1989) 27, 28, 29 Cunningham (1979) 599, 601
Attorney-General's Reference No. 5 of 1989 (1989)	DALBY (1982)
1990 (1990)	Dickson (1990)
Attorney-General's Reference No. 25 of 1990 (1990) (Alan James Doheny) 382, 383 Austin (1986)	Dolan and Cormack (1981)
(1975)	EATON (1989)
Bell (1989)	FISHER and Manlow (1989)
Birtles (1969) 519, 520 Boswell (1984) 218, 219, 278, 279, 337, 338, 339, 477, 478, 521, 522, 616, 617, 618 Bouchereau (1977) 500, 501 Bradford (1911) 258 Bradbourn (1985) 231, 232, 234 Brook (1949) 258 Browne (1984) 684, 685	GAY (1989) 315, 316 Gayle (1989) 319, 321 Godber (1986) 296, 298, 299, 322, 324, 325 Goodchild (1991) 508, 512 Goodwin (1981) 650, 652 Gould (1983) 578, 580 Green (1986) 384, 386 Green and Green (1984) 399, 401

HAGGIS (1990) 267, 269 Hammertons Cars Ltd. (1976) 498, 499 Hart (1983) 253, 255, 257 Hart (1986) 8, 10 Harwood (1979) 304, 306 Hawkins (1985) 660, 661 Haynes (1983) 384, 387 Hill (1989) 292, 295 Hodgson (1968) 364, 368 Holloway (1982) 581, 583, 662, 664 Holmes (1990) 278, 279 Horrigan (1985) 422, 424 Horseman (1983) 578, 580 Hough (1984) 225, 226, 228 Howard (1985) 426, 427 Hughes (1988) 508, 511	Newton (1974)
Hunter (1991) 282, 284 Hussain and Mugal (1983) 470, 471 JONES (1980) 480, 481, 482	Passmore (1989)
KANDHARI (1979)	Pike (1971) 526, 528 Pilford (1985) 322, 324 Pither (1979) 364, 368 Powell and Carvell (1984) 336 Powis and Pritchard (1987) 57, 59
Kent (1990) 586, 588 King (1973) 180, 181, 182 Knight (1991) 581, 583, 628, 629 Kouadio (1991) 679, 680	Pridige ν. Grant (1985)
Lake (1986) 336 Lamb (1968) 526, 528 Lawrence (1982) 258, 259 Lennard (1973) 482, 483	R. v. Broadcasting Complaints Commission, exp. Owen (1985)
Litchfield (1988)	R. v. Cardiff Stipendiary Magistrate, exp. Morgan (1989)
McCann (1972) 519, 520 McCormick v. Hitchins (1988) 482, 483, 485, 496 McCue (1987) 186, 187	R. v. Croydon Crown Court. ex p. Miller (1986)
McGarric (1989) 260, 262 McLaughlan (1987) 8, 10 McLonghlin (1985) 403, 404 McNamara (1984) 544, 547 Mackenzie (1988) 642, 644 Mathieson (1987) 63, 65 Matthews (1987) 480, 481, 482 Michael (1976) 488 Michael (1990) 471	R. v. Grice (1977) 256 R. v. Guildhall Justices, ex p. Cooper (1983) 434 R. v. Harlow Justices, ex p. Galway (1975) 428, 429, 434 R. v. Hartlepool Justices, ex p. King (1973) 428, 429, 434
Miller (1976)	R. v. Highbury Corner Stipendiary Magistrate ex p. di Matteo (1990)
Murphy (1988)	Carter (1969)
Nagari (1980)	R. v. Newbury Justices, ex p. Pont (1984)

R. v. Rotherham Magistrates' Court, ex p. Zaine Floyd Brongh (1990)408, 410 R. v. Southwark Crown Court, ex p. Ager (1990)	Smith (1988) 182, 183, 184 Smith-Bryant (1989) 572, 574, 575 Spura (1988) 501 Stewart (1983) 322, 323 Stewart (1988) 650, 652 Stone (1988) 150, 151, 152, 153 Storey (1984) 38, 39, 40 Stuart and Williams (1979) 416, 418 Sweeney (1986) 226, 228 Symes and Lowery (1982) 408, 411
Mooney (1980)	TAYLOR (1986) 511, 544, 547 Thompson (1989) 695, 697 Todd (1990) 319, 321, 381, 382 Tosland (1981) 247, 249 Townsend (1979) 384, 387 Turner and Others (1975) 352, 578, 579 Turtan (1986) 364, 368
Robertshaw (1981)	Universal Salvage v. Boothby (1983)
Robinson (1990) 304 Rodenhurst (1989) 218, 219 Rolt (1984) 628, 629	Vallett (1950)
Ronaldson (1990)	WALKER (1990) .731, 733 Wallis (1979) .63, 65 Ward (1971) .599, 601 Warrior (1984) .322, 323 Webster (1991) .299, 300, 301
SAKHI (1984) 540, 542 Sattir Singh (1988) 356, 358 Savindra, Carter and Benmore (1968) 401 Saville (1980) 486, 488, 489 Scott (1989) 334, 335, 336, 599, 601 Scott (1990) 231, 234, 262, 263 See (1990) 568, 570 Shah (1987) 422, 424 Sheen (1987) 472, 473 Shettan (1986) 442, 444 Shelton (1988) 472, 473 Silver and Gosling (1982) 544, 547 Slee and Worgan (1990) 302	Wehner (1977) 268 Wemyss v. Hopkins (1875) 289 Wheatley (1983) 478, 480, 481 Whittall v. Kirby (1947) 483 Wichine (1958) 482, 483, 484 Wilburn (1991) 684, 685 Williams (1989) 15, 16 Willis (1974) 461, 463 Witchelo (1992) 677, 678 Wortley (1991) 609, 611
Smith (1981) 578, 580 Smith (1983) 329, 330 Smith (1984) 244, 246	Young (1991)

Table of Statutes

1861	Offences against the Person Act (24 & 25 Vict., c. 100)	1959	Obscene Publications Act (7 & 8
	s. 4	1960	Eliz. 2, c. 66)
	289, 396, 651		s. 13 597
1072	s. 20	1961	(3)
1873	Supreme Court of Judicature Act (36 & 37 Vict. c. 66)		2, c. 39) s. 1(2)
1875	s. 47	1967	s. 3
1925	Criminal Justice Act (15 & 16		Criminal Justice Act (c. 80) 597 s. 39597, 598
	Geo. 5, c. 86) s. 24(1)		s. 56
1933	Children and Young Persons Act (23 & 24 Geo. 5, c. 12) 706,		407, 525, 526, 529 (5)
	709		s. 67
	s. 1(1)(a)	1968	(1) 15, 16, 642, 643, 644 Criminal Appeal Act (c. 19)
	s. 39 358	1700	s. 11 328
	s. 53		(3)
	321, 322, 323, 324,		s. 17(1)(a)
	325, 326, 327, 328, 636, 637, 666, 667,		s. 1(1)(a)
1026	705, 708, 729, 730		s. 17(1)(a) 154
1936	Public Health Act (26 Geo. 5 & 1 Edw. 8, c. 49)		Courts Act (c. 23) s. 4(1)
	Pt. III 492	1071	s. 11(2)255, 256, 488
	s. 92	1971	Misuse of Drugs Act (c. 38) 429 s. 27 256
	s. 93 492		Finance Act (c. 68) 229
	s. 94 489, 490, 491, 492 (1) 492		Immigration Act (c. 77)
	(2)490, 491, 494	1972	s. 6
	(4)	1972	s. 6
	s. 95		(1)
10.10	s. 99490, 493, 494		s. 97 485
1948	Criminal Justice Act (11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 58)	1973	s. 143
	s. 17		(c. 62)406, 440
	s. 28 431		s. 2(1)
	s. 29		s. 8
	s. 79 431		(7)63, 65
1952	Sched. 9		(8)157, 158, 159 s. 12(2)406, 407
	Geo. 6 & 1 Eliz. 2, c. 55)		s. 14259, 589, 590
	s. 18		(1)589, 590, 621 (a)591
	(2)		(1A) 590
1956	s. 29 430, 432, 433, 434, 436 Sexual Offences Act (4 & 5 Eliz.		(3) 588, 589, 590, 591 (8) 621
	2, c. 69) 463		s. 16(3)(<i>b</i>)439, 621

1973	Powers of Criminal Courts Act—	1981	Supreme Court Act (c. 54)
1213	cont.	1701	s. 47 377, 380, 486, 644
	s. 16(5) 621		(2) 253, 254, 255, 643
	(b) 299, 300, 301, 619, 620,		Transport Act (c. 56)
	621, 642, 644, 302, 439, 440		Wildlife & Countryside Act (c.
	s. 20		s. 1 9
	(1) 301		s. 21 9
	s. 21	1982	Criminal Justice Act (c. 48) 411, 439, 440, 590, 697, 733
	(3)		Part I 441
	s. 24 528		s. 1 323, 408, 411, 412, 440
	(2)525, 526		(2)
	s. 28		(4)
	s. 31(3)(a) 488		(a) 440
	s. 3532, 490, 491,		(i)
	(1)		(4A)19, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 299, 300,
	(IA)		301, 302, 438, 440,
	(2) 212		441, 596, 570, 670, 692
	s. 37		(a)17, 19, 281, 283, 284, 441
	s. 40(1) 268		(b)202, 203
1974	s. 43 274		(c)290, 291, 731
1974	Legal Aid Act (c. 4)		s. 1A(1)
	Health and Safety at Work Act		s. 1B
	(c. 37)657, 658, 659		(2)(b) 326
1975	s. 33		(5)325, 327 s. 2(1)411
	Act (c. 51)		s. 7(8) 298
1076	s. 27	1983	Mental Health Act (c. 20)
1976	Endangered Species Act (c. 72)		s. 1(2)
	s. 4 9	1985	Companies Act (c. 6)
1977	Criminal Law Act (c. 45) 428, 434		s. 223317, 318
	s. 16		Sexual Offences Act (c. 44)306, 308
1979	Customs & Excise Management	1986	Drug Trafficking Offences Act
	Act (c. 2)		(c. 32)
	s. 68(2)709, 710 s. 170		356, 357, 390, 391, 486, 487, 502, 505, 653, 654, 687
1980	s. 170		s. 1(1) 503
	(c. 43)		(2)
	s. 19(1)		s. 2(2) 503
	(3) 434		(3)503, 504
	s. 22(2)		s. 3
	428, 429, 430, 434		(3) 67 487
	s. 40 491		s. 5
	s. 108(1)		(3)
	s. 133		(9)(a)
	(1)269, 527,		s. 6
	528, 529		(1)(a)
	(2)527, 528, 529 s. 150(1)527		s. 360(1)(a)
1981	Forgery and Counterfeiting Act		Company Directors Disquali-
	(c. 45) s. 15(1)(b)		fication Act (c. 46)
	Contempt of Court Act (c. 49)		(1)
	s. 12 598		s. 13 604

TABLE OF STATUTES

1988	Road Traffic Act (c. 53) s. 5(1)	1988	Criminal Justice Act—cont. s. 41
	(6) 495 s. 34(1) 189 (3) 266		(7)
	s. 35		(2) 687 (4) 687 (5) 687
	Sched. 2		(6)
	Part IV		Copyright, Designs and Patents Act (c. 48)
	340, 350, 352, 361, 403, 578, 592, 622, 624, 650, 653, 656, 690, 693, 712, 725	1990	s. 109

Appellants

ADAMS, Mark Barry	145 212 568	Bates, Michael John Beaumont, Steven Bekka, Janet Angela Helen Bennett, Robert Edward Betts, Mark	270 520 586
and Others		Bingham, Andrew Hill	45
Anderson, Barry Michael	564	Black, Jason George Michael	
Anderson, Daniel Blake	325	Bowen, Michael Patrick	89
Anderson, Gerald Joseph	456	Bradshaw, Andrew Donald	393
Andrews, Roger David		Bray, Martin	5
Arshad, Mohammed		Brown, Stephen Graham	
Ashraf, Mohammed	451	Brown, Wayne Kenneth	
Attorney General's Reference No. 25 of 1990 (Alan James Doheny)	220	Browne, Jason Anthony Martin Bruce, Marcus, and Kumah, Papafu-	92
Attorney General's Reference No. 1 of		mah	636
1991 (Eric Stephen Hughes)	134	Bulmer, Ian	424
Attorney General's Reference No. 2 of		Burnett, Anne	
1991 (Edward Peter Campbell Dil-	227	Busby, Colin Ian	291
Attorney General's Reference No. 3 of	331	Callen, Philip	60
1991 (Richard Sean Hyland)	349	Calvert, Martin	634
Attorney General's Reference No. 4 of	347	Campbell, Philip	630
1991 (David Christopher Noble)	182	Carroll, Thomas Anthony	99
Attorney General's Reference No. 7 of	100	Carter, Carol Dawn	
1991 (Sefton Kendrick Morgan)	285	Carter, Derek Charles	354
Attorney General's Reference No. 8 of		Casse, Matthew	20
1991 (Lawrence Jepson)	360	Casseeram, Ramjutee	384
Attorney General's Reference No. 11 of		Chamberlain, Gary Allen	535
1991 (Edward Peter Campbell Bur-	1.000000	Chamberlain, William Andrew	525
nett)	402	Chewings, David Ernest	
Attorney General's Reference No. 13 of		Choudhary, Javed Akhtar	290
1991 (Philip Richard Smart)	650	Clark, Christopher David	124
Attorney General's Reference No. 14 of	446	Clarke, Anthony John Clifford, and Purvis, Edward James	663
1991 (Stephen Arthur James Reed) Attorney General's Reference No. 15 of	440	Clarke, Simon	640
1991 (Kevin King)	622	Cleary, Terence Henry	
Attorney General's Reference No. 16 of	1.7 See dec	Cleaver, Timothy Ross	
1991 (William Peter Clark)	653	Clugston, John	165
Attorney General's Reference No. 17 of		Cocks, David Robert	166
1991 (Anthony Hart)	656	Coleman, Anthony Neville	508
Attorney General's Reference No. 18 of		Collier, Dean Russell	33
1991 (Gareth Vaughan Roberts)	624	Connors, Miles, and Connors,	
Attorney General's Reference No. 19 of	711	Thomas	
1991 (Richard Henry Garbutt) Attorney General's Reference No. 20 of	711	Cov. Christopher	
1991 (Steven Ronald Roast)	577	Coy, Christopher	300
Attoney General's Reference No. 21 of	2113	Ciunci, John Charles	370
1991 (Ryan Samuel Gormley)	689	Danga, Harbeer Singh	408
Attorney General's Reference Nos. 22		Davids, Carl and Others	
and 23 of 1991 (Mark John Jacques		Davies, Gordon Barry	
and Richard Charles Jacques)	592	Derbyshire, Andrew Stuart	
Attorney General's Reference No. 24 of	724	Devall, Richard	
1991 (Mark Andrew Willcocks)	124	Donnelly, Gerard	084
Baker, Ian	57	James	441
Barraclough, Michaela	604		
Barrell, Steven Edward Charles and		Edwards, Angela	
Others	646	Edwards, Sean Karl	356

Evans, Christopher Anthony	413	Kemp. Kelvin Mark	
Evans, Kelvin	377	Kent, Warren	
	120	King, Phillip	
F., Anthony	420	Kumar, Shekhar	490
F., Jacqueline Ann	338	LEATHERBARROW, Thomas	627
Fanson, Christopher Edward Gordon	95	Lemmon, Kevin	
Fenton, Paul AnthonyFogarty, Stephen John	328	Luxon, Michael John and Others	
Frank Michael	500	Lynas, Karl	
Frank, MichaelFrazer, James	705	Lylids, Kall	202
Fuller, James		McCingue Alayandas	224
Furlong, Kenneth		McCluskie, Alexander	02
Fuzzey, Claire Anne	169	McGuire, David	
i uzzey, ciane rime	100	McKinney, John Fitzgerald	185
GARCIA, Juan Pareja	583	McNichol, Alan	250
Gibbon, Jason		Madarbakus, Afzal Mohammed	542
Gill, Christopher Martin		Mahoney, Peter John	328
Golding, Calvin Dale	142	Marti Justin	1
Gormley, John Henry	133	Mastin, David Alan	303
Grant, Martin Charles	54	Martin, Vanessa Jane	
Gravil, James Darren	416	Mawson, Gary	
Green, Paul Palmerston		Mendez, Michael Mervyn	94
Grey, Anthony John William		Miah, Mohammed	278
Griffiths, Clive Samuel		Miall, John Fraser	264
Gunn, George Urquhart		Moore, David Anthony	464
		Moore, Eugene William	130
Hailes, Ian Gordon	540	Morrell, Paul	659
Harling, David Michael and Hayden,		Morton, Bernard Charles	
Alvis	672	Munns, Andrew Jason	470
Harrison, Susan		Murphy, John Patrick	717
Hawker, Gary Alan			2203
Hayer, Sean Francis	454	N., Bruce Edwin Albert	
Hayes, George Markie	626	Nawaz, Ahner	
Hayes, Michael John	722	Nolan, Leroy	144
Haywood, Alan John	175		
Helder, Stephen		O'NEILL, Justin Paul and Others	
Hewitt, Paul Jonathan		Odendaal, Peter Arthur	
Hiscock, John Andrew Hoey, Donald Michael	177	Okelola, Festus	
Holland, Rachel	244	Oliver, John Richard Bryan	246
Holmes David Leonard	20	Omojudi, Stephen Olaurewaju	106
Holmes, David Leonard	714	Onwuka, John Ekilisie Osborne, Robert John	225
Hotchen, Neil	250	Osborne, Robert John	640
		D. D. T. L.	2/0
Houghton, Martin Paul Howard, John	720	P., Pamela Jean	309
Hull, Graham Brian	223	Page, Lawrence Howard	505
Huskinson, David Arron		Palmer, Jane Veronica Susan	153
		Patel, Mohammed Igbal	550
ISMAIL, Ibrahim	395	Peffer, Terrence	
		Perrin, Robert James	
JACKSON, Jane	22	Pesanane Simon	438
Jackson, Trevor	22	Pesapane, Simon	331
Jama, Rashid	63	Porter, Leslie Jason	258
Jason, Orlando S	306	Postlethwaite, Lee Alan	260
Jewell, Ian Anthony		Powell, Shane	202
James, Gwilym Evans	399	Pretty, Martin Alan	280
Jones, Melvyn Ashton and Others	698		
Jones, Susan	275	REAY, Raymond	533
Judge, Noel Christopher, and Wood-		Redfern, James Michael, and Dunlop	
ridge, Susan	685	Limited (Aircraft Tyres Division)	709
		Reid, David	645
KALKAN, Dursan		Reid, Stephen Anthony	513
Kearsley, Peter Paul Anthony	295	Remblance, Peregrine Elias	388

vii

JUSTIN MARTI

COURT OF APPEAL (Lord Justice Watkins, Mr. Justice Boreham and Mr. Justice Tucker): April 10, 1991

Long term detention of juvenile—robbery—robbery by boy aged 14—whether sentence of detention under Children and Young Persons Act 1933, s.53(2) appropriate.

Two years' detention under Children and Young Persons Act 1933, s.53(2)

upheld on a boy aged 14 for robbery.

The appellant, a boy aged 14, pleaded guilty to robbery. Wearing a mask he accosted a woman aged 60, threatened her with a knife and demanded money. The woman gave him her purse containing £5. The appellant was arrested a few minutes later. Sentenced to two years' detention under Children and Young Persons Act 1933, s.53(2).

Held: there were no grounds on which the court could interfere with the sentence.

References: detention of juveniles, Current Sentencing Practice E 4.5(g).

Miss S. Spier for the appellant.

BOREHAM J.: On November 5 1990, in the Crown Court at Inner London, before Her Honour Judge Negus, the appellant pleaded guilty to robbery. He was then 14 years of age. Sentence was postponed in order that an up to date social inquiry report might be obtained. That was done. On December 3, before His Honour Judge Pryor Q.C., the appellant was sentenced to two years' detention under section 53(2) of the Children and Young Persons Act 1933. He now appeals against sentence by leave of the single judge.

They were these. Just before midnight on June 5, 1990 a Mrs. Demowbray, aged 60, parked her motor car and was walking to her home along a street in West London. The appellant had been lurking between two other parked cars, obviously lying in wait for some such victim as this lady. He jumped out in front of her. He was holding in his hand a kitchen knife, which the victim described as being about eight inches long. He was wearing a mask which covered his face. He stood quite close to her, about two feet away. He pointed the knife in the middle of her body and said, according to her: "Give me your money or I will kill you." Not surpris-

The facts of the offence of robbery can be shortly stated. They were unpleasant.

ingly, she was very frightened. She therefore took her purse out of her bag and gave it to the appellant who then ran away. She followed him for a short while but then lost him. The purse contained £5.

It so happened that nearby there were three police officers on duty in a police vehicle. They saw the appellant running along the street. They were suspicious, so they stopped him. He said he was going home and that he was running rather than walking because he was late. At that point a message came over the radio, and so the officer tackled him in this way. He said: "Where is the knife you threatened this woman with?" The appellant said: "What knife?" He denied that he had threatened any woman. Another officer found the knife and the missing purse nearby.

The appellant was arrested; on the way to the police station he admitted that he was the culprit. When interviewed, he said that he left home at about 10.30 that

night, taking the kitchen knife with him. He admitted that he had threatened the lady with the knife and he admitted saying: "Give me your money." He denied that he had threatened to kill her if she did not. We interpose to say that the court proceeded on the footing that in this particular regard what he said was right, namely, no threat to kill her. Not surprisingly, he found it difficult to offer any explanation as to why he had done what he did.

As we have said, the appellant was 14 years of age when he appeared before the Crown Court. He was born on July 2, 1976. It follows therefore that he was within a little less than a month of his fourteenth birthday at the time of this robbery. At that time he lived with his father and his stepmother in a flat at Lime Grove. By the time he came to the Crown Court he had one conviction recorded against him for burglary. That was recorded on August 29, 1990. It was not an offence which had been recorded by the time he committed the robbery. In respect of that offence a

supervision order was made.

There was before the Crown Court a number of reports. There was a social inquiry report which had been prepared for the hearing before the justices in August 1990. That report, as do the other reports, sets out what can only be described as somewhat unfortunate home circumstances; difficulties in his relationship with his father and the difficulties which his father and stepmother were having in coping with his behaviour. It was hoped that a place at a special school could be found because there was concern about his behaviour, his attitude and attendance at normal school. The appellant had lived with an aunt for about nine years up to the age of 11. That had been a thoroughly unhappy experience. He himself said that he had feelings of anger which he found difficult to control. He told the probation officer on that occasion that he wanted to apologise to the victim, and the probation officer recommended an alternative to detention. As we have said, the magistrates felt able, in the circumstances, to accede to that suggestion. A supervision order was made.

The Crown Court had before it a psychiatric report. It was prepared on behalf of the defence. It is unnecessary to go into the detail of that report. It is sufficient to say that the consultant psychiatrist concluded that this young man had behavioural and personality problems and difficulty in conforming, which led to the further conclusion that this appellant required what was described as a structured and well-disciplined environment in order to teach him to conform in a sensible way. There was also an assessment report from a group which had been set up by the Dr. Barnado's authorities in partnership with Hammersmith and Fulham Social Services. They suggested that any sentence of detention would introduce the appellant to considerably more sophisticated offenders than himself. They recommended a supervision order with what is called a specified activity programme, which is outlined in the report.

The judge felt unable to accede to the suggestion made that there could be an alternative to custody. He came to the conclusion that this offence was so serious

that a custodial sentence was necessary.

The single judge, in giving leave, directed that prison and medical reports should be obtained. It is sufficient to say of the medical report that it discloses no medical problems as far as this young man is concerned. His health is satisfactory. The house report observes that he still has serious personality and behavioural problems. It would be of no advantage and would only add unnecessarily to the length of this judgment to cite in detail from that report. It is clear that those who have had him in their care since he was sentenced, regard him as a young man immature for his age, who still lacks self-control and who needs to come to terms with the problems which face him.

That said, the report is encouraging. It is quite clear that he has made substantial progress, albeit he has some distance to go, since December 1990, which is still a comparatively short period of time. He is a young man who has a talent for sport, and in particular for soccer. It is unfortunate that up to now the regime in which he has been held had been unable to provide the sporting facilities which would clearly do him a lot of good and which might contribute to further improvement in his behaviour and further resolution of those outstanding problems, to which reference has been made. It is clear that those who have him in their charge are alive to this problem. The approval of the Home Office has been sought in the hope of obtaining a place in what is referred to as an open unit, where the sort of facilities to which I have made reference will be available. That is the up to date situation.

When the single judge gave leave he said that he did so on the basis of a short paragraph in the application for bail which had been made to him. It reads in this

way:

"That as a 14 year old and never having been in custody before or indeed sentenced for any offence, he is suffering trauma whilst in custody of sufficient seriousness that the authorities have contacted his solicitor indicating that they would support the appellant in being sentenced in any way other than depriva-

tion of liberty."

This must have come about as a result of a misunderstanding because in the course of her submissions to this court, Miss Spier has made it clear that she no longer relies upon that because certainly the reports before us do not support it. We mention it only because it was mentioned and relied upon by the single judge. Ground one of the grounds of appeal put forward on behalf on this appellant can be dealt with equally shortly. That, too, was clearly based on a misunderstanding. It suggested that Her Honour Judge Negus, who first dealt with this matter by way of adjournment on November 5, 1990, had indicated at that time that a custodial sentence was not uppermost in her mind. When one comes to the transcript, it is clear that she intended something entirely different. In those circumstances Miss Spier no longer relies on that.

Miss Spier, to whom we are grateful for her very careful and realistic submissions to this Court, accepts this was a very serious offence involving the use of a knife against a lady of mature years who was making her way home at night; thus, consideration clearly had to be given to stern punishment. On the other hand, as Miss Spier has pointed out, although the victim must have been very frightened, no physical harm was done to her. No physical violence was applied to her, no doubt because she was frightened enough to hand over the money. There it is. The appellant is entitled to rely upon the fact that he did not lay hands on her. Miss Spier further concedes that an immediate custodial sentence was inevitable. She puts the matter in this way; if the appellant had been 16 years of age, why then, she could have made no complaint on his behalf about the sentence of two years' detention. But she reminds us that we are dealing with a young lad, now 14, and only 13 at the time he committed this grave offence.

Miss Spier submits that the judge has really deflected himself, if not misdirected himself, in two ways. The first was this. The judge said, when sentencing the appellant, "I am quite satisfied that nothing but a substantial custodial sentence could possibly be justified in this case." No complaint is made of that. He then went on to say: "If you were over 21, you would certainly be going to prison for some period between 5 and 10 years for this grave offence and you qualify for a custodial sentence because the offence to which you pleaded guilty is so serious that a non-custodial sentence cannot be justified."

There is no complaint made of most of that passage. What is suggested by Miss

Spier is that the judge chose the wrong starting point. She submits that he set the starting point for an adult in a case such as the present too high. In support of that contention she has referred us to a number of comparatively recent decisions of this Court, where sentences of a substantially lower order have been confirmed in cases akin to this. We hope we do no injustice to, or show no lack of respect for, either her industry or her arguments, if we do not refer specifically to those. It has been helpful to be reminded of them. As counsel knows, no two cases are alike, and one can glean from other decisions no more than a general trend or a broad indication of what the appropriate starting point should be.

At all events, we are prepared to assume that in taking a figure of 10 years as a starting point, the judge would have been setting it too high, but, in our judgment, the judge was not speaking of a starting point of 10 years for this young man for this offence. Had it been otherwise, one cannot help but think he would have imposed a sentence longer than two years. He was merely demonstrating to the appellant the gravity of the offence by pointing out to him what, in his view, would have been an

appropriate bracket for an adult offender in circumstances such as these.

The second comment which Miss Spier submits is open to criticism was made a little earlier in the sentencing remarks, where the judge clearly indicated that in his judgment an element of deterrence was necessary in the sentence he imposed. Miss Spier conceded that the language of section 53(2) of the Children and Young Persons Act is wide enough to allow a deterrent sentence to be passed. Her point is this. It is one thing to talk of deterrence when one is talking of people of 16 and upwards. It is an expression which such persons would understand and in respect of such persons it might have some effect. She contends that it is not appropriate when dealing with an appellant who was 13 at the time he committed the offence, and who is now only 14. She supports that submission with the observation that there is no evidence here that there were other 13 years olds lurking in the locality, ready to carry out the sort of offence for which this young lad was being sentenced. That is true; but deterrence is not necessarily aimed at identified persons or groups or gangs. Deterrence is intended to have a more general effect.

We are unable to accept the criticisms which have been levelled at the judge. It seems appropriate, albeit this was a young offender, that a substantial sentence

with a deterrent element should be imposed.

Finally, Miss Spier suggests that insufficient weight was given by the judge to a possible alternative and, in particular, that if no other form of sentence was appropriate, as the judge found, why then, this appellant's rehabilitation did not require that he should serve as long as two years. Miss Spier submits that a shorter period would have sufficed to meet the gravity of the offence and to serve the interests of the appellant. She has, helpfully, called before us a Mr. Williams, a social worker, who knows this young man and who has kept in contact with him since he has been detained. He was able to say, and we accept, that the experience so far gained by the appellant has had a salutary and deterrent effect upon him; in other words, that which the judge sought to achieve is being achieved. That, after all, is what is reflected in the up to date report to which reference has been made.

Mr. Williams, understandably, would prefer that the alternative put before the judge be accepted by us, namely, a supervision order coupled with a specified activity programme. That is an alternative to which this Court feels wholly unable

to accede. This offence was too serious to allow us to take that course.

We turn to the last question we have to decide which is, having decided that the sentence imposed was correct in principle, was a period of two years too long? In any circumstances, to get the sentence exactly right, is often difficult. To have to sentence a young lad of 14 for a very serious offence must be among the most diffi-

cult of sentencing exercises. On one side is the gravity of the offence and the aggravating circumstances, and on the other are the sympathy evoking mitigating circumstances; the plea of guilty, his acknowledgement at an early stage to the police of his guilt, his extreme youth, and his unhappy background. In our judgment, the judge has applied himself with great care and with great understanding, to the sentencing of this young appellant. He came to the conclusion, based upon the reports before him, and in particular upon the consultant psychiatrist's report, that a period of two years was appropriate.

Having considered those matters and having considered them in the light of the more up to date report which is before this court, we consider that no criticism can

properly be levelled at the decision that he reached.

The appellant will know, and no doubt his family and those who advise him will know, that the period of two years is not a fixed period. It is the maximum period for which he can be held. His future and the length of time he serves in detention is very much in the hands of the Home Secretary, Moreover, one knows from experience that the Home Secretary has available to him a range of facilities and different regimes to which this young lad might go. We have already indicated that there are moves afoot to send him to a more open regime where his love of sport, and in particular soccer, can be indulged. The up to date reports before us really confirm the propriety of the sentence imposed by Judge Pryor. Current signs are encouraging. It seems to us that that which Judge Pryor hoped to achieve is beginning to come to pass. We can only hope that in the succeeding months even greater success will be achieved. This could only be to the advantage of the appellant and of society.

Having given this matter long and anxious consideration, we have come to the conclusion that there are no grounds, despite Miss Spier's attractive presentation, which would entitle or persuade us to interfere with the sentence imposed. In those

circumstances, this appeal is dismissed.

MARTIN BRAY

COURT OF APPEAL (Lord Justice Watkins, Mr. Justice Boreham and Mr. Justice Tucker): April 11, 1991

Detention in a young offender institution—unlawful wounding—unprovoked attack with weapons-whether custodial sentence justified.

Eighteen months' detention in a young offender institution upheld for unlawful

wounding in the form of an unprovoked attack with weapons.

The appellant pleaded guilty to unlawful wounding (his plea of not guilty to wounding with intent to do grievous bodily harm was accepted). The appellant and a co-defendant were driving in a car when they saw a young man walking with two young women. The appellant attacked the young man with a metal bar, and his codefendant attacked him with a sawn-off billiard cue; the victim was struck a number of times and received a head wound which penetrated to the skull. Sentenced to 18 months' detention in a young offender institution.

Held: this was gratuitous unprovoked violence: the sentencer was right to conclude that a non-custodial sentence could not be justified in the circumstances, and he had found the right level of sentence.