# LETS BE NORMAL!

The Psychologist Comes To His Senses

FRITZ KÜNKEL



LET'S BE NORMAL!



8690752

## LET'S BE NORMAL!

The Psychologist Comes to His Senses

By FRITZ KÜNKEL, M.D.

TRANSLATED BY
ELEANORE JENSEN





IVES WASHBURN - - PUBLISHER NEW YORK MCMXLVI



T8690752

试读结束: 需要全本请在线购买: www.ertongbook

#### TRANSLATOR'S NOTE

One of the difficulties presented in the translation of almost any German thinker who gives us either a new point of view, or a new way of looking at ideas discussed by older philosophers, is the word combination possible in German and impossible in English.

Dr. Künkel has built this book carefully. To have simplified in the translation in order to avoid the problem presented by a few of the German words used, would have meant not only to have done Dr. Künkel injustice in deducting from the totality, but to have given credence to the superstition that all Americans want their literature put through a chopper so that they need no mental sharpness to cut through.

There are not more than half a dozen expressions in the text which need mention, and while we are sure that they are understandable without further definition, we wish to attach to them our interpretation of their meaning to avoid possibility of ambiguity.

Dressur (training) is the German noun meaning training or breaking in, and is commonly applied to animals. Dr. Künkel coined a new word, Dressat, signifying the means used for the training.

One trains a dog. That is the Dressur. One trains

by limiting or directing activity. That is the Dressat.

A child tries to climb a tree and falls. Depending on several factors explained in the text, he will either try to climb again, or he will give up further attempt. If he is too discouraged by the fall, he sets up the *Dressat* (training formula), "I must not climb trees." The *Dressur* (training) is to avoid climbing trees.

A child has heard another telling stories. He runs home to mother and tells one he has made up. He is ridiculed. The training formula set up is, "I must not make up stories." The training pattern is an unimaginative child.

It is to be remembered, of course, that training formula and training pattern are merely descriptive terms of something which takes place unconsciously and that the above are schematic examples.

Finalität in German means literally finality or end. The dictionary definition for finality is: (1) The state or quality of being final. (2) A final, conclusive or decisive act. Dr. Künkel coined the word Infinale (translated, infinal) to mean that which is not conclusive or is not an end in itself. The verb finalisieren (translated, finalize) means to set a goal for a certain procedure or activity. Umfinalisieren (translated, refinalize) means to replace the objective purpose or goal of the same procedure or activity by an egocentric one.

A child eats to satisfy his hunger. He has hunger because the body announces its need for nourishment. The body needs nourishment to continue living. The life in the child's body permits him to grow. This growth develops his capacities. The capacities serve not only him but mankind. Mankind, in turn, as an organization, fosters these various processes.

Now the child discovers that when he does not eat, his mother pays much more attention to him. The original objective purpose of eating is replaced by the egocentric goal to secure his mother's attention. This refinalization breaks the infinal chain of purposes, or what Dr. Künkel calls the "pyramid" of purposes. The simple example was a series of infinal purposes. Each process was the means to an end, and each end, in turn, became the means to a higher end.

Beziehungsperson (translated, contact person).

The advertising business has produced a man known as the contact man. It is he who establishes contact between his employers and the customers. He is the medium for the connection between those close to him and the outside world.

Every mother is forced for a time to be the contact person for her child. If she educates her child correctly, she spreads the child's exclusive interest in her to others and loosens the bonds sufficiently to enable the child to become independent and objective. Those children who are neurotic cling to the contact person (whether mother, father, nurse, and later, husband or wife) who stands between him and life. Everything

#### TRANSLATOR'S NOTE

coming from the outside must come through this contact person, and the neurotic expresses himself with the assistance of or through this contact person. The contact person has to bear responsibility, make decisions, and act as a refuge for the neurotic.

#### PREFACE

The terms "character" and "characterology" have other meanings in this book than they usually possess. The book concerns itself neither with a system of character traits nor with a system of character types, and still less with speculation on the intelligible character. It attempts to make understandable the interrelationships and development of all forms of human behavior.

The empirical character can be as little detached from bodily processes in human beings as it can from psychic events. The term "character" fuses the antinomy, "body and soul," into an organic unity. This unity is a form of singularly stylistic cast. On the one hand, general, stylistic laws are set up for the different forms of character (as one might speak of laws of Gothic or baroque art). On the other hand, each individual represents a unique and unrepeatable being, with his own fate (like the Strassburg Münster or St. Peter's Church in Rome).

What is to be understood by the word "character" becomes clear only in the course of the discussion. The definition of the conception "character" does not belong at the beginning, but at the end of the book. It should be noted, though, that character should not be thought of as something innate and

inalienable combined with a substance, but as a totality of qualities determined by laws and therefore scientifically explorable. This totality of qualities adheres to a substance, namely, a human being, and is acquired by him, operates, and disappears when he dies. On this account characterology appears here as the doctrine of changes in the psychophysical formation of the human being.

Nonic characterology has developed from the individual psychology of Alfred Adler. It owes its philosophical orientation to the transcendentalism of Immanuel Kant, and has repeatedly deepened and clarified itself in the wisdom of Christianity. It acquired its concrete form by practical work with human beings in need, and must find its verification or correction in this practical work.

This book concerns itself chiefly with the problems of everyday life, with psychotherapy, pedagogy, public welfare, and above all, with the tremendous task which confronts mankind today: the self-education of the individual.

FRITZ KÜNKEL, M.D.

#### INTRODUCTION

#### THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

#### I. Human Character

It is not difficult to acquire knowledge of human character; all that is necessary is the experience of a long life. Many who study human character, either professionally or as a hobby, become quite good judges of human nature in the course of years. Teachers, physicians, clergymen, political and economic leaders accomplish as much as they do less by their professional knowledge than by their knowl-

edge of mankind.

We all need an understanding of human nature as much as we need our daily bread. But we cannot wait until the wisdom of old age brings it to us. And for some not even a long life suffices to obtain the necessary experience. The question arises repeatedly whether it is not possible to make this knowledge accessible by study to those who seek it. An understanding of human nature should be teachable. There should be a scientific characterology in which the legendary or imaginary insights of all keen observers of human nature (the so-called prescientific insights) would be united to an unprejudiced and provable system of conceptions and conclusions.

Science would have produced such a characterology a long time ago if it had not stumbled upon an obstacle to the solution of this problem which it could not surmount. It is the difficulty of the standpoint resulting from the following consideration: a child is not in a position to judge the experiences of an adult; an unmusical person cannot quite understand the effects of music; a person incapable of love, the effects of love; and an unbeliever, the effects of belief.

A true science must be accessible to everyone who studies long and hard enough to acquire knowledge of it. That means the logical construction of universally valid observations which we have a right to demand from every science. It is nonsense to expect, however, that characterology can make maturity understandable to the immature.

The premise for characterology is not a scientific mental training which is possible to every healthy human being, but something quite different: the clarification of one's own character. So long as one lacks this experience, all study and all intelligence are useless. It is not a matter of a science founded upon general reason, but a system of insights, or a "wisdom" based upon the individual personality, which extends as far as the inner clarification of this personality.

This becomes clear as soon as it is a question of understanding the events and connections described in the following pages under the motto, "Clarification." The person who has never made, nor even come close to making, this experience will deny it. If he sees the process of clarification being consummated in others, he will establish theories to interpret it as sickness or self-deception so that he can classify it according to his own store of experiences. Since it lies beyond his experience, he will not be able to understand it, and still less to learn from it.

We shall find two different conceptions of human life according to the interpretation of "clarification." We shall find that these two conceptions correspond to two different degrees of maturity of the human character. Human character, as presented in this book, will be understandable only to those who have experienced clarification or been close to it. The others will be the object of our investigations, but they will not be able to apply the results to themselves or their fellow human beings.

The description of the difference between the clarified and the unclarified human being, and the study of the process of clarification form the essential scope of characterology.

### II. The Scientific, or Causal, Viewpoint

The person who believes clarification the essential event in human life, knows that the way to it leads through suffering and that all who want to escape suffering miss clarification. He sees development as a curve which sinks, almost touches bottom, and

rises again. The person who does not know clarification has the ideal of an even development. It is the classic ideal: the way of the fit leads to Olympus, without suffering or crisis. That is why the philosophy of antiquity teaches how to evade suffering, or how to combat it when it comes.

The goal of such a development is the "perfect human being." It does not matter whether it is thought of as a determined, natural goal, which raises all people to its own height (like a platonic idea, or an Aristotelian entelechy), or whether one imagines it an indetermined progress forced from below to above by natural drives (somewhat as in neo-Darwinism). In any case, development is regarded as the effect of energies previously present; i. e., precisely taken, the future is definitely settled at the very beginning.

This makes the empiric fact of free will an unsolvable problem. It also discloses the mechanistic tendency of all these views of life. The world were then nothing but a machine; perhaps an infinitely complicated, but still generally calculable machine. And that is why it would then be the task of science to reveal the secrets of life. It is clear, though, that the object of a science can only be something which is determined by basic premises and the law of cause and effect. Science recognizes not only no creation, but not even individual, creative acts, neither in finite, mortal life, nor in the totality of the living. It recognizes nothing as new; it recognizes only a new

grouping of old parts. But that means: it recognizes only what is dead.

The ideal of science is physics, which tries to refer all events to a last unified something which it calls energy. Everyone who wants to make human beings the objects of such a natural scientific (causal) method of observation, premises tacitly that all being is, in the last analysis, a mechanism, that is to say, dead; he stamps the human being as something dead before he begins to explore him.

The most ingenious presentation of a human soul on this mechanistic basis is the system of psychoanalysis created by Sigmund Freud. But just this teaching shows distinctly the weak spot which all such systems must have: it does not recognize the conception of responsibility. The individual is no longer the doer of his deeds; he is the battlefield on which the drives which live in him fight for supremacy. What is done is not what the human being wills, but what the drive strongest at the moment drives him to do. His drives are formed by his inherited physical organism and childhood influences. If he has any luck, he has a harmonious drive system, and if he is unlucky, he is ruined by the conflicts of his drives. Under such a system it is difficult to see just how the healthy person is any better than the criminal or the sick individual. No one is responsible for a destiny brought about by drives.

It makes a tremendous difference whether one says, "Hunger seeks its satisfaction in the intake of nour-

ishment," or, "The hungry human being seeks his satisfaction in the intake of nourishment." In the first case, any apple thief can say, "It was not I; my hunger stole the apple." The reader must not be offended at the childishness of this example. The man who is more familiar with modern psychology and its application in the courts knows that judgment is passed frequently on a basis which may be briefly expressed as follows: the defendant did not commit the criminal act; his affects did it; or if it was not his affects, it was alcohol; or if it was not alcohol, it was his grandparents who transmitted to him that sort of blood and that kind of brain; in any event, it was not he.

Science must furnish constantly new explanations to avoid the concept of responsibility. What one is responsible for cannot be explained by causes. A man who can explain his conduct by causes (which are not himself) is not responsible for his conduct. The causes forced him to act thus. All that is causally explainable must, of necessity, take place as it actually occurs. It could not be changed because there was no cause to change—if there had been cause to change, it would have been changed. In the realm of science there is neither freedom nor responsibility, and for that reason, precisely taken, there is no life.

The man who concedes that what is more important in our circle of experiences, namely, human conduct, cannot be the object of science because its