

LNCS 3193

Pierangela Samarati
Peter Ryan
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Refik Molva (Eds.)

Computer Security – ESORICS 2004

9th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security
Sophia Antipolis, France, September 2004
Proceedings

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Computer Security – ESORICS 2004

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on Research in Computer Security
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Proceedings

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Library of Congress Control Number: 2004111116

CR Subject Classification (1998): E.3, D.4.5, C.2.0, H.2.0, K.6.5, K.4.4

ISSN 0302-9743

ISBN 3-540-22987-6 Springer Berlin Heidelberg New York

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Printed in Germany

Typesetting: Camera-ready by author, data conversion by Olgun Computergrafik

Printed on acid-free paper SPIN: 11315414 06/3142 5 4 3 2 1 0

Commenced Publication in 1973

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Preface

Foreword from the Program Chairs

These proceedings contain the papers selected for presentation at the 9th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security (ESORICS), held during September 13–15, 2004 in Sophia Antipolis, France.

In response to the call for papers 159 papers were submitted to the conference. These papers were evaluated on the basis of their significance, novelty, and technical quality. Each paper was reviewed by at least three members of the program committee. The program committee meeting was held electronically; there was an intensive discussion over a period of two weeks. Of the papers submitted, 27 were selected for presentation at the conference, giving an acceptance rate lower than 17%. The conference program also included an invited talk.

A workshop like this does not just happen; it depends on the volunteer efforts of a host of individuals. There is a long list of people who volunteered their time and energy to put together the workshop and who deserve special thanks. Thanks to all the members of the program committee, and the external reviewers, for all their hard work in the paper evaluation. Due to the large number of submissions the program committee members were really required to work hard in a short time frame, and we are very thankful to them for the commitment they showed with their active participation in the electronic discussion. We are also very grateful to all those people whose work ensured a smooth organization process: Refik Molva, who served as the General Chair, Marc Dacier, the Sponsoring Chair, Yves Roudier, who served as the Publicity Chair and maintained the Web pages, Sabrina de Capitani di Vimercati, who helped in the review process, Dieter Gollmann, who served as the Publication Chair and collated this volume, and Anne Duflos and Laurence Grammare for helping with the local arrangements.

Last, but certainly not least, our thanks go to all the authors who submitted papers and all the attendees. We hope you find the program stimulating.

Peter Ryan and Pierangela Samarati
(Program Co-chairs)

Foreword from the General Chair

Initially established as the European conference in research on computer security, ESORICS has reached the status of a main international event gathering researchers from all over the world. Taking place in a different European country every other year during its first seven occurrences, it has been a yearly conference since 2003.

ESORICS 2004 was organized by the Institut EURECOM and took place in Sophia Antipolis, France, September 13–15, 2004.

The organization of such an important event required a major effort and we wish to express our sincere appreciation to the organization committee members for their excellent work.

We would like to express our special appreciation to the Program Chairs Pierangela Samarati and Peter Ryan for coming up with a high-quality technical program that was the result of a complex evaluation process they handled very smoothly.

We are also indebted to the Institut EURECOM who not only allowed us and other organization committee members to dedicate considerable time and energy to the organization of this event, but also provided logistic and financial support to host it.

Sophia Antipolis, September 2004

Refik Molva

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Incorporating Dynamic Constraints in the Flexible Authorization Framework

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Abstract. Constraints are an integral part of access control policies. Depending upon their time of enforcement, they are categorized as static or dynamic; static constraints are enforced during the policy compilation time, and the dynamic constraints are enforced during run time. While there are several logic-based access control policy frameworks, they have a limited power in expressing and enforcing constraints (especially the dynamic constraints). We propose dynFAF, a constraint logic programming based approach for expressing and enforcing constraints. To make it more concrete, we present our approach as an extension to the *flexible authorization framework (FAF)* of Jajodia et al. [17]. We show that dynFAF satisfies standard safety and liveness properties of a safety conscious software system.

1 Introduction

Constraints are a powerful mechanism for specifying high-level organizational policies [21]. Accordingly, most access control policies contain constraints, usually categorized as static or dynamic, referring to their time of enforcement by the access controller. As examples, consider the following two constraints: *an undergraduate student should not be permitted to grade qualifying examinations at the PhD level*, and *an author should not be allowed to review his/her own manuscript*. The first constraint can be enforced by prohibiting *grading* permissions on PhD examinations for every undergraduate student, thereby making it statically enforceable. The second constraint requires an access controller to evaluate if the requesting subject is also an author of the document to be reviewed when the request is made. This constraint cannot be evaluated prior to the request, making the constraint dynamically, but not statically, enforceable. Enforcing the latter kind of constraints over access permissions expressed as Horn clauses is the subject matter of this paper.

The past decade has seen several logic based *flexible* access control policy specification frameworks. Woo and Lam [25] propose the use of *default logic* for representing access control policies. To overcome the problems of undecidability and non-implementability that arise in Woo and Lam's approach, Jajodia et al. [17] propose an access control policy specification framework (FAF) based on a restricted class of logic programs, viz., those that are *locally stratifiable*.

Bertino et al.’s framework [6] uses *C-Datalog* to express various access control policies [6]. Barker and Stuckey use *constraint logic programming* for multi-policy specification and implementation [4].

Although they are powerful in expressing access control policies, these frameworks have a limited power in specifying and enforcing constraints. For instance, Jajodia et al. [17] use an integrity rule (a logic rule with an `error()` head) to specify constraints. Barker and Stuckey [4] define some special consistency checking rules (with head of predicates *inconsistent_ssd*, *inconsistent_dsd*) to encode the separation of duty constraints. However, the enforcement of the constraints is left outside the framework; as a result, dynamic constraints cannot be enforced in the access control engine properly.

To overcome these drawbacks, we propose a constraint logic programming based approach to express and enforce dynamic constraints. To make it more concrete, we present our approach as an extension to *Flexible Authorization Framework (FAF)* proposed by Jajodia et al. [17]. Our approach is applicable to other logic based access control frameworks because our constraint specification and enforcement modules are built on top of the existing framework modules. The proposed extension, called *dynFAF*, has two extra modules. First module, the *integrity constraint specification and derivation module (ISM)*, is responsible for specifying the atomic conflicts and deriving all possible complex conflicts in the system that represent the constraints. The second module, the *dynamic access grant module (DAM)*, is responsible for enforcing the constraints specified by ISM dynamically. In addition, DAM allows subjects to *relinquish* permissions that were granted to them. In our design, FAF composes the *static* component, and ISM and DAM compose the *dynamic* component of dynFAF.

We show that dynFAF satisfies safety and liveness properties granting any access that does not violate derivable constraint, and denying those that do. Because FAF policies are stratified logic programs, they have a stable model semantics [14]. Our constraint specification policies taken together with FAF policies also have a local stratification, thereby admitting a stable model that extends the former. In addition, proposed dynamic access grant module enriches the syntax of the former by having yet another layer of constrained logic programs, that taken as a whole extends the former local stratification. Therefore, a dynFAF specification admits a well-founded model in which some predicate may result in an *undefined* truth in addition to the usual *true* or *false* values; however, our design ensures that any access requested of dynFAF returns only *true* or *false*.

The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 contains a brief overview of FAF, followed by a description of its limitations. Section 3 presents the architecture of dynFAF, including the descriptions of ISM and DAM modules. Section 4 presents the semantics of dynFAF syntax. Section 5 shows that dynFAF satisfies the traditional safety and liveness properties, and that the semantics of the granting and relinquishing access rights are enforced properly. Section 6 compares our work to those of others. Section 7 concludes the paper.




Fig. 1. dynFAF Architecture

2 Overview of FAF

FAF [17] is a logic-based framework to specify authorizations in the form of rules, based on four stages (each stage corresponds to a module) that are applied in a sequence, as shown in FAF Architecture part of Figure 1. In the first stage of the sequence, some basic facts such as authorization subject and object hierarchies (for example directory structures) and a set of authorizations along with rules to derive additional authorizations are given. The intent of this stage is to specify basic authorizations and use structural properties to derive new authorizations. Hence, they are called *specification and propagation policies*. Although propagation policies are flexible and expressive, they may result in *over-specification* resulting in conflicting authorizations. FAF uses *conflict resolution policies* to weed out these in the second stage. At the third stage, *decision policies* are applied in order to ensure the completeness of authorizations. The last stage consists of checking for integrity constraints, where all authorizations that violate integrity constraints will be denied. In addition, FAF ensures that every access request is either granted or rejected, thereby providing a built-in completeness property.

FAF syntax consists of terms that are built from constants and variables (no function symbols) and they belong to four sorts, viz., subjects, objects, actions, and roles. We use the capital letters with subscripts such as X_s, Y_o, X_a , and X_r to denote the respective variables belonging to them, and lower case letters such as s, a, o , and r for constants. FAF has the following predicates:

1. A ternary predicate **cando**(s, o, a), representing grantable or deniable requests (depending on the sign associated with the action) where s, o , and a are subject, object, and signed action terms, respectively.
2. A ternary predicate **dercando**(s, o, a), with the same arguments as **cando**. The predicate **dercando** represents authorizations derived by the system using inference rules modus ponens plus rule of stratified negation [2].
3. A ternary predicate **do**, with the same arguments as **cando**, representing the access control decisions made by FAF.
4. A 4-ary predicate **done**(s, o, a, t), meaning subject s has executed action a on object o at time t , t is a natural number.
5. Two binary predicate symbols **over_{AS}** and **over_{AO}**, each taking two subject and object terms as arguments two object terms respectively.

6. A predicate symbol without argument, **error**, symbolizing violation of an integrity constraint, where a rule with an **error** head must not have a satisfiable body.
7. Other terms and predicates necessary to model specific applications. For example, constants AOH, ASH denote object and subject hierarchies with **in**, where **in**(x, y, H) denotes that $x \leq y$ in hierarchy H . For example, we denote the fact that **usr\local** is below **usr** in the object hierarchy AOH by **in**(**usr\local**, **usr**, AOH).

Because any FAF specification is a locally stratified logic program, it has a unique stable model [14], and a well-founded model (as in Gelfond and Lifshitz). In addition, the well-founded model coincides with the unique stable model [3, 17]. Furthermore, the unique stable model can be computed in quadratic time data complexity [24]. See [17] for details.

2.1 Limitations of FAF

In its current design, FAF has these limitations. First, FAF expresses constraints using integrity rules of the kind **error**() $\leftarrow L_i, \dots, L_n$ where **error** is an argument-less predicate that should not be valid in any model and L_i, \dots, L_n are other literals. Ensuring that granted permissions do not imply **error** is enforced outside of the logical machinery of FAF. Accordingly, it is not within the logical inference engine of FAF to avoid constraint violations. To elaborate further, FAF evaluates an access request as a query **?do**(s, o, a), and ensures the completeness and consistency of the specification, consisting of the rules from the first three modules, by ensuring that one and only one of **do**($s, o, +a$) or **do**($s, o, -a$) evaluates to *true*. However, it is possible that both ($s, o, +a$) and ($s, o, -a$) could be rejected by the integrity enforcement module making the eventual outcomes incomplete, as the inference rules are unaware of rejections by the integrity enforcement module. Thus, the integrity enforcement needs to be brought inside the reasoning engine, as done in dynFAF.

Second, FAF does not allow constraint derivation, although this occurs in practice. For example, role based access control (RBAC) models have conflicting roles (say, r_1 and r_2) where a single subject assuming them simultaneously violate the policy. In addition, an application may want to declare junior roles of conflicting roles to be conflicting. That is, if roles r_3, r_4 are junior to roles r_1 and r_2 , respectively, by satisfying the constraints $r_3 \leq r_1$ and $r_4 \leq r_2$, then no subject should be allowed to assume r_3 and r_4 simultaneously. Our extension facilitates constraint derivation.

Third, in FAF each access request is either granted or denied on its own merit. But some applications may want *controlled (don't care) nondeterminism*. For example, a subject is allowed to assume role r_1 or role r_2 , but not both, with no preference for either. If we are to accept a unique stable model, then either r_1 or r_2 , but not both can be assumed by the subject. dynFAF facilitates controlled nondeterminism in granting permissions.

Finally, and importantly, FAF does not consider an evolving access control system. That is, if $\text{do}(o, s, +a)$ is in the stable model of an authorization specification, the access request (o, s, a) is always permitted. In practice, an authorization may be relinquished by the user or the administrator some time after it is authorized (e.g., in workflow management systems). Consequently, some authorization that is not allowed at a point of time because of constraints restriction may be allowed later if the conflicting authorizations are relinquished. Notice that inserting a negative authorization $\text{cando}(o, s, -a)$ does not model this situation. The soon to be described *dynamic access grant module* of dynFAF provides this functionality.

3 dynFAF: A Constraint Logic Programming Based Extension to FAF

To address the problems described in the previous section, FAF is enhanced by adding an *integrity constraint specification and derivation module* (ISM) and a *dynamic access grant module* (DAM), grants accesses that avoid those conflicts. FAF enhanced with these two modules are referred to as *dynFAF*, shown in Figure 1. An access request for (s, o, a) is modeled in dynFAF as a predicate instance $\text{request}(s, o, \pm a, t)$, where $(s, o, +a, t)$ is a request to obtain permission for (s, o, a) at time t (equals to a query $\text{?grant}(s, o, a, t)$) and $(s, o, -a, t)$ is a request to relinquish already existing permission for (s, o, a) at time t (equals to a query $\text{?relinquish}(s, o, a, t)$). dynFAF ensures that any request for permission is statically granted by FAF, and granting it does not violate any constraints specified by ISM.

3.1 Integrity Constraint Specification and Derivation Module (ISM)

ISM uses two predicates:

- A binary predicate symbol, **conflict**, where $\text{conflict}(x, y)$ is an atomic conflict where x and y can be either (subject, object, action) triples or object, action, or subject terms.
- A binary predicate symbol **derConflict**. **derConflict** has the same arguments as **conflict**. $\text{derConflict}(x, y)$ is true iff x, y constitute a derivable conflict.

We use Horn clause rules to specify atomic conflicts and derivable conflicts based on already defined atomic conflicts. The corresponding rules are called *conflict rules* and *conflict derivation rules*, respectively. Each conflict rule has a **conflict** predicate as its head and some **cando**, **dercando**, **done** or **rel**-literals as its body.