


# MORALITY IN PRACTICE

F o u r t h   E d i t i o n

*James P. Sterba*



STUDENT  
BOOK CENTER  
STERMOR 962

PHI306

NEW \$36.00

USED \$27.00

NO REFUND IF  
REMOVED

---

---

# Morality in Practice

Fourth Edition

**Edited by**  
**James P. Sterba**  
University of Notre Dame

**Wadsworth Publishing Company**  
Belmont, California  
A Division of Wadsworth



Philosophy Editor: Tammy Goldfeld  
Editorial Assistant: Kristina Pappas  
Production Editor: The Book Company  
Print Buyer: Karen Hunt  
Permissions Editor: Robert Kauser  
Designer: Vargas/Williams/Design  
Copy Editor: Susan Lundgren  
Cover: Lois Stanfield  
Compositor: Kachina Typesetting  
Printer: Fairfield Graphics



*This book is printed on  
acid-free recycled paper.*

ITP™

**International Thomson Publishing**

The trademark ITP is used under license

© 1994 by Wadsworth, Inc. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transcribed, in any form or by any means, without the prior written permission of the publisher, Wadsworth Publishing Company, Belmont, California 94002.

Printed in the United States of America

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10—98 97 96 95 94

**Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data**

Morality in practice. / edited by James P. Sterba. —4th ed.

p. cm.

Includes bibliographical references.

ISBN 0-534-21277-8

1. Social ethics. I. Sterba, James P.

HM216.M667 1993

303.3'72-dc20

93-5408  
CIP

1-13

14-42

41-73

514-530

114-119

532-558

255-288

# Morality in Practice

Fourth Edition

*This book is again dedicated to Sonya,  
now a teenager, whose sense of what are  
moral problems has changed my own.*



---

## *Preface*

---

Moral problems courses tend to teach themselves. It takes a really bad teacher to mess them up. Teachers can mess up a moral problems course in at least three ways:

1. By presenting just one set of views on various topics. Students appreciate the need for fair play here.
2. By encouraging students to hold a crude relativism. Students know that all moral stances are not equally good.
3. By not being relevant to student concerns. Students can reasonably expect that at least an ethics course will be relevant to their lives.

This text enables teachers to avoid (1) by presenting radically opposed selections on all topics. It enables teachers to avoid (2) by suggesting, through the introductions and through the ordering and selection of topics, how some views turn out to be more defensible than others. It enables teachers to avoid (3) by being the only moral problems text that provides readings on a broad range of standard and new topics. In fact, no other moral problems text combines such breadth and depth. In addition, it has to recommend it, the following:

---

### **New Features**

---

1. Thirty-three new readings.
2. Three new sections: sexual harassment, national health care, and war and humanitarian intervention.
3. Two sections recast and revised: near and distant peoples, sex equality.
4. All other sections revised.

5. A revised general introduction that provides a background discussion of traditional moral approaches to ethics as well as an accessible answer to the question: Why be moral?

---

### **Retained Features**

---

1. Section introductions that help to set out the framework for the discussion and criticism of the articles in each section.
2. Brief summaries at the beginning of each article that enable students to test and improve their comprehension.
3. Each section of the anthology concludes with one or more articles discussing specific practical applications.
4. Suggestions for further reading are found at the end of each section.

In putting together this fourth edition, I have again benefited enormously from the advice and help of many different people. Very special thanks go to my colleague John Robinson, who offered many suggestions that have been incorporated into this edition. Thanks also go to Ken King of Wadsworth Publishing Company, George Calmenson of The Book Company, my wife and fellow philosopher Janet Kourany, and Wendy Donner of Carleton University. I would also like to thank the following reviewers whose suggestions were especially helpful: Elizabeth Anderson, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor; Edward Becker, University of Nebraska, Lincoln; Thomas Carlson, Macalester College; Charles Dresser, Arizona State University; Timothy J. Eves, University of Connecticut; and Justin Schwartz, Ohio State University.



---

## Contents

---

*Preface*    *xiii*

*General Introduction*    *1*

### I.    The Distribution of Income and Wealth

Introduction    16

#### ALTERNATIVE VIEWS

1. **John Hospers** / The Libertarian Manifesto    21
2. **Kai Nielson** / Radical Egalitarianism    31
3. **John Rawls** / A Social Contract Perspective    41
4. **James P. Sterba** / From Liberty to Equality    55

#### PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS

5. **Supreme Court of the United States** / *Wyman, Commissioner of New York Department of Social Services v. James*    61
6. **Supreme Court of the United States** / *Plyler v. Doe*    64
7. **Peter Marin** / Homelessness    70

### II.    Near and Distant Peoples

Introduction    76

#### ALTERNATIVE VIEWS

8. **Garrett Hardin** / Lifeboat Ethics: The Case Against Helping the Poor    81
9. **Peter Singer** / The Famine Relief Argument    89
10. **Lawrence Blum** / Impartiality, Beneficence, and Friendship    99
11. **James Rachels** / Morality, Parents, and Children    105

#### PRACTICAL APPLICATION

12. **Gus Speth** / Perspectives from the *Global 2000 Report*    114

### III. Abortion and Euthanasia

Introduction 122

#### ALTERNATIVE VIEWS

13. **Judith Jarvis Thomson** / A Defense of Abortion 127
14. **John Noonan** / How to Argue about Abortion 136
15. **Mary Anne Warren** / On the Moral and Legal Status of Abortion 146
16. **Jane English** / Abortion and the Concept of a Person 157
17. **Catharine MacKinnon** / A Feminist Perspective on the Right to Abortion 163
18. **James Rachels** / Euthanasia, Killing, and Letting Die 173
19. **Bonnie Steinbock** / The Intentional Termination of Life 183

#### PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS

20. **Supreme Court of the United States** / *Planned Parenthood v. Casey* 189
21. **Linda Bird Francke** / Abortion: A Personal Moral Dilemma 195
22. **Supreme Court of the United States** / *Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health* 199
23. **The Case of Dr. Kevorkian** 204

### IV. Sex Equality

Introduction 208

#### ALTERNATIVE VIEWS

24. **Susan Okin** / Justice and Gender 211
25. **James P. Sterba** / Feminist Justice and the Family 223
26. **Christina Sommers** / Philosophers against the Family 231
27. **Marilyn Friedman** / They Lived Happily Ever After: Sommers on Women and Marriage 236

#### PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS

28. **National Organization for Women (NOW)** / Bill of Rights 244
29. **Supreme Court of the United States** / *California Federal Savings and Loan v. Department of Fair Employment and Housing* 245



## V. Affirmative Action and Comparable Worth

Introduction 252

### ALTERNATIVE VIEWS

- 30. **Barry R. Gross** / The Case against Reverse Discrimination 255
- 31. **Bernard Boxill** / The Case for Affirmation Action 260
- 32. **Charles Murray** / Affirmative Racism 272
- 33. **Claude M. Steele** / Race and the Schooling of Black Americans 279
- 34. **Clifford Hackett** / Comparable Worth: Better from a Distance 288
- 35. **Elaine Sorensen** / The Comparable Worth Debate 293

### PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS

- 36. **Supreme Court of the United States** / *City of Richmond v. Croson* 300

## VI. Pornography

Introduction 312

### ALTERNATIVE VIEWS

- 37. **Catharine MacKinnon** / Pornography, Civil Rights and Speech 314
- 38. **Lisa Duggan, Nan Hunter, and Carole Vance** / Feminist Antipornography Legislation 326

### PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS

- 39. **United States District Court and Court of Appeals** / *American Booksellers v. Hudnutt* 335
- 40. **Supreme Court of Canada** / *Donald Victor Butler v. Her Majesty the Queen* 343

## VII. Sexual Harassment

Introduction 352

### ALTERNATIVE VIEWS

- 41. **Barbara A. Gutek** / Understanding Sexual Harassment at Work 354
- 42. **Ellen Frankel Paul** / Exaggerating the Extent of Sexual Harassment 365

### PRACTICAL APPLICATION

- 43. **Nancy Fraser** / Reflections on the Confirmation of Clarence Thomas 369



## VIII. Privacy, Drug Testing, and AIDS

Introduction 382

### ALTERNATIVE VIEWS

- 44. **W. A. Parent** / Privacy, Morality, and the Law 384
- 45. **Susan Dentzer, Bob Cohn, George Raine, Ginny Carroll, and Vicki Quade** / Can You Pass the Job Test? 391
- 46. **James Felman and Christopher Petrini** / Drug Testing and Public Employment 397
- 47. **Theresa L. Crenshaw** / HIV Testing: Voluntary, Mandatory, or Routine? 411

### PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS

- 48. **Court of Appeals of the United States** / *Schaill v. Tippecanoe School Corporation* 417
- 49. **United States Court of Appeals** / *Chalk v. U.S. District Court of California* 420

## IX. Gay and Lesbian Rights

Introduction 428

### ALTERNATIVE VIEWS

- 50. **Michael Levin** / Homosexuality Is Abnormal 430
- 51. **Timothy F. Murphy** / Homosexuality and Nature 434
- 52. **Paul Cameron** / A Case against Homosexuality 439
- 53. **Richard D. Mohr** / Prejudice and Homosexuality 448

### PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS

- 54. **Supreme Court of the United States** / *Bowers v. Hardwick* 456
- 55. **Ken Corbett** / Gays in the Military: Between Fear and Fantasy 462

## X. Animal Liberation and Environmental Justice

Introduction 466

### ALTERNATIVE VIEWS

- 56. **R. D. Guthrie** / Antropocentrism 469
- 57. **Peter Singer** / All Animals Are Equal 475



58. **Paul W. Taylor** / The Ethics of Respect for Nature 487  
 59. **James P. Sterba** / Environmental Justice 499

#### PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS

60. **Congress of the United States** / From the Animal Welfare Act 506  
 61. **Congress of the United States** / Amendments to the Animal Welfare Act 507  
 62. **Supreme Court of the United States** / *Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill* 508

## XI. National Health Care

- Introduction 514

#### ALTERNATIVE VIEWS

63. **Michael Walzer** / The Case of Medical Care 516  
 64. **Nancy Watzman** / Socialized Medicine Now—Without the Wait 519  
 65. **John C. Goodman** / An Expensive Way to Die 525

#### PRACTICAL APPLICATION

66. **Health Insurance Association of America** / A Plan for Comprehensive Health Care 529

## XII. War and Humanitarian Intervention

- Introduction 532

#### ALTERNATIVE VIEWS

67. **James P. Sterba** / Reconciling Pacifists and Just War Theorists 536  
 68. **Michael Walzer** / Humanitarian Intervention 544  
 69. **Barbara Harff** / The Need for Humanitarian Intervention: Bosnia and Somalia 549

#### PRACTICAL APPLICATION

70. **Robert S. McNamara** / A New World Security Order 555



---

---

# General Introduction

Most of us like to think of ourselves as just and moral people. To be truly such, however, we need to know something about the demands of justice and how they apply in our own particular circumstances. We should be able to assess, for example, whether our society's economic and legal systems are just—that is, whether the ways income and wealth are distributed in society as well as the methods of enforcing that distribution give people what they deserve. We should also consider whether other societal institutions, such as the military defense system, the education system, and the foreign aid program, are truly just. Without investigating these systems and coming to an informed opinion, we cannot say with any certainty that we are just and moral persons rather than perpetrators or beneficiaries of injustice.

This anthology has been created to help you acquire some of the knowledge you will need to justify your belief that you are a just and moral person. For this purpose, the anthology contains a wide spectrum of readings on twelve important, contemporary, practical problems:

1. The problem of the distribution of income and wealth. (Who should control what resources within a society?)

2. The problem of near and distant peoples. (What obligations do we have to near and distant peoples?)
3. The problem of abortion and euthanasia. (Do fetuses have a right to life, and what should we do for the dying and those requiring life-sustaining medical treatment?)
4. The problem of sex equality. (Should the sexes be treated equally, and what constitutes equal treatment?)
5. The problem of affirmative action and comparable worth. (What specific policies are required to remedy discrimination and prejudice?)
6. The problem of pornography. (Should pornography be prohibited because it promotes violence against women?)
7. The problem of sexual harassment. (What is sexual harassment and how can it be avoided?)
8. The problem of privacy, drug testing, and AIDS. (Do programs for drug testing and testing for AIDS violate a person's right to privacy?)
9. The problem of gay and lesbian rights. (What rights should gays and lesbians have?)



10. The problem of animal liberation and environmental justice. (What should our policies be for the treatment of animals and the environment?)
11. The problem of national health care. (How can our national health care system be improved?)
12. The problem of war and humanitarian intervention. (What are the moral limits to the international use of force?)

Before you get into these problems, however, you should know what it means to take a moral approach to these issues and how such an approach is justified.

---

### *The Essential Features of a Moral Approach to Practical Problems*

---

To begin with, a moral approach to practical problems must be distinguished from various nonmoral approaches. Nonmoral approaches to practical problems include the *legal approach* (what the law requires with respect to this practical problem), the *group- or self-interest approach* (what the group- or self-interest is of the parties affected by this problem), and the *scientific approach* (how this practical problem can best be accounted for or understood). To call these approaches nonmoral, of course, does not imply that they are immoral. All that is implied is that the requirements of these approaches may or may not accord with the requirements of morality.

What, then, essentially characterizes a moral approach to practical problems? I suggest that there are two essential features to such an approach:

1. The approach is prescriptive, that is, it issues in prescriptions, such as "do this" and "don't do that."
2. The approach's prescriptions are acceptable to everyone affected by them.

The first feature distinguishes a moral approach from a scientific approach because a

scientific approach is not prescriptive. The second feature distinguishes a moral approach from both a legal approach and a group- or self-interest approach because the prescriptions that accord best with the law or serve the interest of particular groups or individuals may not be acceptable to everyone affected by them.

Here the notion of "acceptable" means "ought to be accepted" or "is reasonable to accept" and not simply "is capable of being accepted." Understood in this way, certain prescriptions may be acceptable even though they are not actually accepted by everyone affected by them. For example, a particular welfare program may be acceptable even though many people oppose it because it involves an increased tax burden. Likewise, certain prescriptions may be unacceptable even though they have been accepted by everyone affected by them. For example, it may be that most women have been socialized to accept prescriptions requiring them to fill certain social roles even though these prescriptions are unacceptable because they impose second-class status on them.

---

### *Alternative Moral Approaches to Practical Problems*

---

Using the two essential features of a moral approach to practical problems, let us consider three principal alternative moral approaches to practical problems: a *Utilitarian Approach*, an *Aristotelian Approach*, and a *Kantian Approach*.<sup>1</sup> The basic principle of a Utilitarian Approach is:

Do those actions that maximize the net utility or satisfaction of everyone affected by them.

A Utilitarian Approach qualifies as a moral approach because it is prescriptive and because it can be argued that its prescriptions are acceptable to everyone affected by them since they take the utility or satisfaction of all those individuals equally into account.

To illustrate, let's consider how this approach applies to the question of whether



nation A should intervene in the internal affairs of nation B when nation A's choice would have the following consequences:

	Nation A's Choice	
	<i>Intervene</i>	<i>Don't Intervene</i>
Net utility to A	4 trillion units	8½ trillion units
Net utility to B	2 trillion units	-2 trillion units
Total utility	6 trillion units	6½ trillion units

Given that these are all the consequences that are relevant to nation A's choice, a Utilitarian Approach favors not intervening. Note that in this case, the choice favoring a Utilitarian Approach does not conflict with the group-interest of nation A, although it does conflict with the group-interest of nation B.

But are such calculations of utility possible? Admittedly, they are difficult to make. At the same time, such calculations seem to serve as a basis for public discussion. Once President Reagan, addressing a group of black business leaders, asked whether blacks were better off because of the Great Society programs, and although many disagreed with the answer he gave, no one found his question unanswerable.<sup>2</sup> Thus faced with the exigencies of measuring utility, a Utilitarian Approach simply counsels that we do our best to determine what maximizes net utility and act on the result.

The second approach to consider is an Aristotelian Approach. Its basic principle is:

Do those actions that would further one's proper development as a human being.

This approach also qualifies as a moral approach because it is prescriptive and because it can be argued that its prescriptions are acceptable to everyone affected by them.

There are, however, different versions of this approach. According to some versions, each person can determine through the use of reason his or her proper development as a human being. Other versions disagree. For example, many religious traditions rely on

revelation to guide people in their proper development as human beings. However, although an Aristotelian Approach can take these various forms, I want to focus on what is probably its philosophically most interesting form. That form specifies proper development in terms of virtuous activity and understands virtuous activity to preclude intentionally doing evil that good may come of it. In this form, an Aristotelian Approach conflicts most radically with a Utilitarian Approach, which requires intentionally doing evil whenever a *greater* good would come of it.

The third approach to be considered is a Kantian Approach. This approach has its origins in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century social contract theories, which tended to rely on actual contracts to specify moral requirements. However, actual contracts may or may not have been made, and, even if they were made, they may or may not have been moral or fair. This led Immanuel Kant and contemporary Kantian John Rawls to resort to a hypothetical contract to ground moral requirements. A difficulty with this approach is in determining under what conditions a hypothetical contract is fair and moral. Currently, the most favored Kantian Approach is specified by the following basic principle:

Do those actions that persons behind an imaginary veil of ignorance would unanimously agree should be done.<sup>3</sup>

This imaginary veil extends to most particular facts about oneself—anything that would bias one's choice or stand in the way of a unanimous agreement. Accordingly, the imaginary veil of ignorance would mask one's knowledge of one's social position, talents, sex, race, and religion, but not one's knowledge of such general information as would be contained in political, social, economic, and psychological theories. A Kantian Approach qualifies as a moral approach because it is prescriptive and because it can be argued that its prescriptions would be acceptable to everyone affected by them since they would be agreed to by everyone affected behind an imaginary veil of ignorance.

To illustrate the approach, let's return to the example of nation A and nation B used



earlier. The choice facing nation A was the following:

	Nation A's Choice	
	<i>Intervene</i>	<i>Don't Intervene</i>
Net utility to A	4 trillion units	8½ trillion units
Net utility to B	2 trillion units	-2 trillion units
Total utility	6 trillion units	6½ trillion units

Given that these are all the consequences relevant to nation A's choice, a Kantian Approach favors intervention because persons behind the imaginary veil of ignorance would have to consider that they might turn out to be in nation B, and in that case, they would not want to be so disadvantaged for the greater benefit of those in nation A. This resolution conflicts with the resolution favored by a Utilitarian Approach and the group-interest of nation A, but not with the group-interest of nation B.

---

### *Assessing Alternative Moral Approaches*

---

Needless to say, each of these moral approaches has its strengths and weaknesses. The main strength of a Utilitarian Approach is that once the relevant utilities are determined, there is an effective decision-making procedure that can be used to resolve all practical problems. After determining the relevant utilities, all that remains is to total the net utilities and choose the alternative with the highest net utility. The basic weakness of this approach, however, is that it does not give sufficient weight to the distribution of utility among the relevant parties. For example, consider a society equally divided between the Privileged Rich and the Alienated Poor who face the following alternatives:

	Nation A's Choice	
	<i>Alternative A</i>	<i>Alternative B</i>
Net utility to Privileged Rich	5½ trillion units	4 trillion units
Net utility to Alienated Poor	1 trillion units	2 trillion units
Total utility	6½ trillion units	6 trillion units

Given that these are all the relevant utilities, a Utilitarian Approach favors Alternative A even though Alternative B provides a higher minimum payoff. And if the utility values for two alternatives were:

	Nation A's Choice	
	<i>Alternative A</i>	<i>Alternative B</i>
Net utility to Privileged Rich	4 trillion units	5 trillion units
Net utility to Alienated Poor	2 trillion units	1 trillion units
Total utility	6 trillion units	6 trillion units

A Utilitarian Approach would be indifferent between the alternatives, even though Alternative A again provides a higher minimum payoff. In this way, a Utilitarian Approach fails to take into account the distribution of utility among the relevant parties. All that matters for this approach is maximizing total utility, and the distribution of utility among the affected parties is taken into account only insofar as it contributes toward the attainment of that goal.

By contrast, the main strength of an Aristotelian Approach in the form we are considering is that it limits the means that can be chosen in pursuit of good consequences. In particular, it absolutely prohibits intentionally doing evil that good may come of it. However, although some limit on the means available for the pursuit of good consequences seems desirable, the main weakness of this version of an



Aristotelian Approach is that the limit it imposes is too strong. Indeed, exceptions to this limit would seem to be justified whenever the evil to be done is:

1. Trivial (e.g., stepping on someone's foot to get out of a crowded subway).
2. Easily reparable (e.g., lying to a temporarily depressed friend to keep her from committing suicide).
3. Sufficiently outweighed by the consequences of the action (e.g., shooting one of 200 civilian hostages to prevent in the only way possible the execution of all 200).

Still another weakness of this approach is that it lacks an effective decision-making procedure for resolving practical problems. Beyond imposing limits on the means that can be employed in the pursuit of good consequences, the advocates of this approach have not agreed on criteria for selecting among the available alternatives.

The main strength of a Kantian Approach is that like an Aristotelian Approach, it seeks to limit the means available for the pursuit of good consequences. However, unlike the version of the an Aristotelian Approach we considered, a Kantian Approach does not impose an absolute limit on intentionally doing evil that good may come of it. Behind the veil of ignorance, persons would surely agree that if the evil were trivial, easily reparable, or sufficiently outweighed by the consequences, there would be an adequate justification for permitting it. On the other hand, the main weakness of a Kantian Approach is that although it provides an effective decision-making procedure for resolving some practical problems, such as the problem of how to distribute income and wealth and the problem of near and distant people, a Kantian Approach cannot be applied to all problems. For example, it will not work for the problems of animal rights and abortion unless we assume that animals and fetuses should be behind the veil of ignorance.

So far, we have seen that prescriptivity and acceptability of prescriptions by everyone affected by them are the two essential features of a moral approach to practical problems,

and we have considered three principal alternative approaches that qualify as moral approaches to these problems. Let's now examine what reasons there are for giving a moral approach to practical problems precedence over any nonmoral approach with which it conflicts.

---

### *From Rationality to Morality*

---

To begin with, the ethical egoist, by denying the priority of morality over self-interest, presents the most serious challenge to a moral approach to practical problems. Basically, that challenge takes two forms: Individual Ethical Egoism and Universal Ethical Egoism. The basic principle of Individual Ethical Egoism is:

Everyone ought to do what is in the overall self-interest of just one particular individual.

The basic principle of Universal Ethical Egoism is:

Everyone ought to do what is in his or her overall self-interest.

Obviously, the prescriptions deriving from these two forms of egoism would conflict significantly with prescriptions following from a moral approach to practical problems. How then can we show that a moral approach is preferable to an egoist's approach?

---

### *The Justification for Following a Moral Approach to Practical Problems*

---

In Individual Ethical Egoism, all prescriptions are based on the overall interests of just one particular individual. Let's call that individual Gladys. Because in Individual Ethical Egoism Gladys's interests constitute the sole basis for determining prescriptions, there should be no problem of inconsistent prescriptions, assuming, of course, that Gladys's own particular interests are in harmony. The crucial problem



for Individual Ethical Egoism, however, is justifying that only Gladys's interests count in determining prescriptions. Individual Ethical Egoism must provide at least some reason for accepting that view. Otherwise, it would be irrational to accept the theory. But what reason or reasons could serve this function? Clearly, it will not do to cite as a reason some characteristic Gladys shares with other persons because whatever justification such a characteristic would provide for favoring Gladys's interests, it would also provide for favoring the interests of those other persons. Nor will it do to cite as a reason some unique characteristic of Gladys, such as knowing all of Shakespeare's writings by heart, because such a characteristic involves a comparative element, and consequently others with similar characteristics, like knowing some or most of Shakespeare's corpus by heart, would still have some justification, although a proportionally lesser justification, for having their interests favored. But again the proposed characteristic would not justify favoring only Gladys's interests.

A similar objection could be raised if a unique relational characteristic were proposed as a reason for Gladys's special status—such as that Gladys is Seymour's wife. Because other persons would have similar but not identical relational characteristics, similar but not identical reasons would hold for them. Nor will it do to argue that the reason for Gladys's special status is not the particular unique traits that she possesses, but rather the mere fact that she had unique traits. The same would hold true of everyone else. Every individual has unique traits. If recourse to unique traits is dropped and Gladys claims that she is special simply because she is herself and wants to further her own interests, every other person could claim the same.<sup>4</sup>

For the Individual Ethical Egoist to argue that the same or similar reasons do *not* hold for other peoples with the same or similar characteristics to those of Gladys, she must explain *why* they do not hold. It must always be possible to understand how a characteristic serves as a reason in one case but not in another. If no explanation can be provided, and in the case of Individual Ethical Egoism none has

been forthcoming, the proposed characteristic either serves as a reason in both cases or does not serve as a reason at all.

---

### *Universal Ethical Egoism*

---

Unfortunately, these objections to Individual Ethical Egoism do not work against Universal Ethical Egoism because Universal Ethical Egoism does provide a reason why the egoist should be concerned simply about maximizing his or her own interests, which is simply that the egoist is herself and wants to further her own interests. The Individual Ethical Egoist could not recognize such a reason without giving up her view, but the Universal Ethical Egoist is willing and able to universalize her claim and recognize that everyone has a similar justification for adopting Universal Ethical Egoism.

Accordingly, the objections that typically have been raised against Universal Ethical Egoism are designed to show that the view is fundamentally inconsistent. For the purpose of evaluating these objections, let's consider the case of Gary Gyges, an otherwise normal human being who, for reasons of personal gain, has embezzled \$300,000 while working at People's National Bank and is in the process of escaping to a South Sea island where he will have the good fortune to live a pleasant life protected by the local authorities and untroubled by any qualms of conscience. Suppose that Hedda Hawkeye, a fellow employee, knows that Gyges has been embezzling money from the bank and is about to escape. Suppose, further, that it is in Hawkeye's overall self-interest to prevent Gyges from escaping with the embezzled money because she will be generously rewarded for doing so by being appointed vice-president of the bank. Given that it is in Gyges's overall self-interest to escape with the embezzled money, it now appears that we can derive a contradiction from the following:

1. Gyges ought to escape with the embezzled money.