

Citizenship a

Globalization and the politics of Belonging

Citizenship and Migration

Globalization and the Politics of Belonging

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Preface

The membership of individuals in modern democratic societies is marked by the status of citizenship. Those who belong in a given nation-state have documents certifying their membership (generally a certificate of birth or naturalization, and an identity card or passport). More importantly, citizens possess a wide range of civil, political and social rights. The pivotal right is that of participation in law-making and government, for it is this which makes the active citizen, who is supposed to be the basis of popular sovereignty. Such rights are balanced by a series of obligations to the community and state. Ideally, citizens are meant to belong to one nation-state only. In turn, the nation-state is meant to be inclusive of all the people living on its territory. The underlying assumption is that there is sufficient cultural homogeneity to allow agreement on the basic rules of conviviality, despite differing individual and group values. The democratic state needs the participation of all its members: everybody is meant to belong.

The reality has always been somewhat different. Most nation-states have had groups on their territory not considered capable of belonging, and therefore either denied citizenship or alternatively forced to go through a process of cultural assimilation in order to belong. Moreover, even those with formal membership have often been denied some of the rights vital to citizenship, so that they have not fully belonged. Discrimination based on class, gender, ethnicity, race, religion and other criteria has always meant that some people could not be full citizens. Securing the participation of previously excluded groups has been seen as the key to democratization.

But globalization creates new challenges for citizenship, both in established western democracies and in the emerging nation-states of Eastern Europe, Asia, Latin America and Africa. The growing international mobility of people questions the basis for belonging to the nation-state. The heterogeneity of cultural values and practices grows exponentially, so there is no time for processes of acculturation and assimilation. The boundaries of the nation-state are being eroded: millions of people have multiple citizenships and live in more than one country. Millions more do not live in their country of citizenship. Governments find that their power to control the economy, the welfare

system and national culture is being eroded. Global markets, transnational corporations, regional and supra-national bodies, and a new pervasive international culture are all gaining in influence. The idea of the citizen who spent most of his or her life in one country and shared a common national identity is losing ground.

Millions of people are disenfranchised because they cannot become citizens in their country of residence. Even more people, however, have formal membership of the nation-state yet lack many of the rights that are meant to go with this. Porous boundaries and multiple identities undermine ideas of cultural belonging as a necessary accompaniment to political membership. There are increasing numbers of *citizens who do not belong*. This in turn undermines the basis of the nation-state as the central site of democracy.

These are the central themes of this book. We will argue that basing citizenship on singular and individual membership in a nation-state is no longer adequate, since the nation-state model itself is being severely eroded. Instead, new approaches to citizenship are needed, which take account of collective identities and the fact that many people now belong at various levels to more than one society. If democracy is to be maintained and enhanced, all members of society must have a political voice as a citizen. But belonging can no longer mean being part of a national community, based on common history and culture. Much of our discussion focuses on western nations, but we will also examine issues of citizenship and difference in the Asia-Pacific region as an example of the new issues arising in non-western countries.

The fundamental problem is to work out new rules for conviviality, which provide not only the basis for equality, but also the conditions for cross-cultural communication and the development of a new sense of community. The solution must lie in a mode of citizenship that reconciles the pressures of globalization with the reality that states will continue, for the foreseeable future, to exist as the most important political unit. One aim must be to dissolve the nation part of the nation-state and to replace it with a democratic state based on open and flexible belonging. Citizenship should not be derived from the membership of one or more cultural groups, but from residence on a state's territory. Other significant links – such as origin in the territory, family bonds, economic involvement or cultural participation – should also confer citizenship rights, which may need to be differentiated according to the type of linkage. A second aim is to devise forms of democratic political participation that transcend state boundaries, for many vital decisions are now made in regional, supra-national and transnational contexts.

New forms of belonging should not be based on culture, but neither can they ignore it. Citizenship rules must be based on the recognition that individuality is always formed in social and cultural contexts, and that individuals are always also members of social and cultural groups, with particular needs, interests and values. The liberal principle of abstracting from these contexts leads to a fiction of equality as citizens, which is belied by real differences in political and economic power. Democratic societies have addressed this by developing welfare states, but globalization makes it necessary to go a step further and to develop approaches to citizenship designed to achieve both individual equality and the recognition of collective difference. This requires a radical rethinking of citizenship rights. Our discussion in this book will concentrate on the issue of democratic belonging for ethnic minorities (both immigrants and indigenous peoples in former settler colonies), but reshaping citizenship for minorities inevitably affects the nature of citizenship as a whole.

This book is the result of several years of debate and cooperation between its two authors. The method has been for one of us to write a first draft for each chapter, which has been followed by intensive discussion and revision. Thus, each chapter contains ideas and analysis from both of us. In the end, however, we cannot claim full agreement on all the views expressed here. The main responsibility for Chapters 1, 3, 4, 5 and 6 lies with Stephen Castles, and for Chapters 2, 7, 8, 9 and 10 with Alastair Davidson.

Chapter 1 examines globalization and the dilemmas it creates for the nation-state and citizenship. Globalization erodes the autonomy of the nation-state, undermines the ideology of distinct and relatively autonomous cultures, and causes the increasing mobility of people across borders. This leads to crucial new questions on modes of political and cultural belonging. These new factors destabilize traditional ways of balancing the contradictions that always beset the nation-state model: the contradictions between the inclusion and exclusion of various groups, between the rights and obligations of citizenship, and most important – between political belonging as a citizen and cultural belonging as a national. Finally, we look at four recent theoretical responses to the challenges presented for citizenship by globalization.

Chapter 2 focuses on theories of citizenship and their adequacy in a situation of global change. The essential concern of citizenship has always been the empowerment of people over the natural and social environment, but the form and content of that empowerment changes according to the historical and societal context. Since the democratic

revolutions of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, citizenship has meant first and foremost the assertion of popular will, and then a list of the rights inherent in all people as equals. Democracy implies the *active citizen*, able to participate in the exercise of political power, rather than just the *passive citizen* as a bearer of rights. The problem, however, has always been to stipulate who belongs to the people and is therefore entitled to be a citizen. The historical conflation of the citizen and the national involved a process of homogenization of minorities. The population mobility and cultural interchange inherent in globalization leads to an irreducibility of multicultural difference, which makes the linking of nationality and citizenship anachronistic. The challenge is to integrate the global, regional and local dimensions of belonging into a new political model.

Chapter 3 sets the scene for understanding the links between immigration, minority formation and citizenship. In it, we examine the immigration experience of a range of countries, including permanent settlement countries like the USA and Australia; former guestworker importers such as Germany; former colonial powers like France and Britain; and new immigration countries both in Southern Europe and Asia. We discuss the significance of 'ethnic minority' status and look at statistical indicators of the size of minorities. We argue that nation-states have an intrinsic drive towards the creation of cultural difference and the radicalization of minorities. This arises from the dualism between the nation as a cultural community and the state as a political community. We go on to look more specifically at the legal, economic, social, spatial and cultural factors that underpin minority formation.

In Chapter 4, we consider how immigrants can become citizens in various countries, that is, the rules for naturalization and for access to citizenship through birth or residence. In many cases, these rules are changing rapidly in response to the problems thrown up by mass immigration. One new aspect is the emergence of forms of 'quasi-citizenship' or 'denizenship' through which immigrants gain many of the rights of citizenship without formal membership. Another important factor is the rights created through international agreements and supra-national bodies. Overall, there are signs of convergence of rules for access to citizenship in western countries, yet actual practices still differ considerably.

Chapter 5 goes on to look at what it actually means to be a citizen, using Marshall's triad of civil, political and social rights. We show that the situation of various groups varies considerably and is strongly linked to processes of racialization. Social citizenship is particularly signifi-

cant, since it is a precondition for real chances of political participation. Globalization leads to increasing inequality and to new forms of social exclusion that affect minorities most severely. We argue that it is necessary to add two additional categories of rights – gender and cultural rights – in order to achieve full citizenship for members of minorities.

In Chapter 6, we discuss ethnic mobilization and the emergence of new political subjects. Community formation is often the result of experiences of exclusion from mainstream society. It consists of processes of home-building and place making, the development of ethnic economies, the building of religious institutions and the assertion of national identities. Different types of ethnic consciousness emerge, including assimilation, separatism, diasporic identities and transnational consciousness. Minority communities and consciousness are the breeding ground for political associations and movements, which affect political institutions and political culture in many different ways.

Chapter 7 argues that new forms of citizenship are beginning to develop in response to the problems posed by globalization and population mobility. These new forms are contested and incomplete, but they show the possibility of post-national belonging. We examine two of the most important approaches. The first is multiculturalism. Our discussion focuses on the USA and Australia, which have very different understandings of the concept. Yet, in both cases, multiculturalism has changed the ideological and legal basis for citizenship, although it has fallen short of bringing about the fundamental changes needed to empower citizens in a globalizing world. The second example is the role of regional economies – especially the European Union – in changing citizenship. The creation of supra-national laws and powerful legal institutions shifts power away from the national level. This makes it necessary to seek ways of achieving active citizenship through democratic supra-national political institutions and practices.

Chapter 8 extends the analysis to emerging nation-states outside the traditional western sphere through a discussion of citizenship in the Asia-Pacific region. Most of the world's nations aspire to democracy and citizenship, yet historical conditions for the development of democratic ideas and practices vary widely. We look at the extent to which new immigrants can become citizens, and find that the emphasis on ethnic homogeneity is often far stronger than in western countries. As for the quality of being a citizen, the rights of citizenship are extremely restricted in most non-western countries. A long struggle lies ahead not only for the rights of minorities, but also to create genuine citizenship for everybody.

Chapter 9 presents some ideas for new forms of citizenship, which go beyond current models – even the multicultural and regional ones. A post-national state must be able to accommodate a multiplicity of notions of the good. This requires a continuing debate between individuals and communities on an agreed set of democratic procedures and goals. A basic requirement for success is a shared civic culture of tolerance and trust, based on a differential set of human rights that could protect what is most sacred for each group from the potential tyranny of the majority. Group representation would be needed in order to allow minority voices to be heard. At the same time, the state would have to guarantee social, economic and educational standards adequate to ensure genuine participation for all. This model would require not only institutional structures acceptable to all, but also mechanisms to facilitate communication across cultural difference. Such a model would put a premium on political mobilization and active citizenship.

Finally, Chapter 10 points out that conditions in large areas of the world – most of Africa, Central and South Asia and parts of Latin America – are such that active citizenship and transnational democracy seem almost out of reach. Citizenship presupposes a functioning state, the rule of law and basic human rights guarantees. All these are absent in countries that are home to the majority of the world's population. Indeed, globalization has in many places led to a dramatic decline in economic, social and political standards. The result is often a situation of chaos, in which weak and oppressive states compete for influence with fundamentalist movements and criminal organizations. However, globalization also means that such conditions in the poorer parts of the world inevitably spill over into the rich countries, undermining social and political achievements. The struggle for democratic citizenship must therefore have a global perspective, with the aim of creating the conditions for full participation everywhere. Citizenship or chaos are the stark alternatives at the beginning of the new millennium.

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The Crisis of Citizenship

In that summer of 1914, when the rulers of human destinies drew European humanity from the playing fields of universal suffrage to the already prepared arena of universal military service, the town of Visegrad provided a small but eloquent example of the first symptoms of a contagion which would in time become European and then spread to the entire world. (Andric, 1994 [1945], p. 265)

Today we are experiencing the weakening of civic feeling and of political bonds. There is nothing to guarantee that the modern democratic nation will in future have the capability of maintaining the social bond, as it has done in the past.... It seems impossible for democracies to demand of their citizens to defend them with their lives. In democracy there is no longer any supreme sacrifice: the individuals and their interests have taken the place of the citizens and their ideals. (Schnapper, 1994, p. 11, translation by Castles)

Until a few years ago, the notion of citizenship was little discussed outside university political science courses. Being a citizen was just a matter of common sense in the fortunate minority of the world's countries that might be considered to be democracies. It was 'normal' to be a citizen, which meant having the rights to vote and to stand for political office, enjoying equality before the law and being entitled to various government services and benefits. Being a citizen also meant having the obligations to obey the laws, to pay taxes and – in extreme situations – to defend one's country. As for the rest of the world, it was a widespread aspiration to move towards the western model of citizenship. As the President of Mongolia, Punsalmaaggiyu Orchirbat, said when he visited Paris, the symbolic birthplace of the modern nation, 'In 1990 we embarked on a great journey to join the common course of mankind – democracy and human rights, the market economy and economic development' (*Le Monde/Guardian Weekly*, 5 May, 1996). Those were the icons of progress. The nation-state had become the

global norm for political advancement, and citizenship was seen as an integral aspect of prosperity and modernization.

There are, however, signs that citizenship has in recent years become problematic. Several countries have revised their laws and practices concerning the rights and obligations of citizens. Others have changed their rules for access to citizenship for immigrants, children of immigrants and other minorities. New countries emerging from the dissolving multiethnic states of real socialism have sought to define and establish appropriate rules of citizenship. Other new countries forged out of former colonies have dissolved into anarchy because of a failure to build an inclusive national identity and a stable state. The notion of citizenship has become the focus of political and academic discourse, with a spate of books, debates and conferences. Citizenship campaigns have sprung up, which claim that extending citizenship to certain groups, or changing the substance of certain aspects of citizenship, could help to solve major social problems. Why this sudden interest in something that seemed so obvious? Is it the result of major changes in the political and social context? Or is it that we have become sensitive to possible omissions and problems implicit in the common-sense notion of citizenship?

The answer is both. The global context of citizenship is changing dramatically, but so is the way in which we perceive it. These two trends are linked: there have always been some fundamental ambiguities in the notion of citizenship, but these did not seem to matter much as long as the political context appeared fairly coherent and stable. That context was, of course, the nation-state: the development of modern citizenship was inextricably linked with the emergence of the nation-state in Western Europe and North America from the seventeenth century onwards. The current crisis of citizenship is thus closely linked with the challenges facing the nation-state model at the end of the twentieth century. These affect – in specific ways – not only the classical nation-states of Western Europe, but also the nation-building societies of North America and Oceania, and the new industrial countries of Asia and Latin America.¹

Globalization and the nation-state

The essence of the nation-state is the institution of citizenship: the integration of all the inhabitants of a territory into the political community, and their political equality as citizens. Of course, relatively few nations

match this democratic ideal. How many countries have not had a violent change in government during the twentieth century? It is hard to think of more than seven! In how many states do the people really have a choice about who forms the government and what it does? Yet most heads of state claim that their country is democratic, and most politically aware people aspire to this.

The European and North American nation-states that emerged from the seventeenth to the nineteenth centuries were astonishingly effective, in both internal and external terms. Their political systems facilitated the integration of diverse groups into cohesive populations and provided the conditions for capitalist industrialization. They were able to dominate and colonize the rest of the world, and to impose economic relations and cultural values that were to transform all the disparate societies and bring them into a global system. These nation-states continued the work of the great centralizing monarchies: Spain, Portugal, France and England. However, they quickly transcended the absolutist model, marginalizing those countries that did not make the transition to the modern nation-state on time. Colonialism was crucial to the emerging nation-states: exploiting the natural resources and the labour power of dominated peoples made industrialization possible. When the 'late nations' such as Germany and Italy began to seek 'their place in the sun', and the colonized peoples demanded freedom, the result was the conflicts that were to lead to the most violent century in history.

This dialectic of progress and violence indicates some of the ambivalences inherent in the nation-state model. Can it work if all the societies of the world constitute themselves as nation-states and seek equality in a global system? Or is it premised on the domination of weaker countries, and the stigmatization and exclusion of the Other? It is vital to deconstruct the contradictions of the nation-state model if we are to find ways of achieving more democratic types of citizenship and more equitable and peaceful international relations. However, the project of this book is more modest: we aim to analyse just one – albeit the most important – aspect of the nation-state in the light of some of the challenges it faces in the current epoch. Our theme is citizenship and the ways in which it is being questioned and reshaped by current global transformations.

Globalization is widely seen as one of the most important determinants of the human condition in the contemporary world, so we need to characterize it here, as the context for debates on citizenship. Globalization is a term used to summarize the following trends:

- The emergence of a global economy based on the activities of transnational corporations and on international markets for capital, commodities, services and futures.
- The very rapid introduction of new information technologies that are revolutionizing communication, production and trade, and facilitating the international dissemination of cultural values.
- The formation of regional economies and markets characterized by the free movement of capital, goods and labour across nation-states' borders. The European Union (EU) is the most developed example, while the North American Free Trade Area and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum permit free movement in some respects but not others.
- The development of supra-national institutions and legal norms to regulate economic and political relations (the EU, the World Court, the European Court of Justice, the World Trade Organization and so on).
- The growing significance of democracy and human rights as near-universal norms of governance in the international community.
- The emergence of a global commitment to a common set of values and standards of the Good as a result of global information transfer and cross-cultural awareness.

The development of global systems of production and trade is not in itself new – it is a central aspect of modernity as embodied in the world-wide empires of the great European powers that reached their zenith in the pre-1914 era of imperialism. What is new today is the all-embracing character of global relationships, the speed of reaction through electronically networked markets and media, and the decline of central control as the role of national governments diminishes. Globalization is characterized by a lightning-quick transmission of information through new media. Television images of human disasters in Central Africa bring that world into the living-rooms of rich countries. However, the converse is also true: the idealized lifestyles of Beverly Hills are flaunted before the world's poor.

It is doubtful, however, whether the global media explosion is really breeding a global consciousness. Most of its images exist only in a fantasy realm completely divorced from the lives of 80 per cent of the globe who view them. This rupture between mental or cultural life and lived life is marked by the fact that, of some billion international trips per year, most are made by a relatively small group of privileged people from rich countries. The bulk of the world's population either

stay where they were born, or move to adjoining countries much like their own. It is important to avoid an over-facile definition of globalization based on the experience of privileged minorities, as found for example in the work of Ohmae (1995). Most people still do not have a wide experience of different cultures of that direct sort that allows them to make sense of media grabs.

Even more significant is the fact that economic, social, educational and health conditions still vary immensely. Even in the USA, income inequality grew sharply in the 1980s: the rich got richer, there were more poor people, and the middle classes were eroded (Reich, 1991, pp. 196–207). This trend applies in virtually all the older industrial countries, where the decline of welfare states has exacerbated the social polarization. Growing inequalities in wealth can also be found in newly industrializing countries. Economic development under conditions of free markets and non-interventionist states seems inevitably to lead to greater inequality. Modernization theories claim that higher living standards will 'trickle down' to disadvantaged groups, yet it is far from clear that this is happening. The most glaring inequality, however, is still that between the industrial countries (both old and new) and those areas which have not been able to achieve sustained economic development. In many areas of Africa and Asia, real income is falling. This means declines in educational opportunities, health standards and even life expectancy. Whole nations are being excluded from the new global order.

A recent text on global inequalities makes this devastatingly clear, mortality tables showing an 18:1 greater chance of dying before the age of 5 years in poor against rich countries, and a life expectancy of 54.5 years compared with 80 years. More than 90 per cent of children attend secondary school in rich countries, against fewer than 20 per cent in poor countries (Bradshaw and Wallace, 1996, Chapter 2; Streeten, 1996). Another study points out that in the 1980s, real minimum wages fell by up to 50 per cent in Africa and Latin America. In the 42 poorest countries, the expenditure on health fell over 50 per cent and that on education over 25 per cent. Resource transfer to poor countries went from a positive 43 billion dollars in 1981 to a negative 33 billion dollars in 1988. Comparative income gaps have widened, the average per capita income in an advanced country being 58 times that in the least developed countries, where over half the world's population live on 5.6 per cent of world income (Turk, 1993, pp. 17–18; Khor, 1996). Like many other texts, these sources suggest that globalization is making the discrepancy worse. There is a 'relentless growth'

in the number of the 'absolute poor' reaching 1.3 billion in 1993 (Global Commission, 1995, pp. 21–3).

Globalization is characterized by new forms of inclusion in and exclusion from societal relationships. Castells (1996, p. 3) argues that 'our societies are increasingly structured around a bipolar opposition between the Net and the Self'. He emphasizes the role of new information technologies in creating global networks of wealth, power and images. These networks can 'selectively switch on and off individuals, groups, regions and even countries' according to their relevance in fulfilling instrumental goals. This system is economically efficient but incapable of giving meaning to people's lives. To escape such abstract universalism, people increasingly seek meaning through particularistic identities based on ethnicity, religion, regionalism or nationalism.

This explains why many contemporary conflicts are not concerned primarily with 'rational' economic and social interests. The defence of local or sectional interests against globalizing forces may be based on cultural symbols connected with dignity and identity. Resistance movements may appear particularistic and even backward-looking because discourses of universalism appear to have been monopolized by globalizing forces. At worst, the result is a new 'tribalism' in which populations retreat from universal to exclusive localist outlooks and a new anarchy or chaos dominates outside rich countries (Global Commission, 1995, pp. 16–17). There is a massive increase in violence, crime, war and drug addiction (UNRISD, 1995). In some places, barbarism rules: torture, rape, cannibalism and other bizarre expressions of violence become commonplace (Kaplan, 1996b; Touati, 1996; Zheng, 1996). We can thus discount any notion that globalization spells the homogenization of experience throughout the globe on the lines of that in advanced countries.

Globalization affects citizenship in many ways. This can be summarized by pointing to three main aspects, of which two are contextual and the third more direct. First, globalization questions the notion of the relative autonomy of the nation-state, upon which each separate national citizenship is based. Globalization breaks the territorial principle, the nexus between power and place. Wieviorka (1994, p. 25) has drawn attention to the 'decomposition of national industrial societies'. The 'national industrial society', as it evolved in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, articulated three elements – society, state and nation – in a particular form. 'Society' referred to an economic and social system based on rational (as opposed to traditional or religious) principles, within a bounded national territory. 'State' referred to a

political system based on secular (and usually democratic) principles, capable of regulating economic and political relations and change. 'Nation' referred to a 'people' defined on the basis both of belonging to the territory of the state and having a common cultural and ethnic background (Lapeyronnie *et al.*, 1990, pp. 258–62). Politics, the economy, social relations and culture were congruent in that they all took the nation-state as their main point of reference. The nation-state was seen as a discrete unit within a world of nation-states. The whole of classical sociology takes this 'national society' for granted (Lapeyronnie *et al.*, 1990, p. 259). Even the critics of capitalism based their politics on national units: social-democratic demands for economic reform and welfare policies addressed the state; communists called for world revolution but were organized nationally.

Globalization has destabilized the 'national industrial society'. The central dynamics of economic life now transcend national borders and have become uncontrollable for national governments. Deindustrialization of the older industrial nations has led to profound social changes and has eroded the membership basis of the labour movement. The nation-state is still the basic unit for welfare systems, but no government can pursue welfare policies that ignore the pressures of global markets. This alters the terms for socialist parties: even if they can get elected to power, they may have to abandon their traditional objectives and adopt economic rationalism. Capital may appear to have won the class struggle, but this leads not to Fukuyama's (1992) 'end of history' but instead to forms of social and political disorganization that threaten the security of the well-off and the stability of democratic states. What, then, does it mean to be a citizen if the autonomy of the nation-state is being eroded, and the vote that one wields cannot influence key political decisions because they are no longer made by national parliaments?

The second aspect of globalization is that it has undermined the ideology of distinct and relatively autonomous national cultures. These were always a myth because virtually every nation-state has been made up of a number of ethnic groups, with distinct languages, traditions and histories. Homogenization is at the core of the nationalist project. The internal Other has to be made into a national before he or she can become a citizen. As Renan pointed out in 1882 in his famous discourse 'What is a nation?' (Renan, 1992), forgetting the history of ethnic distinctiveness and the (often repressive) process of overcoming it is vital to national identity. Moreover, no frontier has ever been completely impervious to cultural influences: even Enver Hodja's Albania could not completely encapsulate itself against the influences

of western culture, as the rush to migrate to Italy after 1989 showed. All cultures are hybrids. Nonetheless, ideas of national cultural distinctiveness have underpinned nation-building and patriotism.

Globalization has changed all this: rapid improvements in transport and communications have led to an unprecedented degree of cultural interchange. The industrialization of media production puts enormous pressure on national and local cultures. Dominance by global cultural factories, for example Hollywood, means the diffusion of specific value systems connected with consumerism, individualism and US lifestyles. At the same time, however, we witness a re-ethnicization of culture at a subnational level. This trend appears as a form of resistance to both the nationalization and the globalization of culture. Collectivities that constitute themselves around cultural claims may be based not only on ethnicity, but also on regional location, gender, sexual preferences and lifestyles. National culture is being squeezed between the global and the local.

The third aspect is the central theme of this book: globalization means the rapidly increasing mobility of people across national borders. The period since 1945 and especially since 1980 has been marked by large-scale migrations of all kinds: temporary and permanent movements; labour migrations and refugee exoduses; individual and family flows; highly skilled specialists and manual workers (Castles and Miller, 1998). Such migrations have led to settlement in nearly all highly developed countries and in many parts of the less-developed regions. Populations have become more heterogeneous and culturally diverse. Cultural difference and social marginalization are often closely linked, creating ethnic minorities with disadvantaged and relatively isolated positions in society. In addition to long-term migration, mobility takes on other forms that may have a considerable impact on local cultures and economies: tourism, the short-term movement of business executives and experts, and the mobility of young people in search of education and training.

The mobility of people has always been an inherent part of colonialism and industrialization. Sailors, soldiers, traders, administrators and settlers were sent out to manage and exploit the colonized Others, who were constructed through racist ideologies as being inferior and threatening. As the flow of colonial profits back to the metropolises helped to provide the capital for industrialization, new mass migrations started. At first, these were movements of impoverished rural workers into the new industrial towns. As these reserves dried up, however, workers were pulled in across national borders: Irish to Britain; Poles

and Italians to Germany, France and Switzerland; and Eastern and Southern Europeans to fuel the industrial take-off of the USA. These migrants were eventually, to a large extent, absorbed into the national populations, and their children became citizens.

Two things are new about current migrations. The first is their sheer scale: they affect all regions and most countries of the world simultaneously. The speed at which new ethnic minorities have emerged has confounded policy makers and undermined laws and practices concerned with integration and citizenship. The second is the ethnocultural characteristics of many of the immigrants: they come from areas that are increasingly distant – not only in kilometres, but also in cultural terms. They often originate in former colonies or areas of military presence of the receiving countries: North and West Africans in France; Caribbeans, Indians, Pakistanis and Bangladeshis in Britain; Mexicans, Filipinos, Koreans and Vietnamese in the USA; and so on. Many recent migrants, however, come from areas where the linkages are based on more tenuous experiences of economic and cultural penetration: Arabs to the USA; South East and South Asians to Japan; Chinese to virtually all developed countries. The highly historical success of the western nation-states in establishing the domination of the Third World has created mechanisms that now question the nation-state; this domination has led to linkages that facilitate the movement of not only capital and commodities, but also people and ideas – in both directions.

Key questions

The colonized Other is returning to the metropolises and becoming part of their populations and societies. In every city of Western Europe and North America, ethnic heterogeneity has become an inescapable reality. This Other has no shared past with the people of the receiving society. The cultural background, as seen in the contrast between Christian and Islamic traditions, may be very different. In the case of migrants from former colonies, the culture of the Other may partially mirror that of the receiving society, yet the dialectical unity of exploiter and exploited may contain a fundamental difference in experience. This situation raises crucial questions:

Can these Others be submitted to a process of acculturation (as were previous internal minorities), which will reduce them to nationals and thus qualify them for membership in the nation-state?

- Or is such a process unthinkable in the era of globalization, with its multiple identities and diasporic communities?
- Has the pace of intermingling of ethnic groups become so rapid that there is no time for the process of forgetting different histories, which Renan saw as being crucial to national identity?
- Does this mean that the nation-state and citizenship will have to be modified to fit the new reality of the collective presence of the irreducible Other in multiethnic societies?
- If so, what can be the characteristics of possible new forms of political belonging?
- What political action is needed to develop these new forms?

These are the central questions of this book. Before discussing them further, it is necessary to return briefly to the problems that have always been implicit in the notions of the nation-state and citizenship.

Ambiguities of citizenship

Citizenship is one of the key institutions of contemporary societies, at the very core of both democracy and national identity, yet it has always been ambiguous in various ways. First, it implies not only inclusion, but also exclusion: the citizenship of certain types of person implies the non-citizenship of others. In the Greek *polis*, slaves, foreigners and, above all, women were excluded. In the modern states that emerged in the nineteenth century, the very size of the society precluded direct democracy. Suffrage was linked to the assumption of the capability of a man to participate rationally in the public sphere and to represent the people dependent upon him (women, children, servants and employees). In a wider sense, those elected to office had to be capable of representing the social category or interest group from which they derived. Citizenship was restricted to male householders belonging to the dominant religion and ethnic group. The political movements of excluded groups (women, workers, religious minorities and indigenous peoples) have seen access to the franchise as the main instrument of their emancipation.

Today, the problem of *formal exclusion* from citizenship applies above all to immigrants. By 1995, the total foreign population of European Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development countries was 19.4 million, of whom only 6.7 million were EU citizens. There were 2 million North Africans, 2.6 million Turks and 1.4 million

people from former Yugoslavia (OECD, 1997, p. 30). A large number of these were actually born in their country of residence yet had not become citizens, due to the principle of *ius sanguinis* (nationality by descent). Even in North America and Australia, where naturalization is easier to obtain, there is a relatively large number of resident non-citizens. These are people who belong to society as workers, tax-payers and parents, yet are denied full political participation. Even illegal immigrants may be long-term residents but do not enjoy many basic rights. This negates the basic principle of liberal democracy that all members of society should be included as citizens.

There is, however, another dimension, that of *de facto* exclusion: in most countries, there are significant groups, usually marked by race, by ethnicity or by being indigenous peoples, who are denied full participation as citizens. They may have the right to vote, but social, economic and cultural exclusion denies them the chance of gaining political representation or of having any real say in the decisions that affect their lives. This situation is in part a reflection of the fact that the substantial meaning of citizenship itself has become extended in recent times as civil and political rights have been joined by social rights (Marshall, 1964). Put differently, a certain level of social and economic welfare is needed before people can take advantage of formal political rights. Today, it may be argued that collective cultural rights needed to be added to Marshall's triad. *De facto* exclusion presents new challenges for the politics of inclusion, leading to calls for 'differential citizenship' (Young, 1989, 1990) and 'multicultural citizenship' (Kymlicka, 1995).

A second ambiguity of citizenship concerns the relationship between *rights* and *obligations*. This is most evident in the close link between universal suffrage and universal military service (referred to in the quotation from Ivo Andric's epic novel on Bosnia at the beginning of this chapter). Dominique Schnapper's important work on citizenship constantly emphasizes the notion of the 'warrior-citizen' (Schnapper, 1994, p. 49). This link is problematic: it excludes women, who, with a few exceptions (such as in Israel), have not been seen as being capable of defending their nation by violent means. It also implies that democratic nations can only be consolidated internally by hostility towards external groups, that is, by constructing a *Feindbild*, or by the concept of an enemy (see Hoffmann, 1994). Moreover, linking suffrage with conscription can be a means of excluding internal minorities, who may be accused of 'unclear loyalties' in the event of a conflict. A model of citizenship for a global society can hardly be based on the willingness

to indulge in inter-state warfare, although it might require willingness to support the use of force to prevent conflict or human rights abuses.

Both of the above ambiguities are the expression of a more fundamental contradiction: that between *citizenship* and *nationality*, or between the notion of the *citizen* as an individual abstracted from cultural characteristics, and that of the *national* as a member of a community with common cultural values. In liberal theory, all citizens are meant to be free and equal persons, who as citizens are homogeneous individuals (Rawls, 1985, pp. 232–4). This requires a separation between a person's political rights and obligations, and their membership of specific groups, based on ethnicity, religion, social class or regional location. The political sphere is one of universalism, which means equality and abstraction from cultural particularity and difference. Difference is to be restricted to the 'non-public identity' (Rawls, 1985, p. 241).

This, however, conflicts with the reality of nation-state formation, in which becoming a citizen has depended on membership in a community. The nation-state is the combination of a political unit that controls a bounded territory (the state) with a national community (the nation or people) that has the power to impose its political will within those boundaries. A citizen is always also a member of a nation, a *national*. Thus, citizenship is meant to be universalistic and above cultural difference, yet it exists only in the context of a nation-state, which is based on cultural specificity – on the belief in being different from other nations. Historically, this tension has been expressed in measures to incorporate minority groups into the 'national culture'. Today, it is a major issue for indigenous peoples as well as for immigrants: can they only belong to the nation if they reject their own language and traditions and conform to the dominant ones?

It is clearly vital to distinguish between the nation and the ethnic group. There are currently some 200 nation-states in the world, yet over 6000 languages (Moynihan, 1993, p. 72). Language is in most cases an indicator of a cultural community and thus frequently of an ethnic group; if even a fraction of these groups were to seek to become nations, the potential for conflict would be enormous. As Moynihan (1993, pp. 63–106) shows, there is an inherent contradiction between two basic principles of the United Nations (UN): the principle of national sovereignty and that of the self-determination of peoples.

But the difference between the nation and the ethnic group is not always obvious, especially in the Anglo-American literature. For example, Seton-Watson describes a nation as 'a community of people,

whose members are bound together by a sense of solidarity, a common culture, a national consciousness' (Seton-Watson, 1977, p. 1). Connor defines a nation as 'a group of people who *believe* they are ancestrally related. It is the largest grouping that shares that belief' (Connor, 1991, p. 6, emphasis in original, quoted here from Moynihan, 1993, p. 1). Ethnicity is usually defined as a sense of group belonging based on ideas of common origins, history, culture, experience and values. Ethnicity is seen as 'cultural', in contradistinction to 'biological' notions of race (see Castles and Miller, 1998, pp. 30–2).

The distinction between ethnic group and nation in Anglo-American interpretations is usually a practical one based on sovereignty: an ethnic group that controls a bounded territory becomes a nation and establishes a nation-state. Factors of shared history and culture are then complemented by a common economy and legal system. Anthony Smith sums this up as follows:

A nation can therefore be defined as a named human population sharing an historic territory, common myths and historical memories, a mass, public culture, a common economy and common legal rights and duties for all members. (Smith, 1991, p. 14)

Since, however, there are few homogeneous nation-states, the question is how the varying ethnic groups in a territory are to be moulded into one nation. This may take place through the forcible imposition of the culture of the dominant group on the others, for example through the prohibition of minority languages, schools and festivals, as in the case of present-day Kurds in Turkey. The process may be a more gradual and consensual one, in which groups grow together through economic and social interaction, and the development of a common language and shared institutions, such as schools, church and military service. There is a fine line between the nation based on repression and that based on historical consensus. Most have elements of both and are open to subsequent challenge by movements of territorial minorities, as recent European history has shown.

Continental European views on the difference between nation and ethnic group have followed a rather different line, based on the famous distinction between the *Kulturnation* (cultural nation, also known as the ethnic nation) and the *Staatsnation* (state nation, also known as the civic nation). These notions developed as ideological expressions of the struggle for dominance between Germany and France in the nineteenth century.

Germany was a backward patchwork of principalities and mini-states with absolutist rulers until the end of eighteenth century. Nation-state formation did not come through internal impulses, but as a reaction to conquest by the Napoleonic armies. As Habermas points out, national consciousness was based not on democratic civil liberties and popular sovereignty, but on 'the romantically inspired middle-class notion of a *Kulturnation*, a nation defined by its culture' (Habermas, 1994a, p. 146). Romanticism portrayed individuals as part of an organic whole; freedom meant not individual rights but the acceptance of one's role in the greater organism. The state was the embodiment of this superior meaning, which could only be interpreted by great leaders. Democracy had no place in the model (Hoffmann, 1994, pp. 108–30).

The French *Staatsnation*, on the other hand, developed through the democratic revolution of 1789. It was seen as being based not on common culture but on a common will, as expressed both in Rousseau's idea of the 'general will' and in Renan's famous expression of the nation as '*le plébiscite de tous les jours*' (the daily plebiscite). The implication is that citizens of a nation form a community *because* they constantly express the will to do so. The nation should *therefore* be understood as a political project capable of transcending the tension between universalism and particularism (Schnapper, 1994, pp. 83–114). The common will creates and maintains the political unit, whatever conflicts there are within it. This idea provides the basis for a republican form of government, which should be capable of assimilating ethnic or religious minorities.

Yet the claim of transcending culture is dubious, for the French experience was actually based on linguistic homogenization, political centralization and compulsory assimilation. Shared endeavour and suffering in war were seen as the nation-building experiences *par excellence*. 'Political nation-units are generally born in the fracas of war' (Schnapper, 1994, p. 45). Even Renan emphasizes alongside the principle of consent that of common history and culture (see Schnapper, 1994, p. 168). The republican model worked well as long as the dominant group was willing to assimilate others, and the economy was able to provide a reasonable level of social integration to all. But how well has the republican model coped with globalization and the immigration of the Other? We will return to this in later chapters.

A final ambiguity to be noted is contained in the concept of 'naturalization', used in English, French and certain other European languages to refer to the administrative act whereby a foreigner is

accepted as a citizen. Naturalization implies that being a member of a certain nation-state is laid down by 'natural laws', perhaps linked to natural environment or racial descent. Foreigners can only 'become natural' to the new host country through a long process (taking between 5 and 12 years in most countries), which may be seen as an exception to the normal rule of lifelong membership.

Fehér and Heller (1994) have pointed out that becoming acceptable as a citizen has nothing to do with nature but is instead based on a process of cultural adaptation; 'culturalization' would therefore be a more appropriate term. However, naturalization can be taken to mean being assimilated into an order that is 'the only natural one' for the place concerned. Failure to assimilate would then label the immigrant as a deviant or an enemy. The confusion between nature and culture is endemic in discourses on citizenship and the nation-state. The concept of naturalization is in blatant contradiction to the idea of citizenship as culturally neutral and open to all members of a society. Curiously, the German-speaking countries, which are highly restrictive in their policies of access to citizenship, use the more neutral term of '*Einbürgerung*', which literally means 'making into a citizen'.

Dealing with globalization: some approaches

Throughout this book, we will be looking at ideas on how citizenship should be reshaped in response to globalization and cultural diversity. Here we will mention just two positions, which can perhaps be seen as the opposing poles in the debate. Between them lies a wide range of interpretations and suggestions, to be found in a growing body of literature. These two positions are:

- The idea that the substance of citizenship and the nation-state are changing anyway through the inexorable forces of globalization, so that little further action is needed.
- The belief that the nation-state, although weakened by internal and external contradictions, is still the only political unit capable of maintaining democratic citizenship.

There is also, of course, the position that nothing fundamental has changed, and that national politics can go on as before. This view is widely held by conservative commentators and politicians. It leads to isolationism and to policies that are dangerously out of touch with both

global markets and global cultural transformations. We have already advanced reasons for rejecting this position and will not discuss it further here.

The first position – that global forces of themselves bring about reforms in citizenship patterns – can be associated both with the technocratic ideas of global managerialism and with political theories that focus on the growing role of supra-national human rights norms. We will discuss the former using the work of the Japanese management expert Kenichi Ohmae, and the latter with reference to a study by Harvard sociologist Yasemin Soysal.

In his book, *The Borderless World*, Ohmae argues that a supra-national power has already emerged; he calls it the Interlinked Economy (ILE), which consists of the 'Triad' (the USA, Europe and Japan), joined by new industrial economies such as Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore.

It has become so powerful that it has swallowed most consumers and corporations, made traditional national borders almost disappear, and pushed bureaucrats, politicians and the military towards the status of declining industries. (Ohmae, 1991, p. xi)

This may come as something of a surprise to the officials of the EU or the generals of the Pentagon, and indeed – even more so – to asylum-seekers trying to cross the borders of Fortress Europe, but this is not what Ohmae is concerned with: his borderless world applies to the transnational corporations and their executives and specialists. He is talking about what he sees as an inevitable trend:

The policy objective for the ILE will be ensuring the free flow of information, money, goods and services as well as the free migration of people and corporations. Traditional governments will have to establish a new single framework of global governance. (Ohmae, 1991, p. xii–xiii)

For Ohmae, the global economy is driven by the free choices of customers, which dictate a radical opening of economies. The task of government is to end protectionism and to 'ensure that its people have a good life by ensuring stable access to the best and the cheapest goods and services from anywhere in the world' (Ohmae, 1991, p. 12). The burgeoning flow of information is turning people into 'global citizens', who are aware of all that is happening around the world – with regard to tastes and preferences, styles of clothing, sports and lifestyles (Ohmae, 1991, pp. 18–22). Thus, Ohmae reduces the philosophical notion of the

'good life' to the right to buy the most stylish and best-quality consumer goods. Global citizenship is about reducing the role of government in order to permit untrammelled play to the transnational corporations.

Yet it is not so easy to dismiss this vision. Ohmae is right to claim that much economic power has passed from states to corporations and to markets. His argument is a post-nationalist one, when he claims that power in the great companies can no longer effectively be based in one country or on one national culture. He shows that successful management requires the abandonment of 'the headquarters mentality', and a real decentralization of decision making to global networks. This is in turn only possible if corporations can free themselves of the national culture of their founders and develop their own transnational culture, that is, 'a system of values that all employees in all countries and regions unquestionably accept' (Ohmae, 1991, p. 89).

Ohmae's 'borderless world' is a comfortless place for those who believe in national autonomy. Developing countries that seek to build up their economies through protectionism are doomed to failure; in Ohmae's view, they should throw open their borders to a free transfer of commodities and capital, whatever the social costs (which he never mentions). The 'borderless world' is also bad news for anyone who believes in democracy. Governments are increasingly powerless, so the right to elect them has little meaning. There are no democratic mechanisms in the global marketplaces and transnational corporations. The theme is not even discussed in Ohmae's book – he clearly sees it as irrelevant. Ohmae's global citizen is imbued with consumerism, not democratic values.

Ohmae is an adviser to some of the world's most powerful corporations, so his views may be seen as a significant expression of the technocratic logic of advanced sectors of capital. He is pointing to real trends that contain serious threats to any notion of democratic citizenship. The analysis shows the difficulties faced by democratically elected authorities constituted at the nation-state level when they seek to influence the global economy. The answer can only lie in the development of democratically elected supra-national bodies capable of developing countervailing power to control economic interests at the global level.

A very different notion of 'post-national membership' is put forward in the book *Limits of Citizenship* by Yasemin Soysal. She argues that:

A new and more universal concept of citizenship has unfolded in the post-war era, one whose organising and legitimating principles are based on universal personhood rather than national belonging. (Soysal, 1994, p. 1)