




21世纪课程规划教材
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历史悠久，涉及的流派和国家很多，伟大的思想家层出不穷。要做到合理的筛选，首先考虑的是所选思想家在历史上的重要性。一些具有划时代意义的思想家，当然都进入了我们的范围；其次，我们还考虑要尽量涵盖各个历史时期，把古希腊、古罗马、中世纪、文艺复兴、启蒙运动、19世纪和20世纪的思想著作都包括进来。20世纪的思想著作，由于还没有经过长时间的淘洗，所以它们是需要特别对待的。再其次，我们在编选的过程中，尽可能地多字种的原文选读，政治学、社会学、历史学等都能在这本书中有所体现。最后，我们尽可能地选入

西方思想经典选读

A Selected Reading from Western Classics

乔国强 何辉斌 ©主编



Textbook Series for 21st Century



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乔国强 何辉斌 主 编

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前 言

我们在长期的教学实践中发现,许多文科学生对西方的思想经典知之甚少,而能够潜心阅读西方思想经典原作的学生更是少之又少。因此,我们从两千多年间堆积起来的卷帙浩繁的西方思想宝库中精选了 20 位思想家的精品佳作,编辑了这本《西方思想经典选读》,以期能对文科学生的学习和了解西方思想经典有所帮助。

西方思想源远流长、博大精深,对其进行简单的概括和分期并非易事。不过,为了便于学习,我们在此尝试做一个精略的概括和梳理。古希腊、古罗马是西方思想的源头,这个时代的思想家不仅喜欢对现实中的一般的事情进行思考,而且还喜欢将其所思所想进行概括、升华,找到最为抽象的概念和原理,以探索何为世界的真正本原。米利都学派的“始基”、柏拉图的理念、亚里士多德的本体等都以寻求万物最后的本质为特征。这种对世界总体的最一般的概括的学问叫做“本体论”(ontology)。到了中世纪,西方人的本体论有了一定的变化,他们把神看作世界的本体,是把万物统一起来的绝对的最高的存在。古希腊罗马和中世纪的思想很复杂,具体的流派和观点非常多,但总体上看它们有着重本体论的倾向。

文艺复兴之后直到 19 世纪,西方思想的核心转向了认识论的问题,他们更加关心认识的过程和方法、获取真理的途径以及知识的可靠性和真理性等等。这一转向始自法国的笛卡儿,后被欧洲大陆的理性主义者和英国的经验主义者共同加以发展,并在德国古典主义时代达到了非常高的水平。英国经验主义者主要包括培根、霍布斯、洛克、休谟等。培根的《新工具》强调了“归纳”在科学中的作用,弥补了亚里士多德的《工具论》只重演绎推理的偏颇,是经验主义里程碑式的著作。霍布斯、洛克对理性主义的“天赋观念”说进行了批评,强调经验在认识过程中的作用,进一步完善了经验主义的思想。休谟认为,所谓的因果关系只是经验的重复,即两者经常在时间中相继出现,以至于使那些轻信的人断定,前者的出现肯定会引起后者的出现,把两者的关系看作是必然的,还会在将来保持不变。休谟认为这种现象并不意味着必然联系,因为相继出现过一万次的两件事情,完全有可能在第一万零一次的时候停止相随,就是无数次升起过的太阳也不能保证明天还会升起,总有到来的不升起的时刻,说不定在明天就会出现。

欧洲大陆理性主义思想的奠基人笛卡儿积极地寻求通向真理的途径,仔细考察了知识的可靠性、清晰性和明确性。为了找到准确无误的知识,他主张怀疑一切

可以怀疑的东西。在不断地批评和否定之后,他发现原先被人们看作非常确定的知识都经不起推敲,只有那个能够怀疑一切的理性主体是不可怀疑的。欧洲大陆的理性主义者还包括斯宾诺莎、莱布尼茨、伏尔泰、卢梭等。到了德国古典主义时代,康德、黑格尔、费希特、谢林等把理性主义思想推向了高潮。与经验主义相比,理性主义更有深度和系统性,但没有经验主义那么接近现实,有时难免有教条主义的倾向。

除了认识论之外,这一时期的思想家所关心的问题还有很多,如叔本华探讨了意志和表象的问题、尼采探索了超人意志以及克尔恺郭尔批判了思辨哲学,研究了“生存境界”等等。到了19世纪末和20世纪初,西方思想界有一个语言学的转向。在20世纪末又出现了一个文化转向。由于这两个转向离我们比较近,而且我们也没有选这两个领域的文章,所以不在此介绍。

西方思想历史悠久,涉及的流派和国家很多,伟大的思想家层出不穷,要做出合理的选择不是一件容易的事情。我们在筛选的时候,首先考虑到的是所选思想家在历史上的重要性。一些具有划时代意义的思想家,如柏拉图、亚里士多德、笛卡儿、康德等,都被列入了我们的范围;其次,我们还考虑要尽量涵盖各个历史时期,把古希腊、古罗马、中世纪、16、17、18、19和20世纪初的思想著作都包括进来。20世纪的思想著作,由于还没有经过长时间的淘洗,所以我们基本上不将其列入这本教材的编选中。这是需要特别交待的。再其次,我们在编选的过程中,尽可能地把多学科的内容包括进来,使哲学、伦理学、神学、逻辑学、政治学、社会学、历史学等都能在这本书中有所体现;最后,我们尽可能地选入不同国别的思想经典作品,让希腊、罗马、意大利、英国、法国、德国、丹麦等主要欧洲国家都有自己的声音。然而,这本教材的篇幅非常有限,只选了20篇选读,不可能把一切都囊括进来,难免挂一漏万。

本教材由乔国强和何辉斌主编,姜玉琴、陈娴、方环非、卢燕飞同志参加编写。北京大学出版社外语编辑部张冰主任在本教材的编写过程中予以了热情的鼓励和支持,编辑熊学勤同志也不辞辛苦地为本教材的编辑和校对做了大量的工作。在此一并表示最为诚挚的谢意。

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柏拉图

柏拉图(Plato,公元前 427—前 347)出生在一个古老的雅典名门家庭,是古希腊的百科全书式的思想家,在许多领域都有里程碑般的建树。他小时候喜欢绘画和文学创作。大约在 20 岁时成为苏格拉底的学生。40 岁之时,他曾前往叙拉古,试图说服那里的统治者狄奥尼修一世采用他的政治主张,但惨遭失败。同年回到雅典,创立举世闻名的学园(Academy)。此后主要在学园里从事教育和研究,直到去世。有关他投师苏格拉底一事,有个美丽的传说。在第欧根尼·拉尔修的《著名哲学家的生平和学说》中有这样的记载:一天晚上,苏格拉底梦见一只小天鹅停在他的膝盖上,然后发出嘹亮美丽的声音并一飞冲天;第二天柏拉图前来投师,苏氏把柏拉图看作他梦见的那只天鹅。这个故事未必属实,但起码说明了这两位伟大思想家的关系非同一般,在希腊人心目中有着非常崇高的地位。他在公元前 387 年创办的学园,坐落在雅典城西北角的阿卡德摩(Academus),持续了九百多年,于公元 529 年被迫关闭。学园集中了当时在数学、动物学、植物学、地理学、哲学、政治学等领域的顶尖专家,培养出了大量的杰出人才,其中最有名的弟子为亚里士多德。学园的学术水平、社会影响、历史跨度等都是无与伦比的。

柏拉图的著作主要包括《理想国》(*Republic*)、《巴门尼德篇》(*Parmenides*)、《会饮篇》(*Symposium*)等 40 多篇对话,以及 13 封书信。柏拉图对西方文化的影响之大是无法估计的。黑格尔曾说:“哲学之作为科学是从柏拉图开始而由亚里士多德完成的。他们比起所有别的哲学家来应该可以叫做人类的导师。”^①英国哲学家怀特海甚至说:“欧洲哲学传统的最没有争议的一般特征是:它由对柏拉图的一系列注释组成。”^②

《理想国》(*Republic*)是柏拉图最有名的著作。标题的希腊语为 *politeia*,指的是“关于城邦的学问”,兼有“对城邦的研究”和“对人的研究”两层意思。很多研究哲学的专业人士都把这个题目译成《国家篇》,虽然比较忠于原意,但也只表达了前一种意思,却无法体现作者用了大量的篇幅阐述的有关人的教育问题。现在的英


① 黑格尔:《哲学史讲演录》第 2 册,北京:商务印书馆,1996 年,第 151 页。

② A. N. Whitehead, *Process and Reality: An Essay in Cosmology*, New York: Free Press, 1978, p. 39.

语名称来自拉丁译名 De Res Publica, 但这里所谓的 republic 指的是古希腊的城邦, 与现代意义上的“共和国”有很大的区别, 不能望文生义。虽说这个标题本身并没有理想的意思, 但柏拉图在对话中的确描绘了一个相当理想化的国家, 所以最早翻译这本书的吴献书、郭斌和、张竹明都意译为《理想国》。这一译名已经被广泛地接受, 所以我们仍然沿用这一名称。

《理想国》是当时的学术大全, 各个领域的研究者, 包括政治学、伦理学、教育学、心理学、诗学等学科的专家, 纷纷把这部著作列为自己领域中的里程碑。由于当时的学术还没有明确的分科, 所以这部著作的覆盖面很广。如要全面了解这本书, 应当阅读全文。这里的片断选自《理想国》的第 7 卷, 展现了柏拉图的著名的“洞穴”比喻。

柏拉图运用丰富的想象能力, 构思出一个如此奇特的地方。有一个很深的洞穴, 洞中的人世代居住在这里, 被铁链锁在固定的地点上, 连脑袋都不能转动, 眼睛只能看着洞穴最深处的洞壁。他们的后面有一堆火, 在火和人之间, 有一堵矮墙, 墙的后面有人举着各种器物 and 雕像走来走去, 火光将这些物体投影到囚徒面对的墙上。他们由于没有见过真实的东西, 只能把影像当作事物本身。他们每天好像都在看皮影戏, 已完全习惯于这种生活, 没有人试图改变现状。洞穴的情况如下图所示。



如果有人把其中一个囚徒释放出来, 并强迫他看火光和真实的东西, 他肯定会感觉十分痛苦, 在眼花缭乱的情况下无法看清实物, 认为影子是更为真实的东西。如果有人硬将他拉出洞穴, 在强光之下他必然感到眼睛疼痛, 什么也看不清。若要他适应新的环境, 需要一定的时间。柏拉图借用苏格拉底的口说: “首先他看影子最清楚, 其次是人和其他物体在水中的倒影, 然后才是真实的物体本身。接着他可以对着天体和天空本身大饱眼福, 当然这种事情在晚上更容易做到: 他将看月亮和星星的光, 而不是在白天看太阳和阳光。”(242) 这个人一旦看清了太阳, 他就会庆幸自己摆脱了原来的黑暗的洞穴, 来到了阳光普照的世界。外面的世界象征着本质的世界, 用柏拉图的话来说是理念(idea)的世界; 太阳代表着善, 是最高的理念, 是万

物的本原。柏拉图在这里所主张的就是撇开表面现象,看到事物本身,再上升到最为本质的理念。他的这种学术方法对西方国家产生了深远的影响,以至于怀特海把西方学术看作柏拉图脚注。

柏拉图把理念的世界看作明显高于现象的世界,一旦步入这个世界,就不屑于回到原来的地方,因为“那些已经达到这种境界的人不愿俯身处理人类的事情:除了这个更高的世界之外,他们的灵魂哪儿也不想呆”。(244)这就给柏拉图哲学带来了明显的出世的理想主义色彩。不过,他同时还有着非常入世的一面。这个摆脱了愚昧的人虽然很不愿意回到洞穴里,但还是要硬着头皮回到那里去。看到了光明和事物本身之后,他一下子还适应不了洞穴的生活,难以辨别洞穴里的影子,也有点不屑于那些囚徒所谓的智慧。但那些囚徒根本不能理解他,他们嘲笑他,甚至还威胁他,正如柏拉图所说的那样,“人们会说,难道他上去了一趟就把眼睛弄瞎了吗?难道不是根本不值得上去吗?如果可能的话,难道他们不会抓住并处死任何试图把他们释放并带到上面去的人吗?”(243)这是苏格拉底殉身真理的写照,也表现了柏拉图为理想而奋斗终生的精神。他曾三次前往叙拉古试图说服那里的僭主狄奥尼修一世和狄奥尼修二世采用他的政治主张。结果遭到了沉重的打击,一次被带到奴隶市场上出售,幸亏有人把他赎回来,另外两次也遇到了不同程度的危险。尽管如此,他对理想的追求并没有放弃,他坚信,“除非真正的哲学家获得政治权力,或者出于某种神迹,政治家成了真正的哲学家,否则人类就不会有好日子过”^①。

柏拉图敢于为理想而奋斗的精神是非常可贵的。不过,在最愚昧的地方实践最前沿的理想是注定了要失败的,也许折中一点更有现实意义。而且,所谓的本质往往是以牺牲丰富性为代价的,海德格尔认为这样的真理从另一个角度看是一种遮蔽。按照这样的观点去实践必然会有一些弊端。此外,柏拉图过于强调哲学家的善意的屈就,把所有的希望都寄托在圣人的自我牺牲之上,完全否定政治家的功利主义的行为。他说:“不,事实是这样:将要执政的统治者越不愿意从政,其国家治理得越好,越没有分歧,但统治者越渴望从政,其管理最差。”(248)政治家为自己的荣誉和利益而忙碌固然有不少弊病,但不考虑政治家的利益,只讲大思想家的奉献,可能是苍白无力的。在这个问题上,黑格尔比他更有洞见,他把恶看作历史发展的杠杆,离开这种力量,历史的发展就失去了动力。

柏拉图的“洞穴”比喻包含着非常深刻的道理,而且形象鲜明,语言生动,是将哲学与文学熔为一炉的典范。我们应当从“洞穴”比喻获得启发,不断地提高自己的修养,摆脱愚昧的状况。用我们中国话来说,就是不要做井底之蛙。

^① 《柏拉图全集》第4卷,王晓朝译,北京:人民出版社,2003年,第80页。

Republic

The final image, the Allegory of the Cave, is the longest and most famous of the three. It is introduced rather abruptly, but is meant to fit in with the preceding two images (517b—c, 532a—d). Further details of the fit are a matter of dispute, although the broad outlines are clear enough. Like all the great images of the world's greatest literature, Plato's Cave manages simultaneously to appear transparent and yet unexpectedly rich and surprising. Those readers who believe that philosophy is a dry academic pursuit will be surprised at its presentation here as a pursuit which frees us from a terrible slavery; but for Plato and his peers philosophy is a way of life, not just a course of study.

‘Next,’ I said, ‘here’s a situation which you can use as an analogy for the human condition—for our education or lack of it. Imagine people living in a cavernous cell down under the ground; at the far end of the cave, a long way off, there’s an entrance open to the outside world. They’ve been there since childhood, with their legs and necks tied up in a way which keeps them in one place and allows them to look only straight ahead, but not to turn their heads. There’s firelight burning a long way further up the cave behind them, and up the slope between the fire and the prisoners there’s a road, beside which you should imagine a low wall has been built—like the partition which conjurors place between themselves and their audience and above which they show their tricks.’^①

‘All right,’ he said.

‘Imagine also that there are people on the other side of this wall who are carrying all sorts of artefacts. These artefacts, human statuettes, and animal

① 以下对话在苏格拉底(Socrates)与格老孔(Glaucon)之间进行。这一段是苏格拉底的话,接着的是格老孔的回应,以此类推。在柏拉图的对话录中,作者本人没有亲自出场。一般地说,苏格拉底是他的代言人。但苏氏的话中有没有自己的观点?在多大的程度上他是在说自己的话?别的人物是否也会说一些代表柏拉图的观点的话?这些问题都不容易解决,需要仔细体会。(p. 240)

models carved in stone and wood and all kinds of materials stick out over the wall; and as you'd expect, some of the people talk as they carry these objects along, while others are silent.'

'This is a strange picture you're painting', he said, 'with strange prisoners.'

'They're no different from us,'^① I said. 'I mean, in the first place, do you think they'd see anything of themselves and one another except the shadows cast by the fire on to the cave wall directly opposite them?'

'Of course not,' he said. 'They're forced to spend their lives without moving their heads.'

'And what about the objects which were being carried along? Won't they only see their shadows as well?'

'Naturally.'

'Now, suppose they were able to talk to one another; don't you think they'd assume that their words applied to what they saw passing by in front of them?'

'They couldn't think otherwise.'

'And what if sound echoed off the prison wall opposite them? When any of the passers-by spoke, don't you think they'd be bound to assume that the sound came from a passing shadow?'

'I'm absolutely certain of it,' he said.

'All in all, then,' I said, 'the shadows of artefacts would constitute the only reality people in this situation would recognize.'

'That's absolutely inevitable,' he agreed.

'What do you think would happen, then,' I asked, 'if they were set free from their bonds and cured of their inanity? What would it be like if they found that happening to them? Imagine that one of them has been set free and is suddenly made to stand up, to turn his head and walk, and to look towards the firelight. It hurts him to do all this and he's too dazzled to be capable of making out the objects whose shadows he'd formerly been looking at. And suppose someone tells him that what he's been seeing all this time has no substance, and

^① 在苏格拉底看来,包括他自己在内的任何人都可能完全摆脱身处“洞穴”的无知状态,所以这些囚徒“并不与我们不同”。(p. 241)

that he's now closer to reality and is seeing more accurately, because of the greater reality of the things in front of his eyes—what do you imagine his reaction would be? And what do you think he'd say if he were shown any of the passing objects and had to respond to being asked what it was? Don't you think he'd be bewildered and would think that there was more reality in what he'd been seeing before than in what he was being shown now?'

'Far more,' he said.

'And if he were forced to look at the actual firelight, don't you think it would hurt his eyes? Don't you think he'd turn away and run back to the things he could make out, and would take the truth of the matter to be that these things are clearer than what he was being shown?'

'Yes,' he agreed.

And imagine him being dragged forcibly away from there up the rough, steep slope,' I went on, 'without being released until he's been pulled out into the sunlight. Wouldn't this treatment cause him pain and distress? And once he's reached the sunlight, he wouldn't be able to see a single one of the things which are currently taken to be real, would he, because his eyes would be overwhelmed by the sun's beams?'

'No, he wouldn't,' he answered, 'not straight away.'

'He wouldn't be able to see things up on the surface of the earth, I suppose, until he'd got used to his situation. At first, it would be shadows that he could most easily make out, then he'd move on to the reflections of people and so on in water, and later he'd be able to see the actual things themselves. Next, he'd feast his eyes on the heavenly bodies and the heavens themselves, which would be easier at night; he'd look at the light of the stars and the moon, rather than at the sun and sunlight during the daytime.'

'Of course.'

'And at last, I imagine, he'd be able to discern and feast his eyes on the sun—not the displaced image of the sun in water or elsewhere, but the sun on its own, in its proper place.'

'Yes, he'd inevitably come to that,' he said.

'After that, he'd start to think about the sun and he'd deduce that it is the source of the seasons and the yearly cycle, that the whole of the visible realm is its domain, and that in a sense everything which he and his peers used to see is its

responsibility.’

‘Yes, that would obviously be the next point he’d come to,’ he agreed.

‘Now, if he recalled the cell where he’d originally lived and what passed for knowledge there and his former fellow prisoners, don’t you think he’d feel happy about his own altered circumstances, and sorry for them?’

‘Definitely.’

‘Suppose that the prisoners used to assign prestige and credit to one another, in the sense that they rewarded speed at recognizing the shadows as they passed, and the ability to remember which ones normally come earlier and later and at the same time as which other ones, and expertise at using this as a basis for guessing which ones would arrive next. Do you think our former prisoner would covet these honours and would envy the people who had status and power there, or would he much prefer, as Homer describes it, “being a slave labouring for someone else—someone without property”,^① and would put up with anything at all, in fact, rather than share their beliefs and their life?’

‘Yes, I think he’d go through anything rather than live that way,’ he said.

‘Here’s something else I’d like your opinion about,’ I said. ‘If he went back underground and sat down again in the same spot, wouldn’t the sudden transition from the sunlight mean that his eyes would be overwhelmed by darkness?’

‘Certainly,’ he replied.

‘Now, the process of adjustment would be quite long this time, and suppose that before his eyes had settled down and while he wasn’t seeing well, he had once again to compete against those same old prisoners at identifying those shadows. Wouldn’t he make a fool of himself? Wouldn’t they say that he’d come back from his upward journey with his eyes ruined, and that it wasn’t even worth trying to go up there? And wouldn’t they—if they could—grab hold of anyone who tried to set them free and take them up there and kill him?’

‘They certainly would,’ he said.

‘Well, my dear Glaucon,’ I said, ‘you should apply this allegory, as a whole, to what we were talking about before. The region which is accessible to sight should be equated with the prison cell, and the firelight there with the light of the sun. And if you think of the upward journey and the sight of things up on

① 这句话出自《奥德赛》，整句话的意思是：放弃信念和生活比给穷人当奴隶还难以忍受。（p. 243）

the surface of the earth as the mind's ascent to the intelligible realm, you won't be wrong—at least, I don't think you'd be wrong, and it's my impression that you want to hear. Only God knows if it's actually true, however. Anyway, it's my opinion that the last thing to be seen—and it isn't easy to see either—in the realm of knowledge is goodness; and the sight of the character of goodness leads one to deduce that it is responsible for everything that is right and fine, whatever the circumstances, and that in the visible realm it is the progenitor of light and of the source of light, and in the intelligible realm it is the source and provider of truth and knowledge. And I also think that the sight of it is a prerequisite for intelligent conduct either of one's own private affairs or of public business.'

'I couldn't agree more,' he said.

'All right, then,' I said. 'I wonder if you also agree with me in not finding it strange that people who've travelled there don't want to engage in human business; there's nowhere else their minds would ever rather be than in the upper region—which is hardly surprising, if our allegory has got this aspect right as well.'

'No, it's not surprising,' he agreed.

'Well, what about this?' I asked. 'Imagine someone returning to the human world and all its misery after contemplating the divine realm. Do you think it's surprising if he seems awkward and ridiculous while he's still not seeing well, before he's had time to adjust to the darkness of his situation, and he's forced into a contest (in a lawcourt or wherever) about the shadows of morality or the statuettes which cast the shadows, and into a competition whose terms are the conceptions of morality held by people who have never seen morality itself?'

'No, that's not surprising in the slightest,' he said.

'In fact anyone with any sense,' I said, 'would remember that the eyes can become confused in two different ways, as a result of two different sets of circumstances; it can happen in the transition from light to darkness, and also in the transition from darkness to light. If he took the same facts into consideration when he also noticed someone's mind in such a state of confusion that it was incapable of making anything out, his reaction wouldn't be unthinking ridicule. Instead, he'd try to find out whether this person's mind was returning from a mode of existence which involves greater lucidity and had been blinded by the unfamiliar darkness, or whether it was moving from relative ignorance to relative

lucidity and had been overwhelmed and dazzled by the increased brightness. Once he'd distinguished between the two conditions and modes of existence, he'd congratulate anyone he found in the second state, and feel sorry for anyone in the first state. If he did choose to laugh at someone in the second state, his amusement would be less absurd than when laughter is directed at someone returning from the light above.'

'Yes,' he said, 'you're making a lot of sense.'

Since the Cave was expressly introduced as being relevant to education, its immediate educational implications are now drawn out. We all have the capacity for knowledge (in the Platonu sense, not just information), and education should develop that potential. But since it requires knowledge of goodness to manage a community well, then those who gain such knowledge have to 'return to the cave': paradoxically, those who least want power are the ones who should have it.

'Now, if this is true,' I said, 'we must bear in mind that education is not capable of doing what some people promise. They claim to introduce knowledge into a mind which doesn't have it, as if they were introducing sight into eyes which are blind.'^①

'Yes, they do,' he said.

'An implication of what we're saying at the moment, however,' I pointed out, 'is that the capacity for knowledge^② is present in everyone's mind. If you can imagine an eye that can turn from darkness to brightness only if the body as a whole turns, then our organ of understanding is like that. Its orientation has to be accompanied by turning the mind as a whole away from the world of becoming^③, until it becomes capable of bearing the sight of real being and reality at its most bright, which we're saying is goodness. Yes?'

'Yes.'

'That's what education should be,' I said, 'the art of orientation. Educators should devise the simplest and most effective methods of turning minds around. It shouldn't be the art of implanting sight in the organ, but should

① 柏拉图认为知识已经在人的灵魂中,学习只是一个回忆的过程。(p. 245)

② knowledge 在柏拉图著作中是与 opinion 相对的概念,前者指确定的本质的知识,后者指变化的表面的观点。(p. 245)

③ the world of becoming 指的是变化的表面的世界,real being 指的是本质的稳定的东西。(p. 245)

proceed on the understanding that the organ already has the capacity, but is improperly aligned and isn't facing the right way.'

'I suppose you're right,' he said.

'So although the mental states which are described as good generally seem to resemble good physical states, in the sense that habituation and training do in fact implant them where they didn't use to be, yet understanding (as it turns out) is undoubtedly a property of something which is more divine: it never loses its power, and it is useful and beneficial, or useless and harmful, depending on its orientation. For example, surely you've noticed how the petty minds of those who are acknowledged to be bad, but clever, are sharp-eyed and perceptive enough to gain insights into matters they direct their attention towards. It's not as if they weren't sharp-sighted, but their minds are forced to serve evil, and consequently the keener their vision is, the greater the evil they accomplish.'

'Yes, I've noticed this,' he said.

'However,' I went on, 'if this aspect of that kind of person is hammered at from an early age, until the inevitable consequences of incarnation have been knocked off it—the leaden weights, so to speak, which are grafted on to it as a result of eating and similar pleasures and indulgences and which turn the sight of the mind downwards—if it sheds these weights and is reoriented towards the truth, then (and we're talking about the same organ and the same people) it would see the truth just as clearly as it sees the objects it faces at the moment.'

'Yes, that makes sense,' he said.

'Well, doesn't this make sense as well?' I asked. 'Or rather, isn't it an inevitable consequence of what we've been saying that uneducated people, who have no experience of truth, would make incompetent administrators of a community, and that the same goes for people who are allowed to spend their whole lives educating themselves? The first group would be no good because their lives lack direction; they've got no single point of reference to guide them in all their affairs, whether private or public. The second group would be no good because their hearts wouldn't be in the business; they think they've been transported to the Isles of the Blessed even while they're still alive.'^①

'True,' he said.

① 知识分子一旦进入自己的理想天地,就会自命清高,中西方都有这种现象。(pp. 246—247)