ISIS MALAYSIA

ASEAN SERIES

TWO VIEWS ON SUMMIT THREE

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

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(ISIS) MALAYSIA

Published by the Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ISIS) Malaysia and printed by Pencetak Weng Fatt Sdn Bhd.

ISBN 967-947-005-9

THE QUESTION OF A THIRD ASEAN SUMMIT
Pros and cons, approaches and recommendations

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'The summit gathering is by no means a panacea for
the international problems of the contemporary world.
On the other hand, history has not disproven
that it may help to resolve or ameliorate some of these problems.
In any case, it needs to be employed sparingly,
lest it lose its impact. It cannot be permitted
to become a fetish or to merit attention as an end to itself.'

This paper was presented at the 'Conference on Regional Development: The Ties that Bind', the second meeting of Asean institutes of strategic studies, which was held at ISIS Malaysia from Jan 12-16, 1986.

The assessments and views expressed in the paper are entirely the author's own.

OF THE analogies, some colourful and others banal, that one encounters in the idiom of diplomacy, that of the 'summit' perhaps encapsulates most appropriately the tortuous process, the perils, the limelight and the breathless euphoria that characterise an encounter among statesmen at the highest level of representation. Indeed, one commentator even pushed the mountain trekking analogy to the point of describing the officials who accompanied the heads of government to the 1979 Tokyo Economic Summit as 'The Seven Sherpas'.

Such is the fate of the mountain ('because it is there'?) that over the millenia, the summit has not lost its allure to political leaders aspiring to be statesmen, despite the dawning of the so-called 'age of the professional diplomat'. Thus, the journalistic popularity acquired by the expression 'summit diplomacy' during the 1950s should not be taken as suggesting the idea of a new form of inter-state action. Rather, the 'summit' is a recurring phenomenon of international relations. Simply put, it is diplomatic intercourse engaged in by political principals above cabinet or ministerial rank which, in the specific context of this paper, refers to the heads of government of the Asean states.

As instruments of diplomacy, summits may be distinguished by the number of principals involved (i.e. whether bilateral or in multilateral conclave), the type of principals (i.e. among friends or, at least, with non-enemies or involving adversary diplomacy) and the perceived functions of the diplomatic encounter (whether for propaganda effect, sizing-up, intention-revealing or decision-making, though in actuality, elements of all these may be present in a single summit).

The objectives of summit diplomacy are, however, very much determined by the context of international relationship. The eyeball-to-eyeball East-West summits of the Cold War period (e.g. the four-power summits of 1955, 1960 or 1964) were overshadowed by propagandising and point-scoring. Likewise, certain pre-Asean summits (Manila 1963, Tokyo 1964) were, at least in the eyes of the main architects of Konfrontasi, a continuation of conflict and coercive diplomacy by an admixture of other means. On the other hand, in a context of conciliation and rapprochement, summits dramatise and symbolise the opening wedge to a thawing of relations, a fresh start and a conscious return to greater stability. For this reason, the post-summit euphoria is usually more pronounced and the expectation of substantive change is, justifiable or not, that much higher.

But whether summits are convened as part of an adversary-competitive or cordial-confidence building process, they invariably attract special attention by virtue of the assemblage itself. Quite simply, Presidents and Prime Ministers (and their assorted entourages) make for better showmanship and are that much more newsworthy than mere officials and ministers whose groundwork and pre-summit contributions may in reality far exceed their media profiles.

Certainly in cases where an improvement in the climate of political relations is called for, the most dramatic effect can be produced by a meeting between erstwhile adversaries. The longer the gap since the last summit, the greater the significance read into the new encounter. In such an event, the post-summit syndrome of exhilaration (as evidenced, say, by the recent Reagan-Gorbachev summit in Geneva) can quite easily mask the hard negotiations on substantive issues (whether they be arms control, bilateral relations or regional security) that must necessarily follow the symbolic breakthrough.

In cases where more than affirmative gestures are needed or when the sudden, drastic efforts of the initial brave steps forward have been taken, the success of subsequent summits will depend increasingly on the grounds of agreement staked out by lower level negotiations and decision-taking. Hence the 'doctrine of the well-tuned summit' — that before every summit there should be the fullest diplomatic preparation to the extent that it should not even be embarked upon unless its success is virtually certain and indeed, its final communique included in the participants' baggage on arrival'[1]. While this 'doctrine' may veer on the side of excessive caution, it is equally noteworthy that the bizarre protracted summit-level wrangling among the peacemakers of 1919 in Paris, has few, if any, modern day parallels.

The point that emerges from the foregoing general comments on summits is that they have their uses and abuses, efficacies and limitations. The quote at the beginning of this paper may be recalled when we consider the question of a third Asean summit.

Summitry in the life of Asean

It is not without significance that 19 years after the creation of Asean we should be contemplating the question of a third summit meeting. Although only 18 months separated the first and second summit, the association had waited nine years before the first meeting of heads of government was convened in Bali in 1976 and another nine years have transpired since their last gathering in Kuala Lumpur. If Asean may be likened to a marriage of sorts and summitry the consummation of that relationship, one may well be excused for lamenting, 'It has been a long time!' Yet such infrequency contrasts sharply with the proliferation of Asean governmental and non-governmental meetings at all other levels. It is as if the lavish spread of goodwill and interaction at the base of the pyramid has left little (or made unnecessary anything else) to show at the apex.

If success in regional co-operation were to be calibrated in terms of the frequency of summits, then the Asean record has been truly dismal. However,

the record of those who meet more regularly in summitry, has not been too encouraging either. Indeed, the limited achievement of economic summits among the western industrialised nations has led one former Malaysian foreign minister to exclaim, 'No more Cancuns!'[2]

If there has been achievement at all along the broad front of intra-Asean co-operation, that has come about through a flexible approach underlined by a common realisation that 'making haste slowly' is to be preferred to chasing impossible dreams. A comment by the then Malaysian Prime Minister Datuk Hussein Onn at the Bali Summit is worth recalling. He attributed Asean's ability to absorb national differences to the relative informality of the organisation — without its rigid rules of procedure or elaborate machinery[3]. It is this contrived flexibility, together with memories during the early years of Asean's existence, of the pre-Asean political strife and tribulations, that resulted in an initial de-emphasis on political co-operation. This, among other things, had resulted in the summit being an uninstitutionalised feature of Asean co-operation — standing above and yet apart from the formal institutional structure despite the organisational revamp following the Bali summit.

In subsequent years Asean turned out to be a far more effective vehicle for political rather than non-political co-operation. Successive commentators were to point to the poor track-record of intra-Asean economic co-operation even while Asean was emerging as a diplomatic/political community and pressure group to be reckoned with on various international forums.

Diplomatic/political co-operation, co-ordination and policy harmonisation are institutionalised at the highest level, not by the summit, but in annual foreign ministers' meetings which, together with the annually rotating standing committee, can be looked upon as the custodian of the political sovereignties of Asean. Supranationalism has been clearly eschewed and all political co-operation is conducted on the basis of consensus with its requirement for unanimity or at least an absence of strong objection from any partner.

Supplemented by regular meetings of economic ministers and other ministers (e.g. of industry, energy, science and technology) and the occasional summit between pairs of Asean leaders, this structure for consultation and decision-making has reduced the imperative for regular multilateral summits. All this is not to imply that summitry does not fulfil other functions such as investing special significance upon decisions, reaffirming the spirit of community and even giving impetus and a new sense to co-operation.

These functions were to a large extent fulfilled by the first summit which was a milestone in Asean's first decade and seemed to put to international notice the fact that the regional association 'had arrived'. Although much could be claimed for the event as a response to external challenges signalled by the

transition in the previous year of the Indochinese states to communist rule, the first summit was also inward directed to the extent that it reflected a broadly-shared desire to put the Asean house in order. In this respect, the Asean Concord that was signed in Bali was looked upon as providing the guideline and underpinning (through functional co-operation) to regional and national resilience.

The broadening of economic relations and attempts to inject greater meaning into regional projects were paralleled by the establishment of improved institutional structures and a committee system to facilitate such co-operation. The institutionalisation process was advanced by the Agreement on the Establishment of the Asean Secretariat, also signed in Bali.

Asean's conception of and aspiration to regional order of a kind was indicated by the third document signed in Bali, namely the Treaty of Amity and Co-operation in Southeast Asia which, while establishing the basis for regional co-operation and peaceful settlement of disputes, was also intended as a basis for accommodation with communist Southeast Asia.

By the time the second Asean summit was convened, the novelty as well as the opening-wedge effect of the first conference had worn off. But the aura of summitry continued to sustain a high public expectation for a conference which was meant to achieve implementation rather than register a declaratory impact. The going was accordingly fraught with great difficulties. Beyond the new feature of participation by the heads of government of Japan, Australia and New Zealand in the immediate post-summit stage of the conclave (which did pave the way to more substantive extra-regional dialogues and negotiations), the second summit injected little additional momentum to intra-Asean co-operation — whether it concerned the economic co-operation programme, the five industrial projects identified at the previous summit or the strengthening of the regional secretariat hosted by Jakarta. As one Asean study observed, 'The final communique of the second summit was lengthy in words but relatively short in substance. No new ground was broken on regional development as a whole or on zonal neutrality. Also, in economic co-operation, the heads of government called attention to accomplishments already reached . . . References to co-operation in the social, cultural, and information fields in the communique were very nebulous.'[4]

Post-summit disillusionment

It may be surmised that the experiences of the two summits had spawned a certain disillusionment which led to a persisting reluctance to embark on a third

summit. Over a number of issues the high (perhaps, even exaggerated) expectations raised by the previous summits were not fulfilled by follow-up action. Inevitably, a sense of let-down ensued and, considering the highly personal nature of summit conferencing as well as the elite nature of foreign policy-making in practically all the Asean states, it was easy to translate negative sentiments into veto-action. The application of the consensus principle to such a matter of political import is a double guarantee for inaction.

Of the areas of relative inaction, the limited progress of the Asean industrial projects is a sober reminder to those who think 'Asean could use the occasional demonstration of regional cohesion by its leaders to motivate its bureaucratic minions'[5] that the mere exercise of so-called political-will cannot always decree functional co-operation into existence. The more recent trend towards letting private sector initiatives (through Asean industrial joint ventures) provide the momentum to economic co-operation seems to recognise the inherent obstacles, some of à structural rather than political nature, that stand in the way of such co-operation.

Comparing political co-operation with economic co-operation within Asean, one finds that on the one hand, successful political co-operation (over the Cambodia issue or in stabilising neighbourly relationships) has been attained despite the infrequency of summits. On the other hand, the limited scope for economic co-operation and the strong aversion towards any hint of supranationalism serve to question the necessity for more excursions into high-profile diplomacy. Since summits are essentially means to an end, the recurring question is, 'To what further purpose could another summit be put?'

Another disillusionment with summits flows from the over-commitment (generally recognised as the greatest hazard of summitry) of past meetings that remain undelivered. One often cited diplomatic case is the spectre of the Philippine claim to Sabah. The announcement at the Kuala Lumpur summit by President Ferdinand Marcos of the intention to relinquish the claim has, to Malaysia's dissatisfaction, not been accompanied by affirmative action. It is sometimes forgotten that the Sabah problem had also cast its shadow over the Bali summit. It delayed the completion of the draft Treaty of Amity and Co-operation, clause 14 of which provided for the machinery for the settlement of intra-Asean disputes. Malaysia's concern was that the Philippines might use the treaty to pursue its Sabah claim. Kuala Lumpur's stand was that the machinery for pacific settlement of disputes should be operative only when the parties involved voluntarily submit for mediation. This element of consensus was not provided for in the initial draft[6].

In the years subsequent to the Kuala Lumpur summit, the relinquishment of the claim has been raised almost to the status of a precondition by Malaysia

for a third summit which by alphabetical rotation should be hosted by the Philippines. The greater the Philippine interest in hosting the summit, the greater too is the Malaysian temptation to claim a quid pro quo for participation. Datuk Seri Dr Mahathir Mohamad, who since assuming the Prime Ministership of Malaysia has visited all the Asean states with the exception of the Philippines, pointed to the precedence set by former Malaysian Prime Ministers in explaining away the absence so far of a Malaysia-Philippines bilateral summit. It should not be too difficult to fathom the real cause of such diplomatic immobilism.

Although undoubtedly an irritant in Malaysia-Philippines relations, the Sabah problem should not be over-exaggerated as an impediment to regional co-operation. Asean officials have observed that the problem has not been allowed to spill into and affect other areas of functional co-operation. Recounting the comments of an Asean diplomat, one former bureaucrat of the Asean secretariat draws attention to the 'countless cupboards' in Asean where 'skeletons can be safely stored'[7].

Nor has the infrequency of Asean summits meant that consultation, regular contacts and mutual familiarisation at the highest level, are being hampered. On the contrary, bilateral summits do take place quite regularly. One study reveals a total of 96 of these 'bilaterals' occurring between 1967 and 1981. The largest number of them were betweeen Malaysia and Thailand and the least (only two) between Malaysia and the Philippines [8]. In 1979, the Indonesian foreign minister, Dr Mochtar Kusumaatmadja, then chairman of the Asean standing committee, said that his discussions with Asean leaders indicated no great enthusiasm for an early summit. Rather they considered periodic meetings of an informal nature to be more useful [9]. A more recent study, however, has sought to downplay the significance of these visitations. The evidence, to the author, 'suggests that bilateral visits have become more and more politically selective when the practice could have been institutionalised through regularity and comprehensiveness[10]'. To those with a penchant for summitry, 'bilaterals' (quite apart from their effect in reducing the urgency for 'multilaterals') are looked upon as poor substitutes for the display of concerted effort.

The call persists

That the disillusionment over summits is not so widespread as to turn away all Asean leaders from the idea, is indicated by the attempts on several occasions since 1977 to propose a third summit meeting. In May 1980 the proposal for a summit was reported from Manila where the Thai Prime Minister General Prem Tinsulanond had gone to meet with Marcos. Both political leaders felt

it would be timely to hold the summit in the following year. Earlier, in March of 1980, Singapore Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew had said that a summit should be held in the next 18 to 24 months. Commenting on the Prem-Marcos meeting, the *Straits Times* drew attention to the usefulness of a third summit in consolidating and widening consensus on vital issues and in demonstrating Asean solidarity[11].

The inauguration of the Asean Secretariat in 1981 provided the occasion for another attempt to float the idea of a summit. An unnamed Philippine diplomat listed several compelling reasons: the need to iron out differences and tackle political and economic matters, the passage of time and events since the last meeting, the Cambodia problem, the call of private business sectors seeking a fresh direction as to more viable projects and the need for top level exchange on economic matters[12].

The Philippines, which by reason of protocol, has the strongest sense of entitlement to being the next conference host, has been most consistent in its advocacy of a summit. In May 1982 Marcos renewed this advocacy in an opening address to the 13th Asean Economic Ministers Meeting. He said that only a summit could give the impetus needed to achieve greater economic co-operation and co-ordinate new industrial initiatives[13].

However, as it became increasingly apparent that the venue in question was posing difficulties given the problem (discussed earlier) in Malaysia-Philippines relations, Thailand began to push the idea of itself being a more acceptable conference host. And given the underlying difficulty in agreeing to a substantive agenda, the emphasis was shifted to the celebratory role. But Thai attempts to arrange for a ceremonial meeting among Asean leaders during Bangkok's bicentennial celebrations in 1982 did not quite bear fruit. In February 1982, Datuk Musa Hitam, the then Malaysian deputy Prime Minister said, during a visit to Jakarta, that Prem had invited fellow Asean leaders to a summit in Bangkok in April the following year, to commemorate the grouping's 15th anniversary[14]. However, the sought-after summit proved to be quite elusive. Even when Asean political leaders gathered in Brunei in February 1984 to celebrate that country's first national day, a formal summit did not materialise. Instead, they met bilaterally and informally among themselves.

Nevertheless, Thai efforts to canvass support for a summit continued into 1985. At the 18th Asean Ministerial Meeting in Kuala Lumpur, the Thai foreign minister, ACM Siddhi Savetsila made pointed reference to the two successive summits of Asean heads of government in 1976 and 1977 which set in motion the intensification of Asean economic co-operation. He suggested that with the approaching 20th anniversary of Asean's founding (due in 1987) it might be appropriate for Asean to begin reflecting on another set of guidelines for the

next generation of Asean co-operative endeavours to boost Asean's expanding activities [15]. These sentiments were echoed in the speech of the Philippine acting foreign minister, Pacifico Castro, who pointed to the need for 'the strong collective political will at the highest level possible not only to infuse greater dynamism to its intra-regional programmes but to reassert itself, as it did in Bali and ... in Kuala Lumpur eight years ago ... ' Much the same message was carried to Lee during Siddhi's visit to Singapore in September after which he revealed that the Singapore Prime Minister was not opposed to the idea of an Asean summit[16]. In the same month Prem called on President Suharto, during which visit, Indonesia's support for the summit was also sought[17].

By the end of 1985 a meeting at Chiangmai of senior Asean officials had agreed in principle to the holding of a summit. Officials are expected to meet in Manila in January 1986 to prepare the summit proposal for endorsement at the 19th Foreign Ministers Meeting[18]. It would seem that the question of a third Asean summit has now gone beyond the stage of the pros and cons. The question is not about 'whether' but rather, about 'when' and 'where'.

Some new imperatives?

A number of reasons may be advanced for the spreading relaxation of resistance to the convening of a third summit. In the first place, Asean governments are having to grapple with the challenges posed by the economic downturn and recession. At the same time there is a general realisation that intra-Asean economic co-operation has reached a plateau and a new sense of direction is deemed necessary. As the Malaysian Prime Minister put it to the Asean Chambers of Commerce and Industry Conference in late 1985, a firm commitment by Asean countries to economic co-operation is vital in the current atmosphere of a prolonged recession and disruptions in the international trading systems[19].

Secondly, as some critics of Asean's obsession with the Cambodia problem are wont to say, there is the danger of Asean becoming a one-issue organisation which thus loses sight of the other pressing demands for intra-regional resilience and domestic welfare through functional co-operation. Although the more hard-headed may be convinced of the bonding effect of the external challenge, the fact remains that there are inherent strains in the continuing strategy of sustaining a common diplomatic front[20]. Such strains are exacerbated by the persisting problems of co-operation between the partners of the CGDK (whose creation Asean had facilitated) and the newly-emerging struggles within the leadership of the KPNLF which seems to be sorely in need of salvation.

Thirdly, Asean has in recent years experienced the effects of 'institutional drift' as new ministerial blocs emerge within the formal organisational structure. As one former economic bureau director of the Asean secretariat observed, there has been 'a tendency for ministers in certain economic sectors seeking to meet autonomously from the main body of the AEM (Asean economic ministers) and to establish their own separate subordinate bodies'[21]. This adds to the ambiguity in the relations between ministerial blocs (including that between the AEM and AMM or foreign ministers meeting) besides creating problems for transectoral co-ordination. Although the more radical institutional changes proposed by the task force report on Asean co-operation (such as the establishment of a council of ministers and the replacement of the standing committee by a committee of permanent representatives located at the Asean secretariat) may be too far ahead of its time[22], there is the lingering expectation that a summit might at least serve to arrest the 'institutional drift' and refocus attention on the need for improved transectoral co-ordination.

In the fourth place, the serious challenges to the political and economic resilience of the Philippines could well generate drift effects of a different kind. The consequence would be a distancing of the Philippines from the intra-regional and functional concerns of the association. Already it is noted that the economic crisis in the Philippines has further slowed down its participation in the AIP. While some may well question the wisdom and efficacy of any Asean attempt to help stabilise the Philippine condition, there is the notion that psychologically at least a summit might provide a certain bonding element and reinvigorate the sense of purpose within the regional community.

Finally, despite the acquisition of a sixth member in January 1984, the association has yet to see the participation of Brunei at the highest level of co-operation. It would not be inappropriate on the 20th anniversary of Asean to facilitate the consummation of that participation in concorde diplomacy and reaffirm the sense of partnership at the apex.

Of cons and pros

The foregoing discussion would appear to establish a case for an Asean summit. However, some distinctions ought to be made between what a summit can really do vis-a-vis the myriad problems of co-operation, and what the call for a summit is symptomatic of. It could well be that renewed advocacy of summitry is a reflection of a deeper frustration over the myriad drift effects which the association is faced with. Some of these may stem from the difficulty in establishing national rather than regional consensus. Hence, if undue expectation

is placed on a summit, the sense of disillusionment that follows will be all the greater.

It is all too freely claimed that the usefulness of a summit lies in its being able to deal with matters beyond the competence of officials and ministers. However, relegating difficult issues to lower level functionaries makes it possible for the political principals to avoid the glare of publicity over areas of evident deadlock. In the Asean experience there is hardly a case of a successful appeal over the heads of the foreign ministers and senior officials. On the occasion when an Asean secretary-general suggested a summit to overcome some administrative problems of the secretariat and Asean, the action was considered 'inappropriate' and turned back by the standing committee[23].

It is always easier to pay lip service to the idea of economic co-operation than to implement the programme of such co-operation. Unless careful thought is given to how such co-operation can be furthered in a realistic manner, a summit that purports to address the issue could result in a mere talk-shop or, for want of something to show, a platitudinous declaration.

The pitfalls of 'high altitude' diplomacy mentioned so far are hazardous to summiteers but need not preclude the whole idea of attempting the summit. Much depends on how the approach is made. The danger in the case of Asean is that if we wait too long, the event could become an end in itself — the challenge then will be not so much what a summit can do but what we can do to get a summit.

Touching on the intangible, while Asean does not live by symbolic gestures alone, they are not altogether out of place if they serve as affirmative demonstrations of renewed solidarity, goodwill and as a focus on the ties that bind. Twenty years of relatively successful management of stable intra-regional relationships is cause enough for reflection and celebration in a turbulent world where one is used to being grateful for small mercies. In the same vein, neighbours should not begrudge the prestige that sometimes rubs off on the host of such a gathering.

Approaches and recommendations

1. In view of the obstacles (including the Sabah issue) that had stood in the way of a third summit, it is necessary for the Asean partners to avoid imposing pre-conditions on the convening of such a gathering. The focus should instead be on reinforcing the ties that bind.

2. It is not intended to belabour the celebratory function. But if the summit was held to mark the 20th anniversary of the association, a case can be made for returning the conference to the association's birthplace, namely, Thailand. The suggestion is also tactical in that it side-steps the problems (be these diplomatic, political or security) of hosting the event in the Philippines. The fact that summits are not institutionalised may make it easier to break with the rigid principle of alphabetical rotation. And the by-passing as well of Singapore as a conference venue makes the by-passing of the Philippines more palatable.

3. Over and above the celebratory role and the stock-taking of Asean development, the summit should be defined primarily as a discussion and contact meeting rather than as a working meeting so that any additional output is a bonus and a positive surprise.

4. In adopting a realistic approach towards the conference, it is essential to avoid floating grand schemes and making grandiose flourishes that cannot be delivered.

5. Bearing in mind the underlying difficulties in economic co-operation, the approach in mapping out future plans should be guided by flexibility. The objective as indicated recently by Mahathir should be to work towards making Asean a strong economic bloc without the rigidity of the European Community agreements[24]. Flexibility is also underlined by the Singapore foreign minister at the 18th AMM when he spoke of the importance of not subjecting regionalism to the strains of ambitious supranational projects and policies. Viewed against these words of caution, it is unlikely that any comprehensive economic treaty spelling out targets and clear time-frames (as envisaged by the Asean-CCI Special Review Committee on Asean Development) will materialise from the summit.

6. Economic concerns and the problem of economic co-operation must inevitably be addressed. The parameters to such co-operation are set by the fact that Asean has no supranational objectives. Also, as the Asean task force report notes, programmes of economic co-operation in areas which require

the pooling of resources to bring the member countries closer to each other have been more successful than market-sharing. The occasion of the summit could be used to identify further areas for industrial complementation.

7. In building on the strengths of regionalism, the area of Asean-third country co-operation could be more fully explored, particularly on matters pertaining to trade, investment, technology transfer and human resource development. The institutionalisation in October 1985 of the Asean-EC ministers meeting on economic matters could provide a model for the upgrading of formal linkages with other dialogue partners.

8. By far the greatest diplomatic/political challenge to Asean is the Cambodia problem. While dramatic breakthroughs may be premature, the summit could be used not only to re-emphasise the association's resolve to find a peaceful solution, but also to avert the danger of a drift towards regional polarisation with Thailand increasingly attracted to the idea of a de facto alliance with China, and Indonesia increasingly drawn towards a closer relationship with Vietnam.

The above constitutes not only an approach to the convening of a third Asean summit but also points to certain issues around which an agenda can be built. These are essentially modest recommendations. The temptation to elaborate a grand strategy is resisted, bearing in mind the ever present possibility that a summit could end up as (in the words of an Asean leader) 'a ceremonial ritual along an inconsequential road that will lead to nowhere'.

NOTES

1. Sir Godfrey Jackson, *Concorde Diplomacy — The Ambassador's Role in the World Today,* (Hamish Hamilton, London, 1981) p 35-7.

2. Opening statement by Tan Sri Ghazali Shafie at the 15th Asean Ministerial Meeting, June 14, 1982.

3. State Secretariat of Indonesia, 1976, *Asean Summit Meeting Bali, 23-25 February 1976,* p 18.

4. Russell H Fifield, *National and Regional Interests in Asean: Competition and Co-operation in International Politics,* (ISEAS, Occasional Paper No 57, 1979) p 18-19. For a review of the Kuala Lumpur summit see Hans Indorf, 'The Kuala Lumpur Summit — A Second for Asean', *Southeast Asian Affairs 1978,* ISEAS, 1978, p 35-44.

5. Hans H Indorf, *Impediments to Regionalism in Southeast Asia: Bilateral Constraints Among Asean Member States,* (ISEAS, 1978) p 78.

6. *New Straits Times,* Feb 22, 1976.

7. Chng Meng Kng, 'Asean Economic Co-operation', *Southeast Asian Affairs 1985,* (ISEAS, 1985) p 48.

8. Estrella D Solidum, *Bilateral Summitry in Asean,* (Philippines, Foreign Service Institute, 1982) p 12.

9. *Straits Times,* Feb 18, 1979.

10. Indorf, *Impediments to Regionalism in Southeast Asia ... (op cit)* p 73.

11. *Straits Times,* May 19, 1980.

12. *Asean Forecast,* May 1982, p 65.

13. *New Straits Times,* May 21, 1982.

14. *Straits Times,* Feb 19, 1982.

15. *18th Asean Ministerial Meeting and Post-Ministerial Conferences with the*