

A CONSTITUTION
FOR
PAKISTAN

BY
HERBERT FELDMAN

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CHAPTER I.

THE INTERIM CONSTITUTION OF PAKISTAN.

The creation of Pakistan was one of the immediate and direct consequences of the transfer of power, in British India, from Great Britain to the people of the sub-continent. The intention to transfer was first announced on 20 February, 1947 and again confirmed in a statement made by His Majesty's Government on 8 June in the same year. This historic and, in some respects, unprecedented event was the inevitable consequence of certain factors from a consideration of which it was even then possible to predict impending independence. These factors comprised firstly the just aspirations of the people themselves manifested in the prolonged efforts of many leaders and many organisations, notably the Indian National Congress and the Muslim League. Secondly, the visit to India in 1942 of the late Sir Stafford Cripps, at that time a member of Sir Winston Churchill's War Cabinet, followed in 1946, by the Cabinet Mission, had opened the door to a settlement of the question of Indian independence which could never be closed. Thirdly, the ever-increasing representation of Indians in the All-India services, as well as in the Armed Forces, clearly indicated the approaching predominance of Indians in those services, thereby creating a situation in which Indians would, in fact if not in name, have been ruling their own country.

The process of what was called "Indianisation" had started many years before the transfer of power, and even if the speed of that process, as well as the system of appointment to high-level posts, did not satisfy the people of India, there could be no doubt as to the direction of the process or its ultimate consequences. As far back as 1818, when Lord Hastings was Governor-General in Calcutta, he wrote of the time when England would wish to relinquish domination assumed over India,¹ and others coming after him expressed themselves in similar language, notable Thomas Munro, Charles Metcalfe, and Henry Lawrence². The first Indian member of the Indian Civil Service was appointed in 1864 and three more Indians were similarly appointed in 1871³. By 1943, there were more

¹Private Journal of the Marquess of Hastings, London, 1858, ii, p. 326.

²See, e.g., Gleig, *Life of Sir Thomas Munro*, pp. 269-285, passim.

³Sir Edward Blunt, K.C.I.E., O.B.E., *The Indian Civil Service*, Faber and Faber Ltd., London, 1937, p. 50.

Indian members of the Indian Civil Service than there were British¹ and out of 608 officers of the Indian Police, 186 were Indian.² As far back as 1920 Lord Sinha was appointed Governor of the Province of Bihar and Orissa³, and in 1917 Indians became eligible for the King's Commission and places were reserved for them in the Royal Military College at Sandhurst. Immediately prior to, and during World War II, Indians came to occupy, in ever-increasing numbers, places of the highest importance including the majority of the seats on the Viceroy's Executive Council; and the Indianisation of the commissioned ranks in the Armed Services was hastened to give to Indians complete predominance there. From the point of view of administration, therefore, the problem of transferring power had already been more or less solved, and experience since the partition has justified this view both in Pakistan and in India.

Nevertheless, there remained a difficulty in spite of the evident willingness of the British Government to relinquish its power in the sub-continent and in spite of the clamant desire of the people to be liberated from foreign rule. This difficulty arose from the intense difference of attitude between the Indian National Congress on the one hand and the All-India Muslim League on the other. The latter organisation had, for various reasons, come to represent organised Muslim political opinion on a very large scale, and if the Muslim League did not include within its ranks every prominent and politically active Muslim in the sub-continent, it did eventually come to speak for the greater part of Indian Muslim opinion.

The history of this great division within the ranks of the population of the sub-continent need not be recounted here, but it is necessary to notice that in 1940, at its session at Lahore, the Muslim League adopted a resolution to the effect that in its considered view, no constitutional plan would be acceptable to Muslims unless designed on the basic principle of demarcating Muslim majority areas in such a way as to constitute them autonomous and sovereign. What the Muslim League wanted in effect was the creation of an independent homeland for the Muslims of India.

The Indian National Congress, and the Hindu community as a whole, along with some Muslims (notably Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, a prominent Congressman and at present a Minister of the Indian Cabinet) were utterly opposed to the proposal to divide the

¹Sir Reginald Coupland, *Report on the Constitutional Problem in India*, Oxford University Press, 1943, Part I, p. 82.

²*Ibid.*

³*Ibid.*, p. 83.

sub-continent, and in 1942, the Indian National Congress, passed a resolution rejecting any scheme which would, as the resolution phrased it, involve the disintegration of India. Furthermore in June, 1942, Mr. Gandhi, in an article published in his periodical, *Harijan*, stated that when the British were ready to relinquish their power in the sub-continent, the Indian National Congress would, in his own words, "take delivery". Such was the gauntlet which the Muslim League, in the person of its President, Mr. Jinnah, was not slow to pick up and in this way a situation already sufficiently embittered was rendered a good deal more corrosive.

The British attitude, as stated more than once by Mr. Amery when he was Secretary of State for India in the wartime Government of Sir Winston Churchill, was that until the people of India composed their own communal and internal differences, far-reaching constitutional reform of any sort was impossible. Although the point was not without substance, as the horrors which accompanied the partition of 1947 were later to show, it was over-worked, and the British Government was criticised with some reason for adopting the attitude of sitting back in a spirit of negation¹. The criticism is mitigated when it is remembered that the Second World War was raging at the time; but, be that as it may, the attitude could not be continued indefinitely; and in 1942, Sir Stafford Cripps began discussions with the Indian leaders with the object of satisfying them, as far as possible, as to the sincerity of British intentions. Sir Stafford Cripps was not successful, but his mission proved to be the commencement of a series of discussions which culminated in Lord Mountbatten's negotiations leading to independence and the creation of two new Dominions.

In 1946, the Cabinet Mission, led by Lord Pethick-Lawrence, proposed that a Constituent Assembly for the whole of India should be set up. The Mission had rejected the idea of a partition, at least until the lapse of a sufficient period of time in which experience of their own proposals could be gained. At the same time, the necessity for safeguards for minority communities had been accepted. The Muslim League ultimately declined to participate in these proposals and the announcement of His Majesty's Government dated 3 June, 1947 stated in paragraph 4 that, while it was not intended to interrupt the work of the existing Constituent Assembly (that is, the Constituent Assembly which had come into being as a result of the Cabinet Mission's proposals) it was nevertheless clear that any constitution framed by that Assembly could

¹The situation at that time is well summarised in *Report on the Constitutional Problem in India*, op. cit. Part II, *passim*.

not apply to those parts of the country unwilling to accept it. Subsequent paragraphs of the announcement provided methods by which certain parts of the sub-continent could decide whether to join the existing Constituent Assembly or not. As is known, the decision of the Muslim-majority areas was to stay out and to form a new and separate Constituent Assembly for Pakistan, the creation of which had been agreed to among the Indian leaders. This Constituent Assembly was created by a system of indirect election from the Muslim membership of the provincial Legislatures affected by the partition proposal^{1(a)}.

The transfer of power and the creation of two independent Dominions was legally implemented, by a Statute of the British Parliament known as the Indian Independence Act, 1947² of which section 8 provided that, until such time as the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan had framed a constitution for the country, Pakistan would be governed in accordance with the Government of India Act, 1935 or as nearly as might be authorised by the new Government of Pakistan. To meet the changed circumstances created by independence, the Government of India Act, 1935 was, at the outset, made the subject of considerable revision by an Ordinance issued by the Governor-General of undivided India, at the request of the Pakistan leaders³. In order, therefore, to understand the basis of Pakistan's interim constitution, it is necessary to know something of the Government of India Act, 1935 and what it was intended originally to do.

This Act was the direct outcome of the Round Table Conferences between the British Government and Indian leaders, the first of which was held in 1930. At that time Mahatma Gandhi and the Indian National Congress were conducting an active campaign against the Government, and the Congress leaders were not present at the first session. At the second session, Mr. Gandhi, as well as Mr. Jinnah, was at the Conference and Mr. Gandhi put forward the Congress view of what constituted the proper basis for settlement of the constitutional problem, with particular reference to the question of communal differences which were agitating the country. His proposals followed in the main the lines of a report produced by a Committee, made up of representatives from the several religious communities of India, which met in 1928 under the chairmanship of the late Pandit Motilal Nehru, father of the present Indian

^{1(a)} See Mohd. Ashraf, *Cabinet Mission and After*, Lahore, 1946, p. 39 *et seq.*

² 10 and 11, Geo., VI., Ch. 30.

³ The Pakistan (Provisional Constitution) Order, 1947, Governor-General's Ordinance No. 22 of 1947.

Prime Minister. This session of the Round Table Conference failed to produce any solution to the communal problem and it was during this eventful time that Mr. Jinnah, according to a speech made by him in 1938 at the Muslim University Union, became convinced that the motives of the Hindu leaders were selfish and inspired by communal feelings and that safeguards for the Muslims of the sub-continent were indispensable.¹

The intention of the Act, according to the then Secretary of State for India, when addressing the House of Commons on 6 February, 1935, was to enable India to take her place among the fully self-governing members of the British Commonwealth and to provide a method by which the removal of communal differences might be achieved.²

The effect of the Act was to abolish dyarchy in the Provinces and to provide India with a revised constitution and a measure of democratic self-government on a franchise which, according to the rules made under the Act, amounted to about fourteen per cent of the population. The reservations and safeguards were such as to make it impossible to assert that India had achieved a full measure of self-government; nevertheless it was evident that the Act gave ample power to ministers elected by popular, if limited, vote, whereby they could extract responsibility by making those powers reserved by the British, for all practical purposes, futile and impracticable.³ In the House of Lords, when the Bill was discussed, it was observed by the Marquess of Salisbury that, if the Bill were passed there would be no retreat⁴, meaning that the Bill established such a measure of self-government as could never be withdrawn at any time afterwards.

The Act comprised fourteen parts, divided into 321 sections to which were added ten schedules. It has been described as one of the greatest constitutional measures ever to be passed by the British Government⁵ and certainly, whatever adverse criticism there was to be made, no one could reasonably suggest that adequate energy and attention had not been devoted to its drafting. For its preparation, a powerful committee was set up, under the

¹Jamiluddin Ahmed, *Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah*, Sh. Mohd. Ashraf, Lahore, 5th. Edition, 1952, p. 43.

²Hansard, H. of C. ccxcvii, 1172-4.

³C. L. Anand, *The Government of India Act, 1935*, The University Book Agency, Lahore, 2nd. Edition, 1944, Introduction, p. xix.

⁴Parliamentary Debates, Indian Affairs, 1934-45. House of Lords, Column 315.

⁵*The Government of India Act, 1935*, op. cit. p. viii.

chairmanship of Lord Linlithgow, afterwards appointed Viceroy of India, to "consider the future government of India". This committee continued in session for eighteen months almost without interruption. It held 159 meetings and examined 120 witnesses who included in their number 28 leading Indian public men. The Secretary of State for India, Sir Samuel Hoare (afterwards created Lord Templewood) was examined by the Committee for nineteen days and answered more than seven thousand questions.

The result was to produce a constitution of which the most distinctive feature was the change from a unitary to a federal system of government. However, it was provided that that part of the new constitution which related to the establishment of the Federation could not come into effect until there was a consensus of view on the subject among the principal Indian political parties. This consensus was never obtained: on the contrary, the ultimate result of communal and party difference was a partition of the sub-continent; and so this part of the Act did not come into operation, although it is now effective with respect to Pakistan which is, for the present at all events, a Federation under this Act.

It is not and cannot be suggested that the Act contains all that would be required in a constitution drafted for an independent country, and this is only one of the reasons which make it necessary for Pakistan to write a constitution for itself. However, within its two limits, the Government of India Act of 1935 was a comprehensive and thorough piece of legislation as is well shown by the fact that the Constitution of the Republic of India, is conceived, especially as regards administrative matters, within a similar framework.

This, then, is the statute which with amendments provides Pakistan with the constitution by which it has been governed since its creation. The statute is adequate but limited and, in its present form, was scarcely intended to endure for as much as eight years.

The Indian Independence Act of 1947, the second element in Pakistan's interim constitution, provided that until a new constitution was written and adopted, each Constituent Assembly should make laws for its own Dominion. Hence, on 14 August, 1947, the day appointed for the transfer of power, the government of Pakistan, as well as the drafting of its future constitution, became the responsibility of the Constituent Assembly, set up for these purposes in accordance with the Indian Independence Act.

The Pakistan Constituent Assembly met for the first time on Sunday, 10 August, 1947, when Mr. Jogendra Nath Mandal was

elected temporary Chairman¹. On the following day, Quaid-i-Azam Mohamed Ali Jinnah, already Governor-General of Pakistan, was unanimously elected President. Replying to the speeches of felicitation made by several members of the House, the President took the opportunity to say: "The Constituent Assembly has got two main functions to perform. The first is the very onerous and responsible task of framing our future constitution of Pakistan and the second of functioning as a full and complete sovereign body as the Federal Legislature of Pakistan.... I would like to emphasise.... that you are now a sovereign, legislative body and you have got all the powers²."

The first point to be noticed is that in Mr. Jinnah's view, the primary task which awaited the Constituent Assembly was to frame a constitution and the second to function as a Federal Legislature. The next point to be observed is that Mr. Jinnah united in himself the offices of Governor-General and the President of the Constituent Assembly, a remarkable situation terminating only with his death in September of the following year.

This is a convenient point at which to consider the very special place which Mr. Jinnah occupied in Pakistan of which independent Dominion he was, as is well known, the founder. Such was the ascendancy conferred upon him by the extraordinary position which he occupied in the hearts and minds of his followers that, in the words of the Chief Justice of Pakistan, a practice grew up, after Mr. Jinnah's death, "of citing his alleged oral sayings as authority for a particular proposition"³. These alleged oral sayings may not be, and doubtless are not, authority which any court of law can or will accept, but for the historian, Mr. Jinnah's speeches and silences must be of the utmost interest.

He was not only an able statesman and shrewd politician; he was also an eminent lawyer who had practised at the Bar in Bombay, where he had competed successfully with legal talents of the first rank. He was equipped with a sharp clarity of thought and there is not the least reason to suppose that he ever confused in his own mind the situation of the statesman and the thinking of the lawyer. What his views were as to certain legal aspects of his duties as Governor-General and as President of the Constituent Assembly are not recorded since, during his lifetime, problems relative to

¹This gentleman represented what are known as the Scheduled Castes, usually referred to in ordinary parlance as "untouchables".

²Constituent Assembly of Pakistan, Debates, Vol. 1, No. 2, p. 18.

³Federation of Pakistan v. Maulvi Tamizuddin Khan, P.L.D. 1955, Federal Court, p. 300.

them did not arise. But it can be asserted, with some degree of confidence, that Mr. Jinnah was fully aware, as precisely as it is possible for a man of his unusual abilities to be, of his constitutional position in Pakistan and, when he reminded the Constituent Assembly that it was a sovereign body "with all the powers", it seems certain that he spoke as President of that body, not as Governor-General and certainly not as its legal adviser.

Equally, as Governor-General, there appears to have been no confusion as to the correct position so far as he was concerned. In a speech made on 14 February, 1948, at the Sibi Durbar¹ he said: "I may here draw your attention that as a matter of fact, the present constitution—the Indian Independence Act and adaptations of the Government of India Act, 1935, make the position of the Governor-General and his responsibilities clear". He then goes on to refer to the existing constitutional provisions regarding what is called a Chief Commissioner's Province and the exercise by the Governor-General of his discretion as regards the administration of such a province.²

Later, in the same year, on 14 June, when he was addressing the officers of the Staff College at Quetta, Mr. Jinnah said: "I should like you to study the constitution which is in force in Pakistan at present and understand its constitutional and legal implications when you say that you will be faithful to the Constitution of Pakistan....If you have time enough, you should study the Government of India Act, as adapted for use in Pakistan, which is our present Constitution", and he goes on to add, "the executive authority flows from the Head of the Government of Pakistan who is the Governor-General".

Thus far, the constitutional position in Pakistan at the time of its creation was not difficult to understand. The constitution of the country was, temporarily, to be found in the Indian Independence Act of 1947 and the Government of India Act, as adapted. A Constituent Assembly had been brought into existence one of whose two tasks was to provide Pakistan with a constitution in a form that the nation desired. On this subject also, Mr. Jinnah had something to say when addressing the Sibi Durbar. He then observed: "The Constituent Assembly may take some time to accomplish its task of framing the final constitution of our State. It is a stupendous task and it may take eighteen months or two years before it can come into full operation".

¹A "durbar" is a function of a political nature at which a ruler or leader meets those owing allegiance or a duty to him or to the country he represents.

²Unless noted otherwise, extracts from Mr. Jinnah's speeches are taken from a volume of his speeches made after partition and up to the time of his death, printed for the Government of Pakistan in 1948 by the Sind Steam Press.

CHAPTER II.

OBSTACLES TO CONSTITUTION-MAKING.

No one would have disagreed with Mr. Jinnah when he said that to write a constitution is a stupendous task and it remains stupendous even in the most favourable circumstances. As we are about to see, circumstances in Pakistan were not, and are not, among the most favourable.

The difficulties likely to be encountered by any nation faced with the problem of providing itself with a constitution suggest themselves. Assuming that the constitution is intended to accommodate as many points of view as possible and that it will not be imposed by a dictator or by a dictatorial oligarchy, there will be conflicts of ideology and matters of conscience. There will almost certainly be conflicts of interest and sometimes linguistic or ethnic difficulties. The study of a few constitutions now existing in various parts of the world would not fail to reveal the diverse nature and scope of the problems likely to arise.

In the exercise of its advisory jurisdiction, the Federal Court of Pakistan, the supreme judicial tribunal of the country, took the trouble to examine the periods of time taken by some other states in the preparation of their own constitutions. No less than twenty examples were considered and, among them the drafting of the present constitution of the Indian Republic took the longest time, namely two years and ten months. The shortest period (ignoring the first effort at writing a constitution for the Commonwealth of Australia, called "the Sydney Convention") seems to have been taken by Belgium which, in 1830, prepared its constitution, after breaking away from Holland, in three months. A fair average among the rest seems to be in the order of one year.

Pakistan has exceeded every one of these by so great a measure of time that the Chief Justice of Pakistan was moved to say: "There is however one obvious *lacuna* in the Indian Independence Act which is otherwise a masterpiece of draftsmanship—it contains no express provision as to what was to happen if the Constituent Assembly did not or was unable to make a constitution or resigned *en bloc* or converted itself into a perpetual legislature"¹. It may

¹Maulvi Tamizuddin Khan's Case, p. 280.

also be suggested that no one foresaw, or could have foreseen, as Mr. Jinnah's words at Sibi indicate, that year after year would pass without any constitution being produced.

The history of events will show that there were several difficulties in the way of writing a constitution, and it may be doubted whether the Constituent Assembly, as it was devised, turned out to be as efficient or as disinterested an instrument as was expected and hoped.⁶ Perhaps, however, the most intractable obstacles have arisen from two circumstances which call for special consideration. The first is that the country is divided into two parts separated by a distance of a thousand miles at their nearest points. The second is involved in the difference of view as to the place which Islam should occupy in the constitution.

So far as concerns the Constituent Assembly itself, it was formed by means of indirect election from the Provincial Legislatures of those Provinces which formed Pakistan and, in the case of Punjab and Bengal which were partitioned between Pakistan and India, the Muslim membership of the pre-partition Legislative Assemblies of these two Provinces. The method was that devised by the Cabinet Mission in its proposals for the formation of a Constituent Assembly for an undivided India, published in May 1946, so that it cannot be said that Pakistan was the only begetter of the Assembly that came into being. However, the result of adopting the Cabinet Mission's method was to provide Pakistan with a Constituent Assembly of seventy members whose business was not only to draft a constitution but to legislate for a nation of seventy-five million people. As we have already seen, there was no provision for appeal to the country and even casual vacancies were filled by nomination^{1(a)}.

The personnel of the Constituent Assembly comprised an overwhelming Muslim League majority and an opposition made up of representatives of the substantial Hindu community of East Bengal who, as members of the Legislature of the former undivided Bengal, were members of the Indian National Congress. By its very nature, this opposition was compelled to act as much with circumspection as with vigour, especially during those times when relations between India and Pakistan were unduly strained. At the same time, it is but fair to add that in Assembly proceedings the opposition has been given its due share in the work of the Assembly. The Muslim League membership did in fact constitute an oligarchy which, probably because the incorruptible and

^{1(a)} See motion adopted by the Pakistan Constituent Assembly on 31 March, 1950.

skilful hand of Mr. Jinnah was prematurely removed, underwent the deterioration which is the inevitable consequence of power too long enjoyed and liable to no challenge. No doubt, the membership of the Constituent Assembly included many who laboured hard both in the cause of independence and a homeland for the Muslims of the sub-continent, but they proved unable to solve the problem of the constitution.

In certain cases, it can hardly be doubted that the apparently indefinite prolongation of the life of the Constituent Assembly was a welcome matter by reason of the influence membership conferred and the advantageous prospects offered. The behaviour of some of the members was no better than that of the money-changers in the temple, but as the first Constituent Assembly has been dissolved nothing useful is likely to be gained in pursuing here this unhappy aspect.

There remain to be considered those two important circumstances which have so greatly complicated the constitutional problem, and in order to understand how they have exerted so much influence upon the history of Pakistan, it is first necessary to know the salient facts concerning them.

The western wing of Pakistan has an area of 310,236 square miles and a population of approximately 33,779,000 persons, giving a density of 109 persons to the square mile. In fact, the density varies considerably, being as much as 259 persons to the square mile in West Punjab and as little as 8.8 persons to the square mile in the vast and arid tracts of Baluchistan. East Pakistan has an area of 54,501 square miles and a population of 42,063,000 giving a density of 777 persons to the square mile, but in some parts, the density of the population rises to as much as 1,200 persons to the square mile. It is also a point of some political significance that Pakistan's Hindu population is mainly concentrated in East Pakistan and amounts to about 10,000,000 or one-fourth of the total population of the eastern wing.

West Pakistan has a dry climate with a wide range of temperatures. Its people depend for their existence and livelihood on a huge irrigation system. In this area, foodgrains, cotton, sugar-cane, and market garden produce are grown along with wool and hides. West Pakistan's most valuable cash crop is cotton forming about 3-1/2 per cent of the world's total production. East Pakistan, which comprises the Province of East Bengal only, has an entirely different climate which is rainy and tropical.

A network of rivers provides the most convenient means of transport of the important jute and tea crops of this wing.^{1(b)}

These points of difference tend, among other things, to create an economic disequilibrium which is accentuated by the difference in the adjacent Indian territory in each instance. West Pakistan, for the most part, borders on the Indian desert and it is only in the Punjab that there is room for mutual trade and economic activity. Even then, the Indian Punjab is not by any means the most important area in India for the purposes of trade and industry. The Indian territory adjacent to East Pakistan, on the other hand, includes Calcutta, one of the biggest and most important cities in the world. The wealth of Calcutta exerts a magnetism which sometimes attracts eyes in East Pakistan. The peculiar nature of these border conditions has created a situation which could not be ignored and Pakistan has been compelled to adopt measures to overcome the difficulties it imposes². It has been necessary to distinguish between imports of foreign manufactured goods intended for East Pakistan and those intended for West Pakistan and the free flow of such goods between the two wings has been the subject of restriction. Although it is lawful in Pakistan to possess and own unwrought or unmanufactured gold, it has been unlawful, since 22 September, 1954 to transport such gold from West to East Pakistan except with the permission of the State Bank of Pakistan. Eventually the Customs Authorities in Karachi introduced such measures of control on air-cargo from West to East Pakistan that a general complaint was made by the public and the Ministry of Finance cancelled the orders made by the Collector of Customs.

To all of these differences there must be added one more, namely, that of language. In East Pakistan, the language most commonly used is Bengali; in West Pakistan, while most people know Urdu more or less, they speak Pushto, Punjabi, Sindhi, Gujerati, Baluchi, and Urdu according to district and community.

It is not difficult to understand that, unless there exists a great and inviolable spirit of homogeneity and national patriotism which over-rides local ties and sentiments, these geographical circumstances are likely to create problems of a profound and far-reaching character. As we shall see later, the indications are that this spirit

^{1(b)} Data taken from privately circulated Explanatory Memorandum on the Budget 1955-56 and Economic Survey for 1954 prepared by the Ministry of Finance, Government of Pakistan.

²See *Dawn*, Karachi, 13 May, 1955.

has until now been neither sufficiently widespread nor sufficiently strong. In a statement made in Dacca as late as 22 July, 1955, a prominent East Bengal politician accused some of his East Bengal rivals of not possessing a true conception of Pakistan¹. The difficulties implicit in such a division of the country were realised at a very early stage and, during the negotiations conducted by Lord Mountbatten, Mr. Jinnah demanded a corridor, some eight hundred miles in length, to connect East and West Pakistan. This demand, as might be expected, was not agreed to but it sounded many an alarm in Delhi and elsewhere during May, 1947.²

Pakistan had not long been in existence when east-west problems began to reveal themselves. Broadcasting from Dacca on 28 March, 1948, Mr. Jinnah said: "I am sure you must realise that in a newly-formed State like Pakistan.... cohesion and solidarity among its citizens.... is essential for its progress, nay, for its very survival.... That is why I want you to be on your guard against this poison of provincialism that our enemies wish to inject into our State". The suggestion here was that opponents and ill-wishers of Pakistan were seeking to create disruption by exploiting such differences and incompatibilities as might exist between the east and west wings of the country, and thereby break up the new Dominion.

Most political leaders of the country, following Mr. Jinnah's example, have tried, in their public utterances, to create a sentiment of brotherhood and confidence among the peoples of East and West Pakistan, but it is less certain that all of those leaders have observed the same rectitude in their private dealings, whether political or other. In more practical respects, fairly determined efforts have been made to promote the unity which is an indispensable condition to Pakistan's progress. Financial provision has been reserved in the national Budget for the promotion of activities such as will bring the two wings of the country together in spirit and in outlook. The national airline of Pakistan carries passengers to and from each wing at fares which are said to be uneconomic, but which have been reduced as much as possible in order to encourage inter-wing travel and activity. The authorities have gone to considerable pains to ensure that because the seat of the Central Government is at Karachi, the east wing shall not suffer in matters of finance and trade, and special import arrangements have been devised to make it certain that mere considerations of

¹ *The Times of Karachi*, Karachi, 23 July, 1955.

² See Alan Campbell Johnson, *Mission with Mountbatten*, Robert Hale, London, 1951, pp. 94-6.