

[英 汉 对 照]

西方学术经典文库

神圣者的观念

THE IDEA OF THE HOLY

[德]鲁道夫·奥托 著

图书在版编目(CIP)数据

神圣者的观念:英汉对照/(德)奥托著;丁建波译.
北京:九州出版社,2007.4
(西方学术经典文库)
ISBN 978-7-80195-571-5

I. 神… II. ①奥…②丁… III. 宗教哲学—英、汉
IV. B920

中国版本图书馆 CIP 数据核字(2007)第 048754 号

神圣者的观念

作 者 [德]鲁道夫·奥托 著 丁建波 译
责任编辑 周红斌
出版发行 九州出版社
地 址 北京市西城区阜外大街甲 35 号
邮政编码 100037
网 址 www.jiuzhoupress.com
电子信箱 jiuzhou@jiuzhoupress.com
印 刷 九洲财鑫印刷有限公司
开 本 630×970mm 1/16
印 张 27.25
字 数 290 千字
版 次 2007 年 4 月第 1 版
印 次 2007 年 4 月第 1 次印刷
书 号 ISBN 978-7-80195-571-5/C·122
定 价 56.00 元

版权所有 侵权必究

出版说明

在西方学术思想的发展流变中,出现过很多影响深远的经典著作,这些著作穿越时空,为人们长久研读,有的甚至影响了整个人类文明的发展进程。这套《西方学术经典文库》(英汉对照本),精选了其中最有代表性的一些名著,计划达到一百部,将陆续分批出版直至全部完成。

《西方学术经典文库》由多位专家学者指导分类选目,内容涵盖哲学、文学、宗教学、政治学、经济学、社会学、人类学、心理学、法学、历史学等类,注重权威性、学术性和影响性,收录了不同国家、不同时代、不同流派的诸多名著。

《西方学术经典文库》中译本译自英文原著或其他文种的英文译本,以英汉对照的形式出版,读者可以参照原文对作品有更加客观的理解,更好地把握西方学术思想的精髓。

为加以区别,原文中的英文注释,注释号用①、②……形式表示;中文译者注释则以〔1〕、〔2〕……形式表示。至于英译本中出现的原文页码和特殊索引等问题,中文译者在“译者后记”中将予以解释、说明。另外,在英文原著中,有一些表示着重意义的斜体或大写等字体,考虑到读者可以在对照英文阅读中看到,因此在中译文中,没有照样标出,还望读者理解。

九州出版社

The Idea Of The Holy

By *Rudolf Otto*

English Translation

By *John W. Harvey*

本书根据 Oxford University Press 1964 年版本译出

CONTENTS

目 录

CHAPTER I The Rational And The Non-Rational	2
第一章 理性与非理性	3
CHAPTER II 'Numen' And The 'Numinous'	12
第二章 “神秘”与“神秘者”	13
CHAPTER III The Elements In The 'Numinous'	20
第三章 “神秘者”的诸因素	21
CHAPTER IV 'Mysterium Tremendum'	28
第四章 “令人畏惧的神秘”	29
CHAPTER V The Analysis Of 'Mysterium'	58
第五章 对“神秘”的分析	59
CHAPTER VI	72
第六章	73
CHAPTER VII Analogies And Associated Feelings	96
第七章 类比和联想感受	97
CHAPTER VIII The Holy As A Category Of Value	118

第八章 作为一种价值范畴的神圣	119
CHAPTER IX Means Of Expression Of The Numinous	140
第九章 表达神秘的各种方式	141
CHAPTER X The Numinous In The Old Testament	168
第十章 《旧约》中的神秘.....	169
CHAPTER XI The Numinous In The New Testament	192
第十一章 《新约》中的神秘	193
CHAPTER XII The Numinous In Luther	220
第十二章 路德思想中的神秘	221
CHAPTER XIII The Two Processes Of Development	258
第十三章 两种发展过程	259
CHAPTER XIV The Holy As An A Priori Category	264
第十四章 作为一种先验范畴的神圣	265
CHAPTER XV Its Earliest Manifestations	278
第十五章 最初的表现	279
CHAPTER XVI The 'Cruder' Phases	314
第十六章 “较粗糙的”诸阶段	315
CHAPTER XVII The Holy As An A Priori Category	322
第十七章 作为一种先验范畴的神圣	323
CHAPTER XVIII The Manifestations Of The 'Holy' And The Faculty Of 'Divination'	338
第十八章 “神圣”的诸种表现以及 “直觉感受”的能力	339

CHAPTER XIX	Divination In Primitive Christianity	368
第十九章	原始基督教中的直觉感受	369
CHAPTER XX	Divination In Christianity To-Day	384
第二十章	今日基督教中的直觉感受	385
CHAPTER XXI	History And The <i>A Priori</i> In Religion; Summary	
	And Conclusion	414
第二十一章	历史与宗教中的先验:	
	总结与结论	415
译者后记	422

[英 汉 对 照]

西方学术经典文库

神圣者的观念

THE IDEA OF THE HOLY

[德] 鲁道夫·奥托 著

丁建波 译



九州出版社
JIUZHOU PRESS

CHAPTER I

The Rational And The Non-Rational

It is essential to every theistic conception of God, and most of all to the Christian, that it designates and precisely characterizes deity by the attributes spirit, reason, purpose, good will, supreme power, unity, selfhood. The nature of God is thus thought of by analogy with our human nature of reason and personality; only, whereas in ourselves we are aware of this as qualified by restriction and limitation, as applied to God the attributes we use are 'completed', i. e. thought as absolute and unqualified. Now all these attributes constitute clear and definite *concepts*: they can be grasped by the intellect; they can be analysed by thought; they even admit of definition. An object that can thus be thought conceptually may be termed *rational*. The nature of deity described in the attributes above mentioned is, then, a rational nature; and a religion which recognizes and maintains such a view of God is in so far a 'rational' religion. Only on such terms is *belief* possible in contrast to mere *feeling*. And of Christianity at least it is false that 'feeling is all, the name but sound and smoke';^①—where 'name' stands for conception or thought. Rather we count this the very mark and criterion of a religion's high rank and superior value—that it should have no lack of *conceptions* about God; that it should admit knowledge—the knowledge that comes by faith—of the transcendent in terms of conceptual thought, whether those already mentioned or others which continue and develop them. Christianity not only possesses such conceptions but

① Goethe, *Faust*.

第一章 理性与非理性

对于任何一种有神论的神的观念,尤其是对于基督教的上帝观念来说,用精神、理性、目的、善良意志、最高权能、统一、自性等特性来标示和精确地描述神性,都是至关重要的。这样,对神之本质的思考就来自于人的与神相类似的理性与人格的本质,只不过,我们都很清楚,这些特性在被用于人自身时是有所限定的;而在被用于上帝时,则是完备的,也就是说,是绝对的,毫无限制的。现在,所有的特性都可以形成清晰明确的概念:这些概念能被理智把握,能被思想分析,甚至能被定义。一种能这样用概念思考把握的对象就可以被称做理性的。那么,用上述特性所描述的神性本质就是一种理性本质,而用这种观点来认识和对待上帝的宗教就是理性的宗教。只有以这些理性概念为基础的信仰,才能够与纯粹的情感相抗衡。至少对基督教来说,说“情感就是一切,名号只是虚声”^①是错误的——在这里“名号”指的是概念和思想。在更大程度上,我们把理性概念视作一种宗教的较高层次、较大价值的标志和尺度,这种宗教不会缺乏关于上帝的观念,它会以概念思维的形式承认那些无论是已经提到过的还是继承和发展的关于超越者的知识——也就是通过信仰得到的知识。基督教不仅拥有这些概念,而且在拥有这些概念方面

^① 歌德《浮士德》。

possesses them in unique clarity and abundance, and this is, though not the sole or even the chief, yet a very real sign of its superiority over religions of other forms and at other levels. This must be asserted at the outset and with the most positive emphasis.

But, when this is granted, we have to be on our guard against an error which would lead to a wrong and one-sided interpretation of religion. This is the view that the essence of deity can be given completely and exhaustively in such 'rational' attributions as have been referred to above and in others like them. It is not an unnatural misconception. We are prompted to it by the traditional language of edification, with its characteristic phraseology and ideas; by the learned treatment of religious themes in sermon and theological instruction; and further even by our Holy Scriptures themselves. In all these cases the 'rational' element occupies the foreground, and often nothing else seems to be present at all. But this is after all to be expected. All language, in so far as it consists of words, purports to convey ideas or concepts;—that is what language means;—and the more clearly and unequivocally it does so, the better the language. And hence expositions of religious truth in language inevitably tend to stress the 'rational' attributes of God.

But though the above mistake is thus a natural one enough, it is none the less seriously misleading. For so far are these 'rational' attributes from exhausting the idea of deity, that they in fact imply a nonrational or supra-rational Subject of which they are predicates. They are 'essential' (and not merely 'accidental') attributes of that subject, but they are also, it is important to notice, *synthetic* essential attributes. That is to say, we have to predicate them of a subject which they qualify, but which in its deeper essence is not, nor indeed can be, comprehended in them; which rather requires comprehension of a quite different kind. Yet, though it eludes the conceptual way of understanding, it must be in some way or other within our grasp, else absolutely nothing could be asserted of it. And even mysticism, in speaking of it as

表现出其独有的清晰与丰富,就此而言——尽管不是唯一的或者甚至不是主要的,但这正是基督教优于其他形式的以及处于不同层面的宗教的真正标志。这是在一开始就必须正面加以确认的。

但是,尽管承认这一点,我们也必须提防下面一种误解,它会把我们引向对宗教的错误的和片面的理解。这种观点就是:神的本性能够通过上述的或在别处提到的“理性的”性质被完备地彻底地表达出来,这并不是一种不合情理的误解。通过传统的训导语言和它特有的术语与观念,通过对在传道和神学教诲中出现的奇迹问题的专业处理,甚至通过《圣经》的经文本身,我们都很容易陷入上述错误。在这些情形中,“理性的”因素非常突出,而其他因素则丝毫没有显露出来,不过这也在意料之中。一切语言——只要它是由词汇构成的——都声称以传达观念或者概念为业,而这正是语言的意义所在;一种语言在概念与观念的表达上越是清晰明确,这种语言就越好。因此,通过语言来阐释宗教真理,就不可避免地要倾向于强调上帝的是“理性”的性质。

尽管上述错误是再自然不过的了,但是,它仍不失为严重的误导。由于这些“理性的”性质根本不能穷尽神性观念,它们事实上意味着一种非理性或者超理性的主体,而这些性质就是这一主体的诸多属性。它们是那一主体的“根本的”(而不仅仅是“偶然的”)性质,但是必须注意的是,它们也是一些假想的根本性质。也就是说,我们不得不借助它们来界定那个由它们修饰的主体,但是那一主体的更深的本质却不是、事实上也不能通过它们来领会,而更要靠一种完全不同的领会。然而,尽管这一主体总是躲避着概念式的理解方式,但它必然会以某种方式为我们所把握,否则,我们对它就绝对没有任何可说的了。即便是神秘主义——

τὸ ἄρρητον, the ineffable, does not really mean to imply that absolutely nothing can be asserted of the object of the religious consciousness; otherwise, mysticism could exist only in unbroken silence, whereas what has generally been a characteristic of the mystics is their copious eloquence.

Here for the first time we come up against the contrast between rationalism and profounder religion, and with this contrast and its signs we shall be repeatedly concerned in what follows. We have here in fact the first and most distinctive mark of rationalism, with which all the rest are bound up. It is not that which is commonly asserted, that rationalism is the denial, and its opposite the affirmation, of the miraculous. That is manifestly a wrong or at least a very superficial distinction. For the traditional theory of the miraculous as the occasional breach in the causal nexus in nature by a Being who himself instituted and must therefore be master of it—this theory is itself as massively ‘rational’ as it is possible to be. Rationalists have often enough acquiesced in the possibility of the miraculous in this sense; they have even themselves contributed to frame a theory of it;—whereas anti-rationalists have been often indifferent to the whole controversy about miracles. The difference between rationalism and its opposite is to be found elsewhere. It resolves itself rather into a peculiar difference of *quality* in the mental attitude and emotional content of the religious life itself. All depends upon this: in our idea of God is the non-rational overborne, even perhaps wholly excluded, by the rational? Or conversely, does the non-rational itself preponderate over the rational? Looking at the matter thus, we see that the common dictum, that orthodoxy itself has been the mother of rationalism, is in some measure well founded. It is not simply that orthodoxy was pre-occupied with doctrine and the framing of dogma, for these have been no less a concern of the wildest mystics. It is rather that orthodoxy found in the construction of dogma and doctrine no way to do justice to the non-rational aspect of its subject. So far from keeping the non-rational element in religion alive in the heart of the religious

当它把这一主体当作不可言说之物来谈论时——也并不是真的意味着宗教意识的对象就是真的绝对不可言说,不然,神秘主义就只能存在于沉寂之中,然而,神秘主义者的一个总的特征就是他们的滔滔雄辩。

在这里,我们首次遭遇到理性主义与更深刻的宗教之间的冲突,而且在下面我们还要反复提及这种冲突及其表现。事实上,我们在这里即应获得了理性主义的最主要的也是最显著的特征,而它的其他特征都是与此紧密联系在一起的。它并不是人们通常所确认的理性主义否定奇迹,而宗教则相反,是对奇迹的肯定。这很显然是一种错误的或者至少是十分肤浅的区别。传统的奇迹理论将奇迹视为自然的因果链条的偶然断裂,而这一因果链条及其断裂都是由一个存在者创立并控制的——这一理论本身就不能再是非常“理性的”了。理性主义者们一贯默认这种意义上的奇迹,甚至自己也对建构这种理论作出了贡献,而与之相反,反理性主义者们则往往对有关奇迹的整个争论持漠不关心的态度。理性主义与其对立面之间的区别要到其他地方去找寻。这种区别甚至将自己与宗教生活中的精神状态与情感内容的质的区别缠绕在一起。所有这些都取决于这一点:在我们关于上帝的观念中,是非理性主义被理性主义压服甚至是被完全地排斥呢,或者相反,是非理性主义胜过了理性主义呢?如此看来,我们便发现,那种把正统观念视为理性主义之根的正常格言在一定意义上是颇有根据的。这不单是因为正统派专注于教义与教条的建构,还因为这些还牵涉到那些最狂热的神秘主义者。原因更在于正统派在建构教条与教义时,找不到能够公正地对待主体的非理性方面的途径。由于远未做到将宗教中的非理性因素活生生地保留在宗教体验

experience, orthodox Christianity manifestly failed to recognize its value, and by this failure gave to the idea of God a one-sidedly intellectualistic and rationalistic interpretation.

This bias to rationalization still prevails, not only in theology but in the science of comparative religion in general, and from top to bottom of it. The modern students of mythology, and those who pursue research into the religion of 'primitive man' and attempt to reconstruct the 'bases' or 'sources' of religion, are all victims to it. Men do not, of course, in these cases employ those lofty 'rational' concepts which we took as our point of departure; but they tend to take these concepts and their gradual 'evolution' as setting the main problem of their inquiry, and fashion ideas and notions of lower value, which they regard as paving the way for them. It is always in terms of concepts and ideas that the subject is pursued, 'natural' ones, moreover, such as have a place in the general sphere of man's ideational life, and are not specifically 'religious'. And then with a resolution and cunning which one can hardly help admiring, men shut their eyes to that which is quite unique in the religious experience, even in its most primitive manifestations. But it is rather a matter for astonishment than for admiration! For if there be any single domain of human experience that presents us with something unmistakably specific and unique, peculiar to itself, assuredly it is that of the religious life. In truth the enemy has often a keener vision in this matter than either the champion of religion or the neutral and professedly impartial theorist. For the adversaries on their side know very well that the entire 'potholer about mysticism' has nothing to do with 'reason' and 'rationality'.

And so it is salutary that we should be incited to notice that religion is not exclusively contained and exhaustively comprised in any series of 'rational' assertions; and it is well worth while to attempt to bring the relation of the different 'moments' of religion to one another clearly before the mind,

的核心,正统的基督教显然没有认识到非理性的价值,并且由于这种错误,他们赋予上帝观念以片面的理智主义的和理性主义的解释。

这种理性化的倾向不仅仍然主宰着神学,而且也完全主宰着一般的比较宗教学的研究。那些神话学的现代研究者们,以及那些将研究深入到“原始人”的宗教中并力图重新建构起宗教的“基础”和“源泉”的人,都是这种理性化倾向的受害者。当然了,在这些研究中,人们并没有采用我们引为出发点的神圣的“理性的”概念,但是他们倾向于使用这些概念以及概念的逐步“进化”来设定他们所探究的主要问题、制定一些具有较低价值的观念与看法,并以此来拓展道路。人们总是以“自然的”概念或者观念的形式来述诸该主题,这些概念或者观念都存在于人们的观念生活的一般范围之内,而且并不是十分“宗教的”。然后,通过一种让人不得不羡慕的坚定和狡黠,人们断然无视那些在宗教体验中非常独特的东西,即便它们是最原始的信仰形式。但是这一点与其说让人欣羡,不如说让人震惊!因为,如果有一个关于人类经验的独特领域,它能为我们展示出尤其对于其自身来说是毫无疑问的特别而独具的东西,那么,这无疑就是宗教生活。事实上,无论是比起宗教的斗士还是中立的、保持着职业的不偏不倚的理论家,宗教的敌人对这一问题的见解都更加敏锐。从他们的立场出发,反对者非常清楚,所有的“关于神秘主义的争吵”都与“理智”和“理性”毫不相干。

因此,对我们有利的一点就是,我们应当被激励着去注意,宗教并不是由一系列“理性的”断言所独断地彻底地构成的。同时,努力把不同的宗教“要素”之间的关系清晰地揭示出来,从而使宗

so that its nature may become more manifest.

This attempt we are now to make with respect to the quite distinctive category of the holy or sacred.