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# 现代管理宗师 德鲁克 文选

英文版

彼得·德鲁克 (Peter Drucker) 著

Selected Essays  
of  
Peter Drucker

The founder of Modern Management

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**Selected Essays of Peter Drucker**  
The founder of Modern Management

机械工业出版社

Peter Drucker: Selected Essays of Peter Drucker —— The Founder of Modern Management  
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## 序



今年夏天，我在美国南加州大学商学院讲学期间，专程回母校克莱蒙特研究生大学，(The Claremont Graduate University) 拜访了我的老师彼得·德鲁克(Peter Drucker，又译为彼得·杜拉克)教授。交谈中，得知中国机械工业出版社将在中国出版德鲁克教授的管理学论著。作为先生的学生，我在为广大中国读者感到庆幸之余，也愉快地接受先生的邀请，为其论著的中国版作序。

德鲁克教授是当代著名的思想家，一代管理学宗师。《经济学人周刊》甚至称他为“大师中的大师”。

他于1909年出生于前奥匈帝国首都维也纳的一个贵族家庭，在维也纳度过其童年生涯后，即到德国和英国边工作边学习。1937年，因不习惯欧洲的“怀旧”政治气氛而离欧赴美，终身以教学、著书和咨询为业。他特殊的家庭背景、传奇式的经历、渊博的学识及睿智的才思，使其在政治、法律、社会、管理、历史等多个学科领域都留下了精辟的见解和耐人寻味的启示。管理学更是他一生耕耘的主要园地。在此领域，他成就卓著。他是推动管理学发展成为一门严肃科学的先驱，是现代“管理丛林”中经验主义管理思想流派的创立者和代表人物。他的论著被译成20多种文字，在世界各国广为传播，成为全世界管理者、学者奉为主臬的经典。如今这些论著将陆续与中国读者见面，我相信，它们不仅会有助于相关领域的学者、教师、学生的学习和研究，而且会为我国企业的经营管理者提高管理水平提供许多有益的启示。

此次奉献给读者的这部论文集包括了德鲁克教授近20年来撰写的具有经典意义和代表性的58篇论文。虽然这些文章写于不同时代背景，涉及到不同的管理问题，然而，其暗含的主题仍十分清晰，即：后资本主义时代的组织及管理应是什么？在德鲁克教授看来，后资本主义社会已经来临，企业组织及其管理正在经历着彻底的变革。未来的企业组织将不再是一种金字塔式的等级制结构，而会逐步向扁平式结构演进。企业组织内部成员间的关系将是一种平等的伙伴式的关系。在这一社会中，知识虽不是唯一的资源，但肯定是一种最主要的资源。作为这种资源的载体，知识工人与组织的关系将呈现出一种新形式。不仅如此，在后资本主义社会中，以任务为中心的组织具有不断追求革新的特征，这与以血缘、地域为纽带形成的追求稳定的社会共同体形成鲜明对照，不稳定的组织与稳定的共同体将会不可避免地发生矛盾；此外，在这一社会中，具有较高社会地位、高收入的知识工人与普通员工间的关系也会趋于紧张。如何解决这些矛盾和紧张关系，将会成为人类社会和各种组织共同面临的重大课题。

在朝着后资本主义社会演变的过程中，企业管理者，尤其是高层管理者面临着巨大的挑战。未来的管理所采取的形式可能与今日的大不相同，管理的约束条件、控制手段、结构、权力以及管理术语，都可能发生巨大的变化。在这种挑战面前，德鲁克认为，无论是企业组织还是非盈利机构，其领导者首先要明确其组织存在的基础是什么，即独特的“事业理论”

(The Theory of Business)是什么。一般而言，一个组织的“事业理论”由三种假设构成，即：组织对其所处环境的假设；组织对其特殊使命的假设；组织对其完成其使命所需的核心能力的假设。这三个假设是否与现实社会的发展趋势相吻合，是否能相互匹配，是否能为每个组织成员了解和理解，是否能得到经常测试，是影响一个组织的行为、决策及其所得回报的关键所在。其次，在企业领导的经营决策方面，德鲁克教授认为，不管后资本主义社会的计算机信息处理技术如何先进，它都不可能取代管理者的决策行为，都只能是一种管理工具。然而，信息是否全面、准确将极大地影响着企业决策。在他看来，企业有效决策者应基于四个方面的信息进行决策，即：企业经营的基础信息；生产性信息；能力信息以及资源分配信息。再次，在管理效益评估方面，德鲁克教授认为，“盈亏”可以衡量企业的效益，而不是管理的效益。管理的效益可以从企业的资本分配效益、人事决策效益、创新效益以及经营战略的效益等四个方面进行衡量。一个企业的未来主要由当前的四个领域的管理效益所决定。此外，这本论文集在未来企业组织的治理结构、绩效测评、创新管理以及知识工作者的管理等方面，都留下了精辟的论述。


在德鲁克教授近千万字的论著中，这部论文集仅是沧海一粟。然而，窥斑见豹，读者仍可从中领会到德鲁克教授分析、研究管理问题的独特视角和方法。与别的管理学家不同，德鲁克对管理问题的思考呈现出两个明显的特征：其一是从社会、历史的高度去俯瞰和分析组织及组织管理的变迁。这一独特的视角使其不仅能够把握管理的全貌，避免了一叶遮目的狭隘视野，而且，能够正确预测管理变化的方向。知识工作者阶层的兴起即是明证。德鲁克教授早在50年代中期就首先提出了“知识工作者”这一概念。40年后的今天，知识工作者已逐步发展成为现代社会中的一个新兴阶层，成为企业组织中的一个特殊团体。这一视角还使德鲁克的著作不同于研究具体的操作性问题的管理著作，表现出明显的思想性特征。从某种角度看，他的著作不是直接告诉管理者该如何管理，而是告诉管理者应该如何思考管理问题。这充分体现管理研究中个性与共性的统一的特征。德鲁克教授分析、研究管理问题的另一个特征就是其经验主义分析法。他对管理问题的研究总是从企业管理的实际出发，以大企业的管理经验为主要研究对象，通过分析概括和理论升华后，向企业管理人员提供实际的建议。这一方法特征使德鲁克的管理著作变得通俗易懂，深入浅出，且让人感到回味无穷。我相信，读者在阅读这部论文集后所得到的收获将不仅仅限于德鲁克教授的思想和见解，而且也包括德鲁克教授分析研究管理问题的独特视角和方法。



南京大学国际商学院  
院长、教授、博士生导师  
一九九八年十月二十一日



# PREFACE TO EDITION FOR CHINA



About a dozen years ago I received the following letter from the head of a fast-growing American chemical company- a man I had never met.

*Dear Mr. Drucker; I have founded and am running a still fairly small, but fast-growing specialty-chemicals company on the East Coast of the United States. Whenever an essay volume of yours appears, I try to read five or six of the chapters every weekend, and ask my senior associates to do likewise. When I finish on the chapters, I then write myself a letter in which I ask myself: What does this chapter mean for me as a senior business executive? What does it mean for my colleagues on my management team? What does it mean for the company? What ACTION does it imply- for me, the management team, the company? What opportunities does it identify for us? What changes in*

*goals, strategies, policies, structure might it point to. And I ask my senior associates on my management team- altogether six people- to do the same. We then discuss our respective answers at one of our weekly management meetings, and six months later, we discuss the same answers again to see what actions we have actually taken and how they have worked out, but also what actions we should have taken and might still undertake. Of course, a good many of your chapters do not directly apply to us; they lead to understanding rather than to action. But a good many, again and again, stimulate us to do something or to stop doing something. And the most valuable chapters are the ones that make me say: "Of course, I have known this all along. Why haven't I acted on it?"*

I still have not met the man who wrote this letter, but he writes me now every three months and reports what he and his company have been doing as a result of reading my essays. And his business is no longer a small one- it has become a pretty big company operating not only in the US but in Europe and South America as well. And I have since learned that a good number of other readers of mine- in a good many US companies but also in Europe, in South America, in Japanese my essays

more or less the same way.

And this is exactly how I want them used and how I hope they are being used. We have a term in the US for a short essay- and most of my essays in this volume are short essays. We call them "thought starters", - and I hope that is what every one of these essays will be for you, the Chinese reader. But I also hope that my essays are "ACTION STARTERS". For MANAGEMENT is not philosophy or theory. MANAGEMENT is ACTION.

And these essays themselves are the result of ACTION. They all grew out of my CONSULTING PRACTICE- fifty or more years of it- a practice with businesses, but equally with a great many non-businesses such as universities, hospitals, government agencies of all kinds, and so on- and a practice that has been world-wide: in the US and in Canada; in a good many European countries; throughout South American, and in Japan. My clients have included even a major agency of the CHINESE government as well as some fast-growing Chinese universities. And for fifty years I myself have done something very similar to what the writer of the above letter does. I sit down with myself every three months, review all my consulting jobs and WRITE down what I have learned from each, and especially what I have learned from each regarding what executives, businesses, institutions need in respect to MANAGEMENT. It is out of these analyses of my practical experience and that of my clients that I then write the essays of which is a collection presented in this volume.

Of course, a good many of my Chinese readers are likely to say: "But these essays are AMERICAN- and CHINA is different." Of course it is. But actually each of my clients is different too regardless of whether they are American or Brazilian; a huge company or a small struggling new venture; a business or a hospital or a government agency (e.g. the Government of Canada and of Japan for both of which I have done a fair amount of consulting work). But what is different in Management is HOW things are being done. The TASKS are pretty much the same everywhere, regardless of culture and language, regardless of the kind of work a given institution does; regardless of the political or legal framework in which it operates. And these essays deal largely with TASKS. To be sure, a good many will only give INFORMATION to a Chinese reader. But even then, my dear Chinese reader, ask yourself: HOW CAN I TRANSLATE IT IS INTO THE CHINESE ENVIRONMENT, INTO MY ORGANIZATION AND INTO MY WORK SO THAT I CAN TAKE ACTION?

*Peter F. Drucker*  
*August 11 1998*

Peter F. Drucker  
 August / 1998

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PART I

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# THE FRONTIERS OF MANAGEMENT \*

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\*Original Source: Peter F. Drucker. *The Frontiers of Management*. Trumar Talley Books, 1986.

## *The Future Is Being Shaped Today*

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The thirty seven chapters in this volume: an Interview, an Afterword, and thirty-five essays and articles, cover a broad range of subjects. Yet they were planned from the beginning to be published eventually in one volume and as variations on one unifying theme: the challenges of tomorrow that face the executive today. If there is one single postulate underlying these pieces, it is that the future is being made by totally anonymous people, a CEO here, a marketing manager there, a training director or a comptroller yonder doing mundane jobs: building a management team; developing a new pricing strategy; changing a training program so that it matches people with different educational backgrounds to new technologies; or working out a new cost-accounting analysis to find out whether automating the welding line will pay off.

This, after all, is the lesson of this century. It has been a century of unprecedented disasters and cataclysms: two world wars, a Hitler, and scores of lesser but no less murderous villains. Indeed we packed into every decade as much “history” as one usually finds in a century; and little of it was benign. Yet most of this world, and especially the developed world, somehow managed not only to recover from the catastrophes again and again but to regain direction and momentum — economic, social, even political. The main reason was that ordinary people, people running the everyday concerns of everyday businesses and institutions, took responsibility and kept on building for tomorrow while all around them the world came crashing down. Thus

tomorrow is being shaped today.

And what kind of tomorrow it will be thus depends heavily on the knowledge, insight, foresight, and competence of the decision makers of today, and especially of the decision makers in our institutions, that is, on executives. Yet these executives are busy people. Every one of them is already fully occupied with the daily crisis — and the daily crisis is indeed the one absolutely predictable event in the working day of the executive. To enable these busy people to see and to understand the long — range implications and impacts of their immediate, everyday, urgent actions and decisions is thus the purpose to which every one of the pieces in this volume addresses itself.

There is a second theme that runs through these thirty — seven diverse and different articles and essays: Change is opportunity. Every one of the pieces in this volume looks at changes. Some are profound and major ones, such as the impact of information on organization, the meaning of the U.S. entrepreneurial surge in the last decade, or the problems created by the success of management. Other changes are perhaps ephemeral and transitory — though for that matter no less important — for example, the mismatch between traditional jobs and the expectations and qualifications of a new, young, and educated work force. Every one of these changes might be seen as a threat and is indeed seen as such by a good many executives. Every one needs to be seen and exploited as an opportunity — for doing something different, for doing something new, and, above all, for doing something better, something more productive, something more profitable. This volume therefore aims not only at providing knowledge, insight, foresight, and competence; it aims at creating vision.

*PETER F. DRUCKER*  
*Claremont, California*  
*Summer 1986*

## *The Changed World Economy*

---

There is a lot of talk today of the changing world economy. But — and this is the point of this chapter — the world economy is not *changing*. It has already *changed* in its foundations and in its structure, and irreversibly so in all probability.

Within the last ten or fifteen years, three fundamental changes have occurred in the very fabric of the world's economy:

1. The primary-products economy has come “uncoupled” from the industrial economy;
2. In the industrial economy itself, production has come uncoupled from employment;
3. Capital movements rather than trade in goods and services have become the engines and driving force of the world economy. The two have not, perhaps, become uncoupled. But the link has become quite loose, and worse, quite unpredictable.

These changes are permanent rather than cyclical. We may never understand what caused them — the causes of economic change are rarely simple. It may be a long time before economic theorists accept that there have been fundamental changes, and longer still before they adapt their theories to account for them. They will surely be most reluctant, above all, to accept that the world economy is in control rather than the macroeconomics of the national state, on which most economic theory still exclusively focuses. Yet this is the clear lesson of the success stories of the last twenty years: of Japan and South Korea; of West Germany, actually a more impressive though far less flamboyant performance than Japan; and of the one great success within the

United States, the turnaround and rapid rise of an industrial New England that, only twenty years ago, was widely considered moribund.

But practitioners, whether in government or in business, cannot wait till there is a new theory, however badly needed. They have to act. And then their actions will be the more likely to succeed the more they are being based on the new realities of a changed world economy.

## The Primary-Products Economy

The collapse in nonoil commodity prices began in 1977 and has continued, interrupted only once, right after the 1979 petroleum panic, by a speculative burst that lasted less than six months and was followed by the fastest drop in commodity prices ever recorded.

In early 1986, overall, raw-materials prices (other than petroleum\*) were at the lowest level in recorded history in relation to the prices of manufactured goods and services – as low as in 1932, and in some cases (lead and copper) lower than at the depths of the Great Depression.

The collapse of raw-materials prices and the slowdown of raw-materials demand is in startling contrast to what was confidently predicted. Ten years ago *The Report of the Club of Rome* predicted that desperate shortages for *all* raw materials were an absolute certainty by the year 1985. Even more recently, in 1980 the *Global 2000 Report* of President Carter's administration concluded that world demand for food would increase steadily for at least twenty years; that food production worldwide would go down except in developed countries; and that real food prices would double. This forecast largely explains why American farmers bought up whatever farmland was available, thus loading on themselves the debt burden that now threatens so many of them.

But contrary to all these predictions, agricultural output in the world actually rose almost a full third between 1972 and 1985 to

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\*And when its price dropped in early 1986 below \$15 per barrel, oil too sold for no more than it did in 1933 in relation to the prices of manufactured goods and services.



reach an all-time high. And it rose the fastest in less developed countries. Similarly, production of practically all forest products, metals, and minerals has been going up between 20 and 35 percent in these last ten years, again with production rising the fastest in less developed countries. And there is not the slightest reason to believe that the growth rates will be slackening, despite the collapse of prices. Indeed, as far as farm products are concerned, the biggest increase, at an almost exponential rate of growth, may still be ahead.\*

But perhaps even more amazing than the contrast between what everybody expected and what happened is that the collapse in the raw — materials economy seems to have had almost no impact on the industrial economy of the world. Yet, if there was one thing that was “known” and considered “proved” without doubt in business cycle theory, it was that a sharp and prolonged drop in raw — materials prices *inevitably*, and within eighteen months to two and a half years, brings on a worldwide depression in the industrial economy. The industrial economy of the world is surely not normal by any definition of the term.

But it is also surely not in a worldwide depression. Indeed, industrial production in the developed noncommunist countries has continued to grow steadily, albeit at a somewhat slower rate, especially in Western Europe.

Of course the depression in the industrial economy may only have been postponed and may still be triggered, for instance, by a banking crisis caused by massive defaults on the part of commodity-producing debtors, whether in the Third World or in Iowa. But for almost ten years, the industrial world has run as though there were no raw — materials crisis at all.

The only explanation is that for the developed countries — excepting only the Soviet Union — the primary-products sector has become marginal where it had always been central before.

In the late 1920s, before the Great Depression, farmers still constituted nearly one-third of the U.S. population, and farm income accounted for almost a quarter of the gross national

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\*On this, see two quite different discussions, one by Dennis Avery, senior agricultural analyst, of the U.S. Department of State, “U.S. Farm Dilemma; the Global Bad News Is Wrong,” *Science* 230, 24 (October 1985); and Barbara Insel, International Affairs Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York, “A World Awash in Grain,” *Foreign Affairs* (Fall 1985).

product (GNP). Today they account for one-twentieth of the population and GNP, respectively. Even adding the contribution that foreign raw-materials and farm producers make to the American economy through their purchases of American industrial goods, the total contribution of the raw-materials and food-producing economies of the world to the American GNP is, at most, one-eighth. In most other developed countries, the share of the raw-materials sector is even lower than in the United States. Only in the Soviet Union is the farm still a major employer, with almost a quarter of the labor force working on the land.

The raw-materials economy has thus come uncoupled from the industrial economy. This is a major structural change in the world economy, with tremendous implications for economic and social policy and economic theory, in developed and developing countries alike.

For example, if the ratio between the prices of manufactured goods and the prices of primary products (other than petroleum) — that is, of foods, forest products, metals, and minerals — had been the same in 1985 as it had been in 1973, or even in 1979, the U.S. trade deficit in 1985 might have been a full third less, \$100 billion as against an actual \$150 billion. Even the U.S. trade deficit with Japan might have been almost a third lower, some \$35 billion as against \$50 billion. American farm exports would have brought almost twice as much. And our industrial exports to one of our major customers, Latin America, would have held; their near-collapse alone accounts for a full one-sixth of the deterioration in U.S. foreign trade. If primary-products prices had not collapsed, America's balance of payments might even have shown a substantial surplus.

Conversely, Japan's trade surplus with the world might have been a full one-fifth lower. And Brazil in the last few years would have had an export surplus almost 50 percent higher than its actual one. Brazil would then have had little difficulty meeting the interest on its foreign debt and would not have had to endanger its economic growth by drastically curtailing imports as it did. Altogether, if raw-materials prices in relationship to manufactured goods prices had remained at the 1973 or even the 1979 level, there would be no crisis for most debtor countries, especially in Latin

America.

What has happened? And what is the outlook?

*Demand for food* has actually grown almost as fast as the Club of Rome and the *Global 2000 Report* anticipated. But the supply has been growing much faster. It not only has kept pace with population growth; it steadily outran it. One cause of this, paradoxically, is surely the fear of worldwide food shortages, if not of world famine. It resulted in tremendous efforts to increase food output. The United States led the parade with a farm policy successfully aiming (except in one year: 1983) at subsidizing increased food production. The European Common Market followed suit, and even more successfully. The greatest increases, both in absolute and in relative terms, have, however, been in developing countries: in India, in China, and in the rice-growing countries of Southeast Asia.

And then there is also the tremendous cut in waste. Twenty-five years ago, up to 80 percent of the grain harvest of India fed rats and insects rather than human beings. Today in most parts of India the wastage is down to 20 percent, the result of such unspectacular but effective infrastructure innovations as small concrete storage bins, insecticides, or three-wheeled motorized carts that take the harvest straight to a processing plant instead of letting it sit in the open for weeks on end.

And it is not too fanciful to expect that the true revolution on the farm is still ahead. Vast tracts of land that hitherto were practically barren are being made fertile, either through new methods of cultivation or through adding trace minerals to the soil: the sour clays in the Brazilian highlands, for instance, or aluminum-contaminated soils in neighboring Peru, which never produced anything before and which now produce substantial quantities of high-quality rice. Even greater advances are registered in biotechnology, both in preventing diseases of plants and animals and in increasing yields.

In other words, just as the population growth of the world is slowing down, and in many parts quite dramatically, food production is likely to increase sharply.

But import markets for food have all but disappeared. As a result of its agricultural drive, Western Europe has become a substantial food exporter plagued increasingly by unsalable surpluses of all