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EUROPE

IN THE
XIXTH & XXTH
CENTURIES

1815 — 1939

BY

E. LIPSON


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BY E. LIPSON

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
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EUROPE IN THE
19TH & 20TH CENTURIES



PREFACE

THIS new edition appears under the shadow of great events. A second World War is in progress, and as it sweeps with majestic force through the pages of History the onlooker may well feel his desire strengthened to understand the origins of the cataclysm which has set in motion so titanic a conflict. A protracted war necessarily presents many surprises, for the elements of chance and accident largely dictate its immediate course. Yet although prediction is hazardous when we follow the developments from day to day, we may feel confident that the pattern must be true to the design, and that the historical factors which shape human destiny will eventually write the last chapter of the story.

Perhaps the most unexpected feature of the second World War has been the heroic resistance of Soviet Russia against an enemy who in the military as in the political field had perfected the art of springing his surprises upon his victims. The capacity of the Russian people to endure incredible sacrifices in order to expel the invader from their land shows that their national spirit has not been submerged by the new social and economic conditions created within the past quarter of a century. And the ability of their Government to provide in abundance the mechanical resources with which modern warfare is carried on must be taken as evidence that Russia has now mastered the initial difficulties which attended the early stages of her industrial transformation,

and is able to stand up to her formidable opponent in the latter's own chosen field. It may be presumed that the rebirth of the Russian national spirit will accelerate the swing of the pendulum, which was foreshadowed in the section of this book devoted to Soviet Russia.

E. LIPSON.

September, 1943

PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION

THIS book is an expansion of my *Europe in the Nineteenth Century* (1815-1914). The addition of a new chapter on "The Last Twenty-Five Years" (1914-1939), comprising nearly two hundred pages, appears to be justified by the momentous character of the epoch-making events which occurred between 1914 and 1939. The World War, the re-making of the map of Europe, the League of Nations, the Soviet Republic, National Socialism, Fascism, and Economic Nationalism—all mark out the past quarter of a century as no ordinary phase of History. For this reason they merit the attention of students and general readers who seek to understand the complex phenomena of our own age. The attempt to establish a new international order based on the renunciation of war, the creation of Totalitarian States resting on the domination of a single party enveloping like a political octopus the whole life of a nation, the reaction against the conception of a world economy: these movements must profoundly affect the future trend of the European State-system, either by intensifying the forces which now make for separatism, or by harmonizing the divergent interests of discordant elements within the unifying framework of some form of Federal Union.

In the new chapter I have endeavoured to show the interdependence of political and economic factors in shaping the recent development of Europe. The growth of Economic Nationalism, as the fruit and counterpart of Political Nationalism, exerted a baneful influence on the relation-

ships of European nations, and contributed in a vital degree to make inevitable the renewal of war in 1939. In addition, the Socialist State in Soviet Russia and the Corporate State in Fascist Italy are phenomena which belong to the sphere of politics as well as of economics, and therefore constitute an integral part of the political evolution of Modern Europe.

The reader should bear in mind that the use of the present tense in Chapter VIII, on "The New Era" (1871-1914), applies to the European situation as it existed in the years preceding the war of 1914-1918.

The plan on which the original edition of this work was based has given rise to some discussion as to the best way of writing European History. The traditional method of surveying it from the standpoint of international politics was discarded in favour of a method of treatment which afforded a concise and connected account—analytical rather than narrative—of the internal development of the chief European States since the fall of Napoleon. Professor F. J. C. Hearnshaw, in his *Main Currents of European History*, after quoting the preface to the original edition, compares the different methods adopted by historians. Experience of teaching the subject for several years has convinced me that the student is most likely to obtain an intelligent grasp of European History when each country is treated, as far as possible, as a separate entity, although due recognition must be paid to the working of forces which have affected the destinies of all. I recognize, however, that there is ample room for other methods, nor is there any necessity for adopting one to the exclusion of the rest.

E. LIPSON.

April, 1940

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EUROPE IN THE NINETEENTH
CENTURY

CHAPTER I

REACTION AND REVOLUTION IN FRANCE
(1815-1870)

NAPOLEON bequeathed to his successors the problem of reconciling two divergent aims: the establishment of a form of government acceptable to France combined with the pursuit of a policy acceptable to Europe. For over half a century this problem taxed to the utmost the resources of French statesmanship. The French people were resolved at all costs to break up the settlement of 1815, which was associated in their minds with contracted frontiers and loss of national prestige. The Powers were equally resolved to preserve this settlement in all its integrity, conscious that its violation would open the door to endless confusion and the peril of a European conflagration. Three different attempts were made to devise a satisfactory solution of the problem; each in turn met with failure. The position of the Bourbons was compromised from the outset by their dependence upon the Allies, in whose baggage-train, as it was scornfully said, they had returned to France. While the crisis which precipitated their ruin was provoked by the folly of their domestic administration, their fall would appear to have been inevitable sooner or later. The Orleans Monarchy adopted a foreign policy which was in diametrical opposition to the wishes of the nation, and the support of the middle classes only retarded, but could not avert, its

1815
Problems
of French
history.

1815 — ultimate downfall. Napoleon III. was more fortunate in rallying French sentiment for a time to his throne, but his very success involved the alienation of Europe, whose apprehensions were awakened by his efforts to revive the glories of the First Empire ; and in the end he, too, shared the fate of his predecessors. The record of these three successive attempts constitutes the history of France from 1815 to 1870 ; they furnish the thread which gives unity and coherence to the period.

The Ultra-Royalists.

The restoration of the Bourbon dynasty to the throne of France furnished the signal for the outbreak of political strife. The country was divided into two parties, and for fifteen years a struggle ensued which wore all the appearance of an epilogue to the more titanic conflict of 1789. The issues at stake merit attention, because in their light alone we can interpret the confused and troubled events which lead up to the cataclysm of 1830. On one side were grouped the Ultra-Royalists, the obstinate and relentless enemies of the French Revolution, inflexibly resolved not only to stem the rising tide of Liberalism, but to turn back the whole course of French historical development into reactionary channels. They represented the traditional policy of the *émigrés* who had always repudiated the Revolution, and all its works, being pledged to leave no stone unturned until they were once more entrenched in the stronghold of absolutism and privilege. Their fanaticism, the outgrowth of embittered memories, was inexplicable to the new generation which had grown up in the midst of social conditions that already seemed part and parcel of the immutable, unchanging order of the Universe. It was unintelligible even to moderate Royalists : " I do not understand your passions, your relentless hatreds," said Richelieu ; " I pass every day by the house which belonged to my ancestors, I see their property in other hands, and I behold in museums the treasures which belonged to them. It is a sad sight ; but it does not rouse in me feelings either of despair or revenge. You appear to me sometimes to be out of your minds, all of you who have remained in France." His counsels of moderation fell upon deaf ears. For twenty

years the partisans of the *ancien régime* had openly or in secrecy nourished the passion of revenge, waiting for the day when the turn of the wheel of fortune would place the government of France in their hands and enable them to strike a blow at their enemies. In the moment of their triumph it required a magnanimity which only the best minds could feel not to abuse their power, and to sacrifice their own feelings for the general welfare of their country. Unfortunately neither magnanimity nor moderation was a virtue which the Ultra-Royalists had learnt to cultivate, and their excesses brought upon them signal retribution.

The leading idea of the Ultra-Royalist programme was nothing less than to revive the old order, together with certain modifications conceived not in the interests of the monarchy, but in those of the nobility. To achieve this design, they contemplated first of all the restoration of the Catholic Church to its former ascendancy, resting all their projects upon an alliance between Church and State, the altar and the throne. They proposed to endow it with whatever ecclesiastical property, confiscated at the time of the Revolution, still remained in the hands of the State; this was intended to form the nucleus for the growth of a landed Church, fortified by all the authority and prestige which the possession of land alone could confer. At the same time the direction of education, and the vast influence which springs from its wise administration, were given over to the charge of ecclesiastics. A bishop was appointed president of the University (1822), and entrusted with powers of control over the schools so extensive as to constitute almost a dictatorship of education. The Jesuits also were permitted to return to France, and to set up their own seminaries, where instruction was given gratuitously. Once the clerical party was established in an impregnable position, it could then assume the task of reconstructing the social and political system of France under the pretence of re-invigorating its spiritual and moral life. Under the cover of religious teaching the seeds of reaction would be sown far and wide, and the mind of the country thus pre-

1815

Their programme.

1815

pared for the complete transformation of the existing order. The work of the Church in teaching resignation and submission was to be supplemented by a vigorous censorship, which would enable the Government to repress every newspaper or other publication detrimental to the objects it had in view. Public opinion, fettered and controlled, was to be moulded on approved lines, and the nation was to be denied the right of free discussion lest it should awaken to a sense of the perils to which its liberties were exposed. Even foreign policy was to be exploited in a manner which would reconcile the French nation to the most sweeping changes in their domestic situation. The great writer, Chateaubriand, contended that the Bourbon dynasty would never strike deep root in the hearts of the people until it had covered itself with glory on the field of battle. "The white cockade will be established when it has once more faced the foe." Yet a stable monarchy and an endowed Church were only means to an end; primarily the Ultra-Royalists were fighting for the privileges of their own order. Nothing less than this was to be the price of their allegiance. They were bent on recovering their forfeited property and whatever rights the old nobility had possessed on the eve of the Revolution, but in addition they claimed a measure of political power from which hitherto they had always been excluded.

*The
upholders
of the
Revolution.*

In opposition to the Ultra-Royalists were the moderate elements, pledged "to defend the Revolution and continue it without the revolutionary spirit." This party, in the words of their own leader, "dreamt of an alliance between order and liberty, between Legitimacy and the Revolution." Their attitude was in reality conservative, and their policy almost purely negative. They had no sympathy with extreme views, and accepted the monarchy imposed upon them by the arms of the Allies, willing to remain loyal to the King, so long as the King remained loyal to the conditions on which he held his throne. But the cardinal tenet of their faith, to which they passionately and resolutely adhered, was the determination never to relinquish their firm grasp upon the heritage bequeathed to them by the

Revolution. To restore the *ancien régime* with its political, social, and religious traditions was to undo the laborious work of a generation, and a second time to incarcerate the soul of the nation in the prison-house of bondage. The Moderates took their stand by the Charter, which Louis XVIII. had promulgated on his accession to the French throne. Its importance lay in the fact that it definitely repudiated the traditions of the *ancien régime*, and substituted in their place the traditions of the Revolution and the Empire. From the Revolution it took over as part and parcel of the law of France the principles of toleration, equality before the law, and admission to all public offices; from the Empire it borrowed the machinery of centralized administration. The Charter also gave the French people rights of control over the Government, which they had not possessed under the Empire. It established a legislative assembly consisting of two Chambers: one composed of peers, who were either hereditary or nominated by the Crown for life; the other chosen by election, though on a very narrow basis, the franchise being confined to those who paid £13 yearly in direct taxes. The executive alone could initiate legislation, but the Lower Chamber was allowed to reject its proposals and refuse taxes. Whatever its drawbacks, the Charter was at any rate a guarantee of constitutional monarchy and representative government; it was a social compact between the King and his people, while for all the moderate elements in the country it constituted a confession of political faith.

1815

The
Charter.

Between the partisans of the *ancien régime* and the upholders of the new order no reconciliation could be effected. It was impossible to harmonize their aims or their principles. One party or the other would have to succumb, for France could not continue indefinitely to be torn by their struggles for supremacy. In the long run, as we can now see, there could only have been one issue to the conflict, though the immediate course of events was determined by the personal attitude of the King. It was fortunate for the Bourbon dynasty that Louis XVIII. was under no misapprehension as to the temper of the nation or the precariousness of his

Louis
XVIII.

6 EUROPE IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

1815

own situation,¹ and steadfastly refused to throw in his lot with the extremists or to countenance their incendiary campaign. The condition of affairs, in fact, was parallel to that which existed in England after the Restoration of 1660. Alike in England and France the position of the restored monarch was endangered by the extravagance of those who were more royalist than the King, and whose reactionary violence and revengeful passions brought the monarchy into discredit. Alike in England and France the King, inclined to moderation and unwilling to go again on his travels, managed to steer his course safely between conflicting tendencies, and so postponed the crisis. And alike in England where Charles II. was succeeded by his brother James II., and in France where Louis XVIII. was succeeded by his brother Charles X., the bigotry of the new sovereign speedily provoked a storm of opposition which only subsided after it had driven the King headlong from his throne.

The
Chambre
Introuvable.

From the first moment of the restored monarchy, the Ultra-Royalists began to formulate their programme, and to stir up a flood of political passions. A general election was held after the entrance of the Allies into Paris, when the revolutionary elements had been intimidated into passive acquiescence, and resulted in a sweeping majority for the reactionaries. The new Chamber of Deputies, called by Louis the *Chambre Introuvable*, was vindictive and intemperate, and the energies of the Government were almost completely absorbed in a fruitless attempt to curb its intolerant fanaticism. Talleyrand and the Liberal ministry were at once compelled to resign, and their place was taken by the Duc de Richelieu. Richelieu had shown himself a wise administrator in the service of the Tsar whose confidence he enjoyed, and his accession to office was a pledge of more favourable terms in the peace negotiations with the Allies. His statesmanlike moderation was also the best augury for the stability of the Bourbon monarchy, but this quality did not recommend him to the Chamber which

¹ "There seems but one opinion," wrote Castlereagh, "that if the Allied troops were to withdraw, his Majesty would not be on his throne a week": *Correspondence of Castlereagh* (1853), third ser. iii. 32.