

[英 汉 对 照]

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哲 学 研 究

PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS

[英]路德维希·维特根斯坦 著

(二)

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蔡远 译

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352. Here it happens that our thinking plays us a queer trick. We want, that is, to quote the law of excluded middle and to say: "Either such an image is in his mind, or it is not; there is no third possibility!"—We encounter this queer argument also in other regions of philosophy. "In the decimal expansion of π either the group "7777" occurs, or it does not—there is no third possibility." That is to say: "God sees—but we don't know." But what does that mean? —We use a picture; the picture of a visible series which one person sees the whole of and another not. The law of excluded middle says here: It must either look like this, or like that. So it really—and this is a truism—says nothing at all, but gives us a picture. And the problem ought now to be: does reality accord with the picture or not? And this picture *seems* to determine what we have to do, what to look for, and how—but it does not do so, just because we do not know how it is to be applied. Here saying "There is no third possibility" or "But there can't be a third possibility!"—expresses our inability to turn our eyes away from this picture: a picture which looks as if it must already contain both the problem and its solution, while all the time we *feel* that it is not so.

Similarly when it is said "Either he has this experience, or not"—what primarily occurs to us is a picture which by itself seems to make the sense of the expressions *unmistakable*: "Now you know what is in question"—we should like to say. And that is precisely what it does not tell him.

353. Asking whether and how a proposition can be verified is only a particular way of asking "How do you mean?" The answer is a contribution to the grammar of the proposition.

354. The fluctuation in grammar between criteria and symptoms makes it look as if there were nothing at all but symptoms.

352. 在此我们的思维给我们玩了一个奇怪的把戏。即我们想引用排中律,并说:“这个形象或者在他心中存在,或者不存在,没有第三种可能性!”——我们在哲学的其他领域里也会碰见这种奇怪的论点。“在 π 的小数展开式中,‘7777’这个数组或者出现,或者不出现——不会有第三种可能性。”那就是说:“上帝知道——但是我们不知道。”但这意味着什么呢?——我们使用一幅画;画上有有一个可见的系列,一个人看见整个系列,另一个人却没有。排中律在此说:它必须或者看起来是这样,或者是那样。因此,它实际上什么也没有说——这是不言而喻的——而只是给予我们一幅画。现在问题应该是:实在与这幅画是否相符合?这幅画看起来决定了我们必须做什么、找什么以及怎样去做——但是,它没有做到这一点,这恰恰因为我们不知道应该怎样使用这幅画。这里说的“没有第三种可能性”或者“但是不可能有第三种可能性!”——表明我们不能将目光从这幅画上移开:这幅画看起来好象一定包含了问题及其解答,但同时我们却一直感到情况并非如此。

当人们说“他或者有这种经验,或者没有”,情况也类似——我们首先想到的是一幅画,它似乎以一种不可错的方式决定了这个陈述的意义。我们可能说:“现在你知道问题所在了”——而那正是这幅画没有告诉他的事情。

353. 关于一个命题能否及如何被证实的问题,只是“你是怎样意指那个的”这个问题的一种特殊问法。它的回答是对该命题的语法的一个贡献。

354. 语法中在判据和征兆之间的摇摆使它看起来好像除了征兆之外什么也没有。

We say, for example: "Experience teaches that there is rain when the barometer falls, but it also teaches that there is rain when we have certain sensations of wet and cold, or such – and – such visual impressions." In defence of this one says that these sense – impressions can deceive us. But here one fails to reflect that the fact that the false appearance is precisely one of rain is founded on a definition.

355. The point here is not that our sense – impressions might lie, but that we understand their language. (And this language like any other is founded on convention.)

356. One is inclined to say: "Either it is raining, or it isn't—how I know, how the information has reached me, is another matter." But then let us put the question like this: What do I call "information that it is raining"? (Or have I only information of this information too?) And what gives this 'information' the character of information about something? Doesn't the form of our expression mislead us here? For isn't it a misleading metaphor to say: "My eyes give me the information that there is a chair over there"?

357. We do not say that *possibly* a dog talks to itself. Is that because we are so minutely acquainted with its soul? Well, one might say this: If one sees the behaviour of a living thing, one sees its soul. — But do I also say in my own case that I am saying something to myself, because I am behaving in such – and – such a way? —I do *not* say it from observation of my behaviour. But it only makes sense because I do behave in this way. —Then it is not because I *mean* it that it makes sense?

358. But isn't it our *meaning* it that gives sense to the sentence? (And here, of course, belongs the fact that one cannot mean a senseless series of words.) And 'meaning it' is something in the sphere of the mind. But it is also something private! It is the intangible *something*;

比如,我们说:“经验告诉我们,气压表下降时就会下雨,但经验也告诉我们,当我们有某种湿和冷的感觉时或者有如此这般的视觉印象时,也会下雨。”为了证明这一点,人们说这些感觉印象可能欺骗我们。但是这里,人们没有注意到,这些感觉印象之所以能够以可能下雨来欺骗我们,正是以某种定义为基础的。

355. 这里的问题不是我们感觉印象可能欺骗我们,而是我们理解它们的语言。(而这种语言和其他任何语言一样都建立在约定的基础上。)

356. 人们倾向于说:“或者正在下雨,或者没有下雨——至于我如何知道,我如何得知这个信息,那是另一回事。”但是,让我们这样表述这个问题:我把什么称为“正在下雨的信息”呢?(或者,我也有关于这个信息的信息吗?)是什么使这个“信息”成为表征某种东西的信息?难道我们的表达形式在此没有误导我们?因为,“我的眼睛给我提供了‘那边有把椅子’的信息”这种说法,难道不是一个引人误解的比喻?

357. 我们不会说狗可能对自己说话。这是因为我们如此细致地熟悉它的灵魂吗?是的,人们可能这样说:如果人们看见一种生物的行为,那他也就看见了它的灵魂——但是,就我自己而言,我是否也说,因为我如此这般地行为,所以我在对自己说话?——我不是根据对自己行为的观察才这样说。但是,这句话之所以有意义,只是因为我以如此这般的方式行为——因此,并不是由于我意指它,它才有意义。

358. 但是,难道不是我们意指它才使句子有意义吗?(当然,这里还包括:人们不能意指一连串无意义的词。)而“意指它”是某种在心灵领域中发生的事情。但是,它也是某种私人的东西!它是

only comparable with consciousness itself.

How could this seem ludicrous? It is, as it were, a dream of our language.

359. Could a machine think? —Could it be in pain? —Well, is the human body to be called such a machine? It surely comes as close as possible to being such a machine.

360. But a machine surely cannot think! —Is that an empirical statement? No. We only say of a human being and what is like one that it thinks. We also say it of dolls and no doubt of ghosts too. Look at the word “to think” as a tool.

361. The chair is thinking to itself: . . .

WHERE? In one of its parts? Or outside its body; in the air around It? Or not *anywhere* at all? But then what is the difference between this chair's saying something to itself and another one's doing so, next to it? —But then how is it with man; where does *he* say things to himself? How does it come about that this question seems senseless; and that no specification of a place is necessary except just that this man is saying something to himself? Whereas the question *where* the chair talks to itself seems to demand an answer. —The reason is: we want to know *how* the chair is supposed to be like a human being; whether, for instance, the head is at the top of the back and so on.

What is it like to say something to oneself; what happens here? —How am I to explain it? Well, only as you might teach someone the meaning of the expression “to say something to oneself”. And certainly we learn the meaning of that as children. —Only no one is going to say that the person who teaches it to us tells us ‘what takes place’.

362. Rather it seems to us as though in this case the instructor *imparted* the meaning to the pupil—without telling him it directly; but in the end the pupil is brought to the point of giving himself the

某种不可捉摸的东西；只能与意识本身相比。

这怎么会显得荒谬可笑呢？它可以说是我们语言的一个梦。

359. 机器能思维吗？——它能感到疼痛吗？——那么，人的身体是否应该称为这样一台机器？它的确十分接近的可能成为这样一台机器。

360. 但是，机器肯定不能思维！——那是一个经验命题吗？不是。我们只说人或者与人相似的东西能思维。我们也说布娃娃能思维，无疑也说精灵能思维。把“思维”这个词看做一种工具！

361. 这把椅子独自在想……

在哪里？在它的某个部分上？或者在这个物体的外部；在它周围的空气中？还是根本不在任何地方？在这种情况下，这把椅子对自己说话与它附近的另一把椅子对自己说话这两者之间有什么区别呢？——那么，人的情况又如何呢？他在哪里对自己说话？怎么会说这个问题看来毫无意义？怎么会说除了这个人对自己说话以外，不需要具体指明地点？而这把椅子在哪里对自己说话这个问题，看起来却需要一个答案——这是因为：我们想知道椅子是怎样被假定为与人相似的；比如，椅子的头是否在其背部的顶端，如此等等。

一个人对自己说话，这是怎么回事？这里发生了什么？——我如何解释它？那么，就按你教某人“对自己说话”这句话的意义那样去解释。当然，我们从小就学会了“对自己说”这个表述的意义了——只是没有人会说，教给我们这种意义的那个人会告诉我们“那里发生了什么”。

362. 毋宁说，在我们看来，在这个例子中教师将意义透露给学生——而不是直接告诉他；但是最后，学生却被引导到给

correct ostensive definition. And this is where our illusion is.

363. "But when I imagine something, something certainly *happens!*" Well, something happens—and then I make a noise. What for? Presumably in order to tell what happens. —But how is *telling* done? When are we said to *tell* anything? —What is the language — game of telling?

I should like to say: you regard it much too much as a matter of course that one can tell anything to anyone. That is to say: we are so much accustomed to communication through language, in conversation, that it looks to us as if the whole point of communication lay in this: someone else grasps the sense of my words—which is something mental; he as it were takes it into his own mind. If he then does something further with it as well, that is no part of the immediate purpose of language.

One would like to say "Telling brings it about that he *knows* that I am in pain; it produces this mental phenomenon; everything else is inessential to the telling." As for what this queer phenomenon of knowledge is—there is time enough for that. Mental processes just are queer. (It is as if one said: "The clock tells us the time. *What* time is, is not yet settled. And as for what one tells the time *for*—that doesn't come in here.")

364. Someone does a sum in his head. He uses the result, let's say, for building a bridge or a machine. —Are you trying to say that he has not *really* arrived at this number by calculation? That it has, say, just 'come' to him in the manner of a kind of dream? There surely must have been calculation going on, and there was. For he *knows* that, and how, he calculated; and the correct result he got would be inexplicable without calculation. —But what if I said: "*It strikes him as if* he had calculated. And why should the correct result be

自己作出一个正确的实指定义。而且我们的错觉就在于此。

363. “但是,当我想象某种东西的时候,当然有事情发生!”好吧,有事情发生了——然后我就发出一些声音。这是为了什么?可能是为了告知人们发生了什么——然而,这种告知是如何进行的?我们什么时候才说告知了一些事情?——“告知”的语言游戏是什么?

我想说,你把一个人能够把某事告知某人这一点看得过于想当然了。那就是说:我们太习惯于这种通过语言在谈话中进行的交流了,以至于在我们看来交流的全部要害就在于:另外一个人把握我所说的话的意义——这是某种精神的东西:而他可以说把这种意义吸收到他自己的心中。如果他后来还用它进一步做了别的事情,这并不是语言直接目的的一部分。

人们可能会说:“‘告知’使他知道我感到疼痛;它产生了这种精神现象;其余任何事情对于‘告知’来说都不是本质性的。”至于这种知识的古怪现象是什么——还有足够时间来讨论。精神过程真是奇怪。(就好像有人说:“时钟告诉我们时间。时间是什么,这个问题还没有解决。至于人们读出时间的目的是为了什么——这不是这里要讨论的问题。”)

364. 某人在心里做了一次计算。比如,他把结果用于建造一座桥或一台机器——你是不是想说他其实并不是通过计算获得这个数字?比如,这个数字是以一种梦的方式“来到”他的心中?这里肯定有计算,并且已经做过计算。因为,他知道这一点,并且知道他是如何计算的。如果没有计算,就不能说明他所获得的正确结果——但是,如果我这样说会怎么样呢:“他觉得他似乎做了计算。为什么正确的结果需要得到说明呢?他不说一句

explicable? Is it not incomprehensible enough, that without saying a word, without making a note, he was able to CALCULATE?"—

Is calculating in the imagination in some sense less real than calculating on paper? It is *real*—calculation-in-the-head. —Is it like calculation on paper? —I don't know whether to call it like. Is a bit of white paper with black lines on it like a human body?

365. Do Adelheid and the Bishop play a *real* game of chess? —Of course. They are not merely pretending—which would also be possible as part of a play. —But, for example, the game has no beginning — Of course it has; otherwise it would not be a game of chess. —

366. Is a sum in the head less real than a sum on paper? —Perhaps one is inclined to say some such thing; but one can get oneself to think the opposite as well by telling oneself: paper, ink, etc. are only logical constructions out of our sense-data.

"I have done the multiplication in my head"—do I perhaps not *believe* such a statement? —But was it really a multiplication? It was not merely 'a' multiplication, but *this* one—in the head. This is the point at which I go wrong. For I now want to say: it was some mental process *corresponding* to the multiplication on paper. So it would make sense to say: "*This* process in the mind corresponds to *this* process on paper." And it would then make sense to talk of a method of projection according to which the image of the sign was a representation of the sign itself.

367. The mental picture is the picture which is described when someone describes what he imagines.

368. I describe a room to someone, and then get him to paint an *impressionistic* picture from this description to shew that he has understood it. —Now he paints the chairs which I described as green, dark red; where I said "yellow", he paints blue. —That is the impression which he got of that room. And now I say: "Quite right! That's what

话,不写一个记号,就能够计算,难道这不是已经足够不可理解了吗?”——

想象中的计算在某种意义上是不是没有纸上的计算那样真实?它是真实的——心算——它不像纸上的计算吗?——我不知道是不是可以说它像。一张画着黑色线条的白纸是否像人的身体?

365. 阿德尔海德和主教下的是真实的象棋吗?——当然。他们不是仅仅在装着下棋——这在戏剧中是可能的——但是,比如,这盘棋并没有开始——当然它有开始;否则,它就不会是一盘棋——

366. 心里的计算是不是没有纸上的计算真实?——也许人们会这么说;但是,人们也可以使自己考虑相反的情况,可以告诉自己:纸、墨水等等只是我们的感觉材料的逻辑构造。

“我已经在心中做了乘法……”——也许我并不相信这样一种陈述?——但是,那真的是一种乘法吗?它不仅是“一种”乘法,而且是这种心中的乘法。正是这一点我弄错了。因为我现在想要说:是某种精神过程对应于纸上的乘法。因此,这样说就是有意义的:“这个心中的过程对应于这个纸上的过程。”因此,谈论一种投影方法是有意义的,根据这种方法,记号的意象是记号本身的代表。

367. 精神图画就是当一个人在描述他想象的东西时所描述出来的图画。

368. 我给某人描述一个房间,然后让他根据这种描述画一幅印象派图画,以表明他理解了——现在,他把我描述为绿色的椅子画成深红色,在我说是“黄色”的地方,他画成了蓝色——那就是他获得的关于那个房间的印象。并且现在我说:“非常正确!”

it's like."

369. One would like to ask: "What is it like—what happens—when one does a sum in one's head?"—And in a particular case the answer may be "First I add 17 and 18, then I subtract 39 " But that is not the answer to our question. What is called doing sums in one's head is not explained by *such* an answer.

370. One ought to ask, not what images are or what happens when one imagines anything, but how the word "imagination" is used. But that does not mean that I want to talk only about words. For the question as to the nature of the imagination is as much about the word "imagination" as my question is. And I am only saying that this question is not to be decided—neither for the person who does the imagining, nor for anyone else—by pointing; nor yet by a description of any process. The first question also asks for a word to be explained; but it makes us expect a wrong kind of answer.

371. *Essence* is expressed by grammar.

372. Consider: "The only correlate in language to an intrinsic necessity is an arbitrary rule. It is the only thing which one can milk out of this intrinsic necessity into a proposition."

373. Grammar tells what kind of object anything is. (Theology as grammar.)

374. The great difficulty here is not to represent the matter as if there were something one *couldn't* do. As if there really were an object, from which I derive its description, but I were unable to shew it to anyone. —And the best that I can propose is that we should yield to the temptation to use this picture, but then investigate how the *application* of the picture goes.

375. How does one teach anyone to read to himself? How does one know if he can do so? How does he himself know that he is doing what is required of him?

那个房间就是这样的。”

369. 人们可能会问：“当一个人在心里计算时——会是什么样呢——发生了什么？”——在特定的情况下，答案可能是“我先把 17 和 18 相加，然后减去 39……”但是，那并不是对我们问题的回答。这样的答案不能解释什么是在心里计算。

370. 人们应该问“想象”这个词是如何使用的，而不是在想象时有什么意象或发生了什么。但是，那并不意味着我只想谈论词。因为，关于想象本性的问题与我的问题一样，都是关于“想象”这个词的。而我只是说这个问题并不是通过指示的方式来决定的——不管是对于进行想象的那个人，还是对于其他任何人；也不能通过描述任何过程来解释。第一个问题也同样要求对词作出解释；但它使我们期待一种错误的答案。

371. 本质通过语法来表达。

372. 请考虑一下：“在语言中与内在必然性唯一相关联的东西就是任意的规则。它是人们可以从内在必然性中抽取出来放进命题中的唯一的東西。”

373. 语法告诉我们事物是哪一类的对象。（语法的神学。）

374. 在此，最大的困难并不是把事情表述得好像有某些事情是人们不能做到的。好像真的有某种东西，我可以从中引出它的描述，但不能把它显示给任何人——我能提出的最好建议是，我们屈从于使用这幅图画의 诱惑，但是要研究这幅图画的应用是如何进行的。

375. 人们是如何教会别人默读的？人们如何知道他的学生是不是能默读了？这个学生自己又如何知道他正在按照别人要求的去做？

376. When I say the ABC to myself, what is the criterion of my doing the same as someone else who silently repeats it to himself? It might be found that the same thing took place in my larynx and in his. (And similarly when we both think of the same thing, wish the same, and so on.) But then did we learn the use of the words: “to say such-and-such to oneself” by someone’s pointing to a process in the larynx or the brain? Is it not also perfectly possible that my image of the sound *a* and his correspond to different physiological processes? The question is: *How do we compare images?*

377. Perhaps a logician will think: The same is the same—how identity is established is a psychological question. (High is high—it is a matter of psychology that one sometimes *sees*, and sometimes *hears* it.)

What is the criterion for the sameness of two images? —What is the criterion for the redness of an image? For me, when it is someone else’s image: what he says and does. For myself, when it is my image: nothing. And what goes for “red” also goes for “same”.

378. “Before I judge that two images which I have are the same, I must recognize them as the same.” And when that has happened, how am I to know that the word “same” describes what I recognize? Only if I can express my recognition in some other way, and if it is possible for someone else to teach me that “same” is the correct word here.

For if I need a justification for using a word, it must also be one for someone else.

379. First I am aware of it as this; and then I remember what it is called. —Consider: in what cases is it right to say this?

380. How do I recognize that this is red? —“I see that it is *this*; and then I know that that is what this is called.” This? —What?!

376. 当我对自己说 ABC 的时候,另外一个人默默地对自己重复我说的话,什么东西可以作为判据来表明我与他在做同一件事?也许可以发现,在我与他的喉咙里发生了同样的事情。(当我们两人在想同一件事、有相同的愿望时,等等,情况也是如此。)但是,我们是不是通过某人指着喉咙或脑子里发生的过程,以此来学会“如此这般地自言自语”这些词的用法的?难道我关于声音 a 的意象与他的就意象不可能对应不同的生理过程?问题是:我们如何比较意象?

377. 一个逻辑学家也许会认为:相同就是相同——至于同一性是如何确立的,这是一个心理学的问题。(高就是高——至于人们有时看到它,有时听到它,这是一个心理学问题。)

两个意象相同的判据是什么?——一个红色意象的判据是什么?在我看来,就别人的意象而言:判据是他所说的和所做的。就我自己的意象而言:没有任何判据。这里对“红”一词的情况,也适用于“相同”一词。

378. “在我判断我所具有的两个意象是否相同之前,我必须认出它们是相同的。”当这种情况发生时,我如何知道“相同”一词描述了我所认出的东西?除非我能够以某种其他方式表达出我的这种认识,除非别人能教我“相同”一词在此是一个正确的词。

因为,如果我使用一个词需要证明,对于别人也一样。

379. 首先我意识到它是这个;然后我记住它叫什么——考虑一下:在什么情况下这样说是对的。

380. 我如何能认出这是红色的?——“我看见它是这个;然后我知道这就是人们所称呼的这个。”这个?——是什么?!对这