## Proceedings of 2007 International Conference on Concession Public/Infrastructural Projects

Edited by Dai Da-shuang
Su Jing-qin









DALIAN UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY PRESS

## Proceedings of 2007 International Conference on Concession Public / Infrastructural Projects

公共事业/基础设施项目特许经营国际会议论文集

Edited by Dai Da-shuang
Su Jing-qin



**DALIAN UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY PRESS** 

#### 图书在版编目(CIP)数据

公共事业/基础设施项目特许经营国际会议论文集. 戴大双,苏敬勤主编.一大连:大连理工大学出版社, 2007.8

ISBN 978-7-5611-3689-8

I. 公··· Ⅱ. ①戴···②苏··· Ⅲ. ①公用事业一项目管理—国际学术会议—文集②基础设施—项目管理—国际学术会议—文集 Ⅳ. F294—53

中国版本图书馆 CIP 数据核字(2007)第 126531 号

#### 大连理工大学出版社出版

地址:大连市软件园路 80 号 邮政编码:116023 发行:0411-84708842 邮购:0411-84703636 传真:0411-84701466 E-mail:dutp@dutp.cn URL:http://www.dutp.cn 大连金华光彩色印刷有限公司印刷 大连理工大学出版社发行

幅面尺寸:185mm×260mm 2007 年 8 月第 1 版 印张:25.25 字数:580 千字 2007 年 8 月第 1 次印刷

责任编辑:汪会武

责任校对:娜 婉

封面设计:宋 蕾

ISBN 978-7-5611-3689-8

定 价:180.00元

#### **Organizations**

#### 组织单位

Hosted by

主办单位



Department of Construction Management / Institute of International Engineering Project Management, Tsinghua University 清华大学建设管理系/清华大学国际工程项目管理研究院



School of Management, Dalian University of Technology 大连理工大学管理学院

Organized by

承办单位



School of Management, Dalian University of Technology 大连理工大学管理学院

Associated by

协办单位



International Project Management Association 国际项目管理协会(IPMA)



Project Management Research Committee, China中国(双法)项目管理研究委员会(PMRC)



Development & Reform Commission of Dalian Municipal Government 大连市发展和改革委员会

Supported by

资助单位



National Natural Science Foundation of China 国家自然科学基金委员会(NSFC)

#### **Committee of Experts**

#### 专家委员会

顾 问:

王众托 大连理工大学管理学院 教授

中国工程院. 院士

钱福培 Vice President of IPMA

Qian Fu-pei Standing Vice President of PMRC

Northwestern Polytechnical University Professor

主 任:

王守清 清华大学建设管理系暨清华大学国际工程项目

管理研究院 教授 博士生导师

FIDIC-清华大学-中咨协会培训中心 主任

副主任:

Matti Ahvenharju Chairman, Finland Project management Institute

President, Finland Project management Association

苏敬勤 大连理工大学管理学院 教授 博士生导师

大连理工大学管理学院 院长

小林潔司 京都大学大学院工学研究科都市社会工学 專攻

教授

京都大学経営管理大学院 副大学院長

日本応用地域学会 会长

#### 委 员:

Akintola Akintoye Associate Dean, Research and Knowledge Transfer,

School of the Built and Natural Environment,

Glasgow Caledonian University

冯芷艳 国家自然科学基金委员会管理科学部 处长

薛 岩 国际项目管理协会认证委员会 委员

中国(双法)项目管理研究委员会 副主任

顾 强 大连市发展和改革委员会 副主任

周海菲 国家商务部境外经济合作区专家委员会 委员

张学清 香港科技大学土木工程系 副教授

胡祥培 大连理工大学管理学院 教授 博士生导师

大连理工大学管理学院 副院长

叶苏东 北京交通大学管理学院 副教授

戴大双 大连理工大学管理学院 教授 博士生导师

大连理工大学管理学院项目管理研究中心 主任

中国(双法)项目管理研究委员会 副秘书长

#### **Editor Group**

#### 论文集编撰组

戴大双大连理工大学管理学院教授博士生导师苏敬勤大连理工大学管理学院教授博士生导师朱方伟大连理工大学管理学院讲师博士

宋金波 大连理工大学管理学院 讲师 博士

石 磊 大连理工大学管理学院 讲师 博士

王东波 大连理工大学管理学院 博士生

#### **Table of contents**

1	Management Decision-making on Concession Public / Infrastructural
	Projects
Οι <i>Ρα</i>	atput Specifications for Public-private Projects-pitfalls and the Way Forward  atrick T. I. Lam
	om BOT to PPP-A Hong Kong Example bert P.C. Chan, Tony Sidwell, Stephen Kajewski and Esther Cheung10
Int	vo Decades on Rail–Evaluation, Decision Making and Development of Singapore's Urban Rail frastructure: MRT (Mass Rapid Transit) and LRT (Light Rapid Transit)  ii Li, Robert Tiong L.K
Re SU	search on the Value Based Management Index System of Highway Network  Jing-qin, LI Jun, CUI Mao27
Re W∠	search on the Decision-making Model for Concession of Infrastructural Projects  ANG Dong-bo, DAI Da-shuang
Stı <i>CE</i>	ndy on the Obstacles and Strategies for the Implementing BOT in Gas Industry  IEN Li-shun, DAI Da-shuang, SONG Jin-bo
Mi <i>YE</i>	xed Development Strategies for the Development of Infrastructure Projects  Su-dong
Re SO	search on Adjustment Method of Concession Period for Infrastructure BOT Projects NG Jin-bo, DAI Da-shuang, WANG Dong-bo, FENG Chao
Ба: 20	me Analysis of BOT Concession Period and Concessionaire Pricing  U Tan, ZHOU Jie
An LI	alysis of BOT Project Investment Decision Based on the Real Options Model  Xiao-yu

Research on the Coordinate Mechanism of the Interest Concerned in Financing for PPP Construction Projects  YE Xiao-su, CHEN Fei
Discussion on the Characteristics and Applying Fields of PFI Mode  DU Jing
Discussion on Some Problems of Applying PPP in China  WANG Zeng-zhong, FAN Li-chu
The Economic Evaluation of Municipal Engineering PPP projects  WANG Mei
2 Financial Mode on Concession Public / Infrastructural Projects
An Economical Model on Capital Structures and Incentive Mechanism to PPP Project Financing and Operating Modes in Public Projects  HE Shou-kui, FU Hong-yuan
Study of Wastewater Treatment Plant Financing Model Based on Game Theory  YUAN Yong-bo, WANG Ai-lin, JIANG Shao-hua, YAN Guo-dong
Challenges of Private Domestic Finance in Developing Infrastructure Projects in China LI Bing
Research of Project Dynamic Financing System for Infrastructure Project  WANG Song-jiang
Research on the Project Financing Model on the Infrastructure Construction in Hebei Province CHEN Jing-wu, ZHANG Xian, YUAN Hui
Research for Dynamic Financing of Infrastructure Project ——Quantitative Analysis for External Factor  YOU Di, WANG Song-jiang
An Analysis of SWOT on Railway BOT Projects  WU Hai-xi, DAI Da-shuang, LIU Ning
3 Theory and Practice on Agency Mode for Public/Infrastructural Projects
The Evaluation Based on the Specialists' Opinion Selection of Capacity of Agent Construction Units in Government Invested Projects  SONG Yan-qiu, FENG Chao, WEN Yang

WU Yun-na, YAO Na, NING Yu
Operation Pattern Analysis and Related Policy Perfect Base on Agent of Construction System  YUAN Yong-bo, DU Bing-tao, XU Qiang
Principal-agent Analysis in Government Investment Projects Based on Game Theory  GUO Qi, XU Hai-li
Research on the Agent System of Highway Network Based on the Value-Based Management SU Jing-qin, CUI Miao
Construction of Indicator Framework to the Prophase Agent Project  WU Yun-na, ZHAO Na205
Analysis of the Principal-agent Relationship of Government Investment Project and its Countermeasures in China  YANG Jian-ping, WANG Jian-ping
A Study on Hidden Incentive Mechanisms of Agent Construction in Government Invested Projects  WEN Yang, SONG Yan-qiu, FENG Chao
Research on the Principal Agent Problems about the Mode of Agent Construction by Corporations  NI Guo-dong, WANG Jian-ping
Review of Researches on Agent-construction system in Government Investment Project  LIU Ning, DAI Da-shuang, WU Hai-xi
Management of Urban Public Infrastructure Projects  YANG Xiu-mei
4 Risk Management on Concession Public / Infrastructural Projects
The Moral Hazard Issues in the PPP Projects  SHI Lei, Masamitsu Onishi, Kiyoshi Kobayashi
Refinancing and Restructuring of Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) Projects in China FU Xiao, HU Yuan-yuan, Liu Zhi-tao
Risks to Banks in BOT Project Finance SHAN Xiao-li, DAI Da-shuang
An Empirical Study on Critical Risks of BOT Expressway Projects  YANG Wei-hua, DAI Da-shuang, ZHANG Yin
The Study of Risk Identification and Allocation of a PPP Project Financing Mode

GAO Li-feng, ZHENG Yan-yan299
Developing a Quantitative Risk Allocation Mechanism for Public-Private Partnership (PPP) Projects in the PRC: a Research Framework KE Yong-jian, WANG Shou-qing, Albert PC Chan
The Government Functions and the Risk Analysis in the Finance of BOT Projects  CHEN Jing-wu, PAN Hui
Risk Management Maturity of Project-driven Enterprises  XIONG Song-ping, DAI Da-shuang
5 Other Themes
Research on the Difference of Urban Resources in Northeast China  ZHAO Wei-liang, JI Xiao-lan
Construction and Analysis of China's SME Entrepreneur Credit Evaluation Index System  LEI Xiao-min, SONG Jia-shun
The Case Study on the Source of Funds for the Industrialization of Biopharmaceutical Enterprises  ZHOU De-sheng, DAI Da-shuang, XU Kun
An Independent Innovation Pattern Study on State-owned Enterprises of Dalian  YUAN Hui, JIANG Zhao-hua, ZHANG Feng-li
Decision Model for Choosing Network Vulnerability Scanning System  HU Run-bo, YANG De-li, WANG Jian-jun, DIAO Xin-jun
Issues Governments Should Pay Attention to Infrastructure Construction  LI Yun
Research on Discrimination Pricing for Information Products in Project of Software Development  DIAO Xin-jun, LIU Zhi-min, YANG De-li
Analysis on the Post-evaluation Framework for Public-Private Partnership Projects  HU Hua-ru, ZHOU Yuan-qiang, WANG Shou-Qing
Project Schedule Control Theory and Government-invested Construction Projects Application

# Management Decision–making on Concession Public / Infrastructural Projects

公共事业和基础设施项目特许经营决策管理

### Output Specifications for Public-private Projects-pitfalls and the Way Forward

Patrick T. I. Lam

(Dept. of Building & Real Estate, The Hong Kong Polytechnic University)

**Abstract:** In the search for improved efficiency and solution to budget constraints, many public services are increasingly provided under Public Private Partnerships (PPP) in many sectors, including construction-related and facilities management services. These services are procured using Output Specifications, which stipulate the standard of outputs and the conditions for remunerating the services. As such, they are akin to Performance Specifications and share similar pitfalls. This paper examines the roles of Output Specifications in the PPP process; their features; common pitfalls and proposed solutions. It is proposed that more research needs to be carried out on this important aspect to make PPP deals more successful.

Key words: output specifications; PPP; features; pitfalls; solutions

#### 1 Introduction

In recent years, there is a trend of governments outsourcing construction and operation of public facilities to the private sector under the Public-Private Partnership (PPP) arrangements, a model of which is more specifically called "Private Finance Initiative" (PFI) in the UK. The initial aim of the PFI was to increase the flow of capital projects against a background of restraint on public expenditure (RICS 1995) but broader objectives such as service and value improvements are promoted nowadays. The public sector is encouraged to bring the private-sector more centrally into the provision and operation of capital assets. The scope of this outsourcing can include the procurement of built facilities and operational services for hospitals, schools, prisons, physical laboratories, helicopter bases or just the provision of relatively simple services such as helpdesks. Innovative deals are on the increase day by day.

#### 2 The Use of Public-Private Partnerships in Procuring Projects

Typically, a PFI project involves the government in soliciting the private sector to finance, design, construct, operate and maintain a public facility for a defined period, during which the government pays for the service on a unitary charge (i.e., per unit service provided) basis. Upon expiry of the defined period, the facility will be handed back to the government or the service provider's contract may be renewable at that stage. As such, there is a substantial transfer of construction and commercial risks (particularly in respect of demand) to the private sector. On one hand, the government can relieve themselves of the burden of upfront capital expenditure and reduce the size of public establishment. On the other hand, the instillation of commercial disciplines is said to improve the efficiency of operation. This procurement approach also

enables life cycle issues to be incorporated into the business deal, which is not the case for traditionally procured construction.

To start a PFI project, a government entity usually has to establish a business case and benchmark its parameters against a "Public Sector Comparator" (PSC-an estimate of what a project would cost for its whole life if conventional delivery methods were used, considering risk retained by the public sector) in terms of value for money. When the financial model is judged to be sound, the public sector entity will prepare a preliminary statement of their requirements and invite the private sector to express their interest in the project. However, PSC is not universally adopted (e.g., not in China BOT schemes).

Private sector companies usually form different consortia comprising of builders, financiers, designers and operators when they receive the Invitation for Expression of Interest (EOI). Consortia are usually constructor-led in immature markets and financier-led in mature markets. The subsequent pre-qualification will short-list a smaller number of consortia to receive the Invitation to Negotiate (ITN) [which is a public notice requesting bids] based on Output Specifications. When the deal is eventually struck after bid evaluation and negotiation, the Output Specifications will form part of the project agreement. The government's payment for the service is dependent on the fulfillment of the Output Specifications, in terms of availability of the facilities and the performance of the services based on indicators such as response or rectification times of the operation team. Deductions can be effected if the Output Specifications are not fully complied with. As such, the Output Specifications are not only stating the performance of the built facilities but also act as a tool for monitoring the standard of service provided in their use during the contract period, which typically extends to 20 to 30 years after the physical completion. Fig.1 summarizes the stages of a typical PPP/PFI project.

#### **3 Output Specification Features**

As the name implies, Output Specifications focus not on the "inputs" or "how to" of the design and build processes, but on the output performance requirements or "what is required" of the facilities in their physical forms and servicing state. Certainly the portions dealing with construction resemble the performance specifications of a D & B contract. In an example of sewage treatment facility, the effluent quality is specified rather than the process to be applied to the sewage to achieve the effluent quality. Yet, the entire coverage of an Output Specification is much wider than construction alone. For example, for a PFI school project, the Output Specifications will state the requirements for the "Contractor" to incorporate design and planning for future curriculum change and sociological dimensions such as community involvement in school activities. Expectation of shared use of the built facilities with the community is also highlighted. The Output Specifications also delineate responsibilities (as a means of risk allocation) between the government entity and the School Operator. For example, the Output Specifications will state that vandalism is to be managed by the Local Education Authority during school hours whereas outside those hours, responsibilities will lie with the School Operator unless it can be proved that a public official party was involved in the incident

(Audit Commission, 2003). The objectives of Output Specifications, apart from briefing the interested parties on the performance requirements (focusing on service), are to enable innovative solutions to the problems posed by the core requirements. Yet, clients should be mindful of the expensive bidding process.




Figure 1 Flow diagram of PPP/PFI projects indicating relationship with output specifications

As a tool to monitor the Contractor's service, Output Specifications also contain criteria or performance indicators against which the quality of output would be judged. These criteria are

related to the payment mode of the services. In this respect, it has been said that Output Specification requirements were more onerous than "fitness for purpose" since service providers would be responsible for typically 20 to 30 years and depend on their fulfillment for income (Mosey, 1998).

#### 4 Development of Output Specifications

An Output Specification should be made available to the bidders as early as possible in the PPP development process. Unlike the traditional process, negotiations could entail substantial revisions to the document from the invitation stage to the contract formation stage. A survey probing into client briefing via Output Specifications was carried out by Akintoye and Donnelly (2003), which covered 36 construction contractors who had involvement with a variety of PFI projects in the UK-which has launched over 500 PFI projects in the last decade according to the Select Committee Report, 2003.

Twenty two per cent of the respondents preferred to have the Output Specification early at the Invitation for Expression of Interest stage. The majority, however, would like to have it either at First Selection (28 per cent) and Invitation to Negotiate (33 per cent). Only a smaller proportion (17 per cent) would like to receive it together with the tender document (Akintoye and Donnelly, 2003). It was presumed that the early issue of Output Specifications and related documents enabled bidders to assess their own abilities to undertake the project.

Akintoye and Donnelly (2003) also highlighted the Contractors' wish to be consulted early (most preferably at the Invitation to Negotiate stage), in order to reduce an unrealistic demand being placed on contractors by the public sector, thereby reducing the overall time required for negotiation and also the possibility of abortive bids.

More importantly, results from the Akintoye and Donnelly (2003) survey show a lower rating for Output Specifications (2.75 out of 5), in terms of adequacy of detail, when compared with the Project Programme (3.78) and the Project Definition (3.61). The original researchers regarded Output Specifications as one of the most contentious areas in PFI project tendering. They supported the assertion by Cole (1998) that it was difficult to translate broad Output Specifications into proposals which would meet the specific and often complex requirements of various public sector clients. Whilst Output Specifications and the Project Definition are contractual documents, the Project Programme is not (indicating milestones only).

Akintoye and Donnelly (2003) survey further reported that Output Specifications took a longer time to negotiate than Project Definition and Project Programme. A sticky point in negotiation is that client departments often wish to turn Output Specifications into Input Specifications to facilitate monitoring.

#### 5 Pitfalls and Proposed Solutions

The Output Specifications should define the evaluation criteria of proposals to create a level-playing field for all contenders, although eventually the contract version of the

Specifications may incorporate the specific agreement on performance of the successful consortium since PFI projects are essentially awarded not only by competition but by negotiation. Yet, care must be exercised by the Specification Writer not to reveal any intellectual property of a negotiating party to their competitors. It would be quite improper to use the negotiating process as a means of unfairly obtaining and then misusing commercially sensitive information (HM Treasury, 1996).

Compatibility with other service providers also needs specifying. For example, the communication system to be provided by the private sector on a Design-Build-Finance-Operate road should be compatible with the Highway Agency's own system, otherwise the benefit of a national network would be lost.

Interfacing issues need to be addressed in such a way as to alert the service povider to the requirements but not to specify how to achieve them. In many cases, the ability of the Facilities Management Provider to deliver a service will be closely linked to the operational management of the facility. For example, 'out-of-hours' access arrangements for users are likely to have an impact on the security responsibilities of the service provider. The Specification Writer should identify where there are likely to be operational interface issues between different organisations. Constraints should be drawn to the attention of the service providers, since these are risks to be borne by them.

Alternative solutions should stem naturally from a well-written Output Specification, but if conformance to a given scenario is envisaged, say, due to regulatory control, this should be stated clearly so that direct comparison can be made of base bids. This applies to risk allocation as well, in that the Specification Writer can test out the different risk premiums attached to different risk allocation scenarios by inviting alternative bids. Should the budget be a real constraint at the time of inviting bids but not necessarily so when the deal is eventually struck, the Output Specification may ask for the essential elements to be priced alongside optional enhanced items so that some flexibility is at hand rather than accept constraints owing to immediate affordability.

An issue often at conundrum for the Specification Writer is the extent of control retained by the Purchaser in the specification of details. For a complex facility (such as a physical laboratory catering for varying scientific processes), there may well be the need to specify closely the business requirements and to suggest the means of delivery to help the bidders to respond and set a firm baseline for the systems to be developed (NAO Report, 1999). Yet, exploitation of private sector innovation is critical to the success of the PFI in delivering improved value for money (NAO Report, 1998). A balance has to be struck somewhere with careful thought being given by the Specification Writer to the extent to which the Purchaser wishes to specify the means by which the service levels will be achieved at the partial expense of innovation (Lane, 2003).

Other potential problems of Output Specifications and the proposed solutions as extracted from the literature are shown in Table 1 With the great variety of facility types that are put on the PFI agenda of many countries, there is still a great deal to learn about the pitfalls created by Output Specifications for each specific type of project. The general principles, however, should always be that clarity and relevance of contents should prevail. Like the normal specifications