

HANDBOOK OF WORLD PHILOSOPHY

Contemporary
Developments
Since 1945

Edited by John R. Burr

HANDBOOK OF WORLD PHILOSOPHY

Contemporary
Developments
Since 1945

Edited by John R. Burr



GREENWOOD PRESS
WESTPORT, CONNECTICUT

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data

Main entry under title:

Handbook of world philosophy.

Bibliography: p.

Includes indexes.

1. Philosophy, Modern—20th century—Addresses, essays, lectures. I. Burr, John Roy, 1933-

B804. A1H36 190'.904 80-539

ISBN 0-313-22381-5 (lib. bdg.)

Copyright © 1980 by John R. Burr

All rights reserved. No portion of this book may be reproduced, by any process or technique, without the express written consent of the publisher.

Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 80-539

ISBN: 0-313-22381-5

First published in 1980

Greenwood Press

A division of Congressional Information Service, Inc.

88 Post Road West, Westport, Connecticut 06881

Printed in the United States of America

10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

HANDBOOK OF WORLD PHILOSOPHY

Preface

This book represents a beginning rather than a summation; as such, it is exploratory, not definitive. Anyone even vaguely aware of the complexity of the subject matter will be realistic enough to expect only what is possible now. As editor, I feel this work will be a success if it casts into intelligible form what appears to us to be a bewildering profusion of ideas. Accordingly, this work seeks to point beyond itself to further paths of exploration and to guide the reader along these paths.

It is my hope that this book will do more than merely enable the reader to move on from section to section with unflagging interest. I intend it to serve as a kind of compass by means of which those consulting it can get and keep their bearings in a subject matter that opens out indefinitely in all directions.

Now there remain only happy tasks. Here I want to express my appreciation to the distinguished contributors and translators who have so skillfully fashioned the parts of this compass. Their forbearance in the face of unforeseen, yet unavoidable, delays (whether illness, postal strikes, death, natural disasters, revolution, or the harsh vagaries of international politics) has been admirable and sustaining. The book has benefited greatly from their suggestions. I regret that limitations of space and time and the rigorous requirements of stylistic consistency have prevented me from implementing all of them.

I wish to express my gratitude to Marilyn Brownstein of Greenwood Press for her inexhaustible patience, wise advice, and practical assistance.

Nathalie Moore, secretary of the University of Wisconsin-Oshkosh Department of Philosophy, assisted by Steve Grinnell, Virginia Marcoe, Alice Persons, Darlene Schlieve, and Sally Wilke, carried out what must have seemed to them the unending task of typing the manuscript and its revisions. The personnel of the University of Wisconsin-Oshkosh Library provided invaluable help in verifying bibliographic references to works published in so many different parts of the world.

My wife, Marjorie Bakirakis Burr, a mathematician by training and a meticulous individual by nature, relentlessly scrutinized the typescript for typographical errors and consistency of format.

Having labored on this book so long, I more than anyone else realize how short this volume falls of perfection. What virtues it possesses are due to so many; its defects are those of the editor alone.

J.R.B.

Introduction

That portion of the great, worldwide public that is not only literate but also interested in abstract ideas holds two inconsistent views of the character of contemporary philosophy. It sees philosophy today as senescent and as renascent.

The alleged dying of contemporary philosophy could be symbolized by an incident briefly reported in the press in October 1976. "Plato's tree," a fifteen-foot olive tree under which the son of Apollo is said to have taught, judged by scientists to be 3,000 years old and standing alongside the "Sacred Way" highway between Athens and the port of Piraeus, was hit by a bus, completely uprooted, and split into four parts. Portions of the tree were replanted in the original location and surrounded by a protective steel fence in an effort to save it. "Plato's tree" stands for contemporary philosophy, and the destructive bus represents our industrial, technological society relentlessly smashing the remnants of the past. Attempts to preserve and revive any still remaining bits and pieces of what was planted long ago and cultivated up to the present are diligently carried out. Yet, this restoration seems more commemorative than resuscitative.

Opposed to this pessimistic view is the optimistic conviction that contemporary philosophy is in revival, that the period from 1945 to the present has been one of assimilation and incubation of some new broader and more complex synthesis. In a late 1967 interview, the physicist Gerald Holton spoke encouragingly.

It seems to me that philosophy may be now in a position similar to that of physics in the 1920's when quantum mechanics were emerging—full of interesting things, and ready for a very large synthetic advance. Now that logic, linguistic analysis, philosophy of science, aesthetic criticism, cognitive psychology, the new theology and other modern fields have each of them made some impact on more classical styles of philosophy, the ground has been prepared for a more interesting synthesis. I speak here only as an outsider myself, but I do feel that philosophy now may be one of the most exciting of all subjects. You catch that feeling from those who want to help to create the revolution, to help sweep out old styles. Perhaps they are wrong; but such is what young people ought to be in favor of, to be in there fighting their own new battles.¹

Those who remember with some dismay the attempts of pious physicists to reconcile religion and science may look with a dubious eye on any likening of philosophy to physics by a genial physicist who appears to be a kind of fan of philosophers. Still, not only the pessimistic but also the optimistic lay judgments echo in contemporary philosophy with its calls for "reconstruction in philoso-

phy," its criticisms of philosophers for wasting their time on pseudoproblems of their own unintentional creation, its summonses to philosophers to return to the search for Being from which they have strayed for over a thousand years, its proclamations of a "revolution" in philosophy that will, if not solve all the problems, at least reveal them in their true lineaments. None of this is unfamiliar to the philosophical historian of philosophy who discerns in the moving shadows of the spreading and intertwining branches of "Plato's tree" that ever-recurring pattern or "Idea" of struggle, testing, *agon*, and new conception to which the intellectual life of mankind approximates to one degree or another again and again. It is a classic story that is old yet always new, familiar yet ever original.

Today we suffer from no poverty of generalizations. What is needed is a more detailed and comprehensive knowledge of facts on which to base our generalizations. We need to know more, much more of the "form and pressure" of contemporary philosophizing on a world scale. What actually have been the recent courses of philosophy internationally?

The general aim of this book is an empirical one: it is to progress beyond easy generalizations and oversimplified labels to particular philosophic tendencies and cross-currents, to individual philosophers and the distinctive styles and content of their philosophizing. In summary, the comprehensive object of this book is to provide an internationally representative sample since 1945 of the characters, directions, wealth, and varieties of the reflections and activities called "philosophic" as described, interpreted, and evaluated by philosophers particularly knowledgeable about the region or country being discussed; to exhibit the increasingly international development of philosophy; and to point to future possibilities.

Obviously, an encyclopedia of many volumes could be devoted to the subject of this book. Hence, in organizing materials for this book and in selecting countries or regions and authors, the emphasis has been on achieving the most internationally representative sample possible. The limitations of a single volume of finite length prevent the inclusion of every country or region and the discussion, and even notice, of every philosopher professionally active since 1945. Omission from this book does not mean a philosopher or area is unworthy of attention and consideration. The editor left to each contributor the decision as to what to include from 1945 to the present. Since no philosopher any longer claims omniscience or exhaustive philosophic interests and universal sympathies, other authors well might have reached different conclusions as to what to include and what to exclude. Whether or not their decisions would have been better than those of the present authors must be left to debate since "better" in the sense of "more philosophically important" is a judgment influenced by one's philosophical persuasion and a judgment which may change in the course of time. Anyone expecting complete agreement on what is more philosophically important by a phenomenologist, linguistic empiricist, and a Vedantist would be naive.

Universal agreement is also made impossible by the fact that foreign philo-

sophical influences exert a considerable effect on the philosophical development of various countries and regions, although those influences are scarcely the same for every country and region. Professor L. Jonathan Cohen of Great Britain sees the emergence of "a kind of continuum of North Atlantic philosophical culture"; no one makes a similar claim concerning the relation of the European continent to the United States. Anglophone Canadian philosophy differs markedly in its assessment of philosophic significance from that of Francophone Canadian philosophy. The influence of continental European philosophy clearly dominates in Latin America. Native language and the cultural traditions bound up with it play a major role in determining which foreign philosophical influences predominate in a country. Colonialism continues to affect the philosophic complexion of various countries and regions, e.g., the weight carried by Victorian English philosophy in India, the impact of Cartesian philosophy and Comtean positivism in Persia, and the authority of English and French philosophy in Egypt. The major foreign philosophic influence on a country can change relatively rapidly; Sweden has become "Anglo-Americanized" only in the last fifty years. The communists' assumption of power in various countries after World War II has brought with it the doctrine that philosophy's chief task is to serve socialist society. Communist control of the government, however, is not always necessary for this doctrine to be applied. Today in Denmark, for example, as the result of certain legal changes, universities and philosophy departments are reported to be dominated by those who hold that Karl Marx offers the ultimate truth.

Yet, no matter how powerful and prolonged foreign philosophical influences may be (and perhaps because of them), every country resists total intellectual domination from outside and remains unshakably convinced it can make a unique, continuing contribution deeply rooted in its life and history to the character and development of philosophy generally. The enterprise of philosophy is considered to be, not wholly, perhaps, but, at least partly, ineradicably indigenous. Contact with foreign philosophies may be welcomed and even actively sought out by a country. Yet, the motive never seems to be one of simply adopting some exotic philosophy lock, stock, and barrel so much as finding worthy opponents to refute or, at best, enriching and strengthening one's native philosophizing. The unambiguous implication in all of this is that philosophy is not, and should not be, the same everywhere.

Deciding what is "more philosophically important" is further complicated by the immense proliferation since the end of World War II in the number of professional philosophers, departments of philosophy, schools of philosophy, books of philosophy, journals of philosophy, philosophical associations, and philosophical congresses and other meetings for professional purposes. The essays in this book call attention to this rapid expansion. One consequence of this philosophic boom is that no one philosopher or even trio of philosophers can reasonably be expected to possess an exhaustive knowledge of every development and turn of dialectic in their own country over the last thirty-five

years—any more than they can be expected to have read and digested every book and every journal article in every field of philosophy, attended every conference, and heard every paper. The growth in philosophy and philosophical specialization has been accompanied by a reciprocal growth in philosophic modesty.

Indeed, one problem for the editor was to persuade some of the contributors to this volume to shed their excessive modesty over their having to write at least partially autobiographical essays. They have been intimately and extensively involved in the recent philosophical affairs about which they are writing, as a result of which the “objectivity” presumably possessed by the outsider is lost. This loss may well be more than compensated for by the supple, though detailed, understanding of the active participant. Every contributor was left free to discuss his or her own ideas and to criticize those of others. Honesty and frankness are preferable to an anonymous blandness. The final decision as to what to include and exclude from their essays, the style of composition to be employed, and the degree of emphasis to be given to the various aspects of the subjects treated was left to the contributors. The decision as to whether to cover all of the familiar divisions of philosophy such as metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, logic, philosophy of science, aesthetics, philosophy of religion, and history of philosophy, or only some of them was also left to the discretion of the contributors.

For the purposes of this book, “contemporary” refers to the period stretching from 1945 to the present. Why 1945? That year, of course, marks the end of World War II. That struggle does not have the same meaning for all countries and regions because it did not affect them all in the same way. To some, World War II meant devastation, occupation, the torture and slaughter of relatives, friends, and professional colleagues. The war differed radically from the conventional military conflict not only in geographical extent and amount of death and destruction but also in that it was waged consciously and deliberately by all combatants as a culture war in which one way of life fought for the eradication of its opponents’ way and the latter’s replacement by its own. In a full-blown culture war, intellectuals, teachers, and scholars become instant fighters, for they advance, preserve, and transmit their culture. Therefore, they are marked by their enemies for unemployment or reeducation, or even physical extermination.

To others, World War II meant adventure, the extension of one’s own empire as old ones disintegrated, the possibility of freedom from colonial oppression, a new division of the global power and pelf, or some confused struggle not one’s own and sedulously to be avoided. Nevertheless, beyond these different meanings, World War II was generally accompanied by a temporary caesura in the development of world philosophy. Major energy had to be devoted to fighting, to survival, to making propaganda, or at least to maintaining neutrality rather than to increasing philosophic progress. This break was followed by three benefits: (1) greater perspective on the prewar past; (2) release from cultural isolation imposed by wartime conditions; and (3) increased energy and resources devoted to philosophic activity compared to that utilized in the prewar period.

The interruption of World War II loosened the grip of prewar interests and controversies on the minds of many philosophers, thus freeing them to direct their attention to new philosophic problems and fresh formulations of old problems. Much could simply be dismissed as out of date, as irrelevant because it belonged to a past era now gone forever. The philosophic decks had been cleared for action, so to speak. This did not mean that prewar philosophizing was to be totally forgotten or rejected. Rather, it could now be seen more clearly and dispassionately in its true dimensions, undistorted by partisan loyalties. In 1945 and in the years immediately following, it was easier to admit having been mistaken in one's prewar views. For one thing, one could be sure of having lots of company. For another, although immediate conservative attempts were made to blame the entire catastrophe into which civilization had fallen on a few war criminals, the uneasy feeling that something fundamental was wrong remained and grew in the postwar period, to erupt in the 1960s. Socrates' daimon spoke to him only when he was about to do something wrong. Nothing seems to stimulate philosophic activity more than a sense that something is seriously out of joint in one's conceptual structure. Thus, the period after 1945 has proved to be not an absolute break with the past but rather a sober reassessment of it. After 1945, not a few philosophers who had gained professional prominence prior to World War II sharply criticized their earlier views and struck out in new directions. They wrote critical rather than purely laudatory studies of earlier philosophers who once had been major influences on their own philosophizing. Some even undertook thoroughgoing critiques of their entire philosophic inheritance.

Wartime isolation meant a separation not only from one's recent past but also from philosophic activity elsewhere in the world. The end of World War II released an unprecedented effort to make contact with philosophizing in other parts of the world as well as to reestablish connections with prewar philosophizing in one's own country or region. Translations increased; international philosophic congresses multiplied. Leading philosophers traveled about the world and engaged in discussions with their counterparts. The cold war may have temporarily slowed this process of internationalization, but it did not halt it.

Philosophic activity and production expanded beyond anything known in prewar days. The faculties of existing departments of philosophy burgeoned, and curricula expanded and diversified. New departments of philosophy were founded at existing institutions. Of particular significance is the fact that many new institutions of higher education were established around the world. Correspondingly, the number of philosophical books, journals, and meetings bulged. Some philosophers, fondly recalling a past that had seemed on a smaller scale, more leisurely, and more intimate, spoke acerbically of philosophic "inflation." Whatever the ultimate judgment as to the true value of this growth in philosophic activity and production may turn out to be, there can be no denying that governments and private individuals invested heavily in the development of philosophy after 1945, in terms of both human resources and money. What returns

were expected on this investment by the investors remains less clear. To some extent, of course, the growth of philosophy was simply a byproduct of the overall expansion of academe. Nevertheless, no departments of phrenology were established. Philosophy was no longer the queen of the intellectual realm, but neither had she been abandoned. Doubtless, some investors wanted philosophical bodyguards for their cultural souls.

Marxism-Leninism has always attached great importance to philosophy. Could opponents seeking to refute Marxism-Leninism value philosophy any less? A careful reading of the essays in this volume shows that it would be a gross misrepresentation to impugn all postwar support of philosophy as dishonest, self-serving, and cynical. The conviction that the advancement of civilization in the honorific sense of the refinement of knowledge, manners, and taste necessitates the cultivation of philosophy pervades these essays, even though it may be tacitly assumed rather than expressly stated. What is explicitly asserted in essay after essay is that each country or region is making a unique contribution to the future progress of philosophy, regardless of the nature of past contributions. Perhaps this claim applies most emphatically to those countries and regions in which the professional, academic development of philosophy is in an early stage. While the postwar burst of philosophic activity and production initially meant many more teaching positions in philosophy, these essays do not view the enterprise of philosophy merely as a job, a career among others, but as an activity as natural and necessary as breathing.

If philosophy really had become senescent after 1945, it was not petering out but going out in style. Indeed, if there is a problem about the present and future existence of philosophy, that problem is not one of too little philosophy but one of too rich a philosophic diet. Descent through sweeping generalizations and oversimplified labels to a clearer view of the detailed terrain below provided by the essays in this book reveals an immense wealth and variety. The danger for any inquirer into the state of world philosophy today is not the possibility of intellectual starvation but rather of intellectual indigestion. The appropriate tactic today is not to stimulate more philosophizing everywhere but to avoid bewilderment by all the philosophizing everywhere. The initial problem for the investigator of contemporary world philosophy is to escape being overwhelmed by its wealth and variety as Faust was by the vision of the cataract of the totality of human experience. Complaints about a dearth of contemporary philosophizing are confessions of provincialism. This book attempts to resolve this initial problem of the investigator, not by telling everything anyone conceivably would want to know about contemporary philosophy (which would be impossible in a single volume) but by giving a sense of the individuality of the trees and a grasp of the configuration of the forest of contemporary world philosophy which has grown up around "Plato's tree." The essays and the select bibliographies provide the coordinates which will enable each inquirer to cut his own path.

An examination of the essays in this book reveals certain common and particularly salient themes or currents. Contemporary world philosophy is char-

acterized by a pronounced devotion to localism and a desire for universal sophistication on several levels. The term "localism" is used instead of "provincialism" in order to avoid any suggestion of the crude, the ignorant, or a lack of exposure to cultural and intellectual activities. These essays reject clannish devotion to and promotion of any particular locality, country, region, culture, philosophic movement, or field of philosophy. Elaborate sophistication is quite possible within a very limited compass and is consequently compatible with localism, though incompatible with provincialism. The term "cosmopolitan" has been avoided because it suggests rootlessness. By "sophistication" is meant a character not only sensitive to but also actively seeking contact with all ideas, tastes, or ways of life everywhere in the world. George Santayana's dictum crisply captures the essence of this truly internationalized sophistication: "A man's feet must be planted in his country, but his eyes should survey the world." It was what was best in the best of the ancient Sophists. It is an analogue, not of absolute skepticism, but of that scientific skepticism which would have us hold all beliefs tentatively, to test them diligently and repeatedly, and yet be able to act on them resolutely.

The contemporary problem of consistently combining a receptivity to extra-local philosophic doctrines and methods with a loyalty to local philosophic doctrines and methods in such a way as to avoid an unstable eclecticism recurs in essay after essay. It marks the United States, Japan, Korea, and West Germany as well as the Islamic, Marxist-Leninist, and African nations. We are told that since 1945 American philosophy has been instinct with "openness, pluralism, and change." According to Andrew J. Reck, traditional American philosophic tendencies "have been transformed," while transplanted foreign philosophical tendencies "have flourished, with differing measures of yield, on American soil." The Japanese equivalent for the Western term "philosophy" (*Tetsugaku*) was coined as recently as 1874. The one hundred-year history of philosophy in this sense in Japan is described as a period of efforts to master the tradition of European philosophy without becoming European in mind but remaining Japanese in philosophy as an expression of *wakon* (Japanese mind). Korean thought, as Min-Hong Choi notes, has been stimulated by "conflict between native Korean conservative ideas and the very different, progressive ideas introduced from the West," with the result that "today Korean philosophy has a new value system, a new view of truth and the world." Scholars have been reexamining Korea's past "in an effort to find a truly Korean, and at the same time, flexible, developing mode of thinking." Since 1945, West Germany has passed through several stages, according to Hans M. Baumgartner, including a renewal of relations with the philosophies of the 1920s and older traditions, an internationalization of philosophical research, and a "confrontation between analytic-scientistic and traditional philosophy," and is now undergoing the emergence of a period of "critical co-existence" and the exploration of new possibilities. In nearly all Islamic countries, Seyyed H. Nasr finds that "a revival of interest in all aspects of the Islamic tradition" has occurred along with a struggle against

an intellectual and cultural domination by foreign philosophies ranging from positivism to Marxism. Most recently and for the future, according to Nasr, the "most notable feature of philosophical activity in the Islamic world" is the emergence of "a few Muslim intellectuals who are at once profoundly Islamic and possess a truly intellectual perspective and who are seeking to provide an Islamic answer for the challenges posed by modern philosophy and science." A detailed, thorough Marxist critique of non-Marxist philosophies steadily supplants the old tactic of lumping together all of the latter as "idealisms" and summarily rejecting them. The contribution of Romanian philosophy includes, as Alexandru Tănase and Octavian Chețan emphasize, "a comprehensive approach to non-Marxist philosophy today, receptivity to all new trends and problems, openness to the assimilation of valuable contributions, replacement of simplistic and vulgarizing name-calling by serious, well-founded criticism" as unmistakably characterizing the history of the philosophical thought of that country. While it is true that Western-style philosophy is taught at African universities, it is also the case that serious efforts are being made to show the relevance of indigenous world-views and myths for philosophy. Anna-Louize Conradie, the author of the essay on Africa, approvingly states that "Western philosophy has given birth to a type of philosophizing which is no longer specifically Western but global in the true sense of the term."

A decline of localism in another sense has taken place within countries and regions. Contemporary philosophizing has been carried on largely by individuals on university and college faculties. Until after 1945, the number of these institutions in any country or region remained small, and the most influential ones tended to be concentrated in the larger cities and areas of greatest population density. Furthermore, access to these institutions stayed limited to a very small minority of the population. This has been changing since 1945; more and more universities and colleges have been founded in regions which earlier had none. Larger numbers of the university-age population have begun attending them. What is more, those going on to higher education increasingly come from socioeconomic strata of the population which supplied far fewer or no students before 1945.

Even in supposedly advanced "democratic" countries like the United States, many institutions of higher education, some of which only yesterday were institutions primarily for the training of elementary and secondary school teachers, enroll a steadily growing number of students whose parents never attended a college or university. What effect, if any, this diffusion of higher education through the population will have on philosophizing is not clear at present. The evidence is conflicting. Will these changes mean an increasing emphasis on career and vocational education to the detriment of philosophy which traditionally "bakes no bread"? Or will it mean a growing application of philosophy to other fields, including professional and management ones? Or will it mean an immense increase in philosophic criticism directed at throwing off traditional beliefs, values, and customs still gripping the previous nonuniversity-educated

population? Will it bring about a concentration on ethics and social and political philosophy, on the application of philosophy to daily life? Will it radicalize philosophy? Or will it exert a powerfully conservative influence, turning philosophy into a rationalization of traditional religious, social, and moral beliefs? Will it mean a simpler, more "democratic" sort of philosophizing that can be understood and carried on by people without vast learning in the sciences, humanities, and mathematics? Or will it mean an even more refined and learned philosophizing in defense against populist pressures? Will philosophy in the schools be forced into, in effect, recapitulating the history of philosophy from the pre-Socratics to Aristotle or, say, from the Vedas to Shankara? Will it mean intellectual revolution, evolution, or stagnation? To some extent, it will doubtless mean all of these things, and, perhaps, something quite unimaginable at present. In any event, the ingredients now exist for an intellectually potent, even explosive, mixture.

At present, a lessening of localism also may be seen in the fact that no single, special field of philosophy monopolizes the attention of contemporary world philosophy. Of course, in the skeptical ambience of contemporary world philosophizing, the problem of the nature of proof looms large. However, problems in metaphysics, ethics, aesthetics, philosophy of history, ontology, and other specializations interest able thinkers. As the result of historic circumstance, local philosophic development, the presence of some distinguished philosopher, the reign of an official philosophy, or subtle undercurrents of national temperament, a particular set of problems may absorb philosophic energies in one region and be ignored in a neighboring territory. Yet, pluralism rules the world stage. Even in one country or region, the dominance of one sort of problem seems temporary, almost evanescent, destined to change abruptly at any time. Contemporary world philosophy is much like a conglomerate army always on maneuvers. There is a curious fluidity about everything. Once sharply drawn lines blur and become indistinct and then rapidly reform in new configurations.

Philosophic fervor and partisanship have subsided markedly and have been replaced with a kind of enlightened matter of factness, an empirical particularity. The philosophers discussed in the following essays do not vanish into some philosophic movement or school but retain a distinctive individuality. Along with this lesser intensity of commitment has gone a greater thoroughness. Anyone now claiming to have solved all of the important philosophic problems would at best be met with a patronizing smile. Philosophic movements such as linguistic analysis, existentialism, Marxism, and phenomenology no longer generate the blanket enthusiasm they once did. Fresher, subtler exploration and evaluation of their philosophic potentialities have replaced a single-minded refutation of opponents. They no longer have to fight for philosophic respectability, having stepped back into familiar niches in the general philosophic background. Many of the most prominent international philosophic figures of the postwar period such as Ludwig Wittgenstein, Martin Heidegger, Bertrand Russell and Jean-Paul Sartre, have died, and others apparently have ceased major philosophic

production. Wittgensteinianism and ordinary language philosophy are reported to have died out in Great Britain in the 1960s. Bertrand Russell declared that it was not an altogether pleasant experience to find one's self out of fashion in one's own lifetime. Already Heidegger has been placed in an earlier period extending from the end of World War II to the middle 1950s. Although there are new philosophic movements reported aborning, none as yet has achieved the broad, commanding influence of the earlier ones. No new individual philosophers have moved to the center of the international philosophic stage. The recent is now the old; it continues but inspires less and less.

Pluralism is Janus-faced; its opposite visage is skepticism, a characteristic equally distinctive of contemporary world philosophy. The spirit of philosophy today is a critical one, not a consolatory or contemplative one. To call a philosopher a special pleader or an apologist would be to insult him. Dogmatism is the cardinal philosophic sin. Accepted premises, however fundamental, should be scrutinized critically. Our categorical maps should be redrawn in unfamiliar and more intriguing and fruitful ways. There is a pervasive conviction that we don't know enough about nature, about man, about society, about anything. Indeed, we don't know *how* to come to know all we need to know and would like to know. The degree of skepticism varies from country to country, from region to region, but nowhere is it completely absent. If there is an official philosophy, then philosophers attempt to interpret the spirit rather than merely the outward letter of that philosophy. If a particular philosophy is held to be sounder than all others, it is emphatically deemed insufficient simply to assert its superiority. Any such assertion must be supported—negatively by an argued refutation of opposing views, and positively by an argued case that the claim is confirmed by a preponderance of the evidence. Abusive rhetoric no longer suffices. Ultimate truth may be said to be in the keeping of some particular philosophy or philosopher. Yet, in the next breath it is said that we also do not fully understand that philosophy or philosopher. Skepticism also has a toehold in subjects that are only partially covered or not treated at all by the official philosophy. It must not be forgotten that official philosophies that not only survive but also retain their authority for any length of time are never completely rigid. They make a place for change and may include a "superstructure" where alteration may take place, even though it may be described as merely a realm of conjecture, of mere opinion, of pseudoproblems.

On the basis of the essays in this book, the form of skepticism which contemporary world philosophy would like to think it embodies is not absolute skepticism but a skepticism of autonomy. Perhaps this is in part due to a lingering memory of the murderous absolutes culminating in the catastrophe of World War II, as well as to growing scientific knowledge and the huge variety of ideas, beliefs, and customs percolating throughout the world. Contemporary world philosophy does not seriously doubt certain propositions—for example, the advance of philosophy is essential to the advance of human civilization; one's own country or region has a unique, valuable contribution to make to the progress

of philosophy; it is better to know than not to know; critical reflection is preferable to unthinking faith; some philosophic problems are real; and some truth can be known. The skepticism of autonomy is the rejection of merely a "hand-maiden," branch, or logical corollary status for philosophy. Philosophy is viewed as a separate discipline in its own right and worth pursuing for its own sake. Philosophy has its own distinctive problems and methods of analysis. It is a discipline. It is honest inquiry, not subservient rationalization. Philosophy is not the appanage of psychology, advanced physics, or mathematical logic any more than it is of theology. A philosopher may advocate some social policy or political ideology, but, if his philosophic conscience is not to be violated, such an advocacy must not ignore relevant philosophic analyses proffered by supporters and critics. Any and all doctrines may and perhaps should be brought to philosophic judgment. The old individualistic ideal of philosophy as a total vocation, rather than an avocation or a "job" done only in the classroom or while seated at the office desk, remains dominant in contemporary world philosophy. Philosophers still lose their jobs or go into exile or go into prison or go to their deaths rather than cease following the argument wherever it may lead. They are not yet mere functionaries; they are not yet wholly ignored by the police.

Yet, in the midst of this immense philosophic activity, production, and dedication, there is a sense of a pause, a lull, an expectant waiting. Philosophical movements such as phenomenology, existentialism, linguistic empiricism, and Marxism have lost their earlier charisma. They are now philosophic resources to be used rather than causes to be championed. There are and probably will continue to be highly skilled philosophers elaborating ever more sophisticated variations on these older themes and thereby gradually transforming them into something scarcely recognizable to their originators. However, there is a widespread conviction that the important implications of these and other philosophic movements have been worked out and now we must move on to something different. All known philosophic alternatives seem to become less and less what William James called "living options." At the moment, contemporary world philosophy seems transfixed. Nijinsky allegedly explained his magnificent leaps by saying that one simply leaps into the air and pauses a moment. Contemporary world philosophy has leaped but so far has not come down firmly anywhere. Yet, everywhere there is an expectancy tinged with apprehension that the descent is about to begin. Nijinsky went insane. Pluralism could degenerate into chaos. Outside the study window today mobs scream in the streets. Rifle shots pop in the distance. A tang of blood hangs in the air. The Iranian revolution should not be viewed as a unique, isolated affair, as a mere "palace revolution" resulting in the change of a few political leaders with everything else remaining as it was. The glare of publicity and diplomatic bustle this dramatic event has produced for domestic and international political and economic reasons, particularly in the United States, should not blind us to the deeper truth this revolution reveals. Such phrases as "pluralistic world" and "world order" are euphemisms

masking an immense variety of cultures, traditions, philosophies, religions, and political and economic systems not only different from one another but often implacably hostile to one another and driven by a fierce passion for triumph over all opponents. The division of the spoils made after World War II by the victors has held up remarkably well, certainly far better than the one reached at Versailles after World War I. However, those mindful of human history realize that any division of the spoils, no matter how durable it may seem, can only be temporary. But how temporary? This question haunts the world and compels it to catch its breath at each new incident.

Is contemporary world philosophy now in a period of stability or a period of stagnation fringed with disintegration? On the whole, the essays in this book espouse the optimistic view that the period since 1945 has been one of recovery followed by a prolonged preparation, a slow but steady gathering of strength, a progressive organization of new forces that eventually will transform the international philosophic landscape. No detailed predictions as to what might emerge in the future are hazarded in these essays. There are references to “new tendencies,” “new possibilities,” “universal philosophy,” “global philosophy.” The essays suggest that important changes are imminent and that contemporary world philosophy will not remain transfixed for long in its current state. Where will contemporary world philosophy alight, say, a decade from now? Will it come down decisively anywhere at all, at any single place, or at many different places at the same time? Will there emerge a world philosophy and philosophizing distinguishable from the more localized past and present forms? Will the adjectives “British” or “Japanese” before “philosophy” become just as incidental as they now are when modifying “physics?”

The intent of the essays in this book is description, not prognostication. As this introduction has emphasized, although significant progress in creating a worldwide grasp of the detailed condition of contemporary world philosophy has been achieved since 1945, much more empirical work, of which this book is a part, needs to be done. To make precise predictions now would be premature because they would be based on insufficient evidence, to say nothing of the controversy about the existence of any laws of cultural development. Yet, it is difficult to withstand the temptation to speculate on the future on the basis of a realistic assessment of the present. If anywhere, an introduction would seem to be the most excusable place to succumb to that temptation. Since it does not have to maintain the full dignity and gravity incumbent on the main body of a work, an introduction may be more rash. Besides, the editor can always be blamed when the predictions prove erroneous.

As the essays make clear, at present there is no world philosophy in the sense of an agreed-upon set of doctrines, methods of analysis, or even terminology. Nor is there any evidence that such a world philosophy will emerge in the foreseeable future in the absence of a common worldwide language and culture.