

心理学新进展影印丛书

美国心理学会 (APS) 组编

Current Directions 社会心理学新进展 in Social Psychology

英文主编 / 珍妮特·罗莎尔 (Janet B. Ruscher)

伊丽莎白·汉默 (Elizabeth Yost Hammer)

辛自强 点评 申继亮 审校



北京师范大学出版社
BEIJING NORMAL UNIVERSITY PRESS

中国社会科学出版社
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Chinese simplified language edition published by Beijing Normal University Press, Copyright © 2007, Beijing Normal University Press.

Authorized translation from the English language edition, published by Pearson Education, Inc.

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图书在版编目 (CIP) 数据

社会心理学新进展：英文 / (美) 罗莎尔，汉默主编. — 影印本. — 北京：北京师范大学出版社，2007.4
(心理学新进展影印丛书 / 申继亮审校)
ISBN 978-7-303-08432-6

I. 社… II. 罗… III. 社会心理学—研究—进展—英文
IV. C912.6-11

中国版本图书馆CIP数据核字 (2007) 第020045号
北京市版权著作权合同登记图字：01-2007-1035

出版发行：北京师范大学出版社 www.bnup.com.cn

北京新街口外大街19号

邮政编码：100875

出 版 人：赖德胜

印 刷：北京京师印务有限公司

经 销：全国新华书店

开 本：185 mm × 236 mm

印 张：13

字 数：190千字

印 数：1~3 000

版 次：2007年3月第1版

印 次：2007年3月第1次印刷

定 价：22.00元

责任编辑：谢 影 美术编辑：贾 刚

责任校对：李 菡 责任印制：董本刚

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反盗版、侵权举报电话：010-58800697

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出版部电话：010-58800825。

出版说明

“心理学新进展影印丛书”由北京师范大学出版社从培生教育出版集团引进出版，包括《普通心理学新进展》《发展心理学新进展》《认知心理学新进展》《社会心理学新进展》《人格心理学新进展》《健康心理学新进展》《变态心理学新进展》共7册英文影印图书，全部由美国心理学会（APS）组编，撰写者均为心理科学各自研究领域的世界著名学者和专家。入选的文章代表了各心理学分支自2000年以来的最新研究成果，同时各册所涉及的主题也全面体现了该分支学科的研究动态。

作为北京师范大学出版社成立26年以来第一批英文原版影印图书，我们真诚希望“心理学新进展影印丛书”的出版，可以为中国广大心理学研究者、教师以及相关专业的研究生，带来国际心理学界近十年的综合发展趋势，从研究思路、概念界定、研究方法与设计、统计技术以及未来的研究方向等方面，国内的学者能够及时把握到国际同行的关注热点，并感受到他们对传统理论的挑战与创新。

在各册图书中，既包括文献综述、对已有研究的质疑，也结合了先进的实验手段、技术和其他学科的综合知识，研究更多地关注和探索心理现象机制层面的复杂原因。每册均有问题思考，以启发学者们深入思索今后的研究热点和可能产生实质性飞越的突破口。

为便于读者阅读，我们特别邀请了北京师范大学心理学院的申继亮教授作为丛书审校专家，各册分别由北京师范大学的青年学者加入了简要的中文进行导读，同时还评价了研究的优缺点。

这套丛书可以作为各高校教师开设心理学新进展课程或专题讲座的教学用书，同时可以作为相关领域的研究人员发表文献综述的内容依据，尤其还适合作为心理学专业英语课程的教材进行学习和讨论。

策划编辑

谢影

2007年1月18日

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第一编 情境中的人：自我保护、自我评价和自我改变

社会心理学考察情境因素如何影响个体以及个体如何影响情境。一个关键的问题是，谁是情境中的人？传统上，社会心理学家认为这个“人”就是“自我”。自我包括对自己个性特征（比如能力、喜好等）的信念以及对这些个性特征的评价（如自尊），此外，自我还具有执行功能，如自我意识、做出决策、自我控制、实施意图等。

拥有良好的自我观的人，通常是幸福的，对未来有积极的预期，并能激发指向美好未来的行为。当他们的自我受到损害时，他们会努力减少损害，进行自我改变和自我修复。例如，一个人发现自己的伪善行为伤害了别人的感情，或者考试成绩不理想时，就会暂时影响其自我评价，接下来就需要努力修正自己的行为，提高自我评价。有一系列的理论对这种现象进行了解释，如认知失调理论、自我肯定理论和社会比较理论。Tesser 的文章认为，上述理论所描述的自我调节机制的目的都是维护积极的自尊，而且所提供的减少自我威胁的方法，也是可以相互替代的。例如，认知失调理论认为，如果一个人做了与自己已有态度不一致的事情，个体随后就要修改自己的态度，以减少或去除这种伪善或言行不一造成的认知不协调对自己的折磨。比如，哥哥告诉刚进入青春期的弟弟不要学抽烟，然而自己却偷偷抽烟，这时哥哥就可能感到自己劝说弟弟时的态度与自己的行为的不协调，接下来，要么改变态度，要么改变行为，以减少认知失调。Tesser 认为，如果像自我肯定理论声称的那样，加以自我肯定或确证，重新确认自己重要的价值观或品质，也可以让个体获得自我的安宁。此外，还可以通过社会比较（如在考试中自己的成绩至少比班里的某些同学好）维护自尊或自我统一。

社会比较不仅影响自尊，还给个人提供了关于自我的信息。知道自己在某学科考试中与同学相比表现还不错，就提供了证明自己能力的信息，增加自我效能感。当看报纸时，发现很多人坚持与自己类似的观点，也让个体更加相信所持观点的正确性。在社会比较中，人们通常选择特定的人作为比较对象。如 Suls、Martin 和 Wheeler 的文章表明，人们通常选择与自己有类似背景或能力的他人作为比较对象，以预测自己能否像那个人一样在类似的任务上取得成功，从而作出“如果他能行，我也能行”的判断。从长远来看，拥有相对准确的自我观，能够帮助维护自尊，因为个体可以在力所能及的范围内寻求增加自尊的情境而避免威胁

自尊的情境。从这个意义上讲，个体是情境中的个体，个体也积极选择了情境。

尽管人们在某些情况下（如在庞大的、情绪激昂的人群中，在浩瀚宇宙的笼罩下）偶尔觉得自己“失去”了自我，但实际上对于个体而言“自我”总是凸显的。在日常生活中，人们总是关注自己在别人看来是什么样的，如自己的行为是否妥当，外貌是否有吸引力。然而，就像 Gilovich 和 Savitsky 的文章指出的，我们通常过于自我中心。一种表现是我们总觉得自己生活在聚光灯下，别人总在注意我们的一言一行，注意我们每天着装与外貌的变化。然而，实际上别人并没有像我们以为的那么高度关注我们。另一种表现是我们总担心自己内心的状态过于透明而泄露了秘密或担心被人识破，如担心老板看出自己对工作没有兴趣。这两种现象分别被作者称为“聚光灯效应”和“透明错觉”，它们反映了我们对自己如何受人关注的过于自我中心的评估。

对自我受人注意程度的过高估计，或者简单地说，过分的自我关注，通常导致我们试图改变自己以给别人良好的印象或者获得良好的自我观念。于是，我们总是在计划改变自己的某些方面。例如，新年时许下的愿望通常是让自己更美丽、能力更卓越，肥胖甚至仅是丰满而已的人总奢望节食减肥，还有人不断劝说自己戒烟，等等。我们总是相信可以自我改变，改变后一定会更受人欢迎、更成功、更有魅力。当努力改变自我时，一开始或许有些成功。如一天减少了一次零食，一天少抽了两支烟。然而，不久后一切又都回到了原来的状态，见到了美味总忍不住要吃，烟也不能少抽。自我改变的努力失败后，最终带来的是自责、怨恨自己意志薄弱，甚至还产生了绝望感和无助感。然而，不久之后，或许又会燃起自我改变的热情。为什么？Polivy 和 Herman 的文章一针见血地指出，这种现象叫“妄想综合征”，即对自我改变形成的难以实现的、不切实际的期望，总是妄想能改变自我，对改变的可能性和随之而来的益处充满了虚妄的期待和设想。

贯穿这些文章的基本思想是“情境中的人”是积极的自我：努力维护自尊，收集关于自我的信息，解释别人如何看待自己，努力改变不喜欢的自我特征。然而，这种积极的角色并不完全正确运行。情境中的人常常是自我中心、自我保护的。

前面我们基本忠实地按照原意介绍了编者的意图和文章作者的观点。容我最后做一点引申的评论。四篇文章各有新意，不过有的文章也有问题和不足。例如，Tesser 的文章看到了认知失调理论、自我肯定理论和社会比较理论所分别声称的三种自尊调节机制的共性，这是作者的独到之处。Suls 的文章的长处是，在一些大概念下做了更仔细的分类或区分，例如，将社会比较的内容区分成能力和观点的评估，将社会比较的动机区分成自我评估、自我抬高和自我改进，将社会比较的方向区分为向上和向下，将社会比较的过程区分为认同和对比。接下来两篇文章的优点是对一些自我关注和自我改变中的特殊现象或病态现象，提出了概念的命名，像“聚光灯效应”、“透明错觉”、“妄想综合征”等概念令人耳目一新。然而，后两

篇文章的理论深度相对要小一些。而 Tesser 的文章探讨了重要的理论问题，但我难以完全赞同作者的观点。作者认为三种自尊调节机制可以相互替换，这似乎有些抹杀三者的差异性。例如，认知失调理论主要讲在“个体内”如何通过减少认知失调而消除自我受到的威胁；社会比较理论则探讨“人际间”的相互比较如何帮助个体维护自尊；而自我肯定理论只是强调肯定或确认自己的重要价值观可以维护自尊，并不强调消除认知不协调或自我的不统一。三种机制根本不同，虽然都可以服务于维护自尊的同一目标，似乎不能说它们可以“相互代替”，而更稳妥的观点或许是三者“相互补充”。

编者将上述四篇文章收录在“情境中的人”这一大标题下，编者的意思是强调个体与情境的相互作用和相互影响问题。这里所说的“人”在四篇文章中通常采用西方心理学惯常的称谓——“个体”，编者甚至更狭义地将“人”等同于“自我”。问题是三者等同吗？在我看来，西方主流心理学看到的是“个体”，即在统计学意义上可以累加的单个的人，而不是完整的、独特的“人”，不是生活于社会关系中的人。另外的问题是，对于“情境”或者说“环境”这样重要的概念，编者和作者都没有明确指出其内涵，究竟“环境在哪里呢？”我推测，这里的情境顶多是“他人”，如社会比较中的他人，个体以为对自己非常关注的他人。实际上，情境和环境还应有更多的含义吧。甚至更重要的，人与情境的关系还有更丰富的含义。当然，这部分只有四篇文章，即便把它们放在一起，也难以负载太多的期望。这里的简单评论，只是寄望读者思考一些文章之外的东西。

The Person in the Situation :

Self-Protection, Self-Evaluation, and Self-Change

Social psychology examines how situational factors influence the individual, as well as how the individual influences the situation. A critical question, then, is who is the person in the situation? Traditionally, social psychologists have addressed this question by considering the Self. The Self comprises beliefs about one's own characteristics, such as abilities, preferences, and possessions, as well as an evaluation of those characteristics (i. e. , self-esteem). Beyond these characteristics, the Self also possesses an executive function: it is self-aware, renders decisions, exercises self-control, and executes intentions.

Possessing a relatively favorable view of the Self is associated with being happier, having positive expectations about the future, and initiating the behaviors that may secure a better future. Consequently, when most people feel bad about themselves, they attempt to repair the damage. Behaving hypocritically, hurting another person's feelings, or scoring poorly on an examination, for instance, temporarily reduces positive self-regard, and initiates efforts to restore it. A number of social psychological theories deal with such phenomena, including cognitive dissonance theory, self-affirmation theory, and social comparison theory. Tesser's (2001) article suggests that these varied theories all share the common motive of maintaining positive self-esteem and, consequently, the resolutions to self-threats should be substitutable. For example, dissonance theory predicts that, if you do something at variance with your existing attitudes (e. g. , telling a younger sibling to use condoms when you recently have not done so), you later will revise that attitude to remove that terrible feeling of hypocrisy and inconsistency. Tesser's approach, however, suggests that you also might feel better if you engage in self-affirmation (e. g. , reminding yourself of your important values and qualities) or social comparison (e. g. , outperforming a dormmate at billiards or on an exam).

In addition to influencing self-esteem, social comparisons can provide a person with information about the Self. Knowing how one performs relative to classmates provides some information about aptitude in that subject, for example. Scanning an opinion poll in a college newspaper may suggest that one shares the views of others (which, in turn, may enhance feelings that opinions are “correct”) or suggest that one is on the “lunatic fringe” of the college population. Beyond comparisons with these larger groups, people often select particular individuals with whom they compare themselves. As Suls, Martin, and Wheeler (2002) demonstrate, people rely upon individuals who possess similar backgrounds or aptitudes to predict their own abilities at ambiguous tasks. (If she can do it, so can I !). Possessing relatively accurate views of the Self can, in the long run, maintain self-esteem, insofar as the individual then can seek out situations that enhance self-esteem and avoid situations that threaten self-esteem. In some cases, then, “the person in the situation” actively played a role in selecting the situation itself.

Although people occasionally report the experience of “losing” the Self (e. g. , in a huge, emotional crowd; when intoxicated; when overwhelmed by the enormity of the universe) , the Self usually is salient to the individual person. People are attentive to their own appearance, their own past actions, and their own true intentions. Egocentrically, we believe that other people are similarly attentive to us: we believe that there is a spotlight upon us. (And, meanwhile, everyone else proceeds as though he or she is in the spotlight !) As Gilovich and Savitsky (1999) suggest, we believe that peers notice changes in our appearance from day to day, and that strangers notice embarrassing qualities such as an unusual T-shirt choice or facial blemish. They don ’ t, at least not to the extent that we expect !

Not all intentions are consciously recognized, of course. But the ones that are recognized at a conscious level may be executed with varying degrees of success: We plan to vote for a particular candidate, decline a party invitation to allocate time to writing a course paper, or resolve to lose weight or to quit smoking. Initiating difficult-to-execute intentions, and carrying them through to the completion, can be mentally and emotionally exhausting. After foregoing the party, one may have difficulty concentrating on one ’ s studies. People occasionally set forth intentions to change themselves, usually in ways that they think ultimately will provide desired outcomes. Unfortunately, as Polivy and Herman (2001) demonstrate, people often are unrealistic with respect to how quickly

change occurs, and become disappointed when change does not meet their expectations. Focusing again on their own intentions and desires, people are insensitive to the external factors that they cannot control.

Thus, the person in the situation is an active one: striving to maintain self-esteem, gathering information about the Self, interpreting how others see the Self, and endeavoring to change undesirable characteristics. Active, yes. Perfectly accurate, no. The person in the situation often is egocentric and can be ego-protective to boot. As you progress through other topics of social psychology—most of which focus strongly upon situational forces—try to keep the person in situation in mind.

[导读]

论自我防卫的可塑性

为保持积极的自尊或自我评价，人们通常有各种自我防卫行为。已有文献描述了自尊的不同调控机制，如减少认知失调、自我肯定和社会比较等。对这方面研究的评析表明，尽管这三种机制有很大差异，但是它们也可以彼此替代。例如，认知失调所产生的对自我的威胁会影响通过社会比较来维护自尊的尝试。这意味着上述机制都服务于维护自尊的同一目标，在这些用于维护自尊的过程之间有惊人的共性或灵活性，从而使得机制之间有可替换性，而一种机制能否替换另一种机制取决于情绪的迁移。此外，对于内容领域的可替换性问题也做了简要讨论。

On the Plasticity of Self-Defense

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Abstract

Many qualitatively different mechanisms for regulating self-esteem have been described in the literature. These include, for example, reduction of cognitive dissonance, self-affirmation, and social comparison. The work reviewed here demonstrates that despite their differences, these mechanisms may be substitutable for one another. For example, a threat to self via cognitive dissonance can affect attempts to maintain self-esteem via social comparison. This implies that these mechanisms are serving the same, unitary goal of maintaining self-esteem. Thus, there is surprising generality or flexibility in the processes used to maintain self-esteem. Substitution of one mechanism for another may depend on the transfer of affect. The issue of substitutability across domains is briefly discussed.

Keywords

cognitive dissonance; self-affirmation; self-defense; self-esteem; social comparison

Most psychologists have suggested that persons strive to have or maintain a positive self-evaluation, or positive self-esteem. Compared with other motives like self-consistency and self-accuracy, the self-enhancement motive appears to be particularly strong and robust (Sedikides, 1993).

One of the most intriguing aspects of self-evaluation is how it is maintained or defended. Self-defensive and self-augmenting behavior is ubiquitous and easy to observe. For example, Bob explains his good score on the biology test in terms of ability and hard work; he blames his poor score on the chemistry test on bad luck or difficulty of the test. Mary, after being outplayed by her best friend, seems to have lost her enthusiasm for tennis. John insists on talking about his "cousin who got super rich on technology stocks" or his "next-door neighbor who is very important in the state legislature". Self-serving beliefs about the self, flattering social comparisons, and basking in reflected glory are only some of the mechanisms for regulating self-esteem that have been studied. Indeed, the number and diversity of these mechanisms is so great that collectively they have been referred to as the "self-zoo". It is the diversity of these mechanisms that is the focus of this article.

The notion of defending "the self" implies that the self is unitary. However, the mechanisms to defend the self are diverse. The circumstances that call up a particular defense mechanism differ dramatically across mechanisms, and the specific behavioral resolutions that are presumed to restore or

increase self-esteem differ just as dramatically across mechanisms. Such qualitative differences raise questions about the unitary nature of the self.

To address these questions, my colleagues and I (Tesser, Martin, & Cornell, 1996) build on the early work of Lewin and his students Zeigarnik and Ovsiankina (Lewin, 1935). The maintenance of self-esteem can be construed as a goal. If different self-defense mechanisms are serving the same goal, then they should be substitutable for one another (Tesser, 2000). For example, if a dissonant, or inconsistent, behavior threatens self-esteem, then a positive social comparison should reduce the necessity for subsequent dissonance reduction. If, however, the need for consistency is serving an independent goal, then the opportunity for a positive social comparison should have little or no effect on the tendency to reduce cognitive dissonance. Our work (e. g. , Tesser & Cornell, 1991) favors the hypothesis that self-esteem is indeed a unitary goal, as we find remarkable substitutability among defense mechanisms.

THREE PROTOTYPICAL DEFENSE MECHANISMS

As noted, there is a self-zoo full of self-defense mechanisms. It is not practical to test all such mechanisms, nor is there a sampling frame from which one can select a few “representative” mechanisms. Therefore, for practicality, we chose three mechanisms to focus on in our work. To make the outcomes of the research relevant to large segments of the literature, we chose mechanisms that have enjoyed substantial research attention. Also, demonstrating substitutability among mechanisms that are quite similar to one another would make a less convincing case than demonstrating substitutability across mechanisms that appear to be qualitatively different from one another. Therefore, we chose mechanisms that are substantially different from one another.

The mechanisms whose substitutability we have explored are cognitive dissonance (e. g. , Aronson, 1969), social comparison (e. g. , Tesser, 1988), and self-affirmation (e. g. , Steele, 1988). These mechanisms differ substantially in their antecedents and consequences. A threat to self via cognitive dissonance is often aroused when an individual freely engages in a behavior that is inconsistent with one of his or her beliefs or attitudes. A typical way of resolving such a threat is to change the relevant attitude or belief in the direction of the behavior. This mechanism is intrapersonal and focused on inconsistency. A threat to self due to social comparison is often the result of being outperformed by another person with whom one compares oneself. Such a threat is inherently interpersonal and has little to do with inconsistency in the dissonance sense. These