

[英 汉 对 照]

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A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE

[英]戴维·休谟 著

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石碧球 译

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CONTENTS

目 录

(一)

INTRODUCTION 4

导 论 5

BOOK I. Of The Understanding.

第一卷 论知性

PART I. Of Ideas; Their Origin, Composition,

Connexion, Abstraction, &c. 2

第一章 论观念,它们的起源、组合、

联系、抽象等 3

I. Of The Origin Of Our Ideas 2

第一节 论我们观念的起源 3

II. Division Of The Subject 14

第二节 题目的划分 15

III. Of The Ideas Of The Memory And Imagination 16

第三节 论记忆观念和想象观念	17
IV. Of The Connexion Or Association Of Ideas	18
第四节 论观念的联系或联结	19
V. Of Relations	26
第五节 论关系	27
VI. Of Modes And Substances	30
第六节 论样态和实体	31
VII. Of Abstract Ideas	32
第七节 论抽象观念	33
PART II. Of The Ideas Of Space And Time.	52
第二章 论空间和时间观念	53
I. Of The Infinite Divisibility Of Our Ideas Of Space And Time	52
第一节 论空间和时间观念的 无限可分性	53
II. Of The Infinite Divisibility Of Space And Time	58
第二节 论空间和时间的无限可分性	59
III. Of The Other Qualities Of Our Ideas Of Space And Time	66
第三节 论空间和时间观念的其他性质	67
IV. Objections Answer'd	78
第四节 对反驳的答复	79
V. The Same Subject Continu'd	108
第五节 对反驳的答复(续)	109
VI. Of The Idea Of Existence And Of External Existence	134

第六节 论存在的观念和外在	
存在的观念	135
PART III. Of Knowledge And Probability.	140
第三章 论知识和或然性	141
I. Of Knowledge	140
第一节 论知识	141
II. Of Probability; And Of The Idea Of Cause And Effect	148
第二节 论或然性和因果观念	149
III. Why A Cause Is Always Necessary?	160
第三节 为什么一个原因总是必然的	161
IV. Of The Component Parts Of Our Reasonings Concerning	
Causes And Effects	168
第四节 论因果推理的组成部分	169
V. Of The Impressions Of The Senses And Memory	172
第五节 论感官印象和记忆印象	173
VI. Of The Inference From The Impression To The Idea	176
第六节 论从印象到观念的推论	177
VII. Of The Nature Of The Idea, Or Belief	192
第七节 论观念和信念的本质	193
VIII. Of The Causes Of Belief	200
第八节 论信念的原因	201
IX. Of The Effects Of Other Relations, And Other Habits	218
第九节 论其他关系和习惯的作用	219

X. Of The Influence Of Belief	240
第十节 论信念的影响	241
XI. Of The Probability Of Chances	252
第十一节 论偶然性的或然性	253
XII. Of The Probability Of Causes	264
第十二节 论原因的或然性	265
XIII. Of Unphilosophical Probability	290
第十三节 论非哲学的或然性	291
XIV. Of The Idea Of Necessary Connexion	314
第十四节 论必然联系的观念	315
XV. Rules By Which To Judge Of Causes And Effects	352
第十五节 判断原因和结果所依据的通则	353
XVI. Of The Reason Of Animals	358
第十六节 论动物的理性	359

(二)

PART IV. Of The Sceptical And Other Systems

Of Philosophy	368
---------------------	-----

第四章 论怀疑论的哲学体系和其他的

哲学体系	369
------------	-----

I. Of Scepticism With Regard To Reason	368
--	-----

第一节 论关于理性的怀疑主义	369
----------------------	-----

II. Of Scepticism With Regard To The Senses	382
---	-----

第二节 论感官方面的怀疑论	383
III. Of The Antient Philosophy	446
第三节 论古代哲学	447
IV. Of The Modern Philosophy	460
第四节 论近代哲学	461
V. Of The Immateriality Of The Soul	474
第五节 论灵魂的非物质性	475
VI. Of Personal Identity	514
第六节 论人格的同一性	515
VII. Conclusion Of This Book	538
第七节 本卷的结论	539

BOOK II. OF THE PASSIONS.

第二卷 论情感

PART I. Of Pride And Humility,	562
第一章 论骄傲与谦卑	563
I. Division Of The Subject	562
第一节 题目的划分	563
II. Of Pride And Humility; Their Objects And Causes	566
第二节 论骄傲和谦卑；它们的对象和原因	567
III. Whence These Objects And Causes Are Deriv'd	572
第三节 这些对象和原因来自于何处	573
IV. Of The Relations Of Impressions And Ideas	576

第四节 论印象和观念的关系	577
V. Of The Influence Of These Relations On Pride And Humility	582
第五节 论这些关系对骄傲和 谦卑的影响	583
VI. Limitations Of This System	592
第六节 这个体系的限制	593
VII. Of Vice And Virtue	602
第七节 论恶行和德行	603
VIII. Of Beauty And Deformity	608
第八节 论美和丑	609
IX. Of External Advantages And Disadvantages	620
第九节 论外在的有利条件和不利条件	621
X. Of Property And Riches	632
第十节 论财产权和财产	633
XI. Of The Love Of Fame	646
第十一节 论对名声的爱好	647
XII. Of The Pride And Humility Of Animals	664
第十二节 论动物的骄傲和谦卑	665

(三)

PART II. Of Love And Hatred.	674
第二章 论爱和恨	675
I. Of The Objects And Causes Of Love And Hatred	674

第一节 论爱和恨的对象及原因	675
II. Experiments To Confirm This System	680
第二节 证实这个体系的几种实验	681
III. Difficulties Solv'd	710
第三节 疑难的解决	711
IV. Of The Love Of Relations	718
第四节 论对亲友的爱	719
V. Of Our Esteem For The Rich And Powerful	732
第五节 论我们对富人与权贵的尊重	733
VI. Of Benevolence And Anger	748
第六节 论仁慈和愤怒	749
VII. Of Compassion	754
第七节 论怜悯	755
VIII. Of Malice And Envy	760
第八节 论恶意和嫉妒	761
IX. Of The Mixture Of Benevolence And Anger With Compassion And Malice	780
第九节 论仁慈和愤怒与怜悯和恶意的混合	781
X. Of Respect And Contempt	798
第十节 论尊重和鄙视	799
XI. Of The Amorous Passion, Or Love Betwixt The Sexes	806
第十一节 论有关爱情的情感或 两性之间的爱	807
XII. Of The Love And Hatred Of Animals	812
第十二节 论动物的爱和恨	813

PART III. Of The Will And Direct passions.	818
第三章 论意志和直接情感	819
I. Of Liberty And Necessity	818
第一节 论自由和必然	819
II. The Same Subject Continu'd	836
第二节 论自由和必然(续)	837
III. Of The Influencing Motives Of The Will	846
第三节 论影响意志的各种动机	847
IV. Of The Causes Of The Violent Passions	858
第四节 论猛烈情感的原因	859
V. Of The Effects Of Custom	866
第五节 论习惯的各种作用	867
VI. Of The Influence Of The Imagination On The Passions	870
第六节 论想象对情感的影响	871
VII. Of Contiguity And Distance In Space And Time	876
第七节 论空间和时间的接近和距离	877
VIII. The Same Subject Continu'd	886
第八节 论空间和时间的接近和距离(续)	887
IX. Of The Direct Passions	898
第九节 论直接的情感	899
X. Of Curiosity, Or The Love Of Truth	918
第十节 论好奇心或对真理的爱	919

BOOK III. OF MORALS.

第三卷 道德学

PART I. Of Virtue And Vice In General. 932

第一章 德与恶概论 933

I. Moral Distinctions Not Deriv'd From Reason 932

第一节 道德上的差别并非得自于理性 933

II. Moral Distinctions Deriv'd From A Moral Sense 962

第二节 道德上的差别得自于道德感 963

PART II. Of justice and injustice. 976

第二章 论正义与非正义 977

I. Justice, Whether A Natural Or Artificial Virtue 976

第一节 正义是自然的德行

还是人为的德行? 977

(四)

II. Of The Origin Of Justice And Property 994

第二节 论正义和财产权的起源 995

III. Of The Rules That Determine Property 1026

第三节 论确定财产权的规则 1027

IV. Of The Transference Of Property By Consent 1052

第四节 论根据同意而进行的财产转让 1053

V. Of The Obligation Of Promises 1056

第五节 论承诺的义务	1057.
VI. Some Farther Reflections Concerning Justice And Injustice	1076
第六节 关于正义与非正义的进一步思考	1077
VII. Of The Origin Of Government	1092
第七节 论政府的起源	1093
VIII. Of The Source Of Allegiance	1102
第八节 论效忠的起源	1103
IX. Of The Measures Of Allegiance	1122
第九节 论效忠的限度	1123
X. Of The Objects Of Allegiance	1130
第十节 论效忠的对象	1131
XI. Of The Laws Of Nations	1158
第十一节 论国际法	1159
XII. Of Chastity And Modesty	1162
第十二节 论贞节与淑德	1163
PART III. Of The Other Virtues And Vices.	1172
第三章 论其他德行与恶行	1173
I. Of The Origin Of The Natural Virtues And Vices	1172
第一节 论自然的德行与恶行的起源	1173
II. Of Greatness Of Mind	1208
第二节 论心灵的伟大	1209
III. Of Goodness And Benevolence	1228
第三节 论善良与仁慈	1229

IV. Of Natural Abilities	1236
第四节 论自然的才能	1237
V. Some Farther Reflections Concerning The Natural Virtues	1252
第五节 对自然才能的一些进一步思考	1253
VI. Conclusion Of This Book	1260
第六节 本卷的结论	1261
APPENDIX.	1266
附 录	1267
译者后记	1300

PART II. Of Love And Hatred.

SECTION I. Of The Objects And Causes Of Love And Hatred.

'Tis altogether impossible to give any definition of the passions of *love* and *hatred*; and that because they produce merely a simple impression, without any mixture or composition. 'Twou'd be as unnecessary to attempt any description of them, drawn from their nature, origin, causes and objects; and that both because these are the subjects of our present enquiry, and because these passions of themselves are sufficiently known from our common feeling and experience. This we have already observd concerning pride and humility, and here repeat it concerning love and hatred; and indeed there is so great a resemblance betwixt these two sets of passions, that we shall be oblig'd to begin with a kind of abridgment of our reasonings concerning the former, in order to explain the latter.

As the immediate *object* of pride and humility is self or that identical person, of whose thoughts, actions, and sensations we are intimately conscious; so the *object* of love and hatred is some other person, of whose thoughts, actions, and sensations we are not conscious. This is sufficiently evident from experience. Our love and hatred are always directed to some sensible being external to us; and when we talk of *self-love*, 'tis not in a proper sense, nor has the sensation it produces any thing in common with that tender emotion,

第二章 论爱和恨

第一节 论爱和恨的对象及原因

要给爱和恨这两种情感下某种定义是完全不可能的；这是因为它们只是产生一个没有任何混合或构成的简单印象。企图根据这两种情感的本质、根源、原因和对象而对它们加以描述也是不必要的；这既因为它们是我们当下探究的论题，也因为这些情感自身就足以为我们通常的感觉和经验所认知。这一点我们已经在关于骄傲和谦卑中看到了，在关于爱和恨中我还要重复它；而这两组情感之间确实有一种非常大的类似关系，所以为了解释后一组情感，我们就不得不首先简略地阐述一下我们关于前一组情感的推理。

由于骄傲和谦卑的直接对象是自我，或者是我们密切意识到其思想、行为和感觉的那同一个人，所以，爱和恨的对象就是我们不能意识到其思想、行为和感觉的某个其他人。根据经验，这一点是十分明显的。我们的爱和恨总是指向外在于我们的某种有情的存在物；当我们谈到自爱时，就不是在固有的意义上谈爱，而且自爱产生的感觉和一个朋友或情人所激起的温柔的感情

which is excited by a friend or mistress. 'Tis the same case with hatred. We may be mortified by our own faults and follies; but never feel any anger or hatred, except from the injuries of others.

But tho' the object of love and hatred be always some other person, 'tis plain that the object is not, properly speaking, the *cause* of these passions, or alone sufficient to excite them. For since love and hatred are directly contrary in their sensation, and have the same object in common, if that object were also their cause, it wou'd produce these opposite passions in an equal degree; and as they must, from the very first moment, destroy each other, none of them wou'd ever be able to make its appearance. There must, therefore, be some cause different from the object.

If we consider the causes of love and hatred, we shall find they are very much diversify'd, and have not many things in common. The virtue, knowledge, wit, good sense, good humour of any person, produce love and esteem; as the opposite qualities, hatred and contempt. The same passions arise from bodily accomplishments, such as beauty, force, swiftness, dexterity; and from their contraries; as likewise from the external advantages and disadvantages of family, possessions, cloaths, nation and climate. There is not one of these objects, but what by its different qualities may produce love and esteem, or hatred and contempt.

From the view of these causes we may derive a new distinction betwixt the *quality* that operates, and the *subject* on which it is plac'd. A prince, that is possess'd of a stately palace, commands the esteem of the people upon that account; and that *first*, by the beauty of the palace, and *secondly*, by the relation of property, which connects it with him. The removal of either of these destroys the passion; which evidently proves that the cause is a compounded one.

'Twou'd be tedious to trace the passions of love and hatred, thro' all

之间没有任何共同的地方。憎恨也是同样的情形。我们可以因自己的过错和罪过而感到羞耻，但是绝不会感到任何愤怒或憎恨，除非我们受到他人的伤害。

尽管爱和恨的对象总是其他某个人，但是很显然，这个对象恰当地说并不是这些情感的原因，或者单是对象自身就足以激起这些情感。因为，既然爱和恨在其感觉方面是直接相反的，而且它们有着共同的对象，所以，如果那个对象也是它们的原因的话，那它就产生了同等程度的两种相反的情感；而由于这两种相反的情感在被产生的最初瞬间必定会相互摧毁，所以它们二者都不可能出现。因此，必定有某种不同于那个对象的某种原因。

如果我们考虑到爱和恨的原因，我们就会发现，这些原因有非常多的变化，而且彼此之间没有太多共同的东西。任何人的德行、知识、才智、见识和幽默都会产生爱和尊重，正如相反的性质会产生憎恨和蔑视一样。同样的情感会发生于身体方面的才艺，如：美、力量、迅速、机敏以及它们的反面；同样地，家族、财产、衣服、民族和气候的外在优点和缺点也产生那些情感。这些对象中没有一个不能通过其不同的性质而产生爱和尊重，或者恨和鄙视的。

从对这些原因的观察中，我们可以推埋出在那种发生作用的性质和这种性质寓存的主体之间的一种新的区分。因为那个缘由，一位占有一座富丽堂皇的宫殿的王子就赢得了人民的尊重；这首先是因为宫殿的美丽，其次是因为将他同宫殿联系起来的财产权关系。除掉这两种原因的任何一种，都会破坏这种情感，这就明显地证明了那个原因是一个复合的原因。