



基督教文化丛书·卓新平 主编

# 从『神圣』到『努秘』

——鲁道夫·奥托的宗教现象学抉微

朱东华 著



〔德〕鲁道夫·奥托  
(Rudolf Otto, 1869-1937)

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## 总 序

基督教文化按其历史传承既是古代希伯来文化和希腊文化之结合,亦是西方文化发展演变的重要载体。这种文化形态已经成为人类文化的一种重要表述,代表着世界宗教文化中的一个重大体系,它在人类精神生活中有着深远的影响,并且对世界文明尤其是西方文明的进程起着举足轻重的作用。随着人类发展步入“全球化”阶段和各种文化相互激荡、相互渗透、相互融合,基督教以其“文化披戴”和“文化融入”而在世界各地广泛传播,同时适应着、吸纳着各种文化,体现出“本色化”和“处境化”的基本特点。以此为基础的基督教文化亦正形成其具有“开放性”、“包容性”的现代体系,而且已与华夏文化有着直接的关联。在这种情况下,我们认识了解基督教文化,展示、研



其形态或体系的今昔,对于我们跨越世纪和千纪遂有着独特意义,也是我们展开文化对话、参与人类现代文化共构的重要任务。

基督教文化涵盖极广、包罗万象,给人“横看成岭侧成峰,远近高低各不同”之感。这里所指的基督教乃包括天主教、东正教、基督新教这三大教派及其众多派系,而基督教文化的基本特性则体现为一种崇拜上帝和耶稣基督的宗教信仰体系,以及相关的精神价值和道德伦理观念。基督教文化作为这种体系乃形成了其独有的哲学思维方式、神学理论框架、语言表达形式、政治经济结构、社会法律制度、行为规范准则、文学艺术风格和传统风俗习惯等,并表现为受此信仰精神制约和灵性影响的群体及个人之生存选择、思想情趣、文化心态、审美之维和致知取向。在社会实践层面,基督教文化亦代表着以教会为核心的社会存在体制、组织机构及其各种社会政治、信仰崇拜和思想文化活动。基督教文化通过其漫长的发展而形成了“爱智”、“求知”、“重行”、“唯信”等特点,表露出“神秘”、“超越”、“浪漫”、“空灵”等意趣。其思维特色则是形象、意象和抽象的整合与共构,让人体悟到其博大、恢宏和玄奥。所以,其神秘性和超然性使基督教文化研究乃成为一种灵性世界中的探奥洞幽。另外,基督教文化也不断将各种文化因素包摄于内,随

之亦参与了对相关文化体系的重建和改革,因此已广泛渗透和融入到世界众多民族的信仰精神、思想认知、社会发展、政治体制、文化艺术、民情风俗之中。可以说,基督教文化乃表现出信仰与思辨的统一、文化与宗教的互渗、理论与实践的并重、“形上”与“形下”的结合。其复杂性和多样性给我们提供了万花筒般的景观。

为了系统、全面和深入地了解基督教文化,我们组织编写了这套基督教文化丛书。丛书作者多为基督教文化各研究领域的专家和近年来初露头角的后起之秀,其论题涉及到基督教文化中的思想、文学、绘画、雕塑、建筑、音乐、教育、经典、文物、节日、风俗等方面,而且体现出其文化史勾勒与现状研究的有机结合。这套丛书旨在展示基督教文化蕴涵的美感、魅力和神韵,再现其灵性、灵气和灵修对世界文化发展的启迪及感染。因此,丛书各卷将突出其知识性、客观性和可读性,以准确的描述、新颖的构思和优美的文笔而力图达到图文并茂、雅俗共赏、深入浅出之效果。这套丛书得以问世,离不开许多热心朋友的关心和帮助,尤其与宗教文化出版社的大力支持密不可分。了解基督教文化,是我们在当前“开放性”社会中认识世界与自我的一种历史使命,亦是促进不同信仰、不同民族传统之人们相互沟通和理解的一项文化事业。

在这一事业向前发展的进程中,我们期望并欢迎广大读者朋友们的更多关注和积极参与。



从「神圣」到「努秘」

卓新平

2000年4月5日于望京德君斋

## 序

鲁道夫·奥托是 20 世纪上半叶德国著名的基督教神学家和宗教学家。他于 1869 年 9 月 25 日出生在德国下萨克森的派纳(汉诺威)。1888 年 5 月就读于埃尔兰根大学新教神学系,在该系保守派神学家的指导下开始其神学生涯,但不久就转学到格廷根大学自由派神学风行的新教神学系。并于 1898 年以路德论圣灵的论文获得博士学位,随之因成功试讲康德的宗教概念而获得教学系统神学史和相关联的宗教史及宗教哲学的职位。1906 年,奥托在格廷根大学由讲师升为副教授。1915 年,他获得布雷斯劳大学系统神学教授席位,随后自 1917 年任教于有“德国宗教学的麦加”之称的马尔堡大学。在任教期间,奥托先后游历了印度、中国、日本、斯里兰卡,以及北非和近东地区。这些经历使他获得认知世界宗教的广远视域,并深受印度教等东方宗教的影响。而且,他还基于其搜集到的各种宗教制品而在马尔堡建立了一个宗教博物馆。





1924年,他曾出访美国,在奥伯林学院讲授东西方神秘主义。1926年,他又在瑞典乌普萨拉大学教授印度宗教和基督教课程。奥托于1929年3月退休,1937年3月6日在马尔堡去世。其主要著作包括《自然主义世界观与宗教世界观》(1904)、《康德-福瑞士派宗教哲学及其神学运用》(1909)、《神圣:论神圣观念中的非理性现象及其与理性的关系》(1917)、《东西方神秘主义》(1926)、《印度的神恩宗教与基督宗教》(1930)、《罪与原罪》(1932)、《超越世界的情感》(1932)、《上帝之国与人子》(1934)等。后人还编辑出版了其《伦理学文集》(1981)。

从上述简介中,我们可以看到,奥托的学术生涯及其研究著述乃反映了基督教神学与早期宗教学的密切关联和交织,以及宗教学的学科转型和独立发展。其实,西方宗教学的发展正表明了其从基督教神学的派生、嬗变和完全脱离之过程。宗教学的先驱施莱尔马赫本身也是近代著名的基督教神学家,其开创的“体验神学”或“情感神学”使近代西方基督教神学形成突出人之主体和心理因素的发展,并被奥托所继承和深化。这种神学强调人的“体验”和“情感”,且进而从“神圣的体验”来理解宗教的本质,以人的“情感”作为宗教存在的起点和信仰出现的场景,由此亦开始了从“神学”到“宗教学”的转型。奥托最具代表性的

著作是其 1917 年首次出版的《神圣》，这本书对于宗教学的发展亦具有里程碑意义。因此，它已几十次再版，并被译成多种文字发行，成为宗教学的必读之书和经典著作。

奥托在《神圣》中专门讨论了作为宗教核心范畴的“神圣”。他虽然承认这种“神圣”乃宗教信仰所特有的心理状态，将之描述为“对神既敬畏又向往的感情交织”，却与施莱尔马赫强调人之“绝对依赖感”的“主体情感论”或“心理主义”论明显不同。在奥托看来，“神圣”乃主、客体的共构，超然与内在的同存，因为“神圣”既涵括人“对神圣的体验”，亦表明“超自然的神圣”本体。这样，奥托就独辟蹊径，开创了对“神圣”的宗教学、尤其是宗教现象学和宗教哲学意义上的研究。

奥托这部代表著作的中译本由成穷、周邦宪译成，题为《论“神圣”——对神圣观念中的非理性因素及其与理性之关系的研究》，于 1995 年由四川人民出版社出版。必须承认，我国学术界近年来虽对奥托的思想有所评介，对其深入、系统的专题研究却颇为罕见。因此，朱东华博士的专著《从“神圣”到“努秘”》在当代中国学术界就显得格外醒目，引起了人们的关注。这部著作的独特之处，乃在于强调、突出奥托思想的核心观念“努秘”，由此而形成其对“努秘学”的研



究。在研究胡塞尔、海德格尔、舍勒等人对奥托论“神圣”之评论的基础上，朱东华博士着重于其对“努秘学”的现象学解读，从而与传统的神学—形而上学理解形成区别。其研究展示了对奥托“神圣”观之发展、变化的捕捉和分析，并特别关注《神圣》一书早期版本与1936年修订版的异同，以勾勒出奥托本人在认知上的深化，由此使奥托“努秘学”的现象学特征获得解析和说明。此外，朱东华博士亦指出，奥托的宗教现象学因其基督教思想理论的传承而仍具有神学—形而上学意义上的局限。

朱东华博士这部研究著作因其分析之深入和见解之独特而颇受中国宗教学术界的好评，其问世亦表明当代中国学界对奥托思想的研究取得了实质性进展。鉴于奥托的理论学说反映出宗教学在其早期发展阶段与基督教神学的内在联系、以及其相互促进和影响，我们仍可以对奥托及其思想加以基督教文化意义上的审视和评说。因此，衷心希望朱东华博士在这一比较研究领域能有更多的心得、取得更大的成就。

卓新平

2007年9月12日 于北京

## **Preface to Dr. Zhu Donghua's *From "Holy" to "Numinous"***

### **Rudolf Otto's Contributions to the Scientific, Historical, Phenomenological Study of Religion**

In a move to correct "reductive" (limiting, diminishing) assessments of religion as merely "childlike" and "in error" that were propounded 1) by advocates of the "social sciences" (anthropology, psychology, sociology), which were newly formed in the late 19<sup>th</sup> century, and 2) by socialists, Christian liberals of the late 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> centuries returned to an older question of how we know "more in life than meets the eye" (that which transcends), a question distinctly different from the mid-19th century question "what is (mere) religion?"<sup>①</sup> In so doing, they gave rise to a "science" of religion also known as "the history of religion" and "the phenomenology of religion". Taken together, the scientific, historical, phenomenological study of religion resulted from three

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① The question "what is (mere) religion?" is a 19<sup>th</sup> century question asked by social scientists and by socialists.



developmental steps in the western philosophical understanding of “phenomena”.<sup>①</sup>

As to the first step in the 18th century, G. W. F Hegel's (1770 – 1831) *Phenomenology of the Spirit* makes the claim that we can know *noumenon* (the thing-in-itself) by its appearances or manifestations here in the world to which Hegel gives the name “*phenomena*”. In short, for Hegel, that which transcends space and time (*noumenon*) can be known through study of it in space and time manifestations (*phenomena*).

The second step in the 19th century gave ontological status to phenomena as “facts” in the sense of “whatever can be observed”. The study of phenomena was understood to involve descriptions of “facts”, of what can be observed. One difficulty, however, was that when forerunners of today's disciplines of anthropology, psychology, and sociology went out to the world to observe and to describe the “facts” or phenomena of religion, they were not yet fully aware of their subjective involvement with what they sought to describe. For description of facts always involves some subjective involvement with the facts by the describer, no matter how “neutral” the describer attempts to be. It is always the case that the describer's past

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① I have drawn from Arvind Sharma's *To the Things in Themselves: Essays on the Discourse and Practice of the Phenomenology of Religion* (New York, NY: Walter de Gruyter, 2001), for these three steps, especially the first two steps. However, my description of the third step involving Edmund Husserl and his phenomenological reduction differs somewhat from that of Sharma's.

experience, the describer's present state of mind, the describer's general assumptions about the world, and the describer's long-term values, all *substantially influence* what one describes as "fact". Even one's choice of facts to be described involves subjective influence upon what is described. Hence, there is no absolutely "neutral" description. This is true for any empirical science.

The challenge of "controlling", or at least "limiting", subjective influence in description of any phenomena was addressed by the philosophical phenomenologist, Edmund Husserl (1859 – 1938), who, in the early 20th century, took a third step in understanding of phenomena. Husserl's project, begun in 1907, was to carve out a new way of doing philosophy, which he called the "phenomenological method", a way of doing philosophy, which he thought would provide foundation for all empirical science. In brief, Husserl endeavored to provide an account of the act of "pure knowing" in contrast to everyday "knowing" in which we bring past experience and assumptions into the act of knowing that "reduce" (limit, diminish) the act of knowing to mere personal opinion and judgment rather than maintain the act of knowing as an act of openness to something new. In contrast to this kind of "reductive" (limiting, diminishing) everyday knowing, Husserl proposed the "phenomenological reduction", a different kind of reduction from "reduction" meaning "limiting" or "diminishing". In Husserl's usage, the term "reduction" means "to lead back to," a meaning which is based upon the archaic use of Latin, *reducio*, "to lead



back to". For Husserl, the phenomenological reduction *leads back* to the pure act of knowing, enabling one to discern the formal structure of any act of knowing, not yet influenced by particulars of the perceiving subject. In this manner, employing the "phenomenological reduction", Husserl endeavored to provide a unified foundation for all empirical, scientific inquiry. His purpose was to make science more rigorous and exact.

Husserl's phenomenological reduction (leading back to the pure act of knowing) involves two moves that go together: *epoche* and *eidetic* vision. Each of these moves comes from classical Greek philosophy:

1) "suspension of judgment" (Greek *epoche* "to hold back") regarding what is true or false in empirical sensation, and 2) "essential intuition" or "eidetic vision" (Greek *eidos* means "to see") of an "essence" or "universal form" in contrast with empirical sensation.

Borrowing these two Greek terms, Husserl gave them some new meaning. For Husserl, "suspension of judgment" (*epoche*) refers to the practice of suspending (holding back) all common-sense beliefs about the world that we have. In other words, we suspend or "bracket" all of our everyday knowledge of the world including our judgment that there are "objects out there" in the world. It is important to note that suspension here does not mean "denial". Rather, suspension (*epoche*) means "to put aside" so that one's conscious awareness is "led back to" (*reducio*) "pure

consciousness" or "pure knowing." This first move in phenomenological reduction is known as the "transcendental reduction", in the sense that, having suspended all common sense knowledge of an "objective world", we are "led back to" "transcendental consciousness" or "pure consciousness" itself.

The second move of phenomenological reduction is "eidetic vision", which in Husserl's usage refers to "seeing" or having access to the invariant structures of transcendental or pure consciousness itself which are present in every act of knowing. Taken together these two moves constitute the phenomenological reduction which "leads back to, restores" pure consciousness or pure knowing itself. Importantly, in Husserl's discernment, the phenomenological reduction is a kind of "meditative" act.

It was Rudolf Otto (1869 – 1937) who brought Husserl's philosophical phenomenological method to the new science of religion (history of religion, phenomenology of religion), giving this new science of religion a unified theoretical foundation. A German theologian and historian of religions, Otto traveled to Asia for empirical investigation of non-Christian religions, particularly those of India. A follower of Martin Luther, influenced by Kant, Schleiermacher, and his investigations abroad, Otto argued for a fourth formal category of the human mind (in addition to Kant's three categories of pure reason, practical reason, and aesthetic judgment), a category of mind which forms and shapes religious experience as different from any other kind of human experience. As





a formal category of the mind, Otto considered the category of the “numinous” or “holy” to be natural and universal to all human beings. What distinctively marks the category of the “numinous” or “holy” experience is its two simultaneous, opposing aspects: 1) fear – filled awe (*mysterium tremendum*) and 2) immense attraction (*mysterium fascinans*).<sup>①</sup> Combining both aspects at one and the same time, numinous experience, in Otto’s discernment, is not able to be fully expressed in rational, logical terms. Nonetheless, numinous experience does become rational to some extent in, what Otto called “ideograms”, that is, in metaphors, concepts, and doctrines that direct attention toward and provide partial expression of that which is given in numinous experience. Because numinous experience, in Otto’s discernment, is natural and common to all human beings, numinous experience enables apparently quite different religious expressions to be brought into mutual connection. This is to say, numinous experience is a “point of contact” enabling diverse expressions of numinous experience to be brought into dialogue and compared for what is shared in common and what is different.

Otto’s phenomenological examination of “numinous experience”, presented in his now internationally renowned *The Idea of the Holy*, was extraordinarily successful beyond his

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① Rudolf Otto, *The Idea of the Holy* (1917), trans. by John W. Harvey, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1923).