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
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A HISTORY OF Western Philosophy


W. T. Jones POMONA COLLEGE



HARCOURT, BRACE AND COMPANY

New York

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Preface

The reader who has just taken this volume in hand will think it a poor joke for the author to begin by apologizing for its brevity. But long as this book is, the history of Western philosophy is still longer. This being so, every writer on the subject is faced at the outset with a very simple but very critical alternative: either he can say *something*, but unfortunately it will be very little, about *everyone* who philosophized, or he must limit himself to trying to give a relatively consecutive account of a selected number of representative thinkers, omitting any discussion, however brief, of many second- and third-flight philosophers. It seems to me clear that the second alternative is preferable. First, there are a number of works of an encyclopedic kind already available, and I see no good reason for adding to their number. Second, while such works are useful for reference by those already acquainted with the history of philosophy, they are likely to be unintelligible to the beginning student. I still recall my own bewilderment as an undergraduate when I sought to understand a complicated theory that had been "boiled down" by some expositor to a compact but indigestible summary. Further, such abbreviated accounts of philosophical thinking are not only unintelligible; they are, I believe, dangerous. I am assuming, of course, that real knowledge consists in *understanding*, not merely in recognizing. The trouble with a short condensation of a complex theory is that it substitutes recognition for understanding. It is easy, of course, to learn to identify philosophers' names and to make suitable responses on hearing the signal "Plato" or the signal "Aristotle." For the purposes of dinner-table conversation the best procedure is perhaps to memorize a summary, to classify Plato as an "idealist," Aristotle as a "realist," and Marx as a "materialist," and to pass on to greener fields and pastures new. But if we want to understand the views in question, we must dig into the writings of the philosophers themselves.

The first "principle" underlying the composition of this *History* is, then, the principle of concentration. It rests on the thesis that it is better to understand a few theories than to recognize a great many. But concentration implies, as I have already said, selectivity, and I can hardly hope that even those who accept the principle of concentration will approve all of my selections. About the great figures of the remote past there will, probably, be no difference. Everyone will surely agree that here Plato and Aristotle are the masters who stand head and shoulders above all others. And perhaps there will be general agreement that Augustine and Thomas occupy corresponding positions in the Middle Ages—that Augustine demands more attention than, say, Boethius, and Thomas than Duns Scotus. But when we come to the modern period, how are we to choose? Here time has

not yet done the pruning for us; we have to try to anticipate its judgment. To some extent, I must confess, I have simply avoided the issue by dealing with more philosophers in the modern period. The result is that Part Three, which is devoted to the period from the sixteenth century to the present, about equals in length the treatments of the Classical and medieval periods together. This apportionment of space conforms, I think, to the practice of most teachers of the history of philosophy, who usually devote the second semester of a two-semester course to the modern period.

But even with the greater size, selectivity has still been necessary in the modern period, since I determined that here as in the earlier periods I would not mention a philosopher unless I could deal with his views in some detail. Thus, to cite an example, the reader will look in vain for an account of Giordano Bruno; his name does not appear in the Index. On the other hand, I have given a much more extended exposition of Galileo's views than is usual in histories of philosophy. I do not deny, of course, that Bruno is an extremely interesting thinker whose views are typical of one aspect of the Renaissance, nor do I deny that every "educated" man ought to know something about his opinions. But it is impossible, even in a book of this size, to deal with everyone; to me it seems incontestable that Galileo's work is far more important in the development of the modern mind, and sufficiently difficult to require a fairly extended treatment if it is to be intelligible to the scientifically untrained modern reader. Again, in the chapters on the nineteenth century, I have repressed a natural desire at least to mention Fichte and Schelling, in order to have the space to give a fairly detailed, and I hope comprehensible, analysis of Schopenhauer. All three of these thinkers represent a common type of reaction to Kantianism, and while they differ in many ways it is better, I believe, to concentrate on understanding a single example of a fairly common type of view than to attempt to give a complete enumeration. As I have said, I do not expect that this procedure will please everyone; I am simply trying to explain what I have done, and why.

So far I have mentioned only the principles of concentration and selectivity. Another thesis underlying the writing of this volume is the generally recognized but seldom adopted principle that philosophers are not disembodied spirits. Some histories of philosophy are written as if the theories discussed were isolated from everything except other philosophical theories. This arid atmosphere is not the proper home of philosophy. Almost without exception the great philosophers have been concerned with what we may call—from the perspective of two thousand years—"local" problems. We cannot hope to understand their theories unless we see them as expressions—doubtless at a highly conceptualized level—of the same currents of thought and feeling which were moving the poets and the statesmen, the theologians and the playwrights, the painters and the sculptors, as well as the average citizens who were their contemporaries. Otherwise, how would their philosophies ever have "caught on"? These philosophers furnished satisfactory answers only because they knew what questions were exercising their contemporaries—only because they were harassed by the same doubts. This means that if we pass over the total cultural milieu in

which a given philosophy emerges, we do so at the risk of making it seem a timeless (and so meaningless and inconsequent) affair.

In carrying out this principle I have begun my account of Greek philosophy by describing the state of affairs in Athens at the end of the Peloponnesian War, and I have drawn on the plays of Euripides and Aristophanes to illustrate the mood of the times. This, I believe, is a necessary setting for Plato, because his central thesis—the theory of forms—can hardly be understood except as an attempt to answer the scepticism and cynicism of his age. So, too, it is impossible to see the point of his attack on “democracy” in the *Republic* without understanding how democracy had operated in Athens during the Peloponnesian War. Plato’s philosophical absolutism—his insistence on the existence of “absolute” standards for conduct and for knowledge—is understandable only in terms of the social, economic, and political chaos and the moral and religious collapse of the end of the fifth century.

In the same way I have prefaced my analysis of medieval philosophy with an account of the dissolving Roman Empire and have tried to indicate the rich and diversified cultural background out of which Christian philosophy developed. And in discussing the theories of Augustine and Thomas I have tried to keep in mind how the particular tone of each of these philosophical points of view is an expression of the temper of its own age—how Augustine expressed the eschatological fervor of a new sect fighting for its life; how Thomas embodied the serenity of an imperial and universal religion whose piety had been softened by its new sense of responsibility for “that which is Caesar’s.”

Similarly, in connection with the development of the modern mind, I have tried to show the many factors—exploration and discovery, the rise of the money power, Humanism, the Reformation, and above all the new scientific method—that combined to overthrow the medieval synthesis and created new problems which philosophy even today is struggling to resolve. In this volume, in a word, the history of philosophy has been conceived as a part of the general history of culture—an important part but still only a part, and hence intelligible only in its cultural context. This is the third principle underlying the writing of this book.

The fourth is the conviction that a great philosopher, like a great poet, has his own unique idiom and that we lose something, often without any corresponding gain in intelligibility, when we try to paraphrase his views in our own idiom. Accordingly, the reader will find that this book stands halfway between a textbook and a source book, and that it tries to combine the advantages of both. Nothing takes the place in philosophy—or in any other discipline, for that matter—of a direct, patient, and painstaking study of a great text. Only thus, by personal contact, can we come to appreciate and understand a great and subtle mind. But a source book alone has serious limitations. Its selections are apt to be discontinuous and are sometimes too difficult for the average reader to follow. The advantage of a text is that it can make the way easier. It can explicate obscure passages; it can point out comparisons; it can bring the perspective of centuries to bear on difficult

problems; it can show the continuity of thought and culture. Yet explication and interpretation are only aids; they are no substitutes for the documents themselves. Hence what I have tried to do here is first to set out a philosopher's thought in his own words by a careful selection of key passages, and then to bind these together by a connective tissue of comment and criticism. Some philosophers, of course, lend themselves more readily than do others to this type of exposition, and I have allowed the quality of a given thinker's writing as well as the importance of his doctrine to determine the degree to which he speaks for himself in these pages. Plato is more readable than Thomas; hence the proportion of quotations in the Plato chapters is higher than in the Aquinas chapters. A few philosophers are so difficult or so verbose that paraphrase and condensation have been indispensable. This is true, for instance, of Hegel. But even with Hegel I have quoted a few representative passages—one from his logic and another from his social philosophy—which I hope will give the flavor of his mind as well as the obscurity of his manner.

To give an account of the history of philosophy in its cultural context was a formidable and perhaps presumptuous undertaking for a single individual. I am very conscious of the fact that the result would be far more imperfect but for the help I have received from a wide variety of sources. One of the many things for which I have to thank my publishers is the selection of an excellent corps of friendly but severe readers for the manuscript. The first draft of the manuscript was read by Professor I. M. Copi of the University of Michigan, Professor Morris Lazerowitz of Smith College, and Mr. Harold Geisse. In addition, Part One was read by Professor Robert Calhoun of Yale University, and Part Two by Professor Richard McKeon of the University of Chicago and the late Professor Ralph Blake of Brown University. I am most grateful to these gentlemen for the care they devoted to commenting on the manuscript. They have certainly saved me from many errors of fact and interpretation; for those that remain I must be responsible, and I shall be obliged if those that come to notice are pointed out to me.

I am obliged to the many publishers and copyright holders (their names appear on another page) whose co-operation has made it possible for me to use the quotations incorporated in this volume. Since I have followed the style of the various writers and translators I have quoted, the reader will find some variation in spelling, capitalization, and punctuation. When a quotation seemed long or unusually difficult, I have occasionally inserted headings. Full Bibliographical Notes, identified by letters rather than numbers, appear at the end of the book.

I am very grateful to the Board of Fellows of Claremont College for grants, over a number of years, for secretarial assistance. The secretarial work on the manuscript has been done by a variety of hands, but I am chiefly indebted to three good friends: Mrs. Cecily Hall and Mrs. Frances Drake, who did most of the typing, and Mrs. Janet Allen, who has sacrificed many of her own activities to help me through the ordeal of proof-reading and indexing.

W. T. J.

Claremont, California

INTRODUCTION

Philosophy and the History of Philosophy

No one—certainly no one who has lived through the past few years—can grow up to maturity without being disturbed by puzzles of an essentially philosophic kind. War is a radical contradiction of what most of us believe—we kill in order, somehow, to reassert the inviolable sanctity of human life; we see men suffer endlessly and apparently in vain; force seems everywhere triumphant and, confronted with the terrible reality of power, right and justice grow dim and disappear. Who can fail, faced with the agony and meaninglessness of war, to question the meaning of existence? Since it is unlikely that anyone can altogether avoid thinking about these matters, it is not unreasonable to propose that one try to think clearly rather than confusedly about them. This is, perhaps, all the defense that a study of philosophy requires.

A philosophy of life is simply a set of propositions that attempts to provide answers to such questions as these—the “big” questions about the ultimate value and meaning of life. But this is obviously too subjective a definition of philosophy: what provides *me* with a satisfactory answer may not satisfy *you*. It might be tempting to go to the other extreme and say that the function of philosophy is to provide “the” answers, i.e., the true, the real answers, to all these questions. The trouble with this definition of philosophy is that, even if there is an ultimate truth, nobody is likely to find it or, having found it, to be able to formulate it in neat and tidy propositions. We may, therefore, rule out ultimate truth as a criterion of philosophic achievement. But this does not mean that we must commit ourselves to the radical subjectivity of maintaining that all philosophies are equally good. Let us take what we may call “endurance,” instead of ultimacy, as a criterion; if a set of answers satisfies a large number of people for a relatively long time it is, so far, a good philosophy. Someone may reply that no philosophy has ever met this criterion; philosophers and their theories are seldom as well known as even minor movie stars or quarterbacks. But endurance must not be confused with popularity. Philosophical works, as Hume reported in his own case, more often than not “fall dead-born from the printing press.” Nevertheless, a philosophy can endure and provide satisfactory answers for millions of people who, it may be, have never heard the name of the author of these answers.

But endurance is obviously not the sole criterion for evaluating philosophic achievement. Answers which nobody would call philosophic—the superstitions of primitive re-

ligions, for instance—have endured for ages and satisfied millions of people. To be philosophic, answers must not merely satisfy; they must satisfy what we may call a critical intelligence. This second criterion eliminates answers which satisfy only because of our faith in their author. To be philosophic, an answer must be accepted not because it is eloquent or persuasive, but because it is reasoned.

What, then, is a reasoned set of beliefs? In the first place, surely, the beliefs must be mutually consistent. If the various answers given to the various "big" questions contradict each other, we certainly do not have a satisfactory philosophy. Such answers satisfy only if we wear mental blinders and concentrate only on each question and its answer in turn, meanwhile excluding all the others from our attention. It would be idle to deny that people show a surprising capacity for resting contentedly in contradiction; in this book we shall have to point out many instances of answers that break down because of inherent contradictions.

Nor will it do if the answers are merely consistent with each other. They must be consistent with what we may call the accumulated experience of the human race. It might be possible, for instance, to work out a set of answers which were mutually consistent but which assumed that murder, lying, and promise-breaking were justifiable moral conduct. Such a set of answers would not, under this criterion, be a good philosophy. We shall encounter numerous examples of this kind of failure, and we shall find, unfortunately, that it is not always easy to tell whether or not a set of answers denies the "accumulated experience of the race."

Another closely connected criterion for a good philosophy is what we may call integration. We may define this by distinguishing integration from consistency. Propositions are consistent if they do not contradict each other: thus we cannot think of a round square because it is a "contradiction in terms"; but there is nothing inconsistent in thinking at the same time about, say, a tennis racquet and a kitchen stove. Propositions which are sufficiently different, like the proposition "My tennis racquet needs restringing" and the proposition "Our kitchen stove has four burners" cannot be inconsistent; the fact is they are so different that it is difficult to see how they could ever be anything more than separate. Now, a good philosophy will not be merely a set of unrelated propositions, each completely independent of all the others. Such propositions might be free from contradiction and inconsistency, but until they are integrated into some sort of systematic structure, they do not constitute a good philosophy. A good philosophy must, in fact, be a system of integrated propositions—not necessarily a closely knit implicatory system like the propositions of Euclidean geometry, but perhaps interrelated as are the events in a novel, the characters in a play, or the organs in an animal body.

A philosophy, then, is adequate just to the degree that it provides satisfactory answers to all of the big questions. When, however, the conditions of life change radically, new problems emerge. What seemed a very big question to the feudal society of the Middle Ages may not be so important in modern industrial societies; on the other hand, we have

problems which medieval philosophy cannot answer because it never so much as dreamed of the conditions that gave rise to these problems. It follows that endurance is a relative matter and that a good philosophy in one period may not be at all satisfactory in another.

The fact that no philosophy has answered all the big questions once and for all means that there is always room for someone who wants to think things through again for himself. Indeed, thinking things through for oneself is the only way one ever really makes a philosophy one's own. There is no reason, therefore, when one has read Plato or Kant or Hegel, to close up shop and burn one's books.

On the other hand, it would be equally a mistake to suppose that one should begin anew for oneself—that everyone should work out his own “brand new” philosophy without reference to what the great philosophers of the past have done. The person who tries to start from scratch ignores the fact that we *are* our history. Whether we know it or whether we like it, we have our roots in our past. In a very real sense it makes us what we are, and we cannot possibly hope to understand ourselves without knowing something about the development of the Western mind and about the various forces which have affected its growth. If we want a really satisfactory answer for our own day—one that will have a chance of surviving more than a moment—we need to get a perspective on ourselves and our problems. The best antidote for that provincialism which infects a too narrow contemporaneous approach to philosophy (or to any other field) is a study of history.

Again, if we hope to achieve a satisfactory philosophy, we must be sure that we are considering—and doing justice to—all of the big problems. We may be certain that even if certain questions now out of fashion seem unimportant to us today, they will turn up later to destroy our theories. Here, too, the appeal must be made to history. We can lay down a rule to the effect that anything which seemed important to large numbers of sensitive people in the past must in some sense still be important. After all, we all have our blind spots. No one age, any more than a single individual, can equally master the whole complex range of human experience. The only way to compensate for such local limitations is by a sympathetic study and an intuitive reconstruction of the experiences of people quite different from ourselves. What they have found valuable and significant will supplement our own experience and enrich our understanding of ourselves.

Now, even the most cursory survey of the history of Western thought shows two—and only two—periods in which a really great philosophy, in the sense in which we have defined this term, was developed. These periods were the fourth century B.C., when Plato and Aristotle worked out views which on the whole satisfied the Classical world, and the thirteenth century A.D., when St. Thomas performed the same function for medieval man. The history of Greek thought before Plato and Aristotle is essentially a preparation for their work: it is an articulation of the problems to be solved, a sketch of the concepts to be employed in their solution. The history of Classical thought after Plato and Aristotle is a series of comments on and further applications and minor corrections of their work, all within the system created by Plato and Aristotle. There was little attempt to go be-

yond the fundamental concepts they laid down. So in like manner the history of Christian thought pivots on St. Thomas; it is essentially a preparation for, and a subsequent elaboration of, his *Summa*. Hence, each of these syntheses fulfilled the primary purpose of philosophy. The Platonic-Aristotelian synthesis not only satisfied the questions of the fourth-century Athenians; it also formed the basis which inspired and gave meaning to the legal, political, social, and literary achievements of the late Classical period. It provided the framework within which thought moved with assurance, until the rise of Christianity caused men to ask questions which could no longer be answered in terms of the old Greek system. Similarly, the philosophical work of St. Thomas constituted a satisfactory answer for all of Western Christendom until, with the coming of the Renaissance, men once again began to formulate questions of a radically different order; yet even today Thomism is the official philosophy of the Roman Church.

Compared with such enduring syntheses as these, the modern mind has produced as yet only a variety of tentative solutions. To be sure, the contrast between ancient unity and our own modern diversity and complexity is in part illusory. The writings of second-rate philosophers in the fourth and third centuries B.C. are now largely lost and forgotten; as a result, Plato and Aristotle stand out in splendid eminence—an eminence that some one of our own contemporaries may have by 4000 A.D. Yet, even after we make allowances for the inevitable lack of perspective in our judgments about our recent past, it would appear that we are still in an era of experiment and preparation like those eras which preceded the Greek and medieval syntheses, and it would be optimistic to expect any sudden condensation of our modern diversities into a satisfactory view. One reason, undoubtedly, for our failure is the complexity of modern life. It was literally possible for a man like Aristotle to take all knowledge for his province. When Bacon made this claim in the seventeenth century, it already seemed bombastic. Today it would be fantastic. Just so far, however, as philosophy must give a self-consistent and integrated body of answers, it is obvious that a philosophical theory which fails to take account of all aspects of human experience must necessarily be inadequate. Thus, what an Aristotle or a Thomas could achieve in the way of a real synthesis of all knowledge is becoming increasingly difficult, if only because of the sheer quantity of knowledge.

Another cause of our difficulty is that modern philosophy (by “modern” in this connection we mean philosophical inquiry since the Renaissance) has been preoccupied with epistemological studies—with questions concerning the nature of knowledge and its limitations. Modern philosophy, that is, has been essentially negative and critical; it has been capable of subjecting earlier theories to penetrating attack, but generally speaking it has not been able to meet its own criticisms. Again, such positive concepts as have survived modern philosophy’s own critical barrage are physico-mathematical in character, and these have as yet proved too narrow for a world view of the kind Aristotle or St. Thomas attained.

The outstanding fact about modern philosophy, then, is its inability to achieve any-

thing remotely like a satisfactory synthesis of the historic past with the contemporary world view, which is largely based on the findings of modern science. What St. Thomas accomplished was not merely the construction of a new philosophy; it was something at once more difficult and more valuable—a reconciliation of the old and the contemporary. The early Christian Church had violently rejected the Greek view of life as wicked paganism that had to be destroyed, root and branch. But St. Thomas was able to rework the basic Aristotelian concepts so as to bring them into harmony with the profoundly different Christian insights, and at the same time to rethink Christianity in Aristotelian terms. It is important to see that this was not merely a bending of one to conform to the other; neither was left unchanged in the process, and, as is the case in all true “reconciliations,” each drew strength from the other.

At the beginning of the modern period this Thomistic synthesis was challenged by the new scientific methodology, along with a number of other developments which together comprise what we call the Renaissance and Reformation—just as, much earlier, the Greek view had succumbed under the impact of Christianity. While few people today would be wholly satisfied with a simple return either to Thomas or to the Greeks, it would be absurd to ignore them. The great modern problem, in fact, is how to do for modern man what Thomas did for medieval man; but to do this requires a study of history, and thus once again we have evidence of the contemporary utility of historical study.

Nothing is more shallow and inconsequential than a life lived merely from day to day, on the advancing wave of the present moment. As the wave moves forward it carries with it, like grains of sand, the fragmentary remains of the past. Life lived without an appreciation of its multi-dimensional character—without a sense of the arriving future and without an awareness of the continuing past—is bleak and meaningless indeed. The present is whatever it is only because of what it is going to be and because of what it has been.

Those who not only wish “to get rich quick,” but wish even more foolishly to get wise quickly, will be intolerant of any but firm and easy conclusions. But knowledge cannot be reduced to capsule form and swallowed whole, washed down with a little humor and taken three times weekly before football or bridge. Those who (to vary the metaphor) want the world’s wisdom done up in neat parcels, tied with blue ribbons, and stored on the shelves of their memories—there to be left unused, of course, and eventually forgotten altogether—will not like philosophy, for it escapes from tissue-paper wrappings and refuses to stay tied down by blue ribbons. In point of fact, however, these elusive characteristics are what make philosophy both interesting and valuable—interesting, because there is never an end to its possibilities, never an exhaustion of its novelties; valuable, because it is an everlasting reminder of our finitude and, at the same time, evidence of our powers.

Many people, especially in the spheres of morals and religion, are eager for a haven

of certitude, and look back with longing from our modern scepticism and universal doubt to the simple, easy faith of our ancestors. Though this ancestral faith was probably neither so simple nor so easy as it seems from this distance, it is in any case foolish to try to revert to the past: what is gone is gone; it can never be duplicated. But in place of such a faith, as a kind of functional counterpart, it is possible to develop a reasonableness of mind and a sense of balance and perspective.

What is reasonableness? It involves, to begin with, being able to distinguish between evidence and emotional appeal—a distinction as difficult to draw as it is important, for under certain circumstances emotion becomes a form of evidence. Reasonableness also involves knowing the evidence for our beliefs and the limitations of this evidence; it entails being prepared to accept the revision and reinterpretation of beliefs—even of our most cherished beliefs—but only in the light of new evidence and by means of sounder reasoning. For the reasonable man truth, that is, the *attainment* of a static and eternal object, is less important than truth-seeking, which may be defined as open-mindedness—as the power of infinite correction and advance.

The study of philosophy, and especially the study of the history of philosophy, is thus a study in reasonableness. It is the eternal search for truth, a search which inevitably fails and yet is never defeated; which continually eludes us, but which always guides us. This free, intellectual life of the mind is the noblest inheritance of the Western world; it is also the hope of our future.

Notes on the Plates

The basic ideas that permeate a culture are expressed in many different media—in social institutions, in poems, and in paintings, as well as in philosophical inquiry. Accordingly, just as a man who wants to understand the art of the Renaissance ought to know something about Renaissance philosophy, so the student of philosophy will find in Western art much that is illuminating. The illustrations included in this volume have been chosen, not as examples of great esthetic achievement, but as records of the varying patterns of thought and feeling in Western culture. They are intended to supplement the chapters on the cultural and social context of the great philosophical systems and should therefore be studied in connection with the passages indicated.

PLATE I

a. "The Olympians and Dionysus" (from J. Harrison, *Prolegomena to the Study of Greek Religion*, Cambridge University Press)

These drawings represent two major, and conflicting, tendencies in Greek religion that had an important bearing on philosophical developments. On the one hand, there was the state religion devoted to the worship of Zeus, Aphrodite, Athena, and the other Olympians (see pp. 26-32); on the other hand, and appearing somewhat later, there were the mysteries, of which one of the most important was the cult of Dionysus (see pp. 23, 52). While the state religion conceived man's relation to the gods almost on a contractual basis, the mysteries gave expression to a deep thirst for salvation. Thus Dionysus was conceived to be a savior-god whose devotees were assured immortality by ritual purification. According to Miss Harrison (*Prolegomena to the Study of Greek Religion*, pp. 366-67), the first figure reproduced here shows a group of Olympians awaiting the arrival of the new god who was supplanting them in the affections of the masses. Zeus can be identified by his thunderbolt; Athena holds her helmet; Aphrodite bears a dove and flowers. In the second figure Dionysus arrives in his chariot. He carries a grapevine and a wine cup, the symbols of that intoxication which his worshipers held to be one of the means of union with their god.

b. Achilles (from Arthur Lane, *Greek Pottery*, Faber and Faber)

c. Bust of Pericles, by Cresilas (British Museum)

Both of these works, products of the Golden Age, show the level of esthetic achievement in the period between the victory over the Persians and the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War (see pp. 8-10). The vase painting of Achilles is the artist's conception of the legendary hero who best represents the old Greek ideal of virtue—that of the "doer of deeds" who is also an eloquent "sayer of words" (see pp. 26-27, 264). The head of Pericles is a later copy of a work by

Cresilas, a fifth-century sculptor. This idealized portrait represents a characteristic of art which Plato held to be one of its great weaknesses (see p. 159) and which Aristotle, paradoxically, held to be its main strength (see pp. 249-50). According to Aristotle, art is truer than history because it is not tied down, as history is, to a reporting of factual detail. This portrait, for example, so far as it reveals the inner nature of the man, is far truer to reality than any literal rendering of Pericles' features would be. But who was the real Pericles? Unfortunately, there was more than one opinion (see pp. 8-9, 146-47). This, in Plato's view, is just the trouble with art: at best, the sculptor only succeeds in making a copy of Pericles, but Pericles himself is real only so far as he participates in the form "man"; hence a portrait is still further removed from reality. At worst, by "idealizing" the democratic leader, Cresilas becomes a dangerous political propagandist; he and other artists ought, therefore, to be exiled or at least forbidden to practice their arts except under strict supervision (see pp. 148-49). However this may be, from the perspective of twenty-four centuries we can see that both Cresilas and the painter of Achilles were expressing in their own media precisely that ideal of temperance, courage, and intelligence which Plato himself defined and subjected to philosophical analysis in his *Republic*.

PLATE II

a. Mithra sacrificing the divine bull (from G. W. Elderkin, *Kantharos*, Princeton University Press)

This figure represents an important symbol in the worship of Mithra, Christianity's great rival and near-conqueror (see pp. 294-95). This bas-relief was found near Frankfort in Germany, carried there, presumably, by Roman legions. The connection between Mithraism and the cult of Dionysus (see Plate Ia) is obvious: the bull is divine; the blood that flows from his body nourishes the grapevine; hence the worshiper who drinks the wine made from this grape shares in the bull's di-

vinity. There is also a parallel with Christianity: both Mithraism and Christianity were redemptive religions, and in both a bloody sacrifice assured immortality to the believer.

b. **Transenna of the sixth century** (from G. W. Elderkin, *Kantharos*, Princeton University Press)

Note the similarity of the Christian chalice in this sixth-century transenna to the crater in the Mithraic bas-relief in Plate IIa. The iconographic similarity is no accident. It reflects an underlying identity among the numerous mystery religions that swept the Western world as the Roman Empire broke up and a time of troubles set in (see pp. 293-306).

PLATE III

a. **A medieval conception of hell** (British Museum)

Fear of the eternal tortures predicted for sinners, here pictured in a manuscript illumination, was one of the driving forces in medieval society and, along with the promise of salvation for the elect, gave to the culture of the Middle Ages dimensions almost wholly lacking in the more secular cultures of Classical and modern times (see pp. 523-34). The notion of hell created grave problems for the Christian philosophers of the Middle Ages—how were damnation and eternal torment to be reconciled with the idea of God as a merciful and loving Father? (See pp. 489-90.) Notice, among those being brought to hell's gate, unbaptized children who arrive by the basketful. If the Church was the sole intermediary between God and sinful man, it followed by a harsh but irrefutable logic that the unbaptized were necessarily damned. Even those too young to have sinned themselves were the inheritors of Adam's original sin, (see pp. 329, 381, 383).

b. **A page from the "Romance of the Rose"** (British Museum)

It is an oversimplification to suppose, as was once customary, that medieval life was a gigantic neurosis engendered by fear of hell fire. Especially in the later part of the period there was love of life and delight in sensuous beauty, and in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries a kind of proto-renaissance occurred (see pp. 407-13, 440-41). One of the poems that reflects the new this-worldliness of the period was the *Romance of the Rose* (see pp. 408-09), one scene of which is illustrated in this manuscript illumination.

PLATE IV

a. **"The Church Militant and Triumphant,"** Andrea da Firenze (Alinari)

In an age when most of the laity were illiterate, this huge fresco admirably communicated the Church's conception of its mission in this world, and incidentally served as a propaganda document for the Dominican order in a period of intense rivalry between it and the Franciscan order. The left-hand side of the picture depicts the Church's version of social organization. Pope and Emperor sit side by side in peace and harmony, as the supreme heads, under God, of all Christendom, but

the subordination of the secular arm to the spiritual is indicated by the fact that the Emperor's throne is slightly lower than the Pope's (see pp. 394-95, 486). Grouped around the two sovereigns are the neatly ordered hierarchies of feudal society (see pp. 401-03). About the Pope are representatives of all levels of the clergy from cardinals and bishops down to monks and nuns; about the Emperor are the corresponding levels of the laity, from kings to beggars. On the right side of the picture we see the function of the Church in this earthly life. At the bottom the clergy (represented by Dominicans) turn aside the various evils that threaten to corrupt men's souls. Among them can be seen heretics who seek to prevent Christian teaching. These heretics are being instructed by St. Thomas, and some of them apparently have been convinced by his arguments, for they are tearing up their heretical writings. Above, among other figures, a penitent kneels before a Dominican, who absolves the sinner and so provides him with the sole key to heaven. Beyond them, another Dominican guides the elect toward heaven, and still higher up we see the saved souls (now represented as little children) entering the gates of heaven where they are welcomed by St. Peter and other saints.

b. **"St. Theodore"** (Editions Tel)

This figure, which is from the south porch of Chartres cathedral, is approximately contemporary with the crusade of Louis IX. It almost perfectly represents the medieval ideal of chivalry—of that "upright and worthy man" whom Louis aimed to be, whose spiritual love of God is reflected in his loyalty to his feudal superior, in the constancy of his affection for his lady, and in the punctiliousness of his dealings with his fellow knights (see pp. 404-07).

c. **"Apotheosis of St. Thomas,"** Francesco Traini (Alinari)

Thomas is seated in the center of the picture, holding on his lap a copy of the *Summa Contra Gentiles* and other works. About him are grouped the chief sources of Christian doctrine—Moses with the Ten Commandments, St. Paul with his Epistles, and the four Evangelists with their Gospels. But the rays that reach Thomas from these sources do not emanate directly from them; they originate in Christ, the single fountain of Christian truth. Nor does Thomas depend exclusively on these biblical authors: he receives inspiration directly from Christ himself and from the two pagan philosophers, Aristotle (holding his *Ethics*) and Plato (holding the *Timaeus*), the only work of this author known in the Middle Ages). The inferiority of natural knowledge is indicated both by the relatively lower position assigned to the two philosophers and by the fact that the rays of inspiration lead not to Thomas's crown but to his ear. Other rays, emanating from Thomas himself, symbolize his influence on Christian thought. Note the prominence here of the Dominicans, who were members of Thomas's own order.

PLATE V

a. **A thirteenth-century anatomical drawing** (from Charles Singer, *From Magic to Science*. Courtesy of the author)

b. **Man drawn as an anatomical figure** (from *The Drawings of Leonardo da Vinci*, ed. by A. E. Popham, Harcourt, Brace)

The contrast between the formal patterning in the first drawing and the scientific accuracy of the second reflects the new interest in empirical observation that marked the beginning of the modern period.

c. **"Pope Leo X," Raphael** (Phaidon Press, Ltd.)

Giovanni de' Medici (see p. 574) was a Humanist dilettant who delighted in the wealth and power of his office while Germany was aflame with Lutheran reform (see pp. 578-88). The cardinal on the Pope's right is his nephew Guiliano de Medici, later Pope Clement VII.

d. **The earliest known picture of a printing press** (Bettmann Archive)

The invention of printing made possible the rapid dissemination of the new philosophical and scientific ideas that emerged at the beginning of the modern period and thus contributed to the acceleration of cultural change that is one of the leading characteristics of our times. Moreover, as the vast new audience possessed no Latin, printers were obliged to resort to the vernacular languages. The encouragement thus given to the national languages supported other developments that were destroying the feudal system and promoting the emergence of the nation-state (see p. 544). The illustration reproduced here—from the title page of Hegesippus' *Historia de Bello Judaico*—is the earliest known representation of a printing press.

PLATE VI

a. **Selling indulgences** (from *Here I Stand* by Roland H. Bainton. Copyright 1950 by Pierce & Smith. Used by permission of Abingdon-Cokesbury Press)

The Protestant propagandist who drew this scene emphasized the wickedness of the sale of indulgences by showing the Cross empty of the body of Christ; only the crown of thorns and the nails mark his place. On one side of the church the indulgence is preached to a group of men and women clustered about the pulpit; on the other side the sordid financial transaction takes place. On either side of the altar, from which the Lord has departed, papal banners are displayed, including the arms of Leo X (see Plate Vc).

b. **Luther in league with the devil** (from *Here I Stand*)

This drawing represents the Catholic view of the reformer.

c. **"Georg Gisze," Hans Holbein the younger** (Deutsches Museum, Berlin)

It has often been remarked that the Renaissance interest in portraiture reflected the individualism of the age and its new sense of personality (see pp. 565-69, 631). But it was not only popes and secular princes who sat for their portraits. The rise of the money power (see pp. 538-44) brought to the fore a class of bankers and merchants who also desired to record

their features for posterity and who possessed the means to do so. Georg Gisze was a Danzig merchant with an establishment in London, where this portrait was painted. He was thirty-five years old at the time (1532) and a man of wealth and culture, as his surroundings indicate.

d. **Robert Etienne's edition of the Greek Testament** (Philip Hofer)

This edition of the New Testament, published in Paris in 1550, shows how, by the middle of the sixteenth century, the Renaissance had spread north of the Alps. Robert Etienne was a Humanist as well as a printer, and the beautiful typography of this page is typical of Humanist scholarship (see pp. 564-65). Etienne's text is based on Erasmus' (see p. 577) and is the first edition of the New Testament to be published with a critical apparatus (see the notes in the margin of the printed page). Etienne, who was a Protestant, made changes in the sacred text that caused him to have trouble with the theological faculty at Paris and he was obliged to flee to Calvin's Geneva for safety.

e. **Title page of Bacon's "Novum Organum"** (Bettmann Archive)

The discovery of America seemed to the men of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries a symbol of the new scientific method by means of which they were exploring nature's secrets. On the title page of Bacon's *Novum Organum*, the second part of the *Great Instauration* (see pp. 598-610), we see a ship passing westward through the Pillars of Hercules from the peaceful Mediterranean into the stormy Atlantic. The motto reads, "Many will pass through and knowledge will be increased."

PLATE VII

a. **Frontispiece of Sprat's "History of the Royal Society"** (Courtesy, the Royal Society)

During the second half of the seventeenth century the founding of a number of scientific societies under royal patronage was a sign that, despite opposition in conservative circles, the new method was becoming respectable and that its utility was increasingly recognized. Of these organizations one of the most famous is the Royal Society. According to its charter, granted by Charles II in 1662, the members of the Society were to devote themselves "to further promoting by the authority of experiments the sciences of natural things and of useful arts, to the glory of God the Creator, and the advantage of the human race." This illustration appeared in Sprat's *History* (1667). On a pedestal in the center is a bust of the Society's royal founder and patron. To the right of the pedestal is Lord Brouncker, the Society's first president; to its left, Francis Bacon, regarded by the members as the chief inspirer of their work. Suspended from the ceiling are the Society's arms, on a table is its mace, and about the walls are numerous scientific instruments and apparatus.

b. **The gardens at Hampton Court** (Courtesy, Harvard College Library)

c. **Plan of the gardens at Stowe** (Courtesy of the Trustees of the Boston Public Library)

The change in taste from the Age of the Enlightenment to the Romanticism of the early nineteenth century (see pp. 889-92) was reflected in every department of life, including landscape gardening. The gardens at Hampton Court Palace are a typical example of the formal garden made fashionable by Le Notre's great work at Versailles (see p. 868). This kind of garden ignores natural features of the landscape (for instance, the curve of the Thames as it flows past) and imposes on nature a deliberately artificial scheme. The garden at Stowe, the seat of the Dukes of Buckingham, is interesting because the change in taste that occurred after it was laid out in the formal manner caused its owners to alter it to a "natural" garden. Thus what is now an irregular pond at the upper end of the garden was originally an octagonal pool, and most of the formal plantings of trees have been broken up so as to create an informal, natural effect. This style is a good example of that "purposiveness without purpose" which Kant believed to be the essence of beauty (see pp. 868-69).

d. The Falls of the Rhine at Schaffhausen, J. M. W. Turner (Courtesy of the Museum of Fine Arts, Boston)

The same preference for the natural, and especially for wilder, more rugged and untamed aspects of nature, appears in the poetry and painting of the Romantic period. In the early nineteenth century, poets like Shelley delighted in "dizzy ravines" and mountain torrents "where woods and winds content," and artists like Turner painted corresponding scenes.

PLATE VIII

a. London slums, Gustave Doré (New York Public Library)

The rapid industrialization of Europe, which got underway toward the end of the eighteenth century, created social, political and economic problems that dominated the thought of the nineteenth century and that still concern us today (see pp. 904-37). One of these problems is illustrated in the Doré engraving reproduced here. Before the application of steam power to production, manufacturing was largely decentralized and carried on by workers in their cottages. The Industrial Revolution forced the worker to go to the machines and so brought about a tremendous expansion of cities. Since this expansion was totally uncontrolled, it resulted in appalling overcrowding and squalor, and in the political unrest, disease, and vice that always accompany such conditions. This view shows a London slum in 1875, some forty years after the passage of the

Reform Bill (see pp. 905-06) and the initiation of legislation to correct the worst abuses.

b. A nineteenth-century cartoon on evolution (Bettmann Archive)

Probably no scientific development has had so immediate or so widespread an effect on the public mind as Darwin's *Origin of Species*. The theory of natural selection brought home as nothing else could the radical change in man's status in the universe and made dramatically clear the attack on old values that had actually been implicit in the whole scientific development beginning in the sixteenth century. It is not surprising therefore that the evolutionists were the subject of ridicule, scorn, and vituperative criticism. In this cartoon a terrified flunkey announces the arrival of an unexpected guest, "Mr. Gorilla," who has decided to associate with his newly discovered relations. The reaction that occurred in England in the 60's and 70's (see pp. 925-26) was repeated in the United States in the 1920's when a number of states passed antievolution laws and sought to prohibit the teaching of Darwinism.

c. The Ministry of Education and Health, Rio de Janeiro (Black Star)

The technology that modern scientific method has created is now at work undoing the havoc this same technology has caused. The Industrial Revolution, which was the application of technology to manufacturing, made city life hideous for the poor and fantastically inconvenient even for the well-to-do. But in the hands of modern architects and city planners technology is now gradually restoring the amenities of urban life. The so-called International Style, of which the Brazilian Ministry of Education building is an example, is a frank and willing acceptance of the new conditions of life in the twentieth century—urbanized, standardized, mechanized, industrialized.

d. "The Cry," Edvard Munch (National Gallery of Art, Washington, D. C., Rosenwald Collection)

While the designers of buildings like the Brazilian Ministry of Education seem to have made their peace with modern life, others find the new world a strange and terrible place—intolerable and inhumane. The latter reaction is expressed in the lithograph by Edvard Munch (1863-1940) reproduced here. In the margin of the print Munch wrote: "I felt a great cry in the whole universe." The same dichotomy that divides the artists also appears at the intellectual level—as between philosophers who have come to terms with the world science discloses and those who, in various ways, rebel against it (see pp. 992-93).